JUDGMENT Lalit Mohan Sharma, J. This appeal by the Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Patna (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation') under section 110 D of the Motor Vehicles Act, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') is directed against an award given by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, constituted under section 110 of the Act. 2. Admittedly, at about 5. 30 P. M. Oil the 18th July, 1963, there was a head-on collision between a bus, registered no. BRA 9889, belonging to and run by the Corporation and a taxi with registered no. BRT 8233 in which several persons were traveling including one Satyabrat Kar Choudhary, who died as a result of the accident. His wife Bandana Kar Choudhary for self and as natural guardian of her two minor daughters filed an application for compensation under the provisions of Section 110A of the Act. She claimed a sum of Rs. 588200/- by way of compensation. The Corporation denied the liability on the ground that there was absolutely no negligence on the part of the bus driver and the accident took place solely due to the negligence of the driver of the taxi. The owner of the taxi or the hirer of the same did not appear before the Tribunal. The Insurance Company with which the taxi was insured appeared and contested the claim on the ground that the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving of the Corporation bus. It was alternatively contended that the liability of the Insurance Company could not exceed a sum of Rs. 4000/-. 3. The Tribunal on a consideration of the entire evidence produced before it, came to the conclusion that the drivers of both the vehicles were driving rashly and that the accident was the outcome of rashness and negligence of both of them. It was further held that the degree of rashness and negligence on the part of the driver of the bus was far greater than that of the taxi driver and, accordingly, the liabilities of the driver of the bus and that of the taxi were fixed at 2/3rds and 1/3rd respectively. The Tribunal fixed the amount of compensation payable to the petitioner (and her two daughters) at Rs. 150000/-, out of which the appellant-Corporation has been saddled with the liability to pay Rs. 100000/-. Out of the sum of Rs. The Tribunal fixed the amount of compensation payable to the petitioner (and her two daughters) at Rs. 150000/-, out of which the appellant-Corporation has been saddled with the liability to pay Rs. 100000/-. Out of the sum of Rs. 50000/-, payable by hirer of the taxi, it was directed that a sum of Rs. 4000/- would be paid by the Insurance Company. The Road Transport Corporation has thereafter appealed. 4. Mr. Lakshman Saran Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Corporation, has contended that from the evidence on the record, it must be held that the driver of the bus was not guilty of any rashness or negligence at all and the accident was entirely due to the fault of the taxi driver. 5. Admittedly, deceased Satyabrat Kar Choudhary was traveling in the taxi along with his wife Bandana Kar Choudhary (applicant), their daughters, sister of Bandana Kar Chaudhary Anjali Bose and one Mr. Dave from Jamshedpur to Ranchi via Chakradharpur. It is not disputed that the accident took place at a distance of about 6 miles from Chakradharpur towards Ranchi. The applicant examined herself as A.W.1 and her sister as A.W.2 and they have proved the occurrence. Shri Satyabrat Kar Chaudhary was the Manager of a department of Delhi Cloth Mills and Mr. Dave was working as an assistant under him. Mr. Dave also expired as a result of the accident. The other witness Shri Prem Lall Sharma, an employee of the Delhi Cloth Mills was examined on commission to prove that Shri Satyabrat Kar Choudhary was holding the post of Manager in the Delhi Cloth Mills and was paid a monthly salary of 2657/- besides certain allowance and bonus. 6. The Corporation examined its Divisional Manager incharge Jamshedpur, Ranchi division, Durga Prasad, who stated that he visited the spot where the accident took place at about 2.15 P. M. on the next day, that is, 19.7.1963. The place was about six miles from Chakradharpur and about two miles from Keraikella. In that area, the road was running from east to west, Ranchi being on the western side. There was a bend in the road at some distance towards Ranchi side from the place where the Corporation bus was standing after the accident. Similar is the evidence of A. Ws. 1 and 2. In that area, the road was running from east to west, Ranchi being on the western side. There was a bend in the road at some distance towards Ranchi side from the place where the Corporation bus was standing after the accident. Similar is the evidence of A. Ws. 1 and 2. Raghunandan Prasad further stated that he prepared a memo of inspection which was written out as per his dictation by a traffic Inspector of the Corporation Ramnaresh Singh. The memo has been marked as Ext. A in the case. A report was also forwarded by him to the General Manager which is Ext. B. The only witnesses of the occurrence are A. Ws. 1 and 2 and they have consistently said that the bus was coming from Ranchi side at a very high speed and there was a violent head-on-collision with the taxi in which they were traveling. Both of them also stated that there was a bend in the road on the western side and the bus after crossing that portion came on that part of the road which was straight and on which the taxi was coming from other direction. A. W. 1 has stated that the bus negotiated the bend at a very high speed and if that be true, it must be held that the bus was being driven rashly. From the evidence of A. W. 2, it appears that the bus was not visible from this part of the road before it was to come on the bend. This means that the driver of the bus also must not be in a position to see the road on the eastern side of the bend while he was on Ranchi side of the bend. It is true that both the ladies (A. Ws. 1 and 2) stated that the taxi was also being driven at a high speed of about 50 to 60 miles per hour and late Satyabrat Kar Choudhary had asked the driver unsuccessfully to slow down. This only indicates that the driver of the taxi was also rash. But this cannot be an excuse for the bus driver to drive "at a very high speed" as has been deposed to, especially when he had to negotiate a bend. 7. This only indicates that the driver of the taxi was also rash. But this cannot be an excuse for the bus driver to drive "at a very high speed" as has been deposed to, especially when he had to negotiate a bend. 7. The metal-led portion of the road at the place where the accident took place was about 14 to 15 feet in width as stated by A. W. 1. The left flank available to the bus was about 10 to 11 feet wide and that on the left of the taxi was about 7 feet. This evidence is consistent with the statement of the only witness examined on behalf of the Corporation, Durga Prasad (O. W. 1) in paragraph 2 of his evidence. There was no traffic on the road at all except the two ill-fated vehicles. There was no slush or mud on either side of the metal-led portion of the road (A. W. 1). The wheel base of the bus has been stated by O.W.1 to be 90 inches, that is, 71/2 feet. The evidence of A. W. s 1 and 2 indicates that there was no attempt on the part of the bus driver to move the vehicle on its left. The accident took place on the metal-led portion itself which was being mainly occupied by bus. From all these circumstances, the irresistible conclusion is in favour of a finding recorded by the court below that both the drivers were guilty of rash and negligent driving and if blame has to be apportioned, greater share must go to the bus driver. It is significant that none of the two drivers have been examined in the case. The Corporation defended the action and examined a witness, but does not explain as to why steps for examination of the driver have not been taken. He was the best person to explain the detail of the accident and the extenuating circumstance in his favour, if there had been any. Instead, the Corporation examined the officer who visited the spot on the next day. So far as the applicant is concerned, She has examined herself and her sister who have deposed in a straight forward manner and appear to be truthful. The other two adult occupants of the taxi were late Satyabrat Kar Choudhary and Mr. Dave and unfortunately, both of them died in the accident. So far as the applicant is concerned, She has examined herself and her sister who have deposed in a straight forward manner and appear to be truthful. The other two adult occupants of the taxi were late Satyabrat Kar Choudhary and Mr. Dave and unfortunately, both of them died in the accident. It cannot, therefore be said that the applicant withheld any evidence from the court. The contention of learned Counsel for the appellant that the statements made by the witnesses do not establish that the driver was negligent and rash in driving which resulted or contributed to the accident does not appear sound. Normally, in the conditions indicated by evidences, an accident was not expected. As already pointed out above, the road was free and only two vehicles coming from the opposite directions were involved in a head-on collision. The road condition was not such which could lead to the tragedy. By the very nature of things, the applicant or her witness cannot be expected to know more about the precise reason of the accident. In the circumstances, I am of the view that the principle 'res ipsa loquitur' would apply. I am supported by the observations made by Madhya Pradesh High Court in Mangilal Vs. Parasram and others AIR 1971 M.P 5 (F.B.). The situation speaks and the drivers who could have thrown better light have been withheld from the witness box. I, therefore, agree with the finding of the court below and hold that the driver of the Corporation bus as also the other driver were guilty of gross negligence and rashness which resulted in the unfortunate accident. 8. Mr. Sinha argued that the court below was not right in going into the question that the drivers were guilty of any negligence inasmuch as no such allegation was made in the application filed by Bandana Kar Choudhary before the Tribunal. This argument also appears to be equally devoid of any substance. Not only no such objection was taken in the court below, the appellant took a plea that its driver was not guilty of any negligence and that the accident took place solely due to the negligence of the taxi driver. This argument also appears to be equally devoid of any substance. Not only no such objection was taken in the court below, the appellant took a plea that its driver was not guilty of any negligence and that the accident took place solely due to the negligence of the taxi driver. From the very beginning, the Corporation authorities were conscious of the fact that a question relating to the negligence on the part of its driver was involved in the accident and an officer of the Corporation Mr. Durga Prasad, who was also examined as a witness in the case, rushed to the place of the accident and prepared a report which has been exhibited as Ext. B in the case and which states that his view was that the accident occurred entirely due to the fault of the taxi driver, Two witnesses for the applicants were cross-examined on that line and arguments were made in the court below on the question. Besides, the application in the court below is not governed by the Code of Civil Procedure and all the details, which may be required to be stated by the Civil Procedure Code, are not necessary to be stated. The application for claim has to be filled up in the form attached to the Bihar Motor Vehicles Accident Claims Tribunals Rules, 1961, and on a comparison, I find that in the present case, the application was accordingly drawn up. There is no column in the prescribed form for stating about the negligence of any serson. The column for giving the 'name and address of the owner of the vehicle' was duly filled in by mentioning both the bus and the taxi and their owners. It is true that last column states that any other information that may be necessary and helpful in the disposal of the claim may be given. As against this, the applicant stated about the income of the deceased and the beneficiaries, and no allegations were made accusing any body. I do not, however, think that on this ground the action can be dismissed specially in the circumstances mentioned above. Whether the drivers or any of them should be held to be guilty of negligence or not, is a question of inference and if the applicant does not put down her own inference from the circumstances, that should not defeat her remedy. Whether the drivers or any of them should be held to be guilty of negligence or not, is a question of inference and if the applicant does not put down her own inference from the circumstances, that should not defeat her remedy. The point was rightly not taken in the memorandum of appeal and I reject the same. 9. Mr. Sinha next contended that the amount of compensation fixed by the court below is excessive. He, however, did not challenge the proportion in which the appellant and the taxi driver have to share the responsibility fixed by the Tribunal. On the question of quantum, the applicant-respondent has filed a memorandum of cross objection claiming the fun amount mentioned in the claim petition. After the appeal was heard for a day, learned Counsel for the applicant filed an additional memo mentioning two grounds, namely, (i) that the appellant should be held jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of compensation and (ii) that the applicant should be granted interest from the date of the application upto the date of payment. Mr. Lakshman Saran Sinha challenged the maintainability of the cross objection on the ground that the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable. He relied upon the decision in M/s Bokaro and Ramgarh Ltd. Vs. Kathara Coal Co. Ltd. AI 1969 Pat 235 10. It is true that the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be said to apply to the proceeding before the Tribunal. The application is not a plaint and the remedy provided is a speedy one and is not a regular suit. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the period of limitation applicable to the application and the person who is entitled to prefer a claim are all specifically mentioned in Section 110A of the Act. Section 110C of the Act, provides that the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it may think fit, The Tribunal has been vested with powers of a civil court for certain purposes specifically mentioned. But the question is as to what would be the rules applicable to an appeal which comes before the High Court from the award of the Tribunal. But the question is as to what would be the rules applicable to an appeal which comes before the High Court from the award of the Tribunal. The provision relating to the appeal is included in Section 110D of the Act, which states that/any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within 90 days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court, It has been contended that the right to file a cross objection is like a substantive right of appeal which must be conferred expressly by some statute and as Section 110D of the Act, does not mention the right of cross objection, the respondent is not entitled to file one. The basis of this argument is the assumption that the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to the case. This assumption, to my mind, is not correct. The position in relation to the proceeding in the court below is different from that when the matter comes to the High Court. The court below is a specially constituted forum under the Act. Does it mean that the High Court referred to in Section 110D of the Act, is also a designated authority? Excepting what is mentioned in Section 110D of the Act, no other detail about the High Court or the procedure to be adopted thereby is indicated in the Act. The High Court is referred to in the section in general terms. It does not even indicate as to the particular High Court where an appeal can be filed from a particular Claims Tribunal. It, therefore, appears that the High Court has been mentioned in the Act, not as a designated authority and the rules and procedure applicable to the appellate side of the Court must be held to be applicable. That brings us to the question as to what can be deemed to be the ordinary rules applicable to the appellate side of the High Court for an appeal of this nature. 11. The claim before the Tribunal is a claim for compensation for a civil wrong, and action must, therefore, be held to be a civil action. That brings us to the question as to what can be deemed to be the ordinary rules applicable to the appellate side of the High Court for an appeal of this nature. 11. The claim before the Tribunal is a claim for compensation for a civil wrong, and action must, therefore, be held to be a civil action. The right to claim compensation for injury or death due to the negligence of the opposite party is not a creature of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is a right which was recognized in common law and has continued to exist. The Act, merely substitutes a more speedy and efficacious remedy for enforcing such a right by preferring a claim before the Tribunal. The nature of the right or the relief granted does not undergo a change by the enactment of section 110. The position in the case of Bokaro and Ramgurh Ltd. Vs. Kathara Coal Co, relied upon by Shri Lakshman Saran Sinha was quite different. The matter arose under the provisions of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957, which according to the preamble, was an Act, to establish in the economic interest of India greater public control over the coal mining industry and its development by providing for the acquisition by the State of unworked land containing or likely to contain coal deposits or of rights in or over such land, for the extinguishment or modification of such rights accruing by virtue of any agreement, lease, licence or otherwise, and for matters connected therewith. Certain area of land was acquired under the provisions of the Act, and a Tribunal was constituted under Section 14 (2) of the said Act, and disputes regarding the amount of compensation as well as question of apportionment of the same were decided by the Tribunal. The observation by the High Court that no cross objection was maintainable was made in an appeal to the High Court from the decision of the Tribunal, as provided for in the said Act. The Act, was a comprehensive one and whatever were the rights of the parties they had been created under the Act. It was not a right under common law which was being enforced. I, therefore, hold that the case of Bokaro and Ramgurh Ltd. is dearly distinguishable and has no application to the present case. 12. The Act, was a comprehensive one and whatever were the rights of the parties they had been created under the Act. It was not a right under common law which was being enforced. I, therefore, hold that the case of Bokaro and Ramgurh Ltd. is dearly distinguishable and has no application to the present case. 12. The procedure of the appeal, therefore, must be followed in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. The decision in Secretary of State for India Vs. Chellikani Rama Rao AIR 1916 PC 21 may be referred to in this regard. A proceeding under the Madras Forest Act, (Act 5 of 1882) was decided by the Forest Settlement Officer and an appeal, provided under the provisions of the Act, was filed before the District Court. A question arose as to whether the procedure mentioned in the Code of Civil Procedure would govern the appeal. Their Lordships held as follows:- “Their view is that when proceedings of this character reach the District Court, that Court is appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the Country, with regard to whose procedure, orders, and decrees the ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code apply”. Several decisions of the other High Courts including the Full Bench case in K. Chandrashekhara Naik vs. Narayana, AIR 1975 Karnatak 18 after considering the decisions in Collector Varanasi vs. Gouri Shankar AIR 1968 SC. 384 and National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. Vs. James Chadwick and Brothers Ltd. AIR 1953 SC 357 have, in similar circumstances, held that cross objections are maintainable. I am in respectful agreement with the decisions. It must, therefore, be held that the present appeal is governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and Order 41 thereof applies. The claimant-respondents must, therefore, be held to be entitled to file a cross objection permissible under the Code. 13. Coming to the question as to what should be adjudged as the proper amount of compensation, several points raised by the parties have to be considered. The appellant has contended that the amount allowed by the Tribunal is excessive and must be reduced. 13. Coming to the question as to what should be adjudged as the proper amount of compensation, several points raised by the parties have to be considered. The appellant has contended that the amount allowed by the Tribunal is excessive and must be reduced. Learned Counsel for the applicant-respondent has urged that the amount of compensation must be enhanced, interest must be granted and the appellant must be held jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of compensation to which the applicant has been adjudged, entitled to. The last two points, namely, whether interest should be allowed and whether the appellant should be held jointly and severally liable for the entire amount were not taken in the memorandum of cross objection. After the hearing of the appeal started, the claimant-respondents filed additional grounds mentioning these points with a prayer that the Court may permit the same to be raised. There appears to be considerable difficulty in permitting the claimant-respondents to raise these two questions at this stage. The Tribunal, as already stated, has directed compensation to be paid by the appellant and Respondent no. 4 in proportion to 2:1 and Respondent no. 4 has neither appealed nor has appeared in the present appeal. If the new points, if permitted, succeed, the judgment will have to be modified in such a way which will affect Respondent no. 4 also adversely. It is not a case in which the cross objection can be allowed only against the appellant. The claimant-respondents should have, therefore, sent a notice of their cross objection to Respondent no. 4 also, which they have admittedly failed to do. Respondent no. 4 is not represented and it was not possible to have a copy of the cross objection or of the additional grounds served on him without adjourning the case after it had been heard. No reason has been made out for adopting such a course. I, therefore, do not permit Respondents 1 to 3 to raise the new points. 14. So far as the memorandum of cross objection is concerned, this also suffers from the same trouble. No reason has been made out for adopting such a course. I, therefore, do not permit Respondents 1 to 3 to raise the new points. 14. So far as the memorandum of cross objection is concerned, this also suffers from the same trouble. However, as after hearing both sides I am of the view, for the reasons which will follow, that the amount of compensation fixed by the Tribunal must be confirmed, it does not appear necessary to consider as to whether the Court should direct for steps to be taken for service of notice of the cross objection on Respondent No. 4. I may mention here that there has not been such a suggestion on behalf of the claimant-respondents for doing so at this stage either in regard to the memorandum of cross objection or the additional grounds. 15. The court has fixed the amount of compensation at Rs. 150000/- on the basis that the deceased might be spending a sum of Rs. 900/- per month over his wife and children. So far as A. Ws. 1 and 2 are concerned, they did not make any relevant statements on this aspect of the matter. The witness examined on commission, Mr. Prem Lall Sharma, employed in the Delhi Cloth Mills Chemical Works stated that after deducting the income tax, contribution towards the house rent etc. the deceased was getting a sum of Rs. 1772/- per month besides a sum of Rs. 125/- as car driver salary. It has also been stated that in ordinary course, the deceased would have continued in service up to the age of 58 years. He was 41 at the time of his death. The ordinary expectancy of his remaining in service was for 17 years more. A question arises as to what portion of his salary, he was spending on himself and what portion on his family members. The best evidence in this regard could have been given by the applicant Bandana Kar Choudhary, but she has remained silent. Actually, there is no material at all on the records to throw any light on that aspect. The Court has, therefore, to make a guess from the surrounding circumstances which are also scanty in the case. However, it is clear that the deceased was an educated person and was serving the Delhi Cloth Mills on a handsome salary. Actually, there is no material at all on the records to throw any light on that aspect. The Court has, therefore, to make a guess from the surrounding circumstances which are also scanty in the case. However, it is clear that the deceased was an educated person and was serving the Delhi Cloth Mills on a handsome salary. He had been sent to Germany and to London for receiving training to facilitate his work, as has been deposed to by A.W.1. His services were appreciated by the Company and he had to use a car in the course of his duty. From these circumstances, it can be inferred that he would be spending a considerable portion of his salary over himself as compared to the amount which he would be spending over his family members, as he had to maintain an impressive appearance as a representative of his company. I, therefore, do not find any reason to take a view different from that taken by the Tribunal in the matter of the amount of compensation. If it be assumed that the deceased would be spending half of his salary over his family members, which on account of his death the claimant-respondents are deprived of, the said amount would come to about Rs. 886/- per month. Accepting the case of the claimant respondents that the deceased was expected to be in service for 17 years more, the total amount would come to about Rs. 180000/-. Deducting a sum of Rs. 28000/- which the claimant-respondents have already received from the Insurance Company, the amount in round figures comes to about Rs. 150000/-. In absence of any material on the record, I agree that the amount of Rs. 150000/- may be assumed to be the correct amount of compensation. Learned Counsel for the appellant argued that as the amount would be paid in a lump sum, the same should be reduced. In the present case, I am not inclined to apply that principle for the reason that the deceased was receiving some more money by way of yearly bonus and was also providing his wife and children with other amenities like a residential house and a car for occasional use. The contentions of learned Counsels for both sides on the question of amount of compensation are, therefore, rejected. 16. The contentions of learned Counsels for both sides on the question of amount of compensation are, therefore, rejected. 16. For the reasons stated above, both the appeal and the cross objection fail and are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs for this Court. Birendra Prasad Sinha, J. I agree. Appeal and cross objection dismissed.