JUDGMENT B. D. Singh, J. This application by Gaya Prasad Singh and others under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated the 4th December, 1970, (Annexure 9) passed by the President, Board of Secondary Education, Bihar, Patna, (respondent no. 1) directing the Managing Committee of Shivanandan Gaya Ucha Vidyalaya, Bakerpur, in the district of Muzaffarpur, to allow Thakur Rajendra Singh (respondent no, 5) to join the post of headmaster of the said Vidyalaya. 2. In order to appreciate the points involved in the application it will be necessary to state briefly the relevant facts. The managing committee of the said institution had appointed respondent no. 5 as the headmaster of the school and had sent proposal of his appointment for approval to the District Education officer (respondent no. 3) under Letter no. 65 dated 10.4.1963. The Sub-divisional Education Officer (respondent no. 4) approved the appointment of respondent no, 5 by his memo dated 14.5.1963 (vide annexure 1). His confirmation was, however, made dependent upon his passing departmental examination. According to the petitioners respondent no. 5 never informed the Managing committee about his qualifying in the departmental examination, and as such no resolution of his confirmation as the headmaster of the school was ever adopted by the managing committee. Respondent no, 5 continued as temporary headmaster of the said institution until he submitted his resignation on 3.5.1968. Even before his resignation the work of respondent no. 5 as headmaster was never found satisfactory, as stated by the petitioners in their application and some serious charges of embezzlement of school money, indiscipline, insubordination and other misconducts were leveled against him from time to time. The Managing committee had contemplated some action in respect of the misconduct alleged against him. During the regime of respondent no. 5 the institution consistently and continuously suffered, and at his instigation a number of teachers of the institution time and again flouted, contravened and violated the rules of discipline and orders of the managing committee, and exhibited their insubordination at several occasions. The misconduct of respondent no. 5 and his associates reached its climax in the year 1968. Respondent no. 5 the institution consistently and continuously suffered, and at his instigation a number of teachers of the institution time and again flouted, contravened and violated the rules of discipline and orders of the managing committee, and exhibited their insubordination at several occasions. The misconduct of respondent no. 5 and his associates reached its climax in the year 1968. Respondent no. 5, as stated by the petitioners in paragraph 6, realised that his acts of omissions and commissions were fully known to the managing committee and in order to avoid action by the committee he chose to submit his resignation (Annexure 2) in the meeting of the managing committee dated 4.5.68 held in the premises of the school at 5 p. m. The petitioners further stated in paragraph 7 that respondent no. 5 with a view to give parting blow to the institution also managed to procure the resignation of as many as six other teachers of the said institution, including that of Raj Narain Singh, its clerk. The managing committee, however accepted the resignation of the respondent no, 5 and two others and persuaded other teachers to withdraw their resignations. 3. In the other part of the application the petitioners have stated that respondent no. 5, after submitting his resignation, filed an application (Annexure 3) before respondent no. 3, on 5.5.68, stating therein that he was taken to the residence of the Secretary of the school at 8 P.M. on 3.5.68 where he was forced to sign on a letter of resignation and sought an order for his continuance as the headmaster of the school and for necessary action against the Secretary. On 17.10.68 respondent no. 5 filed two further applications before respondent no. 3. In one of the applications he merely demanded his arrears of salary from the managing committee of the said institution (Annexure 4) while in the other application (Annexure 4/1) he had prayed for early disposal of the appeal, which he had filed on 5.5.68 and for direction allowing respondent no. 5 to join in the institution. In the Bihar Assembly some members of the legislature had raised question regarding resignation of respondent no. 5. Regional Deputy Director of Education, Tirhut Division, was asked to make a report in respect of various Assembly questions. 5 to join in the institution. In the Bihar Assembly some members of the legislature had raised question regarding resignation of respondent no. 5. Regional Deputy Director of Education, Tirhut Division, was asked to make a report in respect of various Assembly questions. In memo dated 4.9.68 (Annexure 5) the Regional Deputy Director of Education informed the Deputy Director, Secondary Education Bihar, that there was nothing irregular in the submission of the resignation of respondent no. 5. The Sub-divisional Education Officer (respondent no. 4) under his memo dated 30.4.70 (Annexure 6) forwarded a copy of memo dated 23.3.70 (Annexure 6/1) of the Secretary of the Board of Secondary Education, communicating to the managing committee of the institution, that respondent no. 5 had filed an appeal against the acceptance of his resignation by the managing committee, and the' President of the Board was pleased to order for his reinstatement. The Secretary of the Institution thereafter filed a representation dated 6.5.70 (Annexure 7) to the President requesting him to recall the ex-parte order of reinstatement, and to decide the matter of resignation of respondent no. 5, after hearing the parties and examining the relevant records of the case. Under memo dated 26.9.70 (Annexure 8) the date of hearing of the appeal of respondent no. 5 was foxed on 30.10.70 and it was partly heard on that date and partly on 14.11.70 and finally by the impugned order dated 4.12.70, contained in Annexure 9, the President directed the managing committee to reinstate respondent no. 5. The petitioners have stated in paragraph 16 of their application that after the resignation of respondent no. 5 was accepted, the managing committee appointed Ravindra Kumar (petitioner no. 2) as the acting head-master of the institution with effect from 4.5.68. Respondent no. 3 granted ad hoc approval for three months vide his letter dated 18.9.68 (Annexure 10) and further directed for advertising the post for appointing a regular headmaster. Accordingly, advertisement was made and after having received various applications on 25.8.69 the managing committee selected petitioner no. 2, and forwarded his name for approval as the permanent headmaster of the institution. Respondent no. 3 was pleased to accord approval of his appointment, (vide his letter dated 20.8.70)-Annexure 11), subject to the condition that his continuance as headmaster would depend upon the result of the appeal of respondent no, 5. On 16.11.70 an application was filed by petitioner no. Respondent no. 3 was pleased to accord approval of his appointment, (vide his letter dated 20.8.70)-Annexure 11), subject to the condition that his continuance as headmaster would depend upon the result of the appeal of respondent no, 5. On 16.11.70 an application was filed by petitioner no. 2 before respondent no. 1 stating, inter alia, that respondent no. 5 had no right of appeal as he was a temporary headmaster. 4. The petitioners, on the facts enumerated above, have prayed for quashing Annexure 9. By an order dated 19.2.71 this Court was pleased to stay operation of the impugned order till the disposal of the writ application. It may further be noticed that originally petitioner no. 1 was Ganga Singh, who was replaced by Gaya Pd. Singh under order dated 22.8.74. Similarly by the same order Ramchandra Pd. Singh original (petitioner no. 3) was replaced by Sheobalak Roy. He was, however, replaced later on by Jagannath Singh as petitioner no. 3 vide order dated 27.1.75. 5. Subsequently, an application was filed on behalf of respondent no. 5 on 3.3.71 for vacating the stay order passed by this court on 19.2.71. On 15.3.71 a counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the petitioners in reply to the petition filed by respondent no. 5 for vacating the stay order. Respondent no. 5 filed reply to the counter affidavit filed by the petitioners, on 22.3.71. Petitioner no 2 filed reply to counter affidavit to the petition of respondent no. 5 for vacating stay order on 24.3.71. The Court, however, was pleased to direct on 5.4.71 that the main writ petition should be listed for final hearing, as soon as it was ready, instead of passing any order in connection with the application for vacating stay order. 6. On 24.3.71 respondent no. 5 filed a counter affidavit in reply to the main writ application. On that very date he (respondent no. 5) filed an affidavit denying certain allegations made in paragraph 7 of the counter affidavit filed by the then petitioner no. 1. On 28.4.71 a supplementary counter affidavit was filed on behalf of respondent no. 5. On 18.5.71 the petitioners filed an affidavit in reply to the counter affidavit and supplementary counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no 5. On that very date respondent no. 5 filed an affidavit in reply to the counter reply filed on behalf of the petitioners. On 28.4.71 a supplementary counter affidavit was filed on behalf of respondent no. 5. On 18.5.71 the petitioners filed an affidavit in reply to the counter affidavit and supplementary counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no 5. On that very date respondent no. 5 filed an affidavit in reply to the counter reply filed on behalf of the petitioners. On 13.1.75 a supplementary affidavit was filed on behalf of the petitioners enclosing therewith a copy of the memo dated 20.9.74 (Annexure 13) indicating that petitioner no. 2 had passed the departmental examination held in 1972. Lastly on 13.1.75 a petition was filed for substitution of Jagannath Singh (petitioner no. 3) in place of Sheo Balak Roy. As already stated, vide order dated 27.1.75 he was substituted. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners assailed the order passed by respondent no. 1 and has raised the following points for consideration : (i) whether respondent no. 5 had right to appeal ? If so, could respondent no. 1 have passed ex-parte order directing reinstatement of respondent no 5. ? (ii) Whether resignation of respondent no. 5 and its acceptance by the managing committee would amount to termination of the services of respondent no. 5 or it would mean discharge or dismissal? 8. In my opinion, it will be convenient to deal with both the points together as they are inter-related on the facts and the circumstances of the case. Mr. Prabha Shankar Mishra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, contended that respondent no. 5 after having tendered his resignation and after the same having been accepted by the managing committee got his services terminated of his own accord. Therefore, he had no right to make any grievance before any of the authorities. He emphasised that none of the provisions contained in different rules of the notification dated 7.9.55 made by the Education Department, which has statutory force, would apply in the case of respondent no. 5 Besides, the services of respondent no. 5 not having been confirmed by the managing committee, he being a temporary teacher, had no right of appeal. That apart, he contended that respondent no. 5 had not preferred an appeal through proper channel. 5 Besides, the services of respondent no. 5 not having been confirmed by the managing committee, he being a temporary teacher, had no right of appeal. That apart, he contended that respondent no. 5 had not preferred an appeal through proper channel. He drew our attention to rule 12 of the said notification, the relevant portion where of reads thus: “12 The Managing Committee may impose the following punishment on any member of the staff including those on probation after having finally considered his explanation and the charges leveled against him in writing- (i) Warning, (ii) Censure, (iii) Withholding of normal increments, (iv) Discharge, (v) Dismissal.” Rule 13 of the said notification is to the following effect :- “No order under rule 12 except that for warning of or censure shall be passed unless (i) regular charges have been framed against the teacher and communicated to him with a statement of grounds on which it is proposed to take action, (ii) he has been given adequate opportunity (a) of submitting a written statement of his defence within a fortnight-of the receipt of the order, (b) of being heard in person, if he so desires, and (c) of calling and cross-examining such witness in his defence as he may desire, provided that the officer or the committee conducting the enquiry, may for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing reject the petitioner's prayer to call a witness.” Rule 14 reads as ; “The termination of service of a person-(i) (i) during the period of probation, (ii) during the period in which he holds a temporary appointment. (iii) on retrenchment of a post. will not amount to discharge or dismissal. In such cases, however, the teacher or Headmaster shall be apprised of the grounds on which it is proposed to terminate his services and his reply considered by the Managing committee before orders are passed.” Rule 15 there of provides as follows:- “A teacher shall not be discharged or dismissed save and except on ground of proved inefficiency, conduct involving moral turpitude or gross negligence of duty or behavior likely to prove subversive of discipline, or any other good or sufficient reasons which may make his retention on the school staff no longer desirable. In the last case, the prior approval of the Department is necessary.” Rule 16 is to the following effect :- “The decision of the Managing Committee under clause 15 shall be immediately communicated to the person concerned in writing. The person concerned shall have the right to appeal through the proper channel in respect of orders in which the teacher has been discharged or dismissed. Appeal must be preferred to the District Education Officer within thirty days of the receipt of the punishment order. When an appeal has been preferred, the order of discharge or dismissal shall not be given effect to till the disposal of the appeal by the President, Board of secondary Education.” Rules 17, provides In the following terms :- “The appeal of the person concerned shall be heard by the President of the Board of Secondary Education or any member of the Board of Secondary Education duly nominated by the President or any officer ordinary not below the rank of D.E.O. The appellant and the Secretary of the Managing Committee may be heard in person by the President, Board of Secondary Education or his nominee who may even authorize them to be represented by a representative.” 9. With reference to rules 14 and 15, quoted above; Mr. Mishra urged that the above provisions are not attracted in the case of acceptance of resignation of the teacher or headmaster by the managing committee. In order to find support to his contention he has referred to the case of Gila Pd. Singh V. Managing Committee of S. K. M.M. School, Mokama 174 BBCJ 237 where Madan Mohan Pd. J., inter alia was considering the provisions contained in rules 14 and 15 in a case where a teacher had tendered his resignation. He drew our attention to paragraph 19 of the judgment where in it was observed: “Apart from these consideration in the present case the petitioner had tendered his resignation which had been accepted. The termination of service was, therefore, on the asking of the petitioner and in fact it was not a termination of service on any of the grounds mentioned either in rule 14 or Rule 15 of the Service condition Rules mentioned above. The aforesaid rules envisage cases where the termination of service is at the instance of the employer. The termination of service was, therefore, on the asking of the petitioner and in fact it was not a termination of service on any of the grounds mentioned either in rule 14 or Rule 15 of the Service condition Rules mentioned above. The aforesaid rules envisage cases where the termination of service is at the instance of the employer. It is obvious that if it is during the period of probation or during the period he holds a temporary appointment, such termination may be on the grounds that the employee is not found suitable or his work is not satisfactory or some such other reasons. Such termination may be also on the retrenchment of a post. It is for this reason that the rule requires that the teacher shall be apprised of the grounds on which it is proposed to terminate his service. In such cases the grounds emanate from the employer. The employee has, therefore, to be informed of them and to be heard as against them. To my mind, rule 14 does not purport to cover cases where the termination of service is a result of a resignation tendered by the employee and the same having been accepted. It is well known that in case of temporary appointments it is open to the employer to terminate the service after giving notice. It is equally open to the employee to resign from the post after giving notice. In the present case the petitioner gave such a notice and resigned. This could not be except under the right of an employee arising out of a contract with his employer. It brings the case thus out of the ambit of rule 14.” In this connection learned counsel also referred to a Bench decision of this court in Bishwanath Khetan and others V. President, Board of Secondary Education, Bihar 1973 BBCJ 110 . In that case, respondent no. 6, Gita Pd. Singh was working as a teacher in Sri Krishna Marwari Multipurpose school, Mokamah. According to the case of the petitioners, his appointment was on a temporary basis. According to respondent no. 6, on 10.7.65, he was appointed against a permanent post of teacher on probation the period of probation being for one year. He was not confirmed immediately after expiry of the period of probation. Respondent no. According to the case of the petitioners, his appointment was on a temporary basis. According to respondent no. 6, on 10.7.65, he was appointed against a permanent post of teacher on probation the period of probation being for one year. He was not confirmed immediately after expiry of the period of probation. Respondent no. 6 felt insulted by behaviour towards him of Satya Narayan Yadav, a clerk of the school, and in protest he submitted a written resignation on the 6th March, 1967. His case was that on 15th March, 1967, he withdrew the letter of resignation. According to the petitioners there was no such withdrawal. By Annexure 3, the managing committee accepted the resignation of respondent no. 6 and relieved him from service with effect from 21st May, 1967. Respondent no. 6 then appealed to the President of the Board. The appeal was allowed by an order contained in Annexure 6 and the Managing Committee of the school was directed to reinstate respondent no. 6. As that direction was not followed inspite of several reminders, the order under Annexure 5 superseding the managing committee of the school and constituting an ad-hoc managing committee was passed. In those circumstances the petitioners had filed the written application for quashing the order contained in Annexure 5'. Mr. Lal Narain Sinha, appearing on behalf of the petitioner in that case, contended that even if the case of respondent no. 6 be correct that he was appointed against permanent post on probation, admittedly he not having been confirmed and the period of two years for which a person might be kept on probation according to rule 2, not having expired, his services were terminated during the period of probation and as such the order of the managing committee was passed under rule 14, He, therefore, urged that it could not be considered an order of discharge or dismissal, as envisaged by rule 15 and was not appeal-able under rule 16. Mr. Basudev Pd. appearing for respondent no. 6, had submitted that as the services of respondent no. 6 were terminated against the terms of contract of his service, it was really an order of his dismissal and not one under rule 14. Mr. Basudev Pd. appearing for respondent no. 6, had submitted that as the services of respondent no. 6 were terminated against the terms of contract of his service, it was really an order of his dismissal and not one under rule 14. In the alternative, he had also contended that if rule 14 was to be given in a wider interpretation so as to include cases of termination during the period of probation against the terms of the contract of service, the rule itself was ultra vires. Shambhu Pd. Singh, J., who delivered the Judgment for the Court, observed at page 113 in paragraph 3 as follows :- In my opinion, there is no substance in the aforesaid contentions of Mr. Prasad. The termination of service of respondent no. 6 cannot be said to be against the terms of the contract of his service. An employment on probation under the ordinary law of Master and servant, which must apply to the facts of the case, as respondent no. 6 can not be said to be a Government employee, comes to an end if during and at the end of probation the servant who is appointed on trial is found unsuitable and his service is terminated by a notice. Absence of notice will not entitle the servant to reinstatement, at best he can claim one month's pay as damage if no notice is served upon him. The Managing committee terminated the services of respondent no. 6 during the period of probation and that would not amount to discharge or dismissal either according to ordinary law of Master and servant or according to rule 14 which regulates the conditions of service of respondent no. 6. The only safe guard provided for by rule 14 is that the teacher or the Head-master, whose service is terminated, shall be apprised of the ground on which it is proposed to terminate his service and his reply considered by the Managing committee before orders are passed. In other words, he must get an opportunity of being heard in the matter. It appears from Annexure 3, respondent no. 6 was heard in the matter. Further even if there was any illegality or irregularity in the order terminating his service, he could have perused any other remedy open to him, but certainly he could not have appealed to the President of the Board. It appears from Annexure 3, respondent no. 6 was heard in the matter. Further even if there was any illegality or irregularity in the order terminating his service, he could have perused any other remedy open to him, but certainly he could not have appealed to the President of the Board. It is well established that a person cannot have a right of appeal unless such a right is conferred upon him by statute or rules made there under, Rule 16 confers a right of appeal only against orders passed under rule 15. No appeal, therefore, could lie to the President of the Board against the order contained in Annexure 3, Thus the order of reinstatement passed in Annexure 4 was without jurisdiction and had no binding effect.” 10. Mr. Mishra submitted that utmost the acceptance of resignation of respondent no. 5 would come under rule 14. The provisions contained in rule 15 are not attracted at all in the instant case according to the above observation. He pointed out that the above observation lends support to his other contention also that although respondent no. 5 had passed departmental examination, he could not be deemed to have been confirmed as a matter of course. For that proposition of law he also relied on S. Sukhbans Singh V. The Slate of Punjab AIR 1962 S.C. 1711 where it was observed that a probationer could not, after expiry of the probationary period, automatically acquire status of a permanent member of a service, unless of course the rules under which he was appointed expressly provided for such a result. He further referred to Kabutra Kuar v, Roard of Secondary Education 1963 BLJR 858. In that case Ramaswami, C. J. and Untwalia, J. (as then they were) while considering rules 14 to 1/with regard to the headmaster of a secondary school, observed that his status as an appointee on probation continued unless and until an order of confirmation was made by the managing committee and approved by the Director of Public Instructions. 11. In my opinion, it is true that in the instant case simply because respondent no. 5 had passed departmental examination, it cannot be considered that he was confirmed, unless there was material to show that the Managing committee had confirmed him. Therefore, I hold respondent no. 5 for the purpose of this case as holding a temporary post. 12. 11. In my opinion, it is true that in the instant case simply because respondent no. 5 had passed departmental examination, it cannot be considered that he was confirmed, unless there was material to show that the Managing committee had confirmed him. Therefore, I hold respondent no. 5 for the purpose of this case as holding a temporary post. 12. The main question still remains to be decided is as to whether rule 14 or rule 15 would apply in the case of respondent no. 5. According to Mr. Basudev Pd. learned counsel for respondent no. 5, and Mr. J.N.P. Varma the learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2, on the facts and circumstances of the instant case, respondent no. 5 would be deemed to have been discharged and, therefore, he had right to appeal before respondent no. 1. Respondent no. I has, therefore, passed the impugned order in accordance with law, Mr. Basudev Pd. had drawn our attention to various paragraphs of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no. 5 on 24.3.1971. In paragraph no, 7 it was stated that the statements made in paragraph 7 of the writ petition were false. The story of collective resignation was introduced by the Secretary to get rid of the services of respondent no. 5 and two other teachers. It was incorrect to say that those teachers tendered their resignation at the instance of respondent no. 5, who never asked petitioner no. 2 or any other teacher or clerk of the institution to resign nor they could have resigned at the instance of respondent no. 5, as alleged. The story of mass resignation was mala fide and concocted to give a look of genuineness to the resignation obtained under coercion and threat. In paragraph 8 of the counter affidavit statements made in paragraph 8 of the writ petition were denied regarding submission of resignation on 4.5.68 by respondent no. 5. It was asserted by respondent no. 5 that he had filed an application before the D.E.O. Muzaffarpur on 5.5.68 and before the Mukhiya, Gram Panchayat Bakarpur, on 4.5.68 about the incident that respondent no, 5 was forced to sign a letter of resignation, which was evident from the fact that the said resignation was not written in his hand and was in the pen of the clerk of the school, written at the instance of petitioner no. 1. 1. In paragraph 9 of the counter affidavit also there was denial of the statement made by the petitioners in paragraph 9 of the writ application. This paragraph of the counter-affidavit relates to the procedure adopted by respondent no. 5 for filing appeal before respondent no. 1. He stated therein that he had filed his petition before the D.E.O. Muzaffarpur against forced resignation, which was forwarded to the Secretary, Board of Secondary Education. Bihar, Patna by D.E.O. for necessary action according to the procedure laid down in that connection. According to Mr. Prasad, the petition was rightly treated as an appeal as all the appeals under rule 16 have to be filed before the D.E.O, and not before the President, Board of Secondary Education, though appeals have to be disposed of by the President Learned counsel referred to rule 16, quoted above, which inter alia, provides that the appeal must be preferred before the District Education Officer within 30 days on receipt of the punishment order,. It further provides that when an appeal has been preferred, the order of discharge or dismissal shall not be given effect to till the disposal of appeal by the President, Board of secondary Education. Therefore, he submitted that respondent no. 5 has followed the procedure while filing the appeal and there is no irregularity about it. 13. Our attention was also drawn to the statement made by respondent no. 5 in paragraph 14 wherein an assertion made by the petitioners in paragraph 18 of the writ petition, was denied. Respondent no, 5 reiterated that his signature on the resignation letter was obtained forcibly at the residence of the Secretary of the school, namely, petitioner no. 1, and resignation letter was in the handwriting of the clerk of the school. The District Education officer also in his report dated 30.10.69 Annexure C to the counter affidavit) has clearly mentioned that the resignation of respondent no. 5 was obtained forcibly. According to learned counsel, therefore, on the facts of the instant case forced resignation of respondent no. 5 amounted to illegal removal of respondent no. 5 from the post of the headmaster and it was not a case of termination simplicitor as provided under rule 14. 14. 5 was obtained forcibly. According to learned counsel, therefore, on the facts of the instant case forced resignation of respondent no. 5 amounted to illegal removal of respondent no. 5 from the post of the headmaster and it was not a case of termination simplicitor as provided under rule 14. 14. In my opinion, after having perused the materials on the record, the contentions of the learned counsel for respondent no 5, as also that of respondents 1 and 2 are well founded. The observations in the cases of Gita Pd. singh and Bishwanath khetan (quoted above), wherein it was held that the resignation would amount to termination simplicitor and the provision contained under rule 14 would be attracted, are not applicable on the facts of this case. In those cases, their Lordships were dealing with the cases of voluntary resignation. In the present case there is sufficient material on the record to establish that respondent no. 5 was forced to resign. His resignation, it seems, was obtained by coercion. The very next day he had filed his application before the D.E.O. stating there in that his resignation was obtained by the Secretary per force. Besides, in the instant case, in the impugned order respondent no. 1 has clearly found that the resignation of respondent no. 5 was obtained forcibly. He had before him the report of the District Education officer as well as several members present in the meeting, namely, Tulsidas Mehta, M.L.A. Chandrika Singh, Repat Ram and Ramanand Singh, teachers, representative, had accepted in writing that the resignation of respondent no. 5 and two other teachers were obtained forcibly. Chandrika Singh also had deposed personally before respondent no. 1 on 14.11.1970 that the resignation of respondent no. 5 was obtained forcibly as he was not pulling on well with the Secretary over the question of appointment of the Secretary's son an assistant teacher in the school. 15. In Syed Yakoob V. K. S. Radhakrishanan AIR 1964 S.C. 477 it was observed that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal could not, however be challenged in proceeding for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. 15. In Syed Yakoob V. K. S. Radhakrishanan AIR 1964 S.C. 477 it was observed that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal could not, however be challenged in proceeding for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding being within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the points could not be agitated before a writ court. In that view of the matter, the petitioners cannot challenge the said finding of fact. It is well settled that a contract obtained by means of duress exercised by one party over the other is void-able. As mentioned earlier, in the instant case that very next day, rather on the same day, respondent no. 5 had raised objection to his resignation having been obtained per force. Therefore, I have no doubt in my mind that in the instant case resignation of respondent no.5 was obtained forcibly and as such his resignation letter contained in Annexure "2" has to be ignored. The petitioners themselves in their application have stated, as mentioned earlier, that some serious charges of embezzlement of school money, indiscipline, insubordination and other misconducts were leveled against respondent no. 5 from time to time. The managing committee had contemplated some action in respect of the misconduct alleged against him. During the regime of respondent no, 5 the institution consistently and continuously suffered. Therefore, it is obvious that the managing committee including the Secretary of the school, was annoyed with respondent no, 5 and it wanted to remove him. Under the circumstances his removal, in my view, will amount to discharge and the provision contained in rule 15 would apply, 16. In this connection it is worth while to refer to the case of Mati Ram Deka and others Vrs. General Manager, North East Frontier Railway and ors AIR 1964 S. C. 600 wherein it was observed at page 621 thus: "........The word remove means to discharge, to get rid off, to dismiss. In their ordinary parlance, therefore the said words mean nothing more or less than the termination of a person's office. The effect of dismissal or removal of one from his office is to discharge him from that office. In their ordinary parlance, therefore the said words mean nothing more or less than the termination of a person's office. The effect of dismissal or removal of one from his office is to discharge him from that office. In that sense, the said words, comprehend every termination of the services of a Government servant.....” Reference may also be made to articles, the Welfare State, Rule of law and Natural Justice, of his Lordship K. K. Mathew, a Judge of the Supreme Court, printed in the Journal of the Bar Council of India, volume 3(4) November, 1974, of page 597. It was observed thus: “..........In many circumstances, the mechanical application of a rule means injustice. If you want individualized justice, that is, justice which is appropriate to the case and which is tailored to its needs, you need discretionary power…..” In Jaghdish Pd. Singh v. The President, Board of Secondary Education, Bihar 1974 BBCJ 498 Untwalia C. J. (as he then was) observed at page 506 thus “ “........I think Kabutra Kuers case was wrongly decided-Shortly after the decision of that case, the discussion made with reference to clause 12 of the Rules in my judgment in Ajit Kumar Mukharjee v. The President, Board of Secondary Education, Bihar, Patna, and others would show that had the facts of that case would have shown that it was a case of dismissal or discharge of a temporary teacher by way of punishment, I would have probably taken the same view as the one taken by a Bench of this court in Kailash Chuodhary's case which has been approved by my learned brother.” 17. In the instant case although respondent no. 5 was a temporary headmaster, his removal, was on the facts of the case by way of punishment. Therefore, he had a right to appeal. For the reasons, mentioned above I also hold that the procedure adopted by respondent no. 5 in filing the appeal through the District Education officer was in accordance with law. 18. It may be recalled that Mr. Mishra had made a grievance regarding ex-parte order of reinstatement of respondent no. 5 contained in Annexure 6/1'. In the back ground of the instant case it is obvious that the said order was passed on appear having been flied by respondent no. 5 before respondent no. 1 and after having, prime facie, been satisfied that the resignation of respondent no. 5 contained in Annexure 6/1'. In the back ground of the instant case it is obvious that the said order was passed on appear having been flied by respondent no. 5 before respondent no. 1 and after having, prime facie, been satisfied that the resignation of respondent no. 5 was obtained by force respondent no. 1 had passed that order only by way of maintaining status quo. Therefore, I do not find any flaw in that order, 19. Besides, in the instant case, no injustice, would be caused to petitioner no. 2, who was appointed as the headmaster of the institution, as approved by the District Education officer, only on the condition that his appointment would be subject to the result of the appeal of respondent no. 5. 20. In conclusion, the application is dismissed and the impugned order contained in Annexure 9' is affirmed. In the circumstances, however, there will be no order as to costs. S. K. Choudhury, J. - I agree. Application dismissed.