JUDGMENT - S.M. HAJARNAVIS, J.:---This is a tenants petition under Article 227 of the Constitution against the appellate judgment delivered by the District Judge, Poona, allowing the plaintiffs appeal and setting aside the order of the trial Court and decreeing the plaintiffs suit for possession. The petitioner is a tenant of a room on the ground floor of House No. 403-B, Kasba Peth, Poona, which belonged to the respondent. There is no dispute that the tenancy began prior to 1947 and that initially the rent was Rs. 6/- per month. In 1960, the respondent filed a suit against the petitioner for eviction on numerous grounds, one of which was that the suit premises were left out for residence and that the petitioner was using the suit premises for business. The suit was resisted by the petitioner. It was the case of the petitioner that the suit premises were let out for business. Ultimately the matter was compromised and a purshis was field by the parties saying that they have compromised the matter and that the plaintiff did not want to prosecute the suit further. In terms of that compromise, the rent of the suit premises was increased to Rs. 9/- per month. Thereafter the respondent-landlord gave a notice of termination of tenancy on the 6th March, 1968. He has alleged in that notice that he required the suit premises bona fide for his residence and that the petitioner has been using the suit premises for business purposes while the same were let out for the purpose of residence. He also alleged that the petitioner has erected a permanent structure on the suit premises without the permission of the landlord. The respondent also alleged that the petitioner has acquired alternative suitable vacant possession for his residence. The petitioner did not cachet the suit premises and the respondent then field a suit for possession on the above mentioned grounds. The claim of the plaintiff was resisted by the petitioner. It was stated that the petitioner has not made any change in the user of the premises. The premises were let out for the purpose of business and even if they were initially let out for residence, then there was clear admission by the landlord in the purshis that the suit premises were allowed to be used for business purpose. It was stated that the petitioner has not made any change in the user of the premises. The premises were let out for the purpose of business and even if they were initially let out for residence, then there was clear admission by the landlord in the purshis that the suit premises were allowed to be used for business purpose. It was also urged that in view of the compromise the landlord was estopped from saying that the suit premises were let out for residence. It was also stated that in view of the dismissal of the previous suit, the point regarding change of the user is concluded as res judicate. The necessary issues were framed. The parties led evidence after taking into consideration the material that was placed before him, the learned trial Judge held that the petitioner has not erected any permanent structure without the permission of the landlord. He also held that the petitioner has not acquired vacant possession of suitable premises. He held that the suit premises were let out for the purpose of business and that there was no change of user by the defendant. He held that the suit premises were not required reasonably and bona fide by the landlord. He also held that the defendant has not acquired alternative suitable residence. He, therefore, dismissed the plaintiffs suit for possession. The plaintiff therefore field an appeal in the District Court which was heard by the learned District Judge who reversed the findings regarding the user of the premises and bona fide need of the landlord. He held that the suit premises were let out for the purpose of residence and that the defendant was using the premises for the purpose of business and, therefore, there was a change of user. He made a reference to the compromise decree and observed that in the Purshis the defendant has given an unmistaken admission that there was a change of user. He also held that the compromise decree did not operate as an estoppel or res judicata against the plaintiff. He re-appreciated the evidence and came to the conclusion that the suit premises were let out for residence and the petitioner was using them for business purpose and, therefore, there was change of user and on that count the respondent was entitled for possession. He re-appreciated the evidence and came to the conclusion that the suit premises were let out for residence and the petitioner was using them for business purpose and, therefore, there was change of user and on that count the respondent was entitled for possession. He also held that the family of the landlord consisted of five members, viz., he himself, his wife and three sons who are all of marriageable age and that they were occupying a room of two khans and they established their need for larger accommodation. Therefore, the need of the landlord was reasonable and bona fide and greater hardship would be caused to the plaintiff if the decree for eviction is not passed. Consistent with these findings, he allowed the appeal and decreed the plaintiffs claim for possession. It is against this judgment that the present petition has been field. Mr. Aggarwal, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, urged that the learned District Judge has committed an error in reversing both the findings. There is an error apparent on the face of record in-as-much as the learned District Judge has not correctly appreciated the fact that there was a compromise decree and in that compromise decree the plaintiff himself has recorded the fact that the petitioner was using the suit premises for the purpose of business. He also submitted that the fact that the plaintiff has given on lease a room only a year before the suit notice clearly establishes that the need of the landlord was not bona fide and reasonable. In my opinion, the submission is well-founded and deserves to be accepted. Mr. Chaisas, the learned Counsel for the respondent, urged that under Article 227 of the Constitution, this Court should not interfere with the findings of fact. He invited my attention to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in (Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarte and another)1, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1297 where the Supreme Court, after referring to the decision in (Warvam Singh v. Amarnath)2, 1954 S.C. Reports, 565 and the decision in (Nagendra Nath Bora v. The Commissioner of Hills Division)3, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 1240 has observed : "It would, therefore, be seen that the High Court cannot, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227, interfere with findings of fact recorded by the sub-ordinate Court or Tribunal. Its function is limited to seeing that the sub-ordinate Court of Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. It cannot correct mere errors of fact by examining the evidence and re-appreciating it." It was further observed : "If an error of fact, even though apparent on the face of the record, cannot be corrected by means of a writ of certiorari it should follow a fortiori that it is not subject to correction by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227. The power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be invoked to correct an error of fact which only a superior Court can do in exercise of its statutory power as a Court of appeal. The High Court cannot in guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a Court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal and made the decision of the subordinate Court or Tribunal final on facts." Here in this particular case, I am not asked to reverse the findings of fact. What is urged in this case is that the learned Judge has committed an error in not taking into consideration the impact of the admission of the plaintiff regarding the use of the premises for business purpose in the Purshis that was filed. In the purshis that was filed in the earlier suit viz. Suit No. 703 of 1960 both the parties have stated : "..............................that the defendant is using these premises for business." Taking this fact into consideration, the tenant has accepted the suggestion of the plaintiff to pay Rs. 9/- per month as rent for the suit premises. This does not mean that he has accepted the allegations of the plaintiff that there was a change of user. It only means that the premises at that time were used for the purpose of business and the suit was withdrawn by the plaintiff after filing the Purshis. In view of this clear acceptance of the fact by the plaintiff that the suit premises were being used by the petitioner for the purpose of business, it was really not open to him again to say years afterwards that the petitioner has effected a change of user in the suit premises. In view of this clear acceptance of the fact by the plaintiff that the suit premises were being used by the petitioner for the purpose of business, it was really not open to him again to say years afterwards that the petitioner has effected a change of user in the suit premises. This purshis clearly shows that during 1960 and for the period prior to that, the suit premises were used by the petitioner for business. It was, therefore, not open to the plaintiff to say in 1968 that there was change of user and that admission regarding user during the previous period was not binding on him. The respondent was receiving rent on the basis of the agreement that was arrived at between the parties. The plaintiff was clearly estopped from saying that the petitioner has effected the change of user. The learned Judge has observed : It is common experience that the tenants, after the advent of the Rent Act seldom agreed to such increases voluntarily when they knew for certainty that the landlord had very little remedy at law and to get an increase in the rent. Unless there was some truth in this ground mentioned in the compromise or unless the defendant felt that she was likely to be evicted, she would not have readily agreed for this rise. This reasoning, to say the least, has to be reproduced only to be rejected. The parties may compromise even if they have good case and valid defence in order to establish goodwill between them and to purchase peace. The fact that the parties have compromised does not necessarily mean that one of the compromising parties has no case. The learned Judge has, therefore, committed an error apparent on the fact of record in holding that the suit premises were not let out for the purpose of business initially and reversing the finding recorded by the learned trial Court. He has also not take into consideration the impact of the compromise viz. estoppel. In my opinion, the plaintiff was clearly estopped from saying that the suit premises were not let out to the petitioner for business purpose. So far as the bona fide need is concerned, it is an admitted fact that only a year before the suit notice was given the plaintiff has let out one of the rooms to his cousin. In my opinion, the plaintiff was clearly estopped from saying that the suit premises were not let out to the petitioner for business purpose. So far as the bona fide need is concerned, it is an admitted fact that only a year before the suit notice was given the plaintiff has let out one of the rooms to his cousin. It is not a case that the plaintiff has accommodated his cousin for a temporary period. It is not disputed that he had let out the premises to his cousin. That being so, the learned Judge has committed an error in holding that the need of the petitioner was bona fide and reasonable. It was not open to the landlord to let out the premises and create an artificial shortage and then try to evict other tenants. That is exactly what is being done in the present case. That being so, the learned Judge has committed an error in holding that the need of the landlord was bona fide and reasonable. It is very difficult to understand the reasoning of the learned Judge when he observes : On the point of bona fides, no doubt the plaintiff did not size the opportunity in 1967, but we have to take into account the status of the plaintiff as well as the magnitude of his pocket. With a view to supplement the income when, in particular, he had disposed of his tonga and horse, the might be at great inconvenience leased out one of the rooms. When the finds, in 1968 of 1969 or at the date of the decree in August 1970 his need to be more pressing, it cannot necessarily be stated that they are mala fide. Here is a landlord who lets out a room which is in his possession and only a year afterwards serves notice on another tenant occupying another room to quit on the ground that he requires the suit premises reasonably and bona fide for his occupation. The finding recorded by the learned Judge is unsustainable and deserves to be quashed. Mr. Ghaisas urged that the three sons of the respondent have grown up and they are married and their need is genuine. That may be true and it is open to him to initiate the proceedings on that basis now. The finding recorded by the learned Judge is unsustainable and deserves to be quashed. Mr. Ghaisas urged that the three sons of the respondent have grown up and they are married and their need is genuine. That may be true and it is open to him to initiate the proceedings on that basis now. In the result, the findings recorded by the Appellate Court are set aside and that of the trial Court are restored. The petition is allowed and the rule is made absolute. Under the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. -----