Judgment C.P. Sinha, J., This application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) is on behalf of accused Suresh Prasad Sinha, alias Surendra Prasad Sinha. The prayer is to quash the prosecution pending against the petitioner in the court of Mr. J. Jha, Munsif Magistrate, First Class, Purnea in Case No. C. A. 543 of 1970. The facts giving rise to this application are as under mentioned. 2. On 26.8.1970, this opposite party (Nageshwar Pathak) filed a petition of complaint in the court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Purnea alleging that the accused was known to him for the last 2 to 3 years: On 2.7.1970 at 5 P.M. the accused came to the complainant's place with a cheque book of the State Bank of India, Purnea and requested him (complainant) to deliver to him a sum of Rs.1200/- of which he was in urgent need. In course of those talks the accused assured him that in lieu of that amount he would issue to him a cheque of 3.7.1970 on the State Bank of India, Purnea which he could encash on its presentation that day (3.7.1970) as he had sufficient money to his credit in the Bank to cover the cheque. On that representation of the accused, the complainant advanced him Rs.1200/- in cash and the accused drew up a cheque for that amount on the State Bank of India, dated 3.7.1970, and made it over to him on that very occasion, i.e., 2.7.1970 at 5 P.M. When on 3.7.1970 the complainant presented that cheque to the Bank it was dishonored for the reason that the accused had no money in the Bank. On these allegations the complainant alleged that he had been cheated by the accused in that manner because he (accused) had full knowledge of having no money in the Bank and that the cheque which he was issuing to the complainant for the amount 'so paid to him was bound to be dishonored. It was further said that the subsequent attempt of the complainant to recover that money from the accused did not bear any fruit and he (accused) put off the matter on some pretext or the other having had dishonest design not to pay back the money. Accordingly, he requested that action should be taken against him under section 420, Indian Penal Code. 3. Accordingly, he requested that action should be taken against him under section 420, Indian Penal Code. 3. The Sub-divisional Magistrate, on receiving that complaint, examined the complainant that very day and took cognizance under section 420, Indian Penal Code in the case against the accused and transferred it to another Magistrate for trial. There is no dispute between the parties that after this cognizance the accused moved in revision (Criminal Revision No. 240 of 1970) before the Sessions Judge, Purnea for getting that cognizance quashed. That revision was, however, dismissed by the Sessions Judge in his order dated 11.5.1972 refusing to make a reference to the High Court for that purpose. 4. In the trial court, for the prosecution, 5 witnesses including the Bank Manager and the Complainant (P.WS. 3 and 5) were examined. They were also cross-examined before charge. The dishonored cheque (Ext 2) as also the Bank's refusal to honor it for the reason that the drawer had no sufficient money to cover it (Ext. 1) as also the pleader's notice sent by the complainant to the accused (Ext. 3) were also produced. The Magistrate, after having considered "those materials, has framed charge under section 420, Indian Penal Code against the accused in the following terms: "You Surendra Prasad Singh on or about the 2nd day of July, 1970 cheated Nageshwar Pathak the complainant by dishonestly inducing him to deliver Rs.1200/- (twelve hundred) in cash to you for which you gave him cheque no. BP/17 372460 on State Bank of India, Branch at Pumea by putting date therein 3.7.70. You further assured him that the said cheque would be honored on presentation at the Bank though you knew that you had not the said amount in your account and that the cheque would be dishonored." On the charge being read over to the accused, he pleaded not guilty and later moved the present application for quashing of the prosecution against him. 5. Learned counsel, Mr. Baldeo Prasad Singh appearing for the petitioner has urged for the quashing on the ground that by no stretch of imagination any deception on the part of his client in this transaction could be inferred. The cheque so issued by him was in the nature of a written contract between the two sides under which the accused made himself liable to pay that amount in case it was not encashed in the Bank. The cheque so issued by him was in the nature of a written contract between the two sides under which the accused made himself liable to pay that amount in case it was not encashed in the Bank. As such, if the cheque could not be cashed for want of sufficient money in the Bank to the credit of the drawer, namely the accused, all that" it gave rise to was a breach of the contract on his part for which the remedy of the complainant was in civil court and not by means of the present action of cheating for which the necessary ingredient of fraudulent misrepresentation and dishonest intention on petitioner's part in getting this deal done was completely lacking. In this connection my attention has been invited to the admission of the complainant (P. 5) in his evidence that even prior to this transaction he (complainant) had advanced Rs.600/- by way of loan to the accused which he had paid back by means of a cheque issued in his favour. It is submitted that this admission coupled with the admission in the complaint petition that the two have been known for the last 2 to 3 years past, there could be no scope for reading any dishonest or fraudulent intention on accused's part in trying to take this amount by falsely representing so to the complainant. It was just a chance that when the cheque was presented that day the complainant had no sufficient amount in deposit to encash the cheque. If the accused had any dishonest intention at that time he would not have thought of issuing that cheque to him of the very next day because that was bound to put him in trouble. The issue of the cheque by him has, therefore, to be 'taken as a strong circumstance in favour of his bona fide in this deal. 6. Against the above, the contention of Mr. Braj Kishore Prasad No. 2 representing the opposite party is that from the facts of the case there is no escape for the accused from the position that he had actually practiced deception on the complainant at the time he approached him for taking this money. 6. Against the above, the contention of Mr. Braj Kishore Prasad No. 2 representing the opposite party is that from the facts of the case there is no escape for the accused from the position that he had actually practiced deception on the complainant at the time he approached him for taking this money. He has urged that his approach to the complainant was at 5 P.M. that day by which time the Bank had closed and he could not issue in his favour a cheque of that day, i.e. 2.7.1970. Moreover, the accused must be deemed to have been aware of the depletion of his account in the Bank so that he had no money there to cover the cheque of Rs.1200/- which he was to issue in his favour to repay that advance. In such a circumstance, his representation to the complainant that the amount that he had taken from him, he was going to repay by issuing that cheque in his favour of the very next day, i.e., 3.7.1970 clearly giving out that it would be cashed as soon as it was presented to the Bank because the amount at his credit was sufficient to cover it, was nothing but a fraudulent presentation on his behalf with the obvious object of deceiving him. Moreover, his such deceitful intention is also clear from the fact that the complainant's approach to him for being paid back the amount did not bear any effective response from the accused and the money still remains unpaid. 7. As it appears to me, it will be inexpedient to try to express any definite opinion at this preliminary stage about the merit or otherwise of the aforesaid contentions addressed by the two sides. They are matters which, I think, are to be appropriately decided during the trial on the materials the parties choose to furnish to the court to prove or disprove them. Any attempt on the part of this Court to try to decide about it at this intermediary stage will be manifestly premature. The case is still to be tried on merit. At the present moment only the charge has been framed against the accused by the Magistrate on his being prima facie satisfied about its necessity on the materials placed by the prosecution for the purpose. 3. The case is still to be tried on merit. At the present moment only the charge has been framed against the accused by the Magistrate on his being prima facie satisfied about its necessity on the materials placed by the prosecution for the purpose. 3. In making the instant prayer of quashing the petitioner has invoked the inherent powers of this Court under section 482 of the Code which authorises the Court to make such orders as may be considered necessary to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or other wise to secure the ends of justice. The Supreme Court in the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab on the point of exercise of this power observed that ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code and the High Court will be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. Their Lordships, by way of illustration, have, however, favoured the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction of the Court in cases where the allegations in the petition of complaint even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged because in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises and it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In the instant case, on the obtaining facts it is difficult to hold with the petitioner that on the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not make the offence alleged. I have already referred to the allegations' as they have been made in the complaint petition. Not only that, the prosecution has also examined 5 witnesses, including the complainant, in the case, who have given their evidence on oath to support those allegations in the complaint. The dishonored cheque with the connected papers have been brought on the record, as exhibits. It is after consideration of all those materials that the Magistrate has felt satisfied about the establishment of a prima facie charge against the accused and has framed the charge accordingly against him. The accused's opportunity to meet that charge and demolish it by furnishing the court with necessary materials is fully there. It is after consideration of all those materials that the Magistrate has felt satisfied about the establishment of a prima facie charge against the accused and has framed the charge accordingly against him. The accused's opportunity to meet that charge and demolish it by furnishing the court with necessary materials is fully there. The question whether the accused had any intention of deceiving the complainant while trying to make him part with the aforesaid money on the representation so made by him which he could not have ordinarily done but for that, representation is a question of fact which will necessarily have to be decided after full materials have been placed before the Magistrate during the trial for which, as already observed, full opportunity is still available to the accused. 9. The three decisions, namely, (i) N.K. Shaw V. Suresh Chandra Mitter (ii) The State of Kerala V. A. Pareed Pillai and another and (iii) R.P. Poddar and others V. Dr. M.P. Sinha on which reliance has been placed for the petitioner to have this prosecution quashed would not appear to be helpful. The facts thereof are quite different and distinguishable from the present facts. Because of the marked difference of facts it does not seem necessary to discuss any of these cases in any detail here. There is nothing in these authorities which would justify the quashing of the present case on its facts. On the other hand, the single Judge decision of the Oudh High Court in Kunwar Sen Vs. Emperor relied upon by the opposite party, appears to be more appropriately attracted. In that case, learned Judge held that where the failure to meet payment of the cheque is not accidental the person issuing the cheque would be presumed to have been aware that the cheques would be dishonored and the drawer can be rightly convicted under section 420, Indian Penal Code. I would, however, like to repeat that the question whether non-payment under the cheque due to absence of sufficient money in the account of the accused was accidental or intentional is a question of fact of whose determination has to be made in the trial on the evidence brought on the record. 10. I would, however, like to repeat that the question whether non-payment under the cheque due to absence of sufficient money in the account of the accused was accidental or intentional is a question of fact of whose determination has to be made in the trial on the evidence brought on the record. 10. On the above consideration, I have, therefore no doubt in my mind that at this preliminary stage it is not a fit case in which this Court, in exercise of its extraordinary power, should try to interfere with the proceedings so taken out against the accused for which the Magistrate, on the strength of prima facie evidence before him, has framed the charge as above. This case has to be left out to be fought on merit by the two sides in the trial. 11. Mr. Prasad has also suggested the dismissal of this application on the ground that though it has been given a garb of a petition under section 482 of the Code, it is actually a revisional petition which it is open to him to file in this Court under section 397 of the Code. According to him, since under sub-section (2) of this section 397 the filing of such a revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in a trial is barred, the petitioner has purposely labeled it under section 482 of the Code to circumvent this bar in its maintainability. There seems substance in this contention. 12. As already noticed, the trial court has just framed the charge against the accused in its order dated 11.4.1974. After framing the charge it adjourned the case to 29.6.1974 for evidence in the case. Without trying to participate in the further proceedings of the trial the accused filed the instant application on 15.5.1974 which was admitted on 20.5.1974. In paragraph 7 of this application, while making mention of the charge so framed against him by the Magistrate, it has been averred that it was because of this that he was filing this petition in Criminal Miscellaneous for quashing the prosecution pending against him. From these averments, inference deducible is that it is the framing of this charge against the accused that has made him move this Court to get rid of it. No doubt, in the relief portion he has prayed for the quashing of the prosecution so pending against him. From these averments, inference deducible is that it is the framing of this charge against the accused that has made him move this Court to get rid of it. No doubt, in the relief portion he has prayed for the quashing of the prosecution so pending against him. This enlarged prayer would not seem to be of such consequence in this behalf inasmuch as from his aforesaid averment in paragraph 7 of the petition, he is, at present, taken to be mainly aggrieved with this charge as framed. Since, however, his revision against that charge, which has to be treated as an interlocutory order passed in the case at this stage, could not be entertained in view of the above bar provided in sub-section (2) of section 397, he seems to have taken to this device of entitling the petition to be one under section 432 of the Code to overcome it. In this view of the matter also, the maintainability of this petition would appear to be doubtful. 13. For the reasons stated above, I am inclined to think that the proceeding so taken out against the accused does not deserve to be interfered with at this early stage land should be allowed to continue to be finally concluded on merit in accordance with law. This application, therefore, must fail and is dismissed. Before concluding I must however, observe that whatever I have said above they are meant for the disposal of this application and they should not in any way prejudice the case of any party in the trial which must be heard and decided on its merit uninfluenced by these observations. Application dismissed.