JUDGMENT : Amitav Banerji, J. This second appeal by the Plaintiffs raises two interesting questions of law. The first is, whether the deposit made by a sirdar for the acquisition of the privilege of transfer in respect of the entire sirdari holdings u/s 3 of the U.P. Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act, 1949 enures for the benefit of all the co-sirdars as well, when the applicant expressly claimed the privilege exclusively for himself. The second question is, whether the suit for the partition of a joint holding in which one party had bhumidhari rights and the other sirdari rights lay in the civil court or in the revenue court. 2. To appreciate these questions, it would be necessary to refer to the case of the parties. Mathura Prasad, Ram Autar and Bisheshwar Dayal, Plaintiffs Nos. 1, 8 and 9 exclusively claimed that they had a half share in the bhumidhari holding which they had sold to Plaintiffs Nos. 2 to 7 by a sale deed dated 11th of May, 1957. They claimed that they were in separate possession but in case the court took the view that there had been no partition, they prayed for a partition of their half share. It was also pleaded that the Plaintiff No. 1 and Defendant No. 1, who have descended from common ancestor jointly deposited ten times rent and became bhumidhars of the plots in suit. One Smt. Rajeshwari Devi Defendant No. 6 was impleaded in the suit and it was alleged that if it was found to have a share in the plots in suit the share of the Plaintiffs will be 3/8th and a separate lots for the Plaintiffs be accordingly prepared. The Defendant No. 1 originally was Ram Narain who died during the pendency of the suit and his two sons are Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in this second appeal. They denied that the Plaintiffs have any share in the disputed holding and further asserted that the Plaintiffs were never in possession over any portion of the plots in dispute. It was denied that they ever paid any rent or made the deposit of ten times rent. It was also asserted that the declaration of bhumidhari of the holding was given only in favour of Defendant No. 1. It was denied that they ever paid any rent or made the deposit of ten times rent. It was also asserted that the declaration of bhumidhari of the holding was given only in favour of Defendant No. 1. The names of the Plaintiff No. 1 and his father were wrongly entered and the name of Plaintiff No. 1 was ordered to be expunged from the revenue papers. It was also stated that plot No. 1233 was given in charity to a school and plots Nos. 1128, 1174, 1222 and 1223 were sold to Respondents Nos. 7 and 3 respectively. Lastly, it was contended that the suit was time barred. 3. The trial court found that the father of the Plaintiffs Nos. 1, 8 and 9 was a co-tenure holder. Consequently, the Plaintiffs Nos. 1, 8 and 9 were entitled to 3/8th share in the suit property. The court further held that Smt. Rajeshwari Devi had a eighth share in the plots in suit, and the remaining share was of the Defendant No. 1. Consequently, he decreed the suit for partition and separate possession over 3/8th share of the plots in suit. 4. On appeal by 'the Defendants, two questions were considered by the lower appellate court. Firstly, whether the Plaintiffs were not bhumidhars of the suit property, and secondly, whether the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. Both these points were decided against the Plaintiffs. In the first place the court held that bhumidhari rights were acquired by the Defendant No. 1 alone and not by Ram Charan, father of the Plaintiffs Nos. 1, 8 and 9, since the application for acquisition of the privilege of transfer had been made only by the Defendant No. 1 Ram Narain. He further held that the Plaintiffs had 3/8th share in the holdings or the suit plots but their status was that of a sirdar. On the second point the court below held that in view of Section 331 and Schedule II of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 as it existed in 1957 when the suit was filed, a suit for division of a holding of a sirdar lay in the revenue court and consequently, the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain or try the suit. The court instead of returning the plaint for presentation to the revenue court dismissed the suit. The court instead of returning the plaint for presentation to the revenue court dismissed the suit. In this appeal apart from two questions to which I have referred to earlier, a third question was also raised namely, that the court below was in error in not returning the plaint for presentation to the revenue court and in dismissing the suit. In my opinion this is a subsidiary question which will arise only if it is found that the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. I propose to take up the point of jurisdiction first in this appeal. 5. Section 176 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the U.P. Act I) provides that a bhumidhar or sirdar may sue for division of his holding. It also provides that the Gaon Sabha concerned shall be made a party to such a suit. The question is thus of the forum before which the suit for partition would lie, viz. whether in the civil court or in the revenue court. Section 331 of the U.P. Act I of 1951 refers to Schedule II to the said Act for the forum of a suit for the partition of a holding. Serial No. 16 of Schedule II refers to a suit for division of a holding of a bhumidhari or sirdari. In 1957 when the present suit was filed the forum for filing of a suit for the partition of a holding of sirdari land was in the court of Assistant Collector 1st Class, i.e., a revenue court. In 1957 the suit for partition of a holding of a bhumidhar lay in the civil court. By Uttar Pradesh Land Reforms Amendment Act, 1958, Schedule II was amended. By this amendment the words-" the suit for the division of a holding of a bhumidhar or a sirdar" was substituted for the words "the suit for the partition of a holding of a sirdar". In this case the position prior to the 1958 amendments is to be considered. Admittedly, at that time the entry in column 3 against serial No. 16 in Schedule II only refers to a suit for partition of a holding of a sirdar. It did not refer to a suit for partition of a holding of a bhumidhar. 6. Plaintiffs claimed that they were bhumidhars. Admittedly, at that time the entry in column 3 against serial No. 16 in Schedule II only refers to a suit for partition of a holding of a sirdar. It did not refer to a suit for partition of a holding of a bhumidhar. 6. Plaintiffs claimed that they were bhumidhars. This plea of theirs has been negatived by the lower appellate court and it has been held that they are sirdars to the extent of 3/8th share in the plots in suit. According to the findings given by the court below the Defendant Ram Narain was Bhumidhar to the extent of one half share in the plots in suit. It will, therefore, be seen that at the time of the filing of the suit for partition, Defendant No. 1 Ram Narain had a half share in the plots and the Plaintiff Ram Charan and Smt. Rajeshwari had sirdari rights in respect of the remaining half. Therefore, these plots were bhumidhari for one and sirdari for the other. When the Plaintiffs asked for the partition of his share in the plots in suit, he did not asked for the partition of a holding of a sirdar. If the plots in suit were entirely sirdari, then in that event the suit would undoubtedly lie in the revenue court. But this was not the case when the suit was filed. It was partly sirdari and partly bhumidhari. The Defendant claimed that the entire plots in suit had become his bhumidhari. Even assuming that the finding given by the court below is correct on the other points that it was bhumidhari of the Defendant and sirdari of the Plaintiff, even then the suit would not lie in the revenue court because the Plaintiffs were not asking for the partition of their sirdari holdings inter se amongst them. They wanted a separation of their interests from that of the Defendant. Admittedly, the Defendant's interests was not sirdari, it was bhumidhari. It would, therefore, be seen that the suit of the Plaintiff did not come squarely within column 3 of entry 16 of Schedule II of the Act I of 1951. It is well settled that unless the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is taken away expressly, the suit would lie in the Civil Court. It would, therefore, be seen that the suit of the Plaintiff did not come squarely within column 3 of entry 16 of Schedule II of the Act I of 1951. It is well settled that unless the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is taken away expressly, the suit would lie in the Civil Court. In this case the present suit could not have been filed in the revenue court because it was not a suit for partition of the holding of a sirdar. It was a suit for partition of the entire holding which was partly bhumidhari and partly sirdari. Until the interests of the parties had been separated no specific portion of the plots in suit could be said to be bhumidhari of the Defendant. I am, therefore, satisfied that the suit lay in the civil court and not in the revenue court. The view taken by the court below is erroneous and is set aside. 7. In the view that I have taken above, it is no longer necessary to go into the question whether the court below was in error in not returning the plaint of the suit to the Plaintiff for presentation to the revenue court and in dismissing the suit. In view of the above finding the question does not arise any further. 8. The other major question is whether the Plaintiffs acquired bhumidhari rights in the plots in suit. It has been found that it was the Defendant Ram Narain who had deposited 10 times rent in respect of the suit plots. An order was passed saying that he had acquired bhumidhari rights in respect of the entire suit plots. The finding further is that the Defendant had not made any contribution towards ten times rent and that the application for acquisition of bhumidhari rights did not say anywhere that it was being made on behalf of the Plaintiffs Nos. 1, 8 and 9. The question, therefore, is whether in these circumstances the Plaintiffs would be deemed to have acquired bhumidhari rights along with the Defendant Ram Narain. It will be relevant to notice here that Ram Narain had claimed that the Plaintiffs had no share in these plots but this case of his has been squarely rejected by both the courts below. The question, therefore, is whether in these circumstances the Plaintiffs would be deemed to have acquired bhumidhari rights along with the Defendant Ram Narain. It will be relevant to notice here that Ram Narain had claimed that the Plaintiffs had no share in these plots but this case of his has been squarely rejected by both the courts below. The names of the Plaintiffs had been expunged from the record, but that would not obliterate the right and title of the Plaintiffs in the suit plots. Their title in the land continued. 9. The question, therefore, to be considered is that even if only one of the two or more co-tenure holders make an application for the acquisition of the bhumidhari rights whether the rights would enure for the benefit of the other co-tenure holders. It is true that u/s 3 of the Act certain class of tenants acquire certain privileges under the Act. It is not disputed in this case that the predecessors of the Plaintiffs and the Defendants both were hereditary tenants. It is also eatablished that Ram Narain, father of the Defendants 1 and 2 had deposited the ten times rent on 5-5-1950, vide Ex. A-12 and that a declaration that he had acquired Bhumidhari rights was passed in his favour on 27-2-1961 by the Tehsildar, Bharthana. 10. u/s 19 of the U.P. Act I of 1951, a hereditary tenant became sirdar on the coming in force of the later Act. Thus the tenure holders in the present case became sirdars on the coming in force of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. u/s 18 of the U.P. Act I of 1951 a hereditary tenant possessing the right to transfer the holding by sale becomes Bhumidhar. Under the U.P. Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) a hereditary tenant makes an application u/s 5 of the Act for acquisition of privileges and a declaration is made in Section 6 of the said Act. Consequent upon the grant of declaration u/s 6 the tenant becomes entitled to certain privileges u/s 7 of the Act. One of the privileges acquired by a tenant is that he acquires a right to transfer the holding or his share therein vide Section 7(c) of the Act. 11. Consequent upon the grant of declaration u/s 6 the tenant becomes entitled to certain privileges u/s 7 of the Act. One of the privileges acquired by a tenant is that he acquires a right to transfer the holding or his share therein vide Section 7(c) of the Act. 11. Sections 3, 3-A, 3-B and 3-C contain provisions for the acquisition of privileges by certain class of tenants, sub-tenants, unrecorded co-tenants and by recorded and unrecorded co-tenants jointly. In this case the provisions of Section 3-A of the Act would not be applicable because we are not concerned with sub-tenants. Section 3-B relates to the acquisition of privileges of unrecorded co-tenants. In the present case no application had been made by the unrecorded co-tenants for the acquisition of privileges. Therefore, in my opinion, this provision would also not be attracted. Section 3-C relates to the acquisition of privileges by recorded and un-recorded co-tenants jointly. This provision will also not be applicable for here in the present case an application was made only by one tenant. We have, therefore, to refer to Section 3 which is the principal Section. It states that whoever is a hereditary tenant pays to the credit of the State Government an amount equal to ten times of the annual rent payable by him in respect of the holding shall be entitled to a declaration with effect from the date on which the amount has been deposited, that he has become entitled to the privileges provided by or under the Act. Explanation 1 to this Section states that where a holding is jointly held by two or more tenants the rent payable by any tenant, for the purpose of this Section, to be deemed to be an amount proportionate to his share therein. The finding of fact in this case is that it was Ram Narain, the father of the Defendants 1 and 2, had made the deposit. It was made by him alone and for the purpose of acquiring the privileges for his own self alone. There is also a finding by the court below that Ram Narain was not the sole tenureholder and that the Plaintiffs 1, 8 and 9 and Smt. Rajeshwari Devi had also a share therein. Although Ram Narain had made the ten times of the rent for all the suit plots he had no more than half a share in those plots. Although Ram Narain had made the ten times of the rent for all the suit plots he had no more than half a share in those plots. Consequently, he could not have acquired the privilege in respect of anything more than his share in the plots in dispute. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 states that in the case of a holding held jointly by two or more tenants any one of them may pay the amount on behalf of all the other tenants in the holding. This is an enabling clause which permits one of the co-tenureholders to make the application and pay the amount on behalf of all of them. In the present case although there were more than one tenureholder in respect of the suit plots, Ram Narain had claimed himself to be the sole tenureholder and had claimed the grant of privileges in respect of the suit plots. He had thereby clearly expressed an intention that there were no other tenureholders along with him and that he was not making payment on behalf of any other. Consequently, it is absolutely clear that Ram Narain never intended to pay the amount on behalf of the others nor acquired the privileges for other co-tenureholders. He was seeking this privilege only for himself. The Assistant Collector was called upon to decide whether Ram Narain was entitled to the privilege that he was claiming. He did not at any stage consider whether the privilege was to be conferred on the other co-tenure-holders and whether the amount was being paid on behalf of the other co-tenureholders as well. The acquisition of privileges is not merely the unilateral act of a party. He has to make an application, deposit an amount and file an extract of the khatauni relating to the plots. The matter has to be considered by the Assistant Collector and then an order has to be passed. Thus in the grant of privilege the State is also concerned with the acts through the aegis of the Assistant Collector. As stated above, in the present case there was no application on behalf of the Plaintiffs Nos. 1, 8 and 9 or Smt. Rajeshwari Devi for the acquisition of privileges nor had the amount been paid on their behalf. The Plaintiff's case that the amount had been paid by them has been rejected by the two courts below. As stated above, in the present case there was no application on behalf of the Plaintiffs Nos. 1, 8 and 9 or Smt. Rajeshwari Devi for the acquisition of privileges nor had the amount been paid on their behalf. The Plaintiff's case that the amount had been paid by them has been rejected by the two courts below. It is, therefore, apparent that unless the party who was making a claim for acquisition was doing it on behalf of the other co-tenureholders or was making deposit on behalf of the other co-tenure-holders the other co-tenureholders would not derive any benefit of this deposit or the making of the application. Even if a party treated the entire land to be his alone he could not acquire any more privilege than what was his share in the suit plots. In my opinion, therefore, the mere making of the deposit or the making of an application u/s 5 read with Section 3 of the Act would not confer on the other co-tenureholders the same privilege. If there was no application made on their behalf and if the amount was not paid on behalf of the other co-tenureholders they would not acquire any privilege. If the party making the deposit had deposited a large sum than was due he could claim a refund but the making of a larger deposit would not result in the acquisition of privilege u/s 3 of the Act in favour of the other co-tenure holders. In my opinion, therefore, the court below was right in holding that Ram Narain, the father of Defendants 1 and 2 had acquired Bhumidhari rights in respect of only half share in the suit plots. The Plaintiffs 1, 8 and 9 were only Sirdars and they had not acquired the privilege and consequently were not the Bhumidhars of the suit plots. 12. However, the decision on the second point will not alter the result of this appeal. In view of my decision on the first point that the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain and try this suit the decision of the court below has to be set aside. 13. 12. However, the decision on the second point will not alter the result of this appeal. In view of my decision on the first point that the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain and try this suit the decision of the court below has to be set aside. 13. In the result, therefore, the appeal is allowed, and the judgment and decree of the court below are set aside and the Plaintiffs' suit for partition and separate possession over 3/8th share of the plots given in Schedule A at the foot of the plaint is decreed against the Defendants. However, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs throughout.