HARI SWARUP, J. This petition has been filed by a tenant against the order passed in proceedings under the U. P. Urban Build ing (Regulation of Letting and Eviction) Act, 1972, (hereinafter re ferred to as the Act ). An application was moved under Section 21 (1) of the Act for release of the accommodation. The application was rejected by the prescribed authority. The landlord went up in ap peal. The appeal was allowed and the eviction of the tenant has been ordered. According to the finding of the appellate court, the landlord lives on the first floor while the tenant lived on the ground floor. The latrine, which is on the ground floor, was in common use. He also found that at some time the water tap was also common. On these findings he came to the conclusion that the case was covered by Ex planation (iv) to Section 21 (1) of the Act. Accordingly he held that the building was bona fide required by the landlord. The appellate court then recorded the finding that the need of the tenant was com paratively greater than the need of the landlord, but still allowed the appeal because, according to him, the need of the landlord was bona fide. The first question that arises for consideration is whether Ex planation (iv) to sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act applies to the facts of the present case. Explanation (iv) runs as under: - "the fact that the building under tenancy is a part of a build ing the remaining part whereof is in the occupation of the land lord for residential purposes, shall be conclusive to prove that the building is bona fide required by the landlord. " It has been contended on behalf of the respondent that the building under tenancy is a part of the entire building and hence explanation (iv) applies. The contention of the petitioner on the other hand is that the word building here is only a synonym for the word ac commodation as was used in U. P. Act III of 1947. The contention of the petitioner on the other hand is that the word building here is only a synonym for the word ac commodation as was used in U. P. Act III of 1947. In case the words building under tenancy are given the meaning of accommodation under tenancy, then the expression building the remaining part whereof is in occupation of the landlord will mean the accommoda tion the remaining part whereof is in occupation of the landlord; and it will have to be seen whether the accommodation with the tenant is part of the entire accommodation or not. If, however, the word building is given a wider meaning as including the entire super structure then of course, the ground floor being part of the super structure will be part of building the remaining part whereof is in the occupation of the landlord. Under the old Act premises to be dealt with for purposes of con trol of letting was called an accommodation. It was defined in Sec tion 2 (a): - " (a) accommodation means residential and non-residental ac commodation in any building or part of a building and includes, (i) gardens, grounds and outhouses, of any appurtenant to such building or part of a building; (ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or part of a building; (iii) any fitting affixed to such building or part of a building for the mere beneficial enjoyment thereof, but does not include any accommodation used as a factory for an in dustrial purpose where the business carried on in or upon the build ing is also leased out to the lessee by the same transaction. " In the present Act the premises to be dealt with for purposes of letting have been described as building. The definition of building given in Section 3 (i) is as under: - "building, means a residential or non-residential roofed structure and includes- (i) any land (including any garden), garages and ou1 houses, appurtenant to such building; (ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building; (iii) any fittings and fixtures affixed to such building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. " Comparing the two definitions there appears to be no difference be tween the word accommodation as used under the old Act and the building used under the new Act. " Comparing the two definitions there appears to be no difference be tween the word accommodation as used under the old Act and the building used under the new Act. It is undeniable that a super structure may be divisible in different accommodation which can be separately let out and then, according to the definition each such portion of the super-structure will be a building. The word building in the new Act has thus a special meaning and not the meaning ordinarily understood. It does not mean the entire super-structure, but means only the portion of a super-structure which is independently liable to be dealt with for purposes of letting out. This is the only meaning which the legislature could have in mind while on acting the new Act in the context of the modern system of construction of residential and non-residential building. The enactment has been made in an age when multi-storeyed flats are being constructed and buildings are so designed that they are devisible into separate independent re sidential units and separate commercial units. The control of letting under the Act, through the various provisions of the Act, is to control the letting of each such accommodation. It is wholly immaterial whether such accommodation forms the entire unit of super-structure or is apart of a super-structure. A building under this Act means only an independent allotable accommodation, whether singly situat ed or is part of a building complex. In the present case the landlord is occupying the first floor which under the definition of the build ing given in the Act will be a building, similarly the accommoda tion in occupation of the tenant, namely, the ground floor will be a building within the meaning of the Act. The two are to be dealt with separately and independently and cannot be deemed to be part of a building for purposes of this Act. The presumption, in the absence of express indication is not that the legislature changes, the law, the presumption is about the con tinuity of law. Explanation (i) to Section 21 (1) is pari materia with Rule 7 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Rules. Rule 7 runs as under: - "7. The presumption, in the absence of express indication is not that the legislature changes, the law, the presumption is about the con tinuity of law. Explanation (i) to Section 21 (1) is pari materia with Rule 7 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Rules. Rule 7 runs as under: - "7. Allotment of a portion of accommodation-Where a por tion of accommodation falls vacant and the owner is in occupa tion of another portion thereof, the District Magistrate shall, be fore making the allotment order, consult the owner and shall as far as possible, make the allotment in occordance with the wishes of the owner. " The meaning and purport of explanation (iv), therefore, should be similar to the meaning given by the Courts to rule 7. A Full Bench of this Court considered rule 7. The majority of the learned Judges were of the opinion that the word accommodation means a unit of accommodation and not the entire super- structure. A whole super structure may have various accommodation and for the application of rule 7, it was held that the landlord must occupy a portion not of the entire super-structure but of the accommodation. A similar view was expressed by a Division Bench in the case of Sri Krishna Khanna v. Additional District Magistrate, Kanpur and others (1964 A. L. J. 710 ). In that case the building consisted of two stories. The first storey was in occupation of the tenant while the second storey was in the occupa tion of the landlord. Rule 7 was held not applicable. In explanation (iv) the building under tenancy to be a part of a building the remaining part whereof is in the occupation of the land lord must be a portion which is not an independently allotable unit. Explanation (iv) deals with buildngs for residential purposes and it in ay, therefore, be taken that if a super-structure or a portion there of is an independent residential unit and a part of that independent unit is in the tenancy of a person, then explanation (iv) will be at tracted. It will not be attracted in case the two portions of the super-structure are independently fit for residential purposes and are allotable as such under the Act. Explanation (iv) was thus not attracted in the present case. It will not be attracted in case the two portions of the super-structure are independently fit for residential purposes and are allotable as such under the Act. Explanation (iv) was thus not attracted in the present case. Once explanation (iv) is not attracted the landlord had to prove the bona fide nature of his need and the prescribed and the appellate authorities had to apply the principles laid down for grant or rejection of an application in rule 16 (1) of the U. P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. It appears that the appellate court was under the impres sion that once the bona fide nature of the need of the landlord had been established the need of the tenant was immaterial and he should be directed to be ejected. This is contrary to the provisions of rule 16 as well as to the provisions of Section 21 of the Act. In the case of Roshanlal and another v. Smt. Ramadevi and another 1975 A. L. R. 13 it was held that even though the need of the landlord was bona -fide, permis sion for eviction under Section 21 could not be granted without com paring the needs of the landlord and tenant. It is well established that in case the tenants need is found to, be greater than the land lords need, the tenant cannot be ordered to be evicted. Even if explanation (iv) to Section 21 (1) were deemed appli cable it will not exclude rule 16, because the portion of rule 16, ex cept in cases provided for in the explanation to Section 21 (1) in rule 16 have been held to be ultra vires by a Division Bench of this Court (Lucknow Bench) in Civil Misc. Writ No. 224 of 1973 connected with Civil Misc. Writ Nos. 319 of 1973, 763 of 1974 and 1047 of 1974. The learned District Judge erred in thinking that once the need of the landlord was bona fide nothing more was to be considered. He was clearly in error. He should have applied the principles laid down in rule 16 (1) (a) and (d) before upsetting the order of the Prescribed Authority. As the learned District Judge has misdirected himself, the ap pellate order cannot be deemed to have been passed in accordance with law. In the result the petition is allowed. He was clearly in error. He should have applied the principles laid down in rule 16 (1) (a) and (d) before upsetting the order of the Prescribed Authority. As the learned District Judge has misdirected himself, the ap pellate order cannot be deemed to have been passed in accordance with law. In the result the petition is allowed. The order of the ap pellate court dated May 6, 1974 is quashed and the appellate court is directed to readmit the appeal to its original number and decide it afresh in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case the parties will bear their own costs. .