Judgment :- VEERASWAMI 1. The matter is placed before us by the Master for a decision on the proper court fee payable on the Memorandum of appeal. The appellants land was requisitioned under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immoveable Property Act, 1932. Aggrieved by the alleged inadequacy of compensation under S. 8 as determined by the Arbitrator, the appeal has been preferred under S. 11. The contention is that as this Act makes a difference between requisitioning and acquisition, it should be borne in mind in determining the scope of S. 51 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act. 2. S. 3 of the Requisitioning Act provides for the power to requisition any immovable property and on such requisitioning, the appropriate authority can under S. 4 take possession. Rights over the requisitioned property are defined by S. 5. Release from requisitioning is made under S. 6. Where the property requisitioned needs to be acquired for a public purpose, power therefor is found in S. 7 S. 8 provides the principles and method of determining the compensation and in this section no difference is made between requisitioning and acquisition, though Cl. (c) of sub-S. (1) does refer to the property requisitioned or acquired. S. 11 which provides for appeals is common to both compensation for requisitioning and acquisition. It is clear, therefore, that, so far as the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immoveable Property is concerned, the concepts of requisitioning and acquisition are distinct and different with different results and the quantum of compensation, vis-a-vis S. 8 may also be not identical. 3. But, the question is whether this difference, as is contended for, should be carried into S. 51 of the Court Fees Act. In our opinion, there is no warrant for it. The plain Dictionary meaning of acquisition as given in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary is ‘come into possession of.’ The object of the Court fees Act is to assess court fee on certain principles and, so far as compensation is concerned, the ad valorem rate applies to a memorandum of appeal relating to such a claim. In there any substantial reason why for purposes of assessing court fee, compensation for requisitioning and that for acquisition should be treated differently? In there any substantial reason why for purposes of assessing court fee, compensation for requisitioning and that for acquisition should be treated differently? As far as we are able to see from the standpoint of court fee on a memorandum of appeal, no justification on any conceivable ground presents itself for acceptance. The section dealt with compensation in respect of acquisition of property for public purposes. Acquisition is a very broad term which may comprehend within itself mere taking of possession or short of it, for use as in the case of a licence, or it may result in deprivation of property in the sense that the title itself is extinguished and vested in the acquiring authority. The word acquisition in S. 51 in our opinion is used in the proper sense of taking, which may mean any one or more of the elements, which as a bundle constitute property. So long as the power of getting at the property is in exercise of the power of eminent domain , it does not matter for purposes of S. 51, whether it is the prime domain or the property or any part of element which goes into the concept of property as generally understood. We are, therefore, inclined to think that S. 51 of the Court fees Act covers the memorandum of appeal which relates to compensation for requisitioning of property. 4. It is argued for the appellant that though the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immoveable Property Act speaks of compensation for requisitioning, in fact, such compensation is but rent and therefore the proper section in the Court fees Act to be applied in S. 43. We are unable to accept this stand because requisitioning under the Act does not involve bringing into existence the relationship of landlord and tenant. S. 43 therefore cannot be applied to the appeal memorandum. 5. Our attention was invited to Rama chandran v. State of Madras 1974-2-M.L.J. 313; 87 L.W. 791 a decision of a learned single Judge of this Court. But that case did not decide the point which we are called upon to settle. It is one on a different basis. So too, S.G. Bhagade v. Special Dy Collector, Ahmednagar A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1887, is not of assistance in deciding the above point. 6. It is true that this Court has struck down Art. I Sch. But that case did not decide the point which we are called upon to settle. It is one on a different basis. So too, S.G. Bhagade v. Special Dy Collector, Ahmednagar A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1887, is not of assistance in deciding the above point. 6. It is true that this Court has struck down Art. I Sch. I of the Court fees Act as invalid in a recent judgment. But, at the moment, what will be the quantum of fee that will be payable, we are not concerned with. All that we hold at the moment is that S. 51 of the Court fees and Suits Valuation Act applies to the appeal memorandum.