Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal by a surety against an order passed against him in execution of the decree for money which he had undertaken to satisfy. In the suit the defendant was directed to furnish security for the plaint claim to get the attachment before judgment raised. The appellant, a stranger to the suit, offered the property now sought to be proceeded against as security. That was accepted and the attachment was raised. After the decree the decree amount was not paid. So, the decree-holder got the decree transferred for execution to the Quilon Sub Court as the property given as security was within the jurisdiction of that court, and filed an execution application praying that that property may be proceeded against. When the proclamation notice was received, the appellant took objection to the execution on the ground that since the security bond was not registered it is not enforceable. The court below relying on Thankamma v. Parameswaran Achari 1971 KLR 440 held that the security bond is valid even without registration and hence execution was allowed to be proceeded with against the property. This appeal is filed challenging the correctness of this decision. 2. The point for consideration is whether security bond is invalid and unenforceable for want of registration. There is a Full Bench decision of this Court in Palai v. Nedungadi 1958 KLT 635 that security to be offered under 0.41 R.5 C.P.C. must be in Form No. 3, Appendix G and that it is a mortgage coming within the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and hence unless it is registered it is not enforceable in view of S.49 of the Registration Act. In that decision the question whether a decree or order of court relating to immovable property is exempt from registration under S.17 of the Registration Act was left open. That is the question in this appeal. There is no form prescribed for furnishing any security required under 0.38 R.5 and 6, C.P.C. The bond is only in the nature of an undertaking given by the surety to the court that he will satisfy the decree and the specific property offered may be proceeded against if he defaults. Such an undertaking does not amount to a mortgage under the Transfer of Property Act. It is not executed with all the formalities required by the Act. Such an undertaking does not amount to a mortgage under the Transfer of Property Act. It is not executed with all the formalities required by the Act. This undertaking has no value unless the court accepts it. It is not correct to say that even without the order accepting the bond it is complete and enforceable. We are aware that a view is taken by some of the other High Courts to the effect that the security bond requires no order of court to render it effectual. According to these decisions the order of court only amounts to a finding that the security is sufficient and does not give validity to the bond and the bond cannot be treated as part of the order of the court. It is executed in compliance with or in consequence of that order and is something distinct from the order itself (see Lahore Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd v. Uttem Chand AIR. 1919 Lahore 8. With respect, this view does not appeal to us. It is true it is in pursuance of an order that an undertaking is given to proceed against the property in case the surety does not satisfy the decree. It is open to the court to reject the undertaking and one of the reasons may be sufficiency of the security. On other grounds as well the court may refuse to accept. So, unless the court accepts the security it is only in the nature of an offer and is not binding and can be withdrawn until it is accepted. Therefore, a security bond is not effectual unless it is accepted by the court. In other words, it is the order of the court accepting the bond that creates enforceable obligations. In this respect the following observations of Tak Chand, J. in Kasturi Lal v. Goverdhan Dass AIR 1934 Lahore 138 appeal to us as correct: It is not the execution of the bond which affects the transfer of rights in the property described therein so as to make it available for the satisfaction of the decree which might be passed by the appellate court, but it is the order of the court accepting the bond which creates those rights. That is the view of the High Courts of Bombay, Nagpur, Madhya Pradesh, Mysore and Delhi (see Javappa Lokappa v. Shivangouda Dyamangouda AIR. That is the view of the High Courts of Bombay, Nagpur, Madhya Pradesh, Mysore and Delhi (see Javappa Lokappa v. Shivangouda Dyamangouda AIR. 1928 Bombay 42, Dadoo Balaji v. Kanahaialal Dhanaram AIR. 1947 Nagpur 26, Haijii-wakhanv. Gulabchand Harakchnnd AIR. 1961 Madh. Pr. 2, B. Rama Bhatta v. B. Kodandarama Bhatta AIR. 1963 Mysore 332 and M/s Label Art Press v. M/s Indo European Machinery Co. (P) Ltd. AIR. 1974 Delhi 136, In a very recent decision in Union of India v. R, Rajindera Singh AIR. 1975 H. P. 25 (F.B.) a Full Bench of that court at page 26 observed thus: "It is apparent, as the learned judges observed that it is not the execution of the bond which affects the transfer of rights in the property described therein, so as to make it available for the satisfaction of the decree which might be passed by the appellate court, but it is the order of the court accepting the bond which creates those rights. The bond does not become operative so long as it is not accepted by the court, and that would be so even if the bond has been duly registered immediately after its execution. It was pointed out that if by reason of the insufficiency of the security or on some other ground the court chose not to accept the bond, it would remain a wholly ineffectual and inoperative document despite the fact that it contained all the terms of the transaction and had been duly executed and registered." We respectfully agree with this view and hold that the security bond is only a step in the judicial procedure of the court and becomes effectual only by the order of the court. It is the order of the court accepting the bond which makes it an operative document. 3. Such being the nature of the security bond and the order thereon, the further question is whether this order as it affects rights in immovable property requires registration. For that we have to look into the Registration Act. S.17 (1) of that Act provides that all non-testamentary instruments creating rights of the value of Rs. 100 and above in immovable property must be registered. For that we have to look into the Registration Act. S.17 (1) of that Act provides that all non-testamentary instruments creating rights of the value of Rs. 100 and above in immovable property must be registered. But, sub-section (2), clause (vi) which is in the following terms: "Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) applies to any decree or order of a court except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding". is an exception to this general provision. Clause (vi) as it stands now is a result of the 1929 amendment to the Act. Previously it read as follows: "Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) applies to any decree or order of a court". After the amendment all decrees and orders of a court relating to immovable property are not exempted from registration. If the decree or order is based on a compromise and comprises immovable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding, that decree or order should be registered. An order accepting a security bond is not an order based on a compromise and therefore it would be saved by the general exception given to a decree or order. Further, though the property comprised in the security bond is not the subject-matter of the suit, since that order is not based on a compromise it will not be hit by the exception to the general exception of decrees and orders. In this view, we agree with the conclusion of Krishna Iyer, J. in Thankamma v. Parameswaran Achari 1971 KLR. 440 that a security bond filed and accepted by the court to raise an attachment before judgment is enforceable against a surety even though the same is not registered. 4. No doubt, in some cases third parties might have, subsequent to the order accepting the security bond but without knowledge of it obtained right in the property by voluntary or involuntary transfers. Whether such transfers will be governed by S.48 and /or S 52 of the Transfer of Property Act will be a matter that incidentally may arise for consideration in such cases. Whether such transfers will be governed by S.48 and /or S 52 of the Transfer of Property Act will be a matter that incidentally may arise for consideration in such cases. No such question arises here and they, at any rate, are not reasons to hold that the provisions of the Registration Act or the Transfer of Property Act requiring registration of a mortgage or charge apply to a bond of the type we are concerned with in this case. 5. But, the appellant's counsel is right in his contention that the decree-holder is not entitled to proceed against the property given as security straightaway without an order of court to which the surety is a party that the property charged will be sold unless the liability undertaken by the surety is discharged within a time to be specified in the order. In this regard also we agree with Krishna Iyer, J. in the decision cited above, that the omission to pass such an order vitiates the steps taken by the decree-holder to bring the property to sale. The lower court before directing the property to be sold must pass an order with notice to the surety that unless the decree is satisfied within a time to be specified the property will be sold. 6. In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the lower court and send back the case to the court of first instance to consider the passing of an order directing the surety to pay before a date to be fixed the amount covered by his bond or any lesser sum that may be due. After hearing the contentions of the surety the court will proceed to further pass an order whether a direction should be made to sell the property charged for the decree amount. In the nature of this case the parties shall bear their costs. Allowed.