Judgment :- 1. S.14 of the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, provides so far as material that every order under S.11 shall "be executed by the Munsiff or if there are more than one Munsiff, by the Principal Munsiff having original jurisdiction over the area in which the building is situated as if it were a decree passed by him". The petitioners in these revisions are tenants against whom the respondents have obtained orders of eviction under S.11 of the Act. Three years after but within twelve years of the orders, the respondents made applications before the proper Munsiff under S.14 of the Act for executing the orders. The petitioners objected inter alia that the execution petitions were highly belated but this objection was rejected by the Munsiff. They carried revisions to the District Court, where however they did not press this objection. In these revisions which have been filed from the common order of the District Court, counsel for the petitioners contend that the execution petitions are barred by limitation as Art.137 of the Limitation Act 1963, which is the Article to apply, allows only three years and that the respondents cannot claim the benefit of the longer period of twelve years under Art.136. It was argued that Art.136 applies only to decrees or orders of any "Civil Court" and that an order for eviction under the Act is outside the scope of that Article, as the Rent Control Court is not a "Civil Court" and its order cannot be treated as an order of a civil court merely because S.14 permits it to be executed by the Munsiff "as if it were a decree passed by him". The fiction created by the expression "as if it were a decree passed by him", it was further contended, only attracts the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code relating to execution and does not make it an order of the "Civil Court" within Art.136 enjoying the longer period of 12 years prescribed by that Article. The result, according to counsel, is that execution of orders of eviction falls within Art.137 which is the residuary Article. 2. The result, according to counsel, is that execution of orders of eviction falls within Art.137 which is the residuary Article. 2. Now in point of fact, the order under execution in each case was not passed by the Munsiff Court but S.14 provides that it is to be executed by the concerned Munsiff "as if it were a decree passed by him", thereby conferring upon the order the incidents and consequences of execution as a decree. The object of the fiction which this expression creates is to render the order executable as the decree of a Civil Court and that involves that the fiction could validly be carried to its logical conclusion, as the only inhibition is that a fiction should not be extended beyond its legitimate field. To bold that the fiction embodied in the expression "as if it were a decree passed by him" amounts to making an order of eviction a decree of the Munsiff and therefore of a Civil Court is only to give full play to the fiction and the object of its creation. This construction would attract not only the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code dealing with execution of decrees but also the provisions of Art.136 which prescribes the period of limitation for the execution of decrees. If the expression attracts, as is conceded by counsel for the petitioners, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code in the matter of execution of decrees, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that it must necessarily attract the provisions of Art.136 as well. As I said while a fiction cannot be extended beyond its legitimate field, it must be allowed full operation within its intended sphere. In the oft-quoted words of Lord Asquith in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council, 1952 A.C.109,132: "If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which; if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it. One of these in this case is emancipation from the 1939 level of rents. One of these in this case is emancipation from the 1939 level of rents. The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; ft does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs." White following the above passage, the Supreme Court observed in the recent case, Boacher Pierre Andre v. Superintendent, Central Jail, AIR. 1975 S.C.164: "It is now well-settled law that where a legal fiction is created, full effect must be given to it and it should be carried to its logical conclusion." 3. So carried I must reject, on principle the petitioners' contention and hold that the expression "as if it were a decree passed by him" attracts not only the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code relating to execution but also the provisions of Art.136. 4. Turning to precedents, in Ramaswamy Iyer v. Ramakrishnayya (1969)2 MLJ. 272, Rama Prasada Rao J. of the Madras High Court had to determine the effect of S.18 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960, which like S.14 of the Kerala Act, provides that the order passed by the Rent Controller shall be executed by the City Civil Court in the City of Madras, "as if it were a decree passed by the said court". The learned judge held: "By such a fiction the order passed by the Rent Controller is converted into a decree of a Civil Court and this notional conversion by the operation of the fiction makes it a decree of a Civil Court. If this were so Art.182 of the Limitation Act as it then was under the old Act is naturally attracted. I do not agree with the extreme contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the expression'as if it is a decree of a Civil Court' appearing in S.18 of the Madras Act XVIII of 1960 is not intended to give to an order of the Rent Controller placed in the hands of the City Civil Court, a status of a decree of a Civil Court. In fact, the effect, content and real purpose of S.18 of Madras Act XVIII of 1960 is to clothe the City Civil Court with the jurisdiction to execute the order of a tribunal constituted under Act XVIII of 1960 or a Rent Controller for the matter of that as if it were its own decree, meaning thereby a decree of a Civil Court." 5. This decision effectively meets the contentions of the petitioners. 6. In aid of the conclusion at which I have arrived I might refer to one more decision, although it involved a different enactment. S.59 (1) (a) of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act 1925, as it then stood, provided that an order passed by the Registrar or his nominee shall be executed on a certificate signed by the Registrar, by any Civil Court" in the same manner as a decree of such court". In Bhimsan v. Urban Bank, Muddebihal, AIR. 1947 Bombay 370, the question arose whether an order passed by a nominee of the Registrar was governed by Art.181 or Art.182 of the Limitation Act 1908, which so far as relevant correspond to Art.137 and 136 respectively of the present Limitation Act. Gajendragadkar J. (as he then was) who pronounced the judgment on behalf of the Bench held that the awards which have to be executed in the same manner as decrees of Civil Courts can legitimately be regarded as "decree of Civil Courts" within the meaning of Art.182. Now the expression that fell to be considered was "in the same manner as a decree of such court" but that makes no difference, for the other expression, "as if it were a decree of a Civil Court", as the learned judge points out "may, perhaps be wider and somewhat more emphatic". The decision therefore supports the conclusion reached earlier. 7. Counsel for the petitioners relied upon Sheik Ali v. Sheikh Mohamed AIR. The decision therefore supports the conclusion reached earlier. 7. Counsel for the petitioners relied upon Sheik Ali v. Sheikh Mohamed AIR. 1967 Madras 45, where a Full Bench of the Madras High Court held that the expression "as if it had been passed by the District Court" in S.44A (1), Civil Procedure Code is confined to the manner of executing foreign decrees and does not suggest any implication relating to limitation for execution, that the law of limitation as procedural law and as lexfori however applies but independently of S.44A and that Art.182 which governs execution of a decree or order of any Civil Court in this country, is not applicable to execution of foreign judgments and that it is the residuary article, Art.181 that applies to such execution. The learned judges examined the purpose of the fiction, the context in which S.44A appears following S.42 and 44 which contain similar fictions and the surprising results and anomalies that would follow if the foreign decree is taken to have been passed by the District Court, even on the date it was originally passed by the foreign court. It was in view of these various considerations (explained in Para.13,14 and 15) that their Lordships limited the expression to the manner of execution and held that limitation for the execution of foreign decrees is governed by Art.181 and that the period of limitation accrues on and from the date of filing a certified copy of the decree. In my view, this decision has no application to the interpretation of the fiction created by S.14 of the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 8. I hold that the execution petitions taken by the respondents are within time. 9. A subsidiary point raised in support of the revisions is that the respondents had not complied with the condition of depositing certain amounts within the time stipulated in the orders of eviction. The courts below have held against the petitioners on this point and I find it without any substance. 10. The revisions are dismissed but in the circumstances without costs. Dismissed.