Narain, J. This miscellaneous petition is directed against the order dated the 30th of October, 1973 by which the learned Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad has framed charge against the petitioner for an offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and for quashing the criminal proceeding. 2. The petitioner is the Managing Director of Messrs Superintendence Company of India (Private) Ltd, having its registered office at Calcutta. The Company carried on different kinds of Survey works besides performing quality control of industrial raw materials. The opposite party Shri Tarun Gupta was an employee of the company and on the 18th of August. 1972 he filed a complaint before the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner alleging offences under sections 506 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code. It was stated there that he was at the relevant time the Manager of the Company in its office at Dhanbad on a salary of Rs. 795/per month. He demanded increment of his remuneration at which the petitioner assured him of further increment provided he signed an agreement and in case he did not sign the agreement the consequence would be not only withholding of further increment but also termination of his service. In the circumstance the opposite party signed the agreement and immediately thereafter the petitioner wanted him to do some illegal things, as for example to sign false payment vouchers, false analysis reports and to show less profit for income tax return, The opposite party refused to do so and at this harassment and threats were meted out to him and consequently he had to resign his job. On these allegations the complaint was filed against the petitioner. 3. After examining certain witnesses the trying Magistrate framed charge only for the offence under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code saying that the petitioner between 9th March 1970 to April, 1970 at Dhanbad and Calcutta cheated the opposite party by dishonestly inducing him to sign the agreement. 4. The agreement in question is dated the 9th January, 1970. It has been signed by the opposite party and the petitioner. 4. The agreement in question is dated the 9th January, 1970. It has been signed by the opposite party and the petitioner. The main terms of the agreement are that the opposite party shall not divulge secrets of the company to anyone and that within two years of his leaving the company either by resignation, termination or otherwise, he shall not carry on, directly or indirectly similar business as those conducted by the petitioner's company in Bihar, West Bengal where he also worked before and in others places where he may work and that he shall not join a firm engaged in business similar to the petitioner's company. In default, he made himself liable to pay damages, compensation and other penalties as may be charged or claimed by the petitioner's company against him. In this regard evidence of the opposite party is that on the 9th of March, 1970 the petitioner called him in the Ajanta Hotel at Dhanbad where he was staying. He placed before him a typed agreement and said if the opposite party signed it he will be granted many facilities in his service. The opposite party did not agree to this. Next he called him to his residence in the last week of April, 1970 at Calcutta. When he went there he was shown the same agreement that was shown to him in the Ajanta Hotel. The petitioner again gave him temptation of increased salary and in the event of refusal threat of termination of his service. In the circumstance the opposite party signed the agreement. The stamp paper on which the agreement was signed was purchased on the 4th of April, 1970 though the agreement was stated to be signed on the 9th January, 1970 and that, in fact, the opposite party and the petitioner put their signatures on the agreement in the last week of April, 1970. 5. Mr. Nageshwar Prasad on behalf of the opposite party submitted that the petitioner induced the opposite party to sign the agreement saying that his salary would be increased and that his prospects in service will be bettered. He laid stress on the fact that in case the opposite party refused to sign the agreement threat was given that his career will be in jeopardy resulting in its termination. He laid stress on the fact that in case the opposite party refused to sign the agreement threat was given that his career will be in jeopardy resulting in its termination. According to him making of an agreement with the stipulations as it contains in the above context cannot but fall within the offence of cheating. for the petitioner Mr. Shankar Das Banerjee vehemently urged that element of mens rea was singularly absent from the transaction and this fact will become crystal clear if the terms of the agreement, the surrounding circumstances and the letter of resignation sent by the opposite party are analysed. Arguments were advanced on the question whether the covenant put in the agreement debarring the opposite party from serving in any other rival concern after two years of his leaving the petitioner's company was legal or illegal in law. Both sides relied on Niranjan Shankar Golikari Vs.. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. in support of their respective contentions. For the petitioner my attention was invited to the observation made in paragraph 15 of the decision which is to the following effect :- "Negative covenants operative during the period of the contract of employment when the employee is bound to serve his employer exclusively are generally not regarded as restraint of trade and, therefore, do not fall under section 27 of the Contract Act. A negative covenant that the employee would not engage himself in a trade or business or -would not get himself employed under any other master for whom he would perform similar or substantially similar duties is not, therefore, a restraint of trade unless the contract as aforesaid is unconscionable or excessively harsh or unreasonable or one-sided." For the opposite party it was submitted that this sort of restriction applied only so long as the employee was in service and in support of this contention reference was made to paragraph 10 ibid. There is no doubt observation in support of what has been submitted on behalf of the opposite party but the position has been summed up by saying that "the rule now is that restraints whether general or partial may be good if they are reasonable. A restraint upon freedom of contract must be shown to be reasonably necessary for the purpose of freedom of trade. A restraint upon freedom of contract must be shown to be reasonably necessary for the purpose of freedom of trade. A restraint reasonably necessary for the protection of the convenient must prevail unless some specific ground of public policy can be clearly established against it." Submission on behalf of the petitioner is that it restraint was put upon the opposite party by reason of the fact that from dust he was raised to the position which he occupied at the relevant time. He was allowed to know the secrets of the company and having taken advantage of learning such secrets from the company it would be disasterous if he be allowed to take an employment in a rival company and part with the secrets of the petitioner's company. It was also submitted that such a restraint have been unreasonable and unconscionable if the opposite party was debarred from accepting service for an inordinately long time but it was confined to a period of two years only and that also to places where the petitioner had its business. For the present purpose I do not think it necessary to determine whether such a restraint upon the opposite party was legal or not. Suffice it to say whether an agreement with such a restraint fulfils the requirements of the offence in question. In this connection, it would be noticed that the agreement was according to the opposite party signed in the month of April, 1970. The opposite party went on leave from the 26th of May, 1970 to 29th of May, 1970, applied for immediate transfer from Dhanbad on the 27th of June, 1970 and on the 31st of August, 1970 applied for extension of sick leave from 1st of September, 1970 to 13th of September, 1970 and from Calcutta where he was those days he sent a letter of resignation on the 14th of September, 1970. Since he had taken a job in a rival company of Messrs Eskaps Ltd. at Calcutta and divulged secrets to them the petitioner's firm filed a money suit claiming damages from the opposite party on the 20th of June. 1976 The present complaint was filed by the opposite party against the petitioner on the 18th of August, 1972. Since he had taken a job in a rival company of Messrs Eskaps Ltd. at Calcutta and divulged secrets to them the petitioner's firm filed a money suit claiming damages from the opposite party on the 20th of June. 1976 The present complaint was filed by the opposite party against the petitioner on the 18th of August, 1972. The different dates set out above are said to be a clear pointer to the fact that the complaint was an attempt by way of retaliation of the money suit that had been filed against the opposite party. I find substance in this contention. Had the opposite party any grievance against the petitioners on the scare of obtaining from him the signature on the agreement in question and the illegal work he was asked to do there was no necessity to wait for more than two years to file the present complaint against the petitioner. Besides this, facts mentioned in the letter of resignation are also eloquent. The letter of resignation begins by expressing gratitude to the petitioner and says that during 11 or 12 years that the opposite party had been in the service of the petitioner and the hard work that he put in till mid night his health had completely broken down and he had become mentally tired also. As such it was stated there that after expiry of his leave the letter may be treated as a letter of resignation. Then some request was made about compensatory leave etc. and it was stated "further I have to honour your two years' agreement." After saying all this a request was made for suitable settlement of accounts and a hope was expressed that he will not be harassed for clearance of his dues. Above being the tenor of letter of resignation the point for consideration is whether even obliquely does it suggest any deception or fraudulent and dishonest inducement so as to bring the case within the mischief of section 41 5 of the Indian Penal Code. Clearly there was neither any pressure nor any inducement or any outside influence operating when this letter of resignation was written and if the opposite party had any grievance in respect of the agreement, for which now he had taken upon himself to file the complaint, that was the earliest opportunity to make a grievance either directly or indirectly. Clearly there was neither any pressure nor any inducement or any outside influence operating when this letter of resignation was written and if the opposite party had any grievance in respect of the agreement, for which now he had taken upon himself to file the complaint, that was the earliest opportunity to make a grievance either directly or indirectly. Omission to do so is significant and that lends support to the argument that this criminal case is nothing but a retaliatory measure to the money suit that has been filed against him. 6. Mr. Nageshwar Prasad on behalf of the opposite party tried to explain this letter of resignation by saying that it was a polite way of writing by a subordinate officer to a superior officer and that the opposite party could not be rude to the petitioner since he still had his dues with the petitioner in respect of his General Provident Fund. No body suggests a subordinate officer to be rude to the superior officer but ventilation of genuine grievance of deception and fraudulent and dishonest inducement cannot be equated with rudeness. As such the explanation offered cannot avail the opposite party. 7. Judged in the above light I find that the letter of resignation and the circumstances set out above completely negative the accusation made by the opposite party. Thus this is a case where the evidence on record is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and in such a circumstance it would be a clear abuse of the process of the court if the prosecution against the petitioner is allowed to continue vide R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab. 8. The question of jurisdiction was also raised on behalf of the petitioner by saying that the court at Dhanbad has no jurisdiction to try the case. The jurisdiction at Dhanbad is sought to be supported by relying on the provisions of section 179 of the old Code of Criminal procedure. The section says. "When a person is accused of the commission of any offence by reason of anything which has been done, and of any consequence which has ensued, such offence may be inquired into or tried by a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any such thing has been done, or any such consequence has ensued. The section says. "When a person is accused of the commission of any offence by reason of anything which has been done, and of any consequence which has ensued, such offence may be inquired into or tried by a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any such thing has been done, or any such consequence has ensued. " It was argued for the opposite party that although agreement was signed at Calcutta consequence ensued at Dhanbad inasmuch as he was those days posted at Dhanbad and as a result of the agreement the final consequence was his loss of employment at Dhanbad. The argument has no substance. The service of the opposite party was transferable and it is not quite understandable how the consequence could be said to have become operative at Dhanbad. It will be noticed that resignation was tendered at Calcutta and it was accepted also there. If at all, consequence was the loss of service and this, in itself, cannot vest jurisdiction in the Dhanbad court. Then again, the argument cannot be sustained in law. The true meaning of section 179 is that the thing done and the consequence ensued should together constitute the offence. The consequence must form the integral part of the offence. In other words, the consequence must be such a fact as has to be proved to establish the offence. Admittedly the agreement in question was executed at Calcutta and execution of the document is claimed to fall within the mischief of fraud. If so the offence was complete at Calcutta and, therefore, the question of consequence has no relevance to the offence. 9. It has been argued that the court at Dhanbad has jurisdiction by reason of what happened in the Ajanta Hotel there. Evidence of the opposite party is that on the 9th of March, 1970 the petitioner called him in Ajanta Hotel where he was staying, The petitioner placed before him the typed agreement and asked him to sign it and said that if he signed it he will grant him many facilities. The opposite party did not agree to the offer made. At this he was threatened with dire consequences. Even if some inducement was offered in the Ajanta. Hotel and threats administered the matter regarding execution of the agreement terminated with refusal and that was an end of the matter. The opposite party did not agree to the offer made. At this he was threatened with dire consequences. Even if some inducement was offered in the Ajanta. Hotel and threats administered the matter regarding execution of the agreement terminated with refusal and that was an end of the matter. A mere inducement and threat do not constitute the offence of cheating. Therefore, this aspect of the matter also cannot vest jurisdiction in the Dhanbad court. 10. For the above reasons the criminal proceeding including the charge framed under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner is quashed and the criminal miscellaneous application is allowed. Application allowed.