JUDGMENT : Mohd. Hamid Hussain, J. The applicant Arun Kumar has moved this application u/s 561-A (old)/482 (new) of the Code of Criminal Procedure with the prayer that he should be given the benefit of Section 4 of the U.P. First Offenders Probation Act, 1958, and be directed to be released on probation of good conduct. A true copy of the School Certificate of the applicant is Annexure I to the affidavit of Sukh Lal filed in support of this application. 2. The facts giving rise to this application are that Arun Kumar and Ashok Kumar were tried in Sessions Trials Nos. 87 and 132 of 1970 for having robbed one Keshav of Rs. 117/-on 14-10-69 at about 9.30 P.M. At the time of the incident Arun Kumar pressed a knife on the chest of Keshav while Ashok Kumar relieved Keshav from his bush shirt of a sum of Rs. 117/-. After the incident Arun Kumar and Ashok Kumar ran away from the scene. On the alarm raised by the victim, Head Constable Ram Bahadur Shukla and Constable Ram Bharosey, who were on patrol duty, succeeded in arresting Arun Kumar and Ashok Kumar near the Booking Office of a private bus stand, and on search of their persons a knife was recovered from the pyjama pocket of Arun Kumar, and Rs. 117/- in currency notes were recovered from the pant's pocket of Ashok Kumar. 3. After the conclusion of the investigation and the magisterial enquiry Arun Kumar and Ashok Kumar were committed to the Court of Sessions to stand their trial. Arun Kumar and Ashok Kumar were both charged u/s 392 IPC. Arun Kumar was further" charged u/s 27 of the Arms Act. 4. Arun Kumar and Ashok Kumar pleaded not guilty and gave a counter-version. According to them Keshav used to commit sodomy on them. On the day of occurrence Keshav had committed sodomy on Arun Kumar and Ashok Kumar and offered them Rs. 5/-while they demanded a sum of Rs. 20/-and by way of joke they snatched the money from the hand of Keshav and ran away, and Keshav lodged a false report. 5. The trial court did not accept the counter-version and found the prosecution evidence reliable, and accordingly convicted Arun Kumar and Ashok Kumar u/s 392 IPC and sentenced each of them to 3 year's RI. 20/-and by way of joke they snatched the money from the hand of Keshav and ran away, and Keshav lodged a false report. 5. The trial court did not accept the counter-version and found the prosecution evidence reliable, and accordingly convicted Arun Kumar and Ashok Kumar u/s 392 IPC and sentenced each of them to 3 year's RI. The trial court further convicted Arun Kumar u/s 27 of the Arms Act for being in possession of a knife and sentenced him to one year's RI. The two sentences of 3 year's RI and one year's RI respectively of Arun Kumar were directed to run concurrently. 6. Cr. A. No. 378 of 1971 was preferred by Arun Kumar as well as by Ashok Kumar, in the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court at Lucknow. This appeal came up for hearing before Hon'ble D.S. Mathur, C.J. who dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction and respective sentences of Arun Kumar and Ashok Kumar by his judgment and order dated 19-7-74. At the end of the judgment Hon'ble D.S. Mathur, C.J. observed that: Nothing has even now been brought to my notice which may justify releasing the Appellants on probation or taking a lenient view in awarding the sentences. 7. After more than 2-1/2 months of the dismissal of the appeal the present application u/s 561-A (old)/482 (new) Code of Criminal Procedure was filed in Court on 11-10-74. This application was directed to be laid before Hon'ble D.S. Mathur, C.J. on 15-10-74. The order sheet of this application bears the following orders passed by Hon'ble D.S. Mathur, C.J.: 15-10-74 Hon. Mathur, C.J. Put up tomarrow. Learned Counsel for Petitioner shall serve a copy of the application to the learned Government Advocate today. Sd/- D.S.M. 16-10-74 Hon'ble Mathur, C.J. List when I am sitting alone. Sd/- D.S.M. 29-10-74 Hon'ble Mathur, C.J. From the school certificate it appears that Arun Kumar had left the school in May 1967. The present crime was committed on 4-10-1969 about 2-1/2 years after he left the school. It is said that Arun Kumar's sister was too poor and could not afford to pay the fees and therefore he left the school. It was also said that he was studying privately. List for orders on November 11, 1974. Supplementary affidavit can be filed mean-while to indicate what Arun Kumar was doing since May 1967. It is said that Arun Kumar's sister was too poor and could not afford to pay the fees and therefore he left the school. It was also said that he was studying privately. List for orders on November 11, 1974. Supplementary affidavit can be filed mean-while to indicate what Arun Kumar was doing since May 1967. He has to satisfy the Court that he was behaving nicely and was not simply roaming about. Sd/- S.D.M. 12-11-74. Hon'ble Mathur, C.J. After the conclusion of Arguments in the Criminal Appeal dictation of judgment was postponed by two or three days to enable the Advocate to obtain instructions which may indicate whether the present was a suitable case for release of the Appellant on probation under the U.P. First Offenders Probation Act. Longer time could not be given because of my sitting at Lucknow for that week only. It was when the Advocate was unable to give any suitable information, probably for want of instructions, being unable to contact, the client, that the sentence was maintained. These facts are being placed on record so that the Bench hearing the review application may know full facts. Sd/- D.S.M. 8. A supplementary application dated 24-11-74 was moved. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this application are to the effect: 1. That in the aforesaid Misc. Application in Cr. A. No. 378 of 1971, the Hon'ble Chief Justice ordered for the production of Certificates of good character during the period 1967 to 1969 and as no Pairokar of the Petitioner was present the Petitioner's counsel had to take time up to 11th November, 1974. That on being informed the Pairokar of the Petitioner Sri Sukhlal has brought Certificates of good character from officers of the Education Department, M.L.A., M.L.C., and Advocate who had contact with the Petitioner and those certificates are being filed with this application as Annexure 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. 9. In this application it was further prayed that this petition along with the previous petition and papers be put up before Hon'ble Chief Justice on 6th November 1974. The first Certificate (Annexure 1 to this application) dated 1-11-74 is from Sri Jogendra Kumar Nigam, Advocate, Unnao. The second Certificate (Annexure 2) dated 30-10-1974 is from Dr. Radha Mohan Misra, Assistant Director of Education, Allahabad. The third Certificate (Annexure 3) date 31-10-74 is from Up Vidyalay Nirakashak, Unnao. The first Certificate (Annexure 1 to this application) dated 1-11-74 is from Sri Jogendra Kumar Nigam, Advocate, Unnao. The second Certificate (Annexure 2) dated 30-10-1974 is from Dr. Radha Mohan Misra, Assistant Director of Education, Allahabad. The third Certificate (Annexure 3) date 31-10-74 is from Up Vidyalay Nirakashak, Unnao. The fourth Certificate (Annexure 4) dated 31-10-74 is from Sri Shiv Pal Singh, Sadasya, Vidhan Sabha, Unnao. The fifth Certificate dated 1-11-74 is from Sri Ravi Shanker Pandya, M.L.C. The aforesaid five Character Certificates (Annexures 1 to 5) have been filed with the application but without any affidavit in support of the authenticity of the Certificates. All the above five Certificates were filed in compliance of the order dated 29-10-74 of Hon'ble D. S. Mathur, C.J. All these Certificates along with the main application and the supplementary application dated 4-11-74 were put up before Hon'ble D.S. Mathur, C.J. on 12-11-74 (the day the Hon'ble Chief Justice was retiring) but curiously enough Hon'ble D.S. Mathur, C.J. did not propose to pass a final order on the application but merely placed on record some facts for the information of the Bench hearing the review application. The order dated 12-11-74 passed by Hon'ble D.S. Mathur, C.J. has already been quoted in extenso. Presumably Hon'ble D.S. Mathur, C.J. was either not satisfied that there existed sufficient grounds to review his order dismissing the appeal or was diffident to exercise the inherent powers u/s 561-A (old) 482 (new) Code of Criminal Procedure in a case of this nature, and Hon'ble Chief Justice left it for a Bench to decide the review application after his retirement. 10. Sri Goswami, the learned Assistant Government Advocate, has raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of this application u/s 561-A Code of Criminal Procedure. According to the learned Counsel Cr. A. No. 378 of 1971 filed by the applicant and Ashok Kumar having been dismissed the order of conviction and sentences became final as soon as the judgment in appeal was signed and sealed by the Court, and it is not open to the Court to review the order once signed and sealed. In support of this objection learned Counsel has relied on the provisions of Sections 369 and 430 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. In support of this objection learned Counsel has relied on the provisions of Sections 369 and 430 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The judgment in the appeal which is sought to be reviewed is dated 19-9-74, that is, after the enforcement of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which took effect from the 1st April 1974. Therefore, the provisions of Sections 362 and 393 of this Code corresponding respectively to the provisions of the old Sections 369 and 430, will be applicable. 11. Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is as under: 362. Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. 12. Section 393 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is as under: 393. Judgments and orders passed by an Appellate Court upon an appeal shall be final, except in the cases provided for in Section 377, Section 378, Sub-section (4) of Section 384 or Chapter XXX. Provided that notwithstanding the final disposal of an appeal against conviction in any case, the Appellate Court may hear and dispose of, on the merits- (a) an appeal against acquittal u/s 378, arising out of the same case, or (b) an appeal for the enhancement of sentence u/s 377, arising out of the same case. 13. For the purposes of this case, in the corresponding sections of the old and the new Code of Criminal Procedure there is not much of difference. The old Section 369 and the corresponding new Section 362 both provide that: Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force.... This saving clause in the beginning of the old and the new section is of significant importance. By this saving clause the inherent powers of the Court contained in the old Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and the new Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 remain unaffected. This saving clause in the beginning of the old and the new section is of significant importance. By this saving clause the inherent powers of the Court contained in the old Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and the new Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 remain unaffected. The wordings of the old Section 561-A and the new Section 482 are the same, namely: Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The contention of Sri Goswami, the learned Assistant Government Advocate, that once the judgment in appeal has been signed and sealed by the High Court the same cannot be reviewed or altered by the High Court under its inherent power is not well founded. 14. The question whether the High Court under its inherent power u/s 561-A Code of Criminal Procedure could alter, revoke or review its order in the face of the bar placed by Section 369 and 430 Code of Criminal Procedure came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Raj Narain and Others Vs. The State, (1959) 29 AWR 43. The question which was referred to the Full Bench for opinion was: Whether this Court has power to revoke, review, recall of alter its own earlier decision in a Criminal Revision and rehear the same? If so, in what circumstances? The answer of the Full Bench to question referred to it was: 1. That this Court has power to revoke, review, recall or alter its own earlier decision in a criminal revision and rehear the same. 2. That this can be done only in cases falling under one or the other of the three conditions mentioned in Section 561-A namely: (i) for the purpose of giving effect to any order passed under the Code of Criminal Procedure; (ii) for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any Court; (iii) for otherwise securing the ends of justice. 15. 15. The question of bar of Section 430 to the inherent powers u/s 561-A Code of Criminal Procedure was again referred to a Full Bench of Five judges in the case of Mahesh v. State 1971 AWR 255. The Full Bench answered the question thus: Our answer to the matter referred to us therefore is that the decisions in Raj Narain v. State and Sadhu Singh v. State are correct, though a few observations made therein are not in accordance with the law. The legal position can be summarised by laying down that the High Court is not possessed of general power to review, revise or re-consider the judgment or order duly pronounced in a criminal appeal or a criminal revision, though the judgment or order can be so reviewed, revised or reconsidered in exceptional circumstances in exercise of the inherent power u/s 561-A Code of Criminal Procedure, provided that the inherent power is so exercised for one of the three purposes detailed therein. 16. From the two decisions of the Full Benches mentioned above it is abundantly clear that Sections 362 and 393 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 do not bar the High Court in exercising its inherent powers for one of the three purposes specified in Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure. 17. In the case of Talab Haji Hussain Vs. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar and Another, AIR 1958 SC 376 it has been observed by the Supreme Court: It is hardly necessary to add that the inherent power conferred on High Courts u/s 561-A has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only where such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. After all, procedure, whether criminal or civil, must serve the higher purpose of justice; and it is only when the ends of justice are put in jeopardy by the conduct of the accused that the inherent power can and should be exercised.... 18. In view of the decisions referred to above it is abundandly clear that this Court has inherent powers to review, alter or recall the decision in a criminal appeal for one of the purposes specified in Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure The preliminary objection raised by the learned Assistant Government Advocate is, therefore rejected. 19. 18. In view of the decisions referred to above it is abundandly clear that this Court has inherent powers to review, alter or recall the decision in a criminal appeal for one of the purposes specified in Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure The preliminary objection raised by the learned Assistant Government Advocate is, therefore rejected. 19. Sri T.P. Asthana, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant, has contended that although Hon'ble D.S. Mathur, C. J. was inclined to release the applicant on probation or to take a lenient view on the question of sentence, the applicant Arun Kumar for want of funds could not arrange to produce certificates of his character and age at the hearing of the appeal to get the benefit of Section 4 of the U.P. First Offenders Probation Act, and subsequently the applicant was able to procure the certificates and filed them with the application for the consideration of Hon'ble D.S. Mathur, C.J. 20. Learned Counsel in support of his assertion that even after the appeal has been dismissed by the High Court, under its inherent power the High Court could give the benefit of Section 4 of the U.P. First Offenders Probation Act to the applicant has placed reliance on two decisions, namely: (1) Raj Karan v. State 1966 AWR 534. (2) Chitwan v. Mahboob Ilahi 1969 AWR 119. 21. The case of Raj Karan v. State 1966 AWR 534 has already been overruled in Cr. Misc. Case No. 230 of 1972 (Alld.) arising out of Cr. A. No. 2361 of 1969 (Alld.) by the judgment dated 22-3-72 of the Division Bench. The question which was referred by single Judge to the Division Bench was: Whether, after the decision by the High Court of an appeal from conviction for an offence in regard to which the Court cannot grant permission to compound, it is open to the parties concerned to apply to this Court for exercise of its powers u/s 561-A Code of Criminal Procedure and grant permission to compound the offence after this Court has decided the appeal holding that the Appellant was guilty of an offence which is compoundable with the permission of the Court. The Division Bench answered the question in the negative. The Division Bench while answering the question had occasion to consider the case of Ramai and Others Vs. The Division Bench answered the question in the negative. The Division Bench while answering the question had occasion to consider the case of Ramai and Others Vs. State, (1953) 23 AWR 299, and the case of Raj Karan v. State 1966 AWR 534 with regard to the question whether permission to compound the offence could or could not be granted after the decision of the case. The Division Bench approved the decision in the case of Ramai v. State (supra) and overruled the decision in the case of Raj Karan v. State (supra) as not laying down the correct law on the subject. 22. The second case Chitwan v. Mahboob Ilahi 1969 AWR 119 relied upon by Sri T.P. Asthana, learned Counsel for the applicant has peculiar facts. In that case proceedings u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure were initiated in the court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate by Mahboob Ilahi and others against Chitawan and others. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate after getting the report from the police about the existence of apprehension of breach of peace between the parties passed the preliminary order u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure on 12-9-66 and the disputed land was attached on 26-9-66. The contending parties were directed to file their written statements, affidavits and other evidence in support of their respective claims. The Magistrate after hearing the parties and after considering the oral and documentary evidence on record came to the conclusion that Chitawan and others were in possession of the land in dispute on the date of the preliminary order and two months prior to it. He accordingly ordered the release of the land in favour of Chitawan and others and prohibited Mahboob Ilahi and others from interfering with the possession of Chitawan and others till they were evicted in due course of law. Against the order of the Magistrate, Mahbub Ilahi alone preferred a revision before the learned Civil and Sessions Judge who after hearing the parties made a reference to the High Court for setting aside the order of the Magistrate releasing the disputed land in favour of Chitawan and others and recommended for the relese of the disputed land in favour of Mahbub Ilahi. This reference was accepted by Hon'ble D.D. Seth, J., on 5-4-68 and the disputed land was ordered to be released in favour of Mahbub Ilahi. This reference was accepted by Hon'ble D.D. Seth, J., on 5-4-68 and the disputed land was ordered to be released in favour of Mahbub Ilahi. On 15-4-68 a Criminal Miscellaneous Application was moved in the High Court u/s 561-A Code of Criminal Procedure for setting aside of the order dated 5-4-68 accepting the reference on the ground that against the impugned order of the Magistrate Mahbub Ilahi alone had filed the revision and that three others, namely, Abdul Aziz, Mohammed Ali and Sami Ullah, who had initially joined Mahbub Ilahi in filing the application on which proceedings u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure were initiated, had not preferred any revision against the order of the Magistrate, nor were they arrayed as opposite parties in the revision filed by Mahbub Ilahi, and the impugned order of the Magistrate became final against them, and that resulted in the existence of two contradictory orders, namely, one in favour of Mahbub Ilahi passed in the revision and other of the Magistrate in favour of Chitawan and others as against Abdul Aziz, Mohammad Ali and Sami Ullah. In the peculiar circumstances mentioned above the Court u/s 561-A Code of Criminal Procedure set aside its earlier order dated 5-4-68 and rejected the reference and upheld the order of the Magistrate. The facts of that case are clearly distinguishable and the Court exercised the inherent powers in the peculiar circumstances enumerated above. This case does not in any way support the instant case of the applicant. 23. The contention of the learned Counsel Sri T.P. Asthana that Hon'ble D.S. Mathur, C.J. was inclined to release the applicant on probation on being satisfied about the character and age of the applicants not clearly borne out from the record. The last order of Hon'ble D.S. Mathur, C.J. passed on 12-11-74 before he retired that day has been cited above in extenso. If Hon'ble Mathur, C.J. was inclined to release the applicant on probation and the certificates of character and age had been filed on 4-11-74, there appears to be no plausible reason why an order to that effect was not passed by Hon'ble D.S. Mathur, C.J. Even on 12-11-74 Hon'ble D.S. Mathur, C.J. could have passed the order if he was so inclined for the release of the applicant. 24. 24. There is another hurdle for considering the prayer of the applicant for release on probation of good conduct u/s 4 of the U.P. First Offenders Probation Act. Section 4 of the Act provides that: When any person is convicted of an offence not punishable with death or transportation for life and no previous conviction is proved against the offender, if it appears to the Court before which he is convicted, regard being had to the age, character, antecedents or physical or mental condition of the offender and to the circumstances in which the offence was committed, that it is expedient that the offender should be released on probation of good conduct, the Court may instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond with or without sureties to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period not exceeding 3 years as the Court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour.... 25. A careful reading of the section clearly shows that the question of giving the benefit of Section 4 is to be considered immediately the Court holds the person guilty and convicts him for an offence and before sentencing that person to any punishment. The awarding of sentence is deferred and the convicted person is released on probation of good conduct and he has to appear and receive sentence when called upon. An appeal is a continuation of the trial of an accused person and the benefit of Section 4 of the U.P. First Offenders Probation Act can be given even by the appellate court while affirming the conviction of the accused person, but before confirming or modifying the sentence awarded by the trial court. Once the appellate court confirms the sentence or modifies it and its judgment and order has been signed and sealed the appellate court becomes functus officio, for the purposes of giving the benefit of Section 4 of the U.P. First Offenders Probation Act. While delivering the judgment in the appeal itself on 19-7-1974 Hon'ble Mathur G.J. has observed that: nothing has even now been brought to my notice which may justify releasing the Appellants on probation or taking a lenient view in awarding the sentence. While delivering the judgment in the appeal itself on 19-7-1974 Hon'ble Mathur G.J. has observed that: nothing has even now been brought to my notice which may justify releasing the Appellants on probation or taking a lenient view in awarding the sentence. The operative portion of the order passed in appeal shows that at the hearing of the appeal applicant Arun Kumar was on bail and on dismissal of the appeal he was directed to be taken into custody to serve out the sentences. The question of giving the benefit of Section 4 of the U.P. First Offenders Probation Act under the inherent powers of this Court after the decision of the appeal in our view does not come within any of the three purposes specified in Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure (1973). 26. The exercise of inherent powers u/s 561-A Code of Criminal Procedure by the High Court in cases after the judgment in appeal has been signed and sealed also came up for consideration before a Full Bench in the case of Mulaim Singh Vs. State, (1974) CriLJ 1397. Mulaim Singh was tried separately in two sessions trials and was convicted and sentenced separately. His two appeals in the High Court were dismissed on 8-10-69 and 9-10-69. Subsequently an application was moved on behalf of Mulaim Singh in the High Court praying that the sentence awarded and confirmed in the appeal decided on 9-10-69 may be made concurrent with the sentences of his appeal decided on 8-10-69 under the provisions of Section 397(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This application came up before a Division Bench, and the Division Bench formulated the following questions for decision by a larger Bench: 1. Whether it is open to the judge who decided an appeal to pass an order u/s 397(1), Code of Criminal Procedure after he has delivered the judgment or he will be debarred from doing so because the order will amount to an alteration of the sentence already imposed ? 2. Whether it would be competent for the High Court in exercise of its power u/s 561-A Code of Criminal Procedure to direct that the sentence of a subsequent conviction to imprisonment shall run concurrently with the previous sentence if the stage for exercise of the discretion conferred u/s 397(1) of the Code is over ? 2. Whether it would be competent for the High Court in exercise of its power u/s 561-A Code of Criminal Procedure to direct that the sentence of a subsequent conviction to imprisonment shall run concurrently with the previous sentence if the stage for exercise of the discretion conferred u/s 397(1) of the Code is over ? The Full Bench consisting of three Judges after considering the import of Section 397(1) Code of Criminal Procedure and the scope of the inherent powers of the High Court u/s 561-A Code of Criminal Procedure held that: It is not only the order of conviction but also the sentence awarded and the directions given in that behalf that constitute integral parts of the judgment and cannot be reviewed or altered after the judgment has been pronounced. The direction contained in a judgment with regard to the sentence imposed on the accused, i.e., whether they shall run concurrently or consequtively is as much an integral part of the judgment as his conviction consequent upon a finding regarding the guilt of the accused. A change in the 'course' or 'arrangement' of the sentence would certainly amount to an alteration of the sentence which forms a part of the judgment. We are of the opinion that neither the trial court nor the appellate court is competent to exercise the discretion conferred u/s 397(1) of the Code after the judgment has been signed. 27. In the application u/s 561-A (old) 482 (new) Code of Criminal Procedure it was stated that the applicant was living with his sister who is a Principal at Unnao. It is difficult to accept that the applicant had no means or facility to procure the certificates of his character and age, specially so when his own sister happens to be the Principal of an educational institution in Unnao proper, for being placed before the Court at the time of the hearing of the appeal in order to get the benefit of Section 4 of the U.P. First Offenders Probation Act. The applicant was on bail at the time of the hearing of the appeal. In the circumstances we are not satisfied that the applicant, for reasons beyond his control could not furnish certificates of his age and character in the appellate court at the time of the hearing of the appeal and before the decision of the appeal, 28. The applicant was on bail at the time of the hearing of the appeal. In the circumstances we are not satisfied that the applicant, for reasons beyond his control could not furnish certificates of his age and character in the appellate court at the time of the hearing of the appeal and before the decision of the appeal, 28. Lastly, learned Counsel for the applicant drew our attention to the provisions of Section 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Power to suspend or remit sentences or to commute sentences rests with the appropriate Government and not with the Court. It is open to the applicant on the basis of the certificates of character and age which he has filed in this Court to approach and persuade the appropriate Government for exercising the powers under Sections 432 and 433 Code of Criminal Procedure. 29. This application has no merit and it is accordingly dismissed.