Judgment :- 1. The question involved in this appeal, a simple one as we see it, relating to the appointment of an authorised retail distributor under Clause.45 (1) of the Kerala Rationing Order, 1966 has brought in its wake a very much larger question about the extent and scope of the jurisdiction of this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution to interfere with such appointments. 2. The appellant is a Co-operative Society, who was an aspirant for appointment as an authorised retail distributor under the above mentioned clause of the Order. He failed in his first attempt before the District Supply Officer but succeeded in his appeal before the District Collector. The Commissioner of Civil Supplies who is the revisional authority set aside the order of the Collector. That order is Ext. P2. We shall extract certain parts of that order which are pertinent. "Apart from the above aspect, there are other unsatisfactory aspects in the case which indicate that the dist. supply officer had not enquired into certain relevant aspects When a society which (had) already (been) running four shops is an applicant for licence for a fifth shop, the above factors ought to have been considered by the District Supply Officer as well as by the District Collector As it will not be proper to make a pronouncement on the rival claims of various applicants without a definite finding on the aforementioned aspects, the question of appointment of an A.R.D. for shop No. 94 is remanded to the District Supply Officer, Trichur for fresh consideration and decision" 3. After the matter was so remanded to the District Supply Officer, the District Supply Officer again came to the conclusion by Ext. P3 order that the Co-operative Society, the appellant before us cannot be appointed as the authorised retail distributor. There was again an appeal before the District Collector and the District Collector allowed the appeal by Ext. P4 order. We shall read the relevant part of that order as well. "I have heard the advocates for both the parties. I have also perused the connected records. There was again an appeal before the District Collector and the District Collector allowed the appeal by Ext. P4 order. We shall read the relevant part of that order as well. "I have heard the advocates for both the parties. I have also perused the connected records. The only point for consideration is who should be preferred for appointment as authorised retail distributor in this case whether the co-operative society or V. K. Mohammed It is seen from the minutes book of the rural development co-operative society No.426 which appears to be the predecessor of the appellant society that by a resolution No. 61 dated 5 31961 the society had resolved to surrender shop No. 2 on account of shortage of cardholders and also on account of financial loss. I have got this matter enquired into. There is no conclusive evidence available to prove that shop No. 2 mentioned in this resolution is the present shop No. 94. It has to be remembered that from 1956 to 1964, fair price shops functioned in the state and the practice then in vogue was to distribute one edangazhi of rice per card per week to the low income group. In 1964, informal rationing was introduced and the fair price shop keepers were redesignated as authorised retail distributors. From the security register maintained in the taluk supply office, it is seen that the secretary C.S. No. 426. Kattur was the holder of F. P. Shop No. 94 from 181956. It is further seen that the A. V. Krishnan was the licencee of shop No. 94 from 8 71961 onwards. It is the cancellation of the licence given to this Krishnan that has caused the present vacancy. It is thus clear that shop No. 94 thereafter by A. V. Krishnan. How this happened is not known. It is probable that it was a case of surrender. Serial No.2 shown in the resolution might be the number that the society gave to this shop. I do not however think that this surrender is so grave as to disentitle the society from getting further shops. This surrender was in the year 1961 when there was no informal rationing. But on 13 91971, the secretary of this society wrote to the taluk supply officer about the society's decision to discontinue A.R.D. No. 80 run by it as it was a loss to the society. This surrender was in the year 1961 when there was no informal rationing. But on 13 91971, the secretary of this society wrote to the taluk supply officer about the society's decision to discontinue A.R.D. No. 80 run by it as it was a loss to the society. Consequently, another person was appointed as A.R.D. No. 80. It can therefore be said that this society has recently surrendered one shop on the ground of financial loss. But the same time, it is seen that the cards registered with A.R-D. No. 96 of Kattur were linked with A.R.D 81 run by the appellant. This was necessitated due to the cancellation of the authorisation issued to shop No. 96 run by one P. K Balakrishnan. It can thus be seen that in 1971, shop No.80 was surrendered by the society while shop No.96 run by another individual was amalgamated with the society's shop No. 81. The taluk supply officer has reported that. no serious irregularities committed by the society have been brought to notice so far. The society has sufficient funds also. In the circumstances, I am of opinion that there is no justification to hold that V.K. Mohammed has better claims in this case. I therefore hold that this society has preferential claims for getting the ration shop in question. Accordingly I set aside the order of the District Supply Officer appointing V. K. Mohammed as A.R.P. No. 94 and appoint the appellant, the secretary, Kattur service co-operative society Ltd. No. 426, Kattur as the authorised retail distributor No. 94 Kattur". 4. The other applicant, the first respondent in this appeal then moved this court by O.P. No. 732 of 1975 and prayed that the order Ext. P4 be set aside on the grounds that the order of the Commissioner, the 5th respondent to this appeal had not been given due weight by the District Collector, the 4th respondent in passing Ext. P4 order, that the Collector acted malafide in passing Ext. P4 order and that the preferential treatment given to the appellant was not justified. The learned judge by the judgment under appeal seems to have accepted the position that the order Ext. P4 is against the terms of Ext. P2 order of the Commissioner. The relevant part of the judgment is contained in Para.6 and 7 of the judgment which we shall extract. "6. In the remand order. Ext. The learned judge by the judgment under appeal seems to have accepted the position that the order Ext. P4 is against the terms of Ext. P2 order of the Commissioner. The relevant part of the judgment is contained in Para.6 and 7 of the judgment which we shall extract. "6. In the remand order. Ext. P2 it has been stated that when a society which is already running four shops is an applicant for licence for a 5th shop the factors pointed out by the Taluk Supply Officer in his report dated 8-91973 that while the society was functioning as a rural development co-operative society, the licence of ration shop No. 94 was with the society but it had surrendered the licence on the ground of financial loss and more recently A.R.D. No. 80 also had been surrendered by the society on the ground of financial loss, ought to have been considered by the District Supply Officer as well as by the District Collector. That was taken by the commissioner of civil supplies to be important factors and these factors were duly considered by the District Supply Officer. He specifically points out that the Taluk Supply Officer in his report CS4-1954/ 71 dated 8 91973 had reported that the society was surrendering shops whenever there was no profit from them and that this statement of the Taluk Supply Officer is borne out by the records in the minute book also. In the matter in appeal, the District Collector had to consider whether these observations made by the District Supply Officer were wrong. If they were not wrong on the basis of the remand order, the District Supply Officer was perfectly right in overlooking the society and giving dealership to the petitioner. The Collector himself comes to the conclusion that it is probable that Shop No. 94 was surrendered by the society but then he says that he does not think that the surrender is so grave as to disentitle the society from getting further shops. The Collector has not gone into the reason why the shop was surrendered. If the surrender was on account of financial loss, it was certainly a reason that has to be taken into consideration in dealing with the question whether the shop should be granted to the society or not. The Collector has not gone into the reason why the shop was surrendered. If the surrender was on account of financial loss, it was certainly a reason that has to be taken into consideration in dealing with the question whether the shop should be granted to the society or not. The District Collector himself says that the society has recently surrendered A.R.D. No. 80 on the ground of financial loss. The fact that a shop run by another individual was amalgamated with the 5th respondent society's ration shop cannot in any way detract from the fact that the society was forced to surrender one shop recently on account of financial loss The surrender of shops on account of financial loss being a prime factor and especially when that had been directed by the remand order to be taken into consideration by the District Supply Officer, there was no error of fact or law committed by the District Supply Officer which require interference by the appellate authority District Collector. It is stated in the Collector's order that the Taluk Supply Officer has reported that no serious irregularities have been commuted by the society but at the same time we find that the Taluk Supply Officer has stated in his report dated 8 9 1973 that the society was surrendering the shops whenever there was no profit from them. This is an important aspect of the matter which had to be taken into consideration by the District Collector. The District Collector further states that the society has preferential claim for getting the ration shop. On what basis such preference should be given and what are such claims are not mentioned at all in the order. 7. I am, therefore, of the view that the District Collector's order is vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record. The mere fact that the petitioner has not taken advantage of the right of revision which he could have availed of, is no reason why this court should not interfere if there are sufficient grounds for this court's interference under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, I would quash Ext. P4 order and declare that the petitioner is entitled to be appointed as authorised rationshop dealer on the basis of the order Ext. P3 of the District Supply Officer. Therefore, I would quash Ext. P4 order and declare that the petitioner is entitled to be appointed as authorised rationshop dealer on the basis of the order Ext. P3 of the District Supply Officer. The Original Petition is disposed of as above, but I make no order as to costs." 5. The questions that arise for consideration are whether the order of the Commissioner passed in revision under Clause.45 (11) of the Kerala Rationing Order has concluded any matter which precluded the District Supply Officer or the District Collector from deciding in accordance with their discretion who should be appointed as the retail distributor. We have already extracted the relevant parts of Ext. P2 order and as we understand the order it only states that certain relevant aspects must be considered before a decision is taken. Ext P2 order has therefore not concluded any matter. It is clear from the portion of the order Ext. P4 which we have extracted that the aspects that were directed to be considered Lave been fully considered by the District Collector in Ext. P4. The District Collector as is clear from the order Ext. P4 decided to appoint the appellant notwithstanding the fact that on two former occasions one as early as 1961, and the other much later the appellant society had surrendered two of the shops for which the society had been appointed as an authorised retail dealer. Apparently the Collector did not attach much importance to the surrender. One of the surrenders was brushed aside on the ground that it was done as early as 1961 by the predecessor society and the second one was got over by stating that soon after the surrender other card holders attached to another shop were transferred to a shop of the society. We do not think that we can sit in judgment on these reasons given by the District Supply Officer for rejection of the contention that because of the earlier surrender the society should not be appointed as an authorised retail dealer for we conceive that in proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution we cannot interfere with the order merely on the ground that the order appears to us to be wrong in that we would have come to a different conclusion on the same matter. This proposition is well-settled. In this connection we must also consider the nature and purpose of the appointment. This proposition is well-settled. In this connection we must also consider the nature and purpose of the appointment. The Government themselves are the owners of the commodity, the food-grains. They have the right to deal with it in any manner they like. Since the Order has been promulgated the terms of the Order will have to be complied with and its provisions scrupulously followed in the matter of appointment of authorised dealers. If there has been any deviation from the provisions of the Order, this Court may be justified in interfering. It has not been suggested that there is any violation of the provisions of the Order. 6. It was however suggested that there has been malafides. The averments relating to this aspect are too meagre to sustain such a plea and have not been relied on by the learned judge in setting aside the order Ext. P4. We are unable to accept the contention that the Collector acted malafide. It was not even suggested that there has been no application of the mind to the questions involved. It was not argued that extraneous factors have been taken into account or that relevant factors have been omitted to be considered. The order cannot be said to be perverse or arbitrary. It was certainly passed with jurisdiction. It was not suggested that the District Collector had no authority to decide as he did. There is no patent error of law. In these circumstances, we think, acting under Art.226 of the Constitution, we are not entitled to interfere with the order. 7. Counsel for the respondents contended that the reasons given by the District Collector in Ext. P4 for what he termed 'condoning the omissions' of the Co-operative Society, the appellant, are too trivial. We shall assume so. Even then we are of the view that this Court is not entitled to interfere in proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution. 8. It was then contended that in effect and in substance by Ext. P4 order the District Collector has given preference to the society and the Order not having provided for any preference being given to a Co-operative Society the order is wrong in law. The Order has not laid down guidelines nor has it indicated the circumstances that must be taken into account in determining who should be appointed by the District Supply Officer. The Order has not laid down guidelines nor has it indicated the circumstances that must be taken into account in determining who should be appointed by the District Supply Officer. As we read Clause.45(1) of the Order mentioned above a wide discretion has been conferred on the District Supply Officer in the matter of appointment of authorised retail distributors. Any factor which is not irrelevant can therefore be taken into account. This Court as early as in 1968 upheld the provision in Clause.51-A of Kerala Rationing Order, 1966 which gave preference to a Co-operative Society, in A. Azhaikianambia Pillai & Others v. State of Kerala (1968 KLT. 27). So, even if the authority preferred the appellant merely because it was a Co-operative Society it cannot be said that he has acted in a patently illegal manner justifying interference under Art.226 of the Constitution. 9. In the light of the above, we consider that no case has been made out for interference under Art.226 of the Constitution. With great respect, we are unable to agree with the view taken in the judgment under appeal that there was an error of law apparent on the face of the record which prompted the learned judge to interfere with the order Ext. P4. We set aside the judgment and allow this appeal and dismiss the original petition. We direct the parties to bear their costs throughout. This dismissal will not preclude the first respondent in this appeal from seeking such remedies, if any that may be open to him under the Order. Allowed.