JUDGEMENT 1. This is an application under Section 482, Cr. P.C. for quashing the proceedings in Cr. Case No. 610-A of 1974 State v. Ganga Pd. and others pending in the court of Sri D.V. Sharma, First Addl. Munsif-Magistrate, Etah. In this case a first information report was lodged and investigation was made by a Sub-Inspector of Police, who submitted a final report under Section 169, Cr. P.C. The learned Magistrate, however instead of accepting the final report, passed the following order on 17-7-1974 : "Let accused be summoned for 27-9-1974 under Sections 147, 323, 452 and 352, I.P.C." There is no dispute on the point that the Magistrate had not taken cognizance under Section 190(1)(b), Cr. P.C. but had taken cognizance under Section 190(1)(c) of the Code. 2. Learned counsel for the applicants has argued that it was not open under the new Cr. P.C. to take cognizance by the Magistrate under Section 190(1)(c) on the basis of police papers and final report as the word 'suspicion' which occurred in Section 190(1)(c), Cr. P.C. (Old) has been deleted. Section 190(1)(c), Cr. P.C. (New) reads as follows : "(1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the First Class, and any Magistrate of the Second Class specially empowered in this behalf under Sub-Section (2), may take cognizance of any offence. ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge that such offence has been committed." The controversy has been finally settled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Misra, AIR 1968 SC 117 : (1968 Cri LJ 97). It was held in that case that a Magistrate could not direct the police to submit the charge-sheet under Section 190(1)(b) but it was open to the Magistrate not to accept the final report submitted by the police and to take cognizance himself under Section 190(1)(c), Cr. P.C. In this respect the relevant observations made by the Supreme Court at page 123 are as follows : "There is certainly no obligation, on the Magistrate, to accept the report, if he does not agree with the opinion formed by the police. P.C. In this respect the relevant observations made by the Supreme Court at page 123 are as follows : "There is certainly no obligation, on the Magistrate, to accept the report, if he does not agree with the opinion formed by the police. Under those circumstances, if he still suspects that the offence has been committed, he is entitled, notwithstanding the opinion of the police, to take cognizance under Section 190(1)(c) of the Code............… It is open to the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(c), on the ground that, after having due regard to the final report and the police records placed before him, he has reason to suspect that an offence has been committed." Shri Tejpal, learned counsel for the applicants has vehemently argued on the basis of these observations that the Supreme Court obviously said that cognizance could have been taken on suspicion when the police papers and the final report were before the Magistrate and that is why the Supreme Court had used the word 'suspect'. According to him, after the word 'suspicion' has been deleted from clause (c) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 190, Cr. P.C., it is not open to the Magistrate to take cognizance on the basis of the police papers and the final report. In the present case, it is alleged that there was no protest petition and no other information before the Magistrate apart from the police papers and the final report. 3. Sri Sushil Kumar, learned Addl. Govt. Advocate, has conceded that cognizance in the present case was not taken upon information received from any person other than the police officer. He has argued that in the present case it could be said that the Magistrate had taken cognizance upon his own knowledge derived from the police papers and the final report which were before him. According to him, 'own knowledge' is wider than 'personal knowledge' and it includes 'knowledge' derived from documents. He has argued that in the present case it could be said that the Magistrate had taken cognizance upon his own knowledge derived from the police papers and the final report which were before him. According to him, 'own knowledge' is wider than 'personal knowledge' and it includes 'knowledge' derived from documents. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on the case of Dwarika Nath v. Income-tax Officer, Kanpur, ( AIR 1966 SC 81 ) in which their Lordships of the Supreme Court made the following observations while considering the words 'own knowledge' in the context of swearing of affidavits : "Deponent's own knowledge in Rule 1(2) of Chapter XXII of the Rules is wide enough to apprehend the knowledge of the appellant derived from a perusal of the relevant documents : and the affidavit in express terms disclosed and specified the documents, the source of the appellant's knowledge. He swore in the affidavit that the documents annexed to the affidavit were true copies of public documents....... It is, therefore, not correct to say that the facts stated in the affidavit are not based on the deponent's knowledge." 4. Learned counsel for the applicants has tried to distinguish this case on the ground that it did not lay down the law about 'own knowledge' in the context of Section 190(1)(c), Cr. P.C. He has also argued that these observations were in the nature of obiter dicta as their Lordships of the Supreme Court had also observed "that apart if the affidavit was defective in any manner the High Court, instead of dismissing the petition in limine, should have given the appellant a reasonable opportunity to file a better affidavit complying with the provisions of Rule 1 of Chapter XXII of the Rules". Many other defects were also pointed out in the affidavits and as such the Supreme Court had made these later observations. I do not think that the earlier observations were obiter dicta. Even if they were in the nature of obiter dicta, that can have the binding effect under Art.141 of the Constitution as was held by this Court in the case of Union of India v. Firm Ramgopal Hukum Chand, ( AIR 1960 All 672 ). I do not think that the earlier observations were obiter dicta. Even if they were in the nature of obiter dicta, that can have the binding effect under Art.141 of the Constitution as was held by this Court in the case of Union of India v. Firm Ramgopal Hukum Chand, ( AIR 1960 All 672 ). In view of the aforesaid observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, it can be said that in the present case the Magistrate could have derived knowledge on the basis of the police papers and the final report submitted under Section 169, Cr. P.C. I do not think that by using the word 'suspect' in the case reported in AIR 1968 SC 117 (supra), the Supreme Court had intended that the Magistrate cannot derive 'own knowledge' on the basis of the police papers and the final report and under such circumstances, he could proceed only on the basis of suspicion. 5. Learned counsel for the applicants also placed reliance on the case of A.K. Roy v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 Cal 135 : ((1962) 1 Cri LJ 285) (FB). In that case it was held that when a Magistrate acts on the basis of the police papers and the final report submitted under Section 173, Cr. P.C., he acts under Section 190(1)(b), Cr. P.C. On this point it cannot be considered to be good law as their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held subsequently in AIR 1968 SC 117 : (1968 Cri LJ 97) (supra) that the Magistrate takes cognizance under Section 190(1)(c), Cr. P.C. if he does not accept the final report. In paragraph 15 it is wrongly reported *that the Magistrate can take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(b), notwithstanding the contrary opinion of the police, expressed in the final report. A Division Bench of this Court had occasion to verify it from the original judgement and had observed that Section 190(1)(b) was wrongly reported for the Section 190(1)(c) which exists in the original judgement (vide Ram Chandra v. State of U.P., AIR 1971 All 155 *: (1970 All LJ 1361) : (1971 Cri LJ 578). A Division Bench of this Court had occasion to verify it from the original judgement and had observed that Section 190(1)(b) was wrongly reported for the Section 190(1)(c) which exists in the original judgement (vide Ram Chandra v. State of U.P., AIR 1971 All 155 *: (1970 All LJ 1361) : (1971 Cri LJ 578). Learned counsel for the applicants has also placed reliance on the case of Lal Bihari Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1929 Pat 514 : (31 Cri LJ 55) in which it was held that the expression 'upon his own knowledge' does not include 'knowledge' gained from a police report. In my opinion that authority cannot be considered to be good law in view of the Supreme Court decision in AIR 1968 SC 117 : (1968 Cri LJ 97) (supra). 6. In my opinion the word 'suspicion' means mere suspicion for which purpose no cogent evidence or documents need be produced before the Magistrate. The Legislature rightly considered that it was not proper to allow a Magistrate to take cognizance on the basis of mere suspicion and so the word 'suspicion' was deleted. But a Magistrate can still take cognizance upon his own knowledge which includes personal knowledge as well as knowledge derived from documents including police papers and final report. 7. No other point was argued before me. 8. The petition is accordingly dismissed. It is, however, made clear that cognizance shall be deemed to have been taken under Section 190(1)(c), Cr. P.C. and the provisions of Section 190(1)(c), Cr. P.C. will apply. Application dismissed.