Judgment 1. This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India by the Managing Committee of Rama Nand Uchch Vidyalay for issuing a writ quashing the order passed by the Chairman of the Bihar Secondary Education Board (hereinafter called the Board) derecognising the said school. 2. It is said that the school was recognised for imparting education upto the matriculation standard. The Headmaster of this school, one Ramashrey Singh was, however, found to have defalcated some amount belonging to the school and was dismissed on that account. His dismissal was approved by the Education authorities and ultimately he started another school bearing the same name as the petitioners school. He also manipulated things and brought into collusion the officers of the Board and ultimately got the order withdrawing recognition of this school and for recognition of his own school. It is further said that in this background a notice was sent to the petitioner containing certain charges and calling upon it to meet them. Enquiry was made into this matter by the Block Education Extension Officer who found the allegations to be wrong. Yet, the Chairman of the Board passed the order contained in Annexure-2 dated the 22nd of March, 1975, by which he withdrew recognition of this school and permitted the school started by the aforesaid Ramashrey Singh to function and the question of its recognition to be taken up. It is also said that the Chairmans order purported to be under Sec.31 (2) of the Bihar Secondary Education Board Ordinance, 1974, (Bihar Ordinance 112 of 1974), hereinafter to be referred to as the Ordinance, and hence an appeal was filed by the Managing Committee of the school as provided in Sec.31 (3) of the Ordinance. But the Government not having appointed any authority to hear the appeal, it has not been heard and in spite of a reminder and a legal notice served on the Government to dispose of the matter, it has not been done and, therefore, the petitioner had no remedy but to come to this Court. Hence, the present application. 3. But the Government not having appointed any authority to hear the appeal, it has not been heard and in spite of a reminder and a legal notice served on the Government to dispose of the matter, it has not been done and, therefore, the petitioner had no remedy but to come to this Court. Hence, the present application. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner raised two points before me - firstly, that under the Ordinance the Chairman had no jurisdiction to withdraw the recognition granted to the school, the power being exercisable by the Board and not by him and, secondly, that the order is mala fide at the instance of Ramashrey Singh who was heard in respect of the matter and influenced the decision of the Chairman. 4. On the other hand, it has been contended on behalf of the Board that the present application is not maintainable as the appeal before the Government is still pending secondly, that the question of mala fide cannot be gone into in the absence of Ramashrey Singh who has not been impleaded in this petition and, thirdly, it has been said that the decision was that of the Board and not of the Chairman. 5. It appears that the question of maintainability depends upon the question as to whether there was a competent appeal and the decision on this question depends upon the answer to the question as to whether the decision was that of the Board or of the Chairman. I will, therefore, first address myself to this question. When the writ application was heard the other day, counsel for the Board was not in a position to say as to whether the decision was that of the Board or of the Chairman by virtue of any delegation of authority to the latter. Since then a supplementary affidavit has been filed, in which it is said that the decision was taken by the Board itself. Along with the supplementary affidavit copy of a resolution passed by the Board on the 5th of September, 1974, has been produced. It reads as follows:- "Ramanand Uchch Vidyalay, Rampur Pratapur (Chapra) kee samasya tatha shikshakon ke betan bhugtan ke prashn par vichar kiya gaya. Is sambandh me nimnankit nirnaye liye gaye:- 1. Adhyadesh kee dhara 31 (2) ke anusar purane vidyalaye Rampur Pratappur kee swikriti wapas karne ke sambandh me karrawai kee jaye. It reads as follows:- "Ramanand Uchch Vidyalay, Rampur Pratapur (Chapra) kee samasya tatha shikshakon ke betan bhugtan ke prashn par vichar kiya gaya. Is sambandh me nimnankit nirnaye liye gaye:- 1. Adhyadesh kee dhara 31 (2) ke anusar purane vidyalaye Rampur Pratappur kee swikriti wapas karne ke sambandh me karrawai kee jaye. 6 Naye asthan me asthapit vidyalaye kee manyata ke sambandh me niyamanusar awashyak karrawai kee jaye." In pursuance of this resolution, it is said, the order of withdrawal of recognition was conveyed by the Chairman. I am afraid this order is not open to this interpretation. It will appear that it was on the 5th of September, 1974, that this resolution was passed. If this were the final order withdrawing recognition, nothing was required to be done thereafter by the Chairman or no discretion was left to him to withdraw or not to withdraw recognition. It appears, however, that notice was issued to the petitioner on the 20th of September, 1974, calling upon it to answer certain charges, thereafter parties were heard and the charges were found by the Chairman to have been established, and in pursuance of that the Chairman passed the order on the 22nd of March, 1975. It is thus obvious that the order of withdrawal of recognition was passed by the Chairman and was not a communication of the order of the Board to the school authorities; on the other hand, it was an exercise of the discretion by the Chairman himself. 7. Reading the aforesaid resolution it is obvious that it says that action be taken in connection with the withdrawal of recognition of the school. It does not say that the Board withdraws the recognition granted to the school. If this were the final order and meant to be communicated, it should have contained a direction to somebody to communicate the order in question. On the other hand, it was not so rather it was obviously a direction not to anybody in particular to start proceeding in respect of the withdrawal of recognition of the school and that is exactly what was done. It was thus obviously for initiating rather than a decision on the very question. I am unable, therefore, to construe it as a final decision of the Board. 8. In view of the aforesaid, it was not an order under Sec.31 (2) of the Ordinance. It was thus obviously for initiating rather than a decision on the very question. I am unable, therefore, to construe it as a final decision of the Board. 8. In view of the aforesaid, it was not an order under Sec.31 (2) of the Ordinance. A reference to Sec.31 of the Ordinance would show that the Board has to review the cases of schools, which have been recognised every three years or even before that, it necessary, to find out whether the schools are complying with the conditions laid down for the grant of recognition and whether they are maintaining the standard of teaching and discipline required or not. Sub-section (2) thereof provides that if as a result of the review or for any other good and sufficient reason the Board is of opinion that recognition granted to a school should be withdrawn and the name of that school removed from the register of recognised school, it shall have the authority to do so. Sub-section (3) of the section provides that if a person be aggrieved by the decision of the Board under sub-section (2), he will have the right to make an appeal to the State Government within a period of one month of the notice of the aforesaid decision and the decision of the State Government shall be final. It will thus appear that the appeal is provided against the orders passed under sub-section (2) of Sec.31 of the Ordinance. If the order does not come within the aforesaid sub-section, there is no appeal competent under sub-section (3). In the present case, it was not a final decision of the Board that the recognition of the school be withdrawn and consequently its name removed from the register of recognised schools. The pendency of the appeal before the Government would thus not be a bar to the maintainability of the present application. 9. There is another aspect of the matter which requires mention at this stage and that is this. The Government is sitting tight over the appeal. It is nearly 7 months since the order was passed and nearly 6 months since the order was appealed against. The effect of the impugned order is to debar students of this school from enjoying the privileges to which they would be entitled and, particularly, to sit at the matriculation examination. The Government is sitting tight over the appeal. It is nearly 7 months since the order was passed and nearly 6 months since the order was appealed against. The effect of the impugned order is to debar students of this school from enjoying the privileges to which they would be entitled and, particularly, to sit at the matriculation examination. The State Government cannot be allowed in circumstances like the present ones to keep the appeal pending for a long period. The petitioner sent a reminder to the State Government and not only that, it sent a lawyers notice to the Government and yet the Government does not appear to have moved into the matter. Where remedy is not effective, this Court may not entertain it as a bar to the maintainability of a writ application. Even from that point of view, I find that this petition, in the circumstances aforesaid, would be maintainable. 10. I would now come to the question as to whether the impugned order is without jurisdiction. Having held that it was not the order of the Board which was communicated by the Chairman and that it was an order passed in exercise of his own discretion, it is obvious that he had no jurisdiction to do so. A reference to Sec.15 (5) of the Ordinance would show that the power to withdraw recognition vests in the Board. The Chairmans powers are given in Sec.17 and it is not within his competence to withdraw recognition of a school. There is however, Sec.16 of the Ordinance which provides for delegation of such an authority by the Board to the Chairman but this delegation has to be made by notification in the official gazette and further with the previous approval of the State Government. In the present case, it has not been suggested on behalf of the Board either that the resolution aforesaid has been published in the gazette or that the previous approval of the State Government had been obtained for the purpose of this delegation of authority to the Chairman. If, at all, it be considered to be a delegation of authority. 11. There is another impediment to the validity of this order if it be assumed to be of the Board itself. In that case it cannot be disputed that the Board, as such, had not delegated the power to the Chairman at all. If, at all, it be considered to be a delegation of authority. 11. There is another impediment to the validity of this order if it be assumed to be of the Board itself. In that case it cannot be disputed that the Board, as such, had not delegated the power to the Chairman at all. The Board did not hear the parties nor went into the allegations and counter-allegations which were to be heard and adjudicated. There is not the slightest difficulty about the nature of this power being considered as a judicial function. The order, it at all it be taken to be the Boards order, would be in violation of the principles of natural justice and, therefore, fit to be quashed on that ground alone. 12. As has been stated earlier, the notice on the petitioner was served much later than the resolution of the Board. The parties were also heard thereafter. A subsequent hearing given to the petitioner would not improve the order which had been passed earlier without such a hearing and ex parte. There was thus no application of the mind of the Board at all to the charges and counter-charges. Even if the order be considered to be that of the Board, it was still arbitrary apart from one violating the principles of natural justice as it was not based on any consideration of the cases of the parties concerned. 13. In view of the fact that the order appears to be without jurisdiction, it is not necessary to go into the question of mala fides. 14. I would accordingly set aside the order passed by the Chairman withdrawing recognition of the school. Let a writ be issued accordingly. It will, however, be open to the Board to proceed in the manner, required by law if it wished to pursue the matter. 15. In the result the application is allowed. In the circumstances of the case, however, I will make no order as to cost.