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1975 DIGILAW 205 (KER)

VENUGOPAL v. STATE OF KERALA

1975-08-08

P.GOVINDA NAIR, T.KOCHU THOMMEN

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Judgment :- 1. This appeal is from the judgment dismissing O. P. No. 5157 of 1970 by the 1st petitioner therein. Petitioners 2 to 6 in the original petition are respondents 3 to 7 in this appeal. The appellant and respondents 3 to 7 were selected by the Public Service Commission on 2nd July 1964 pursuant to a notification dated 4th November 1963 issued by the Public Service Commission for appointment as Assistant Registrars in the Co-operative Department. Two other persons were also chosen at the same selection; one Thomas and another Surendran. They were appointed and deputed for training and afterwards were given the pay scale of R.310-600, one of the revised pay scales applicable to Assistant Registrars. The appellant and respondents 3 to 7 who were appointed after 1st July 1968 on which date the revised pay scales came into force were granted only the other and the lower pay scale fixed by the order of Government applicable to persons directly recruited as Assistant Registrars in the Co-operative Department. There were two scales of pay applicable to Assistant Registrars of the Co-operative Department; Rs. 310-600 for Assistant Registrar appointed by transfer from the category of Senior Inspectors and Rs.250-600 for those appointed as Assistant Registrars by direct recruitment. The special rules applicable provided for appointment of Senior Inspectors by transfer as Assistant Registrars In fact, most of the places of Assistant Registrars were to be taken up by Senior Inspectors; only 25 per cent being reserved for direct recruits. We may also mention that before the revision of pay scales the Senior Inspectors were on the grade of Rs. 190-300 with an allowance of Rs. 30. As a result of the revision, the pay scale was enhanced to Rs. 225 450. 2. Two points have been raised by counsel on behalf of the appellant which were raided before the learned single judge as well: (1) The granting of the scale of Rs. 310-600 to the two persons, Thomas and Surendran who stood in all respects in the same footing as the appellant and respondents 3 to 7, is discriminatory and (2) the fixation of two scales of pay for Assistant Registrars who have to discharge the same functions and duties is also discriminatory and violative of Art.16 of the Constitution. 3. The reason trotted out in the counter-affidavit for granting the pay scale of Rs. 3. The reason trotted out in the counter-affidavit for granting the pay scale of Rs. 310-600 to Thomas and Surendran is that they were appointed before 1st July 1968, the date on which the new pay scales came into operation. 1 his reasoning does not appeal to us That those two persons stood on the same footing, as the appellant and respondents 3 to 7, is not denied The only difference sought to be made out is that their appointments were before 1st July 1968. It is very doubtful whether on this basis alone the higher pay scales of Rs 310 600 could have been given to them. We do not wish to say anything more. The two persons Thomas and Surendran are not parties to either the original petition or this appeal and we do not wish to say anything categorical without giving them a chance of being heard. The grant of the higher scales of pay to the above two persons the justifiability of which is doubtful cannot form the basis of claims for equal treatment put forward by the appellant. We reject the first contention. 4. Turning now to the second point urged by counsel, a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court have been placed before us. S. G. Faisinghani v. Union of India and others AIR. 1967 S. C. 1427 dealt with the question whether there can be different rules in the matter of promotion of persons who were in the same cadre though they might have reached the cadre by different routes or might be differently qualified. It was ruled that there could be none. The same view has been taken in the decision relied on in S M. Pandit & others v. The State of Gujarat and others AIR 1972 S. C. 252 and in Ramachandra Shankar Deodhar and others v. The State of Maharashtra and others AIR. 1974 S. C 259. So also in Meruun Continho and others v. Collector of Customs, Bombay & others AIR. 1967 S C. 52 and in Roshan Lal Tandon and another v. Union of India and others AIR 1967 S. C 1889. We may however note that the decision in S G. Faisinghani v. Union of India and others AIR. 1974 S. C 259. So also in Meruun Continho and others v. Collector of Customs, Bombay & others AIR. 1967 S C. 52 and in Roshan Lal Tandon and another v. Union of India and others AIR 1967 S. C 1889. We may however note that the decision in S G. Faisinghani v. Union of India and others AIR. 1967 S. C. 1427 is also authority for the proposition that "The concept of equality in the matter of promotion can be predicated only when the promotees are drawn from the same source. If the preferential treatment of one source in relation to the other is based on the differences between the said two sources, and the said differences have a reasonable relation to the nature of the office or offices to which recruitment is made, the said recruitment can legitimately be sustained on the basis of a valid classification". The quest must therefore be to find out whether there is an intelligible difference perceptible which has relation to the object of providing two scales of pay. The pleadings in this regard is neither full nor satisfactory. But certain facts have been placed before us by counsel on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 which seem to be incontrovertible. We have already adverted to some of these, namely, that 75 percent of the vacancies in the cadre of Assistant Registrars were to go to Senior Inspectors and that the Inspectors were, before the pay revision, in the scale of Rs 190-300 with an allowance of Rs. 30. Their revised pay scale which came into force from 1st July 1968 was Rs. 225-450. Promotions would naturally continue even after 1st July 1968 and many of the Inspectors it is conceivable would have been drawing more than Rs 250. (at the time they were appointed by transfer as Assistant Registrars) which is the starting salary in the scale applicable to Assistant Registrars directly recruited. It is also possible to posit that most of these Inspectors would have had substantial service in the department We consider that those differences would afford substantial reasons for grouping these Senior Inspectors, who form the only other source from which Assistant Registrars are to be appointed in the Co-operative Department, separately and treating them differently. An additional starting pay for them of Rs. 50 more is therefore justified. An additional starting pay for them of Rs. 50 more is therefore justified. It is not as though whenever two scales of pay are made applicable to the same post Art.16 would be attracted. The Supreme Court considered this question very briefly in the decision in Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City I v. S. P. Fain AIR. 1962 S. C. 1139 and observed in Para.3 as follows. "The only other contention raised is that there is discrimination between Class I and Class II Officers inasmuch as though they do the same kind of work their pay scales are different. This, it is said, violates Art.14 of the Constitution. If this contention had any validity, there could be no incremental scales of pay fixed dependent on the duration of an officer's service. The abstract doctrine of equal pay for equal work has nothing to do with Art.14. The contention that Art.14 of the Constitution has been violated therefore also fails". Brief as these observations are they seem to be conclusive as well. The reasons which we have said support the classification. In this view, it is unnecessary to. refer to the decisions in Unikat Sankunni Menon v. The State of Rajasthan AIR. 1968 S C. 81, State of Mysore and another v. P. Narasing Rao AIR. 1968 S. C. 349 and Purshottam Lal and others v. Union of India and another AIR. 1973 S. C. 1088 relied on by counsel for respondents 1 and 2. 5. We see no grounds to interfere with the judgment under appeal. We dismiss the Writ Appeal and direct the parties to bear their respective costs. Dismissed.