JUDGMENT P. Subramonian Poti, J. 1. The petitioner seeks the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash Ext. P-8, which is a letter from the Municipal Commissioner, Shertallai informing the petitioner that his request to withdraw the demands for property tax made on the petitioner cannot be allowed and the tax already demanded may have to be paid, and also to quash Ext. P-9 demand notice dated 29th June 1973 for property tax of Rs. 571.70, being the property tax for the first and second halves of 1972-73. There is also a prayer for issue of a writ of mandamus or direction to restrain the respondents, the Municipal Council, Shertallai from making demands for payment of property tax in respect of the lands and buildings owned by one Ratanlal Murarka and said to be occupied by the petitioner’s company till 17th March 1972. 2. The petitioner is a company registered under the Companies Act. It had a factory at Shertallai within the limits of the Shertallai Municipality. According to the petitioner-company the factory ceased to function on 17th March 1972. The factory buildings and the premises were taken by the company on a perpetual lease from one Chunilal Murarka in the year 1952. The company was in occupation of the buildings ever since as lessee. According to the petitioner-company, on the death of Chunilal Murarka, his son Ratanlal Murarka obtained the said premises under an oral partition between the heirs of Chunilal Murarka. It is further said that the lease in favour of the petitioner- company was terminated with effect from 17th March 1972 and thereafter the company has nothing to do with the land or buildings now and that these belong to Ratanlal Murarka. 3. The respondent, the Municipal Council, Shertallai, was all along assessing the petitioner-company to property tax due in respect of the said land and the buildings thereon. The petitioner alleges that when the first assessment was made on the company in 1956 it was objected to, but nothing was heard on the objection for several years and the petitioner-company continued to pay assessments made from time to time under the belief that as and when orders were passed on the original objection the amount paid by the petitioner-company would be refunded to it. The tax demanded has been paid till 1971. The tax demanded has been paid till 1971. On 5th January 1971 the petitioner-company made a representation to the respon­dent objecting to the levy of property tax. Copy of the objection is Ext. P-3. It is said that tax for the half year ending with 31st March 1971 was paid because of threat of coercive steps. The petitioner-company was told that if in the registers of the Municipal Council the name of Ratanlal Murarka was to be substituted for that of the Company evidence must be produced. That letter is Ext. P-5. There is no case that Ext. P-5 was responded to. Ratanlal Murarka produced title deeds before the respondent, but still, demands were being made on the petitioner-company. But this was only in 1973. In the meantime the petitioner filed O.P. No. 634 of 1972 before this court challenging the levy of property tax on the company. The court by its judgment Ext. P-6 directed the respondent to go into the question on the basis of representation made before it and it is said it is thereafter that Ratanlal Murarka filed certain title deeds. That was filed along with an affidavit of Ratanlal Murarka, copy of which is produced as Ext. P-7. The stand taken by Ratanlal Murarka was that all along he was the owner. The representation of the petitioner was considered by the respondent and it took the stand that there was no mistake in the demand made as the petitioner satisfied the definition of “owner� in the Kerala Municipa­lities Act. It is in the meantime that demand under Ext. P-9 for the year 1972-73 was made. The petitioner’s case is that the company is not liable to answer for the demand as it is not the owner and that at any rate it is not liable to answer it as the lease had been terminated prior to Ext. P-9. 4. A very elaborate counter-affidavit has been filed by the Commissioner of the Shertallai Municipal Council. It is said that the fact that the petitioner’s factory has ceased to function with effect from 17th March 1972 was intimated to the respondent for the first time on 30th June 1973 when Ext. P-7 affidavit and the documents accompanying it were filed by Ratanlal Murarka, one of directors of the petitioner-company. The Shertallai Municipality was constituted in the year 1953. P-7 affidavit and the documents accompanying it were filed by Ratanlal Murarka, one of directors of the petitioner-company. The Shertallai Municipality was constituted in the year 1953. Ever since property tax began to be levied from 1954 the petitioner was the registered owner of the properties in controversy and the tax has all along been paid by the petitioner and the petitioner only. The respondent adds that such payment was without any demur till and inclusive of the tax for the half year ended on 31st March 1970. The petitioner had filed a revision petition for reduction of tax at the time the tax was originally assessed and some reduction was made. There­after there were three general quinquennial revisions of property tax in 1959, 1964 and 1969. Even during the last general revision of 1969 in the revision petition filed by the petitioner on 27th May 1969 before the Commissioner, the respondent, the petitioner did not dispute his ownership of the properties in question. In other words all along the petitioner had never disputed that he was the owner but on the other hand, had made motions for reducing the property tax payable by him thereby evidently leading the respondent also to assume that the petitioner was liable to pay the property tax. On the revision petition filed in 1969 the petitioner was informed that the assessment was not high. It is further said that on 31st July 1970 the petitioner presented before the Commissioner of the Municipality an application under sections 228, 235 and 246 is of the Kerala Municipalities Act, 1960 for permission to make alterations and extensions to the buildings situated in the property accompanied by a plan in duplicate. In the application the petitioner described itself as the owner of these properties. Permission was granted to effect altera­tions. It was for the first time by the original of Ext. P-3 that reference was made to Ratanlal Murarka in connection with the ownership of the property. Therefore it is said for the respondent that the petitioner was the registered owner of the properties for a period of more than 16 years and the petitioner-company was estopped from contending that it was not the owner. P-3 that reference was made to Ratanlal Murarka in connection with the ownership of the property. Therefore it is said for the respondent that the petitioner was the registered owner of the properties for a period of more than 16 years and the petitioner-company was estopped from contending that it was not the owner. It is said that Retanlal Murarka or for that matter his father Chunilal Murarka had at no time disclosed themselves as owners until the controversy arose recently and it is said that:— “Both the Murarkas and the petitioner have been playing a game of hide and seek with ulterior motives�. It is therefore said that till the registry is changed in favour of others and in any event till 30th June 1973 when Sri Ratanlal Murarka filed his affidavit the petitioner was liable to pay tax. 5. The prayers in the petition as I have indicated are only in respect of tax already due and claimed; with regard to the tax for the subsequent period or that which may accrue hereafter no adjudication is called for in these proceedings. This is agreed to by both parties. It goes without saying that in the light of the contention now raised that the lease has been terminated that question may require consideration. Section 106 of the Kerala Municipalities Act obliges a trans­ferer as also a transferee to give notice of the transfer within 3 months after the execution of the instrument of transfer to the Commissioner and subsection (4) provides that in case such notice is not given to the Commissioner the person who makes such transfer shall, in addition to any other liability which he incurs through such neglect, continue to be liable for the payment of property tax. Assuming that there has been surrender by the petitioner-company on 17th March 1972 of the perpetual lease in favour of one of the Directors Ratanlal Murarka the question becomes relevant only after intimation of the transfer. Therefore in regard to assessment up to 1972-73 which is the only matter in controversy before me the question whether there has been a surrender or not is not relevant and therefore I am not proposing to go into that question. Therefore in regard to assessment up to 1972-73 which is the only matter in controversy before me the question whether there has been a surrender or not is not relevant and therefore I am not proposing to go into that question. Suffice to notice the arguments and con­tention of learned counsel for the Municipality Sri Shenoi that there is no plea of surrender but one of termination of lease that termination of perpetual lease could not be made by a lessor and it is not likely that it would have been so terminated since in the case of a company such surrender would normally be borne out by some records and none of such records are produced. The assessment of these circum­stances would have been relevant had the petition required an adjudication as to the liability of the petitioner to pay the tax even subsequent to the years 1972-73 but in view of the categorical statement before me that this is not to be adjudicated in this petition I am not going into this question. 6. The only question is whether Ext.P-8 and Ext.P-9 are improper. In other words whether the respondent was not right in treating the petitioner as the owner. To this the respondent has two answers. The first is that the definition of ‘owner’ takes in not only the persons who has absolute right in the property but also persons like a mort­gagee or a lessee or at any rate a perpetual lessee. The second is that it is not open to the petitioner to raise such a plea since by his conduct he has all along held himself out as the owner of the property and so is estopped from taking a different stand and even if it does not amount to estoppel in view of the conduct of the petitioner no interference is called for in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 7. 7. The term owner is defined in section 3(24) of the Kerala Municipalities Act, 1960 as— “(24) ‘Owner’ includes— (a) a person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive, the rent of any land or building whether on his own account or on account of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who should so receive it if the land or building or part thereof were let to a tenants and (b) the person for the time being in charge of the animal, vessel, or vehicle in connection with which the word is used�. Evidently the scope of the term ‘owner’ is not limited to a person who has absolute right in the property. The extent of the right in the property or the question whether ownership is qualified is not the relevant factor to determine whether a person is an owner within the meaning of section 3 (24) of the Act. Any person receiving or entitled to receive the rent or who can so receive the rent or entitled to receive the rent if the land or building or part thereof were let to a tenant is an ‘owner’. Therefore the test would be whether such qualified ownership enables such a person to let out and receive rent for the property. It may or may not be that it is actually let out. Even if let out it may or may not be that rent is being received. Even though it may not be let out if it is capable of being let out or in other words the qualified owner is competent to let it out and receive rent the person who lets it out is the ‘owner’ within the meaning of section 3 (24) of the Act. 8. Even though it may not be let out if it is capable of being let out or in other words the qualified owner is competent to let it out and receive rent the person who lets it out is the ‘owner’ within the meaning of section 3 (24) of the Act. 8. The definition of the term ‘owner’ in the Travancore District Municipalities Act, 1116 is not so exhaus­tive, for, it read: “3 (19) ‘owner ’ includes— (a) the person for the time being receiving or entitled to receive, whether on his own account or as agent, trustee, guardian, manager or receiver for another person, or for any religious or charitable purpose, the rent or profits of the property, in connection with which the word is used, and (b) the person for the time being in charge of the animal or vehicle, in connection with which the word is used� It appears that originally the definition of the term ‘owner’ in the Kerala Municipalities Bill was modelled on the definition in the Travancore District Municipalities Act. But the Select Committee recommended the change in the definition into the present form evidently to meet a plea that otherwise it may not take in cases of persons who have not let out the building on lease though it is possible that they could let it out. As it now stands the definition is similar to that contained in section 2 (23) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 and section 5 (53) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951. The definition of the term ‘owner’ in the Madras District Municipalities Act, 1920 in section 3 (17) was more or less in terms of the definition in the Travancore District Municipalities Act. Dealing with this definition, the High Court of Madras in Kunhi Pathumma v. Sundara Ayyar A.I.R. 1946 Madras 31, said thus: “Owner is defined in section 3 (17) as including a person who receives or is entitled to receive the rent or the profits of the property. The plaintiff is such a person as he receives rent—at any rate he receives the profits of the property. The plaintiff is such a person as he receives rent—at any rate he receives the profits of the property. Whether a person in the position of the appellant can be assessed to property tax on the basis of his melvaram right was considered in (1939) 2 M.L.J. 304 where the question arose whether he could be assessed on the basis of kudivaram interest also; and it was held that he could not be as the kudivaram belonged not to him but to the ryots. The idea underlying the Act is that a person who owns property is liable to assessment of property tax; and it does not seem to be necessary that he should own the entire interest in agricultural land.� 9. An occupier is also defined in the Kerala Munici­palities Act in section 3 A.I.R. 1946 Madras 31(22) and that reads: “(22) “ occupier � includes— (a) any person who for the time being is paying or is liable to pay to the owner the rent or any portion of the rent of the land or building in respect of which such rent is paid or is payable; (b) any owner in occupation of or otherwise using his land or building; (c) a rent free tenant of any land or Building; (d) a licensee in occupation of any land or building; and (e) any person who is liable to pay the owner damages for the use and occupation of any land or building.� Section 103 of the Act makes property tax a first charge on property. Section 104 of the Act provides that the property tax shall be assessed and the half yearly tax determined, once in every five years and the half yearly tax shall be payable by the owner of the assessed property within thirty days of the commencement of each half year. Within the meaning of the Kerala Municipalities Act the petitioner was an owner as perpetual lessee and therefore was liable to be taxed. 10. Even otherwise the conduct which I have narrated in the earlier part of this Judgment would be sufficient to deny any relief to the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. No doubt the petitioner says that it complained about the assessment in 1956 and has pro­duced a copy of the petition said to be an objection filed by it then. No doubt the petitioner says that it complained about the assessment in 1956 and has pro­duced a copy of the petition said to be an objection filed by it then. The Municipality is unable to trace out such a petition. Whatever that be several years have passed thereafter and petitioner-company has been paying tax without demur, filing revision petitions seeking reduction of tax, making motion seeking permission for alteration's and extensions to the buildings as if it was the owner. This conduct of the petitioner was not for a short period but spread over a period of more than 15 years and even if these may not amount to estoppel this would be sufficient for this court to deny the petitioner any relief. His conduct would justify such a course, if the petitioner cannot as of right move this court. The exercise of jurisdiction is subject to several matters one of which would be the conduct of the petitioner. Estoppel apart, I do not think, the conduct of the petitioner justifies any interference by this court. In these circumstances the petition is without merit. It is dismissed with costs.