JUDGMENT - P.M. MUKHI, J.:---This Civil Revision Application raises a somewhat interesting question as to the scope and ambit of Order 21, Rules 97, 98 and 99 of the Civil Procedure Code and the nature of the summary investigation that is provided therein. The Petitioners, Podar Mills Ltd., are a public limited company, having their registered office at Bombay. In February 1955 the petitioners purchased a large estate comprising several survey numbers of the Revenue Village of Ghatkopar, situate at Agra Road, Ghatkopar in Greater Bombay. Survey No. 151 is a part of the said estate owned by the petitioners. When the petitioners purchased the properties at Ghatkopar, including Survey No. 151, one Smt. Manorama Begum alias Munnavara Begum Emdadali (also sometimes referred to as "Bai Maulani") was a license of an open piece of land in the said Survey No. 151. According to the petitioners, the said portion of land of which Munnavara Begum was a licensee, admeasured 33 x 22. But thereafter when the suit was field and the matter was heard, the parties agreed that the correct measurement of the said open piece of land occupied by her would be 60 x 40. It is the petitioners case that Munnavara Begum continued as a licensee under the petitioners and that the constructed a shed on the said land. In 1962, the petitioners revoked the licence given to Munnavara Begum and filed an ejectment application against her in the Court of Small Causes, Bombay (Being Ejectment Application No. 236/E of 1962 to eject her from the said open piece of land (hereinafter referred to as "the said plot of land" or "the suit premises"). The ejectment application was resisted by Munnavara Begum, who pleaded adverse possession for about 40 years and denied the petitioners right to recover possession of the said plot of land. However, when the ejectment application came up for hearing on the 18th of January, 1965, Munnavara Begum submitted to a decree and agreed and undertook to hand over vacant possession of the said plot of land and she requested that she be given three years time to vacate and further that no compensation be charged from her. However, when the ejectment application came up for hearing on the 18th of January, 1965, Munnavara Begum submitted to a decree and agreed and undertook to hand over vacant possession of the said plot of land and she requested that she be given three years time to vacate and further that no compensation be charged from her. Accordingly, an order in ejectment was passed by the Court of Small Causes ordering her to quit and deliver up possession of the open piece of land admeassuring 60 x 40, being a portion of Survey No. 151 of Revenue Village Ghatkopar, situate at Agra Road, Ghatkopar in Greater Bombay, and hand over vacant possession thereof to the petitioners on or before the 31st of January, 1968. The petitioners say that there was no order as to payment of costs and that Munnavara Begum gave an undertaking that she would hand over possession of the said plot of land to the petitioners on or before the said date. It requires to be noticed that there was no dispute as to the identity or the where-abouts of the property in suit, and both the parties were clearly aware as to what property was covered by the order in ejectment. As stated, Munnavara Begum was to hand over possession in terms of that order. Unfortunately, in July 1967, i.e. before the date on which possession was to be handed over, Munnavara Begum died; one Abdul Latif Mohammed Ali claimed to be her heir and legal representative. It is the petitioners case that when they came to know that Munnavara Begum had died, they made enquiries and found that three persons, viz. (1) Syed Anwar Hussein Kachrawala, (2) Ahmed Hussein Malbari and (3) Jagdishchandra Sharma, who are impleaded as respondents Nos. 1, 8 and 10, in this Revision Application, were in occupation of portions of the shed or chawl which had been constructed by Munnavara Begum on the said plot of land. The petitioners thereupon took out a notice in the Small Causes Court, being Miscellaneous Notice No. 2277 of 1967, Abdul Latif Mohamed Ali and the three occupants of the shed or chawl, referred to above. The petitioners thereupon took out a notice in the Small Causes Court, being Miscellaneous Notice No. 2277 of 1967, Abdul Latif Mohamed Ali and the three occupants of the shed or chawl, referred to above. In that Miscellaneous Notice the petitioners prayed that Abdul Latif Mohamed Ali be substituted in place of the deceased Munnavara Begum on the said ejectment order and execution of the said execution order may be ordered against all the four of them, viz. Abdul Latif Mohammed Ali as the heir and legal representative of the deceased Munnavara Begum and the three persons who were occupying the shed or chawl on the said plot of land. When the Miscellaneous Notice No. 2277 of 1967 come up for hearing, Abdul Latif Mohammed Ali did not contest, but the three occupants, viz. respondent No. 1 Syed Anwar Hussein Kachrawala, respondent No. 8 Ahmed Hussein Malbari and respondent No. 10 Jagdishchandra Sharma, opposed the notice and field their respective affidavits in reply to the said Miscellaneous Notice on the 9th of February, 1968. These affidavits are important and will be required to be looked into. In their joint affidavit dated the 9th February, 1968, Syed Anwar Hussein Kachrawala and Ahmad Hasan Malbari, and in his separate affidavit of the same date Jagdish Chandra Sharma, the three respondents stated on solemn affirmation, among other things that :--- (a) the defendant Munnavara Begum was during her lifetime in occupation of the open piece of land admeasuring about 60 X 40, being a portion of the Survey No. 151, situate at Agra Road, Ghatkopar, Greater Bombay, as an owner thereof for over 45 years and that she, the defendant, had acquired title thereof by adverse possession. (b) they denied that the defendant Munnavara Begum was a licensee of the plaintiff. (c) they denied that the plaintiff was the owner of the said open piece of land. (d) the defendant Munnavara Begum, as owner of the aforesaid open piece of land had erected a structure thereon and had inducted these respondents therein as her lawful tenants. (e) the defendant had let to these respondents the portion of the structures in their actual physical possession with the land under the said structure. (f) these respondents had been paying rent to the defendant in respect of the structures as also the land standing thereunder. (e) the defendant had let to these respondents the portion of the structures in their actual physical possession with the land under the said structure. (f) these respondents had been paying rent to the defendant in respect of the structures as also the land standing thereunder. They then went on to say that "these respondents are ready and willing to pay the rent to whoever establishes his rights thereof". These three respondents then went on to contend in the alternative that in any event defendant Munnavara Begum was a tenant in respect of the suit land so that these respondents, as sub-tenants, would step into the shoes of the deceased defendant and become direct tenants of the plaintiff. It requires to be noticed that although the suggestion was that Munnavara Begum was the owner and alternatively a tenant of the plaintiff, there was no suggestion that the three respondents claimed a hostile title or adverse possession. They simply claimed through defendant Munnavara Begum (since deceased). It also requires to be noticed that there was no suggestion whatsoever made by these three persons, viz. Syed Anwar Hussein Kachrawala, Ahmad Hasan Malbari and Jagdish Chandra Sharma, that the suit properties were not ascertainable or that the structures on the said plot of land had been constructed not by Munnavara Begum but by themselves. As a matter of fact, the phraseology of the two affidavits filed in the reply to the Miscellaneous Notice No. 2277 of 1967 is so clear that it can admit of no ambiguity. It has been solemnly stated in these affidavits that the structures were erected by defendant Munnavara Begum and that these respondents who had been inducted by the defendant Munnavara Begum were in actual possession of their respective portions of the structures. It was certainly not the case of Syed Anwar Hussain Kachrawala that he was in possession of the entire structure or the entire piece of land of which the defendant Munnawara Begum was a licensee in relation to the plaintiffs. Now, the Miscellaneous Notice No. 2277 of 1967 came to be heard on the 12th of February, 1968 when the learned Judge of the Court of Small Causes allowed the name of Abdul Latif Mohamed Ali to be brought on record as the heir and legal representative of the deceased Munnavara Begum and ordered execution to be issued against him. Now, the Miscellaneous Notice No. 2277 of 1967 came to be heard on the 12th of February, 1968 when the learned Judge of the Court of Small Causes allowed the name of Abdul Latif Mohamed Ali to be brought on record as the heir and legal representative of the deceased Munnavara Begum and ordered execution to be issued against him. But as regards the three respondents to whom the notice had been issued as occupants of the shed or chawl and the land thereunder, the learned Judge held that the notice against them was premature and accordingly discharged it in so far as these three persons were concerned. Thereafter the petitioners obtained a warrant of possession of the 17th of June, 1968 and on the 4th July, 1968 sought to execute the warrant and to take possession of the suit premises. When the attempt to take possession was made on the 4th of July, 1968 the Bailiff of the Court of Small Causes, Bombay, was obstructed by the present obstruction, who are respondents Nos. 1 to 21. Obstructionists No. 1 Syed Anwar Hussain Kachrawala (who died after the filing of this petition) is said to have told the Bailiff that he had been authorised by Ahmed Latif Mohamed Ali, the heir and legal representative of the deceased representative of the deceased Munnavara Begum, to collect rent of the various rooms standing on the said piece of land. The other obstructionists stated that they were the tenants of the said Abdul Latif Mohamed Ali in respect of the respective rooms occupied by them, but at the same time claimed independent right (independent right qua whom?) to stay in their respective rooms. As a result of the aforementioned obstruction, the Bailiff did not executive the warrant of possession against the opponents, and returned it to the Court with a report of the obstruction. On the 17th July, 1968 the obstructionist Notice No. 465 of 1968 was taken out by the petitioners, in the Court of Small Causes. In this notice it was prayed that the obstructionists and all other persons who may be found in the suit premises be removed and vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises be handed over to the petitioners. Now, it is important to notice that only respondents Nos. 1, 8, 9, 10 and 11 appeared to show cause and contested the obstructionist notice proceedings. Now, it is important to notice that only respondents Nos. 1, 8, 9, 10 and 11 appeared to show cause and contested the obstructionist notice proceedings. The other obstructionists, i.e. Nos. 2 to 7, and 12 to 21, ignored the notice and simply did not appeal. Syed Anwar Hussain Kachrawala as the obstructionist No. 1 filed his affidavit in reply to the obstructionist notice, wherein he made a statement which, it must be noted, runs counter to what had been solemnly stated by him in his earlier affidavit dated the 9th of February, 1968 in Miscellaneous Notice No. 2277 of 1967. In the affidavit in reply to the obstructionist notice, which dated the 30th of August, 1968, Syed Anwar Hussain Kachrawala set up an entirely new case, and stated once again on solemn affirmation that Bai Maulani (i.e. Munnavara Begum) was a tenant of the petitioners Podar Mills Ltd. in respect of the entire Survey No. 151 admeasuring 201/2 gunthas and that he (Syed Anwar Hussain Kachrawala) was the sub-tenant of Bai Maulani in respect of 850 square yards of land for which, according to him, he had been paying Rs. 55/- per month as the rent thereof since the year 1958. It is to be remembered that in the previous notice he had only said that he was occupying a portion of the structure erected by Munnavara Begum in which he had been inducted by her. Syed Anwar Hussain Kachrawal then went on to claim that he had proof that he was in occupation of the said land (presumably now meaning 850 square yards) since September 1960. As regards the earlier record from 1958 onwards, he put out a story that it was stolen some time in October 1965. It requires to be noticed that except his bare word which is also contradicted by his earlier affidavit, no evidence was produced of any kind to even prima facia substantiate the new case which was now being set up. Then in paragraph 4 of the affidavit dated the 30th of August, 1968 Syed Anwar Hussain Kachrawala made a statement that he was the lawful sub-tenant of the premises aforesaid and , "it was claimed in my own right and on my own account". As regards the other obstructionist, Syed Anwar Hussain Kachrawala stated that they were his tenant. What is perhaps more significant is the statement that follows, viz. As regards the other obstructionist, Syed Anwar Hussain Kachrawala stated that they were his tenant. What is perhaps more significant is the statement that follows, viz. "I say that I have constructed the residential rooms in the year 1958. I deny that since I became sub-tenant there was any sub-tenant as alleged. I say that my tenants are in occupation of the residential rooms since the year 1958. I deny that they were not there till the death of Bai Maulani." It is obvious that Syed Anwar Hussain Kachrawala by his affidavit dated the 30th of August, 1968 sought to set up an entirely new case so that it can be properly said that one of two affidavits at least must be false. Now, in reply to the obstructionist notice, Ahmed Hasan Malbari, who is obstructionist No. 8, (and who this time separately filed an affidavit which is dated the 4th of December, 1968) sought to make this new affidavit not only for himself but also for obstructionist No. 9, Mariumbi his wife, obstructionist No. 10 Jagdish Chandra Sharma and obstructionist No. 11 Smt. Jayavanta wife of obstructionist No. 10. In paragraph 5 of this affidavit. Ahmed Hasan Malbari starts by making a statement that he was not aware whether the petitioner had taken out a notice dated the 30th of October, 1967 for bringing the name of Abdul Latif Mohamed Ali on record. Now this is clearly a false statement because the record shows that an affidavit dated the 9th February, 1968 was filed by Ahmad Hasan Malbari jointly with Syed Ahmed Hussain Kachrawala, in reply to Miscellaneous Notice No. 2277 of 1967. In this affidavit dated the 4th of December, 1968 Ahmad Hasan Malbari denied that Abdul Latif Mohamed Ali was the legal representative of the deceased Munnavara Begum. He then admitted that obstructionists Nos. 8, 9, 10 and 11 had obstructed the execution of the warrant of possession. His contention then was that the portion of land, wherein he (Ahmad Hassan Malbari) along with the other obstructionists resided, did not form the subject matter of the decree obtained by the applicants and he. Therefore, challenged the legality of the attempt to execute the decree against him. His contention then was that the portion of land, wherein he (Ahmad Hassan Malbari) along with the other obstructionists resided, did not form the subject matter of the decree obtained by the applicants and he. Therefore, challenged the legality of the attempt to execute the decree against him. In paragraph 10 of this affidavit, Ahmed Hasan Malbari contended that he was the lawful sub-tenants of Smt. Munnavara Begum is respect of the portion of land admeasuring 10 X 20 "over which the construction of the structure belonged to him". He then said that he had been paying the rent in respect of the said portion of land to Munnavara Begum till her death (which, it must be remembered, took place in 1967 long after the making of the order of ejectment) and that he was residing there for more than twelve years and in any event prior to the 21 of May, 1959 in his own right. Now, there can be little doubt that these statements of Ahmed Hasan Malbari contradict his earlier statement that the structure, to a portion of which he was inducted by Bai Maulani, was constructed by the defendant Munnavara Begum, viz. the judgment-debtor. As regards Jagdish Chandra Sharma, obstructionist No. 10, Ahmed Hasan Malbari as the deponent, made similar statements, viz., that the portion of the structure occupied by obstructionist No. 10 was constructed by him, i.e. Jagdish Chandra Sharma at his own cost. It requires to be noticed that in his earlier affidavit filed by him in reply to Miscellaneous Notice No. 2277 of 1967, Jagdish Chandra Sharma had also stated that it was Munnavara Begum who had erected a structure on the said plot of land and he (Jagdish Chandra Sharma) had been inducted therein as her lawful tenant. It would follow from this that this part of the statement of Ahmed Hasan Malbari in relation to Jagdish Chandra Sharma is at variance with Jagdish Chandra Sharmas own statement. It is difficult to ignore the fact that although Ahmad Hasan Malbari has not now claimed a larger area of land, he has nevertheless set up a new case as to who put up the construction which he was occupying and this new statement is contrary to his earlier statement. One of the two statements would obviously be untrue. It is difficult to ignore the fact that although Ahmad Hasan Malbari has not now claimed a larger area of land, he has nevertheless set up a new case as to who put up the construction which he was occupying and this new statement is contrary to his earlier statement. One of the two statements would obviously be untrue. The learned Judge before whom the Obstructionist Notice No. 465 of 1968 came up for hearing in June 1969 discharged the notice, firstly, on the ground that the ejectment order was not capable of execution for want of proper description of the property and, secondly, on his finding that the obstructionists had proved that they were in possession on their own account as trespassers. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that the ejectment order was not binding on the obstructionists and discharged the notice. It is in these circumstances that the petitioners have approached this Court by a revision application under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. At the outset, it requires to be noticed that out of the 21 obstructionists, only obstructionists Nos. 1, 8, 9, 10 and 11 have come forward to show cause against the obstructionist notice. In other words, so far as obstructionists Nos. 2 to 7 and 12 to 21 are concerned, they did not appear and no cause was shown. They remained absent and unrepresented. I shall deal with this aspect of the matter at a later stage of my judgment. Before considering the contentions of the parties, I find it appropriate to briefly notice the basic approach of the learned Judge of the Small Causes Court to the obstructionist proceedings before him. After noticing that the 5 obstructionists who had appeared to show cause were claiming that they were for the last 10 to 12 years lawful sub-tenants of Bai Maulani (Munnavara Begum), the judgment debtor, he went on to consider whether the obstructionists (obviously the five persons before him) were bound by the ejectment order passed against Bai Maulani (or Munnavara Begum). When the lawyer who appeared for the applicants pointed out to the learned Judge that it was the case of these obstructionists themselves that they were sub-tenants of Bai Maulani and thus claimed under her, the learned Judge went on to set up a new case which was never pleaded before him, viz., that although it was the case of the obstructionists that they were sub-tenants of Bai Maulani, he was not inclined to accept the arguments of the lawyer for the applicants because "it must be remembered that the obstructionists cannot be treated as sub-tenants of Bai Maulani, although the claimed that position in their affidavit". In other words, the learned Judge found that although the obstructionists possession was relatable to the judgment-debtor, they were not her lawful sub-tenants. The learned Judge noticed that the Bai Munnavara Begum was a licensee of the plaintiffs and then came to the conclusion that the obstructionists had no legal status or title in the property which they occupied and that therefore, such persons must be regarded as trespassers. That is how the learned Judge sought to rely on certain observations of the this Court in Messrs. Jaswantilal Jagjivandas Co. v. Western Company (India). Bombay, reported in 61 Bom.L.R. 1087. On this approach, viz., that since the obstructionists could not be considered to be her lawful sub-tenants because Bai Maulani herself was a licensee and because, according to him, the obstructionists must be considered as trespassers, the learned Judge felt that "it would be correct to say that the ejectment order passed against Bai Maulani could not be executed against the persons who are trespassers on the property. 15th September, 1975. During the pendency of this Revision Petition the first obstructionists, Syed Anwar Hussain Kachrawala, died and his heirs have been brought on record. They are his widow and two daughters. It would ,however, appear that the widow and the two daughters are not ad idem so that they are represented before me by separate Advocates. Mr. D.D. Samant, the learned Advocate for the petitioners-original decree-holders, has contended, firstly, that the lower Court did not exercise its jurisdiction and/or acted with material irregularity and illegality in the exercise of its jurisdiction by ignoring the fact that the obstructionists possession was clearly relatable to the judgment-debtor on their own showing. Mr. D.D. Samant, the learned Advocate for the petitioners-original decree-holders, has contended, firstly, that the lower Court did not exercise its jurisdiction and/or acted with material irregularity and illegality in the exercise of its jurisdiction by ignoring the fact that the obstructionists possession was clearly relatable to the judgment-debtor on their own showing. He contended, secondly, that although the obstructionists had themselves in terms taken up the stand and pleaded that they derived title from Munnavara Begum, either as her tenants or if she was held to be a tenants herself then as her sub-tenants, the learned Judge had set up a new case for them and gone on to hold that they were trespassers and, therefore, entitled to remain in possession "in there own right". Mr. Samants complained that the manner in which the learned Judge had arrived at his finding that the obstructionist notice be dismissed was to build up a case which the obstructionist themselves had not pleaded and after holding that the obstructionist were really "trespassers", dismissed the obstructionist notice. Mr. Samants third contention was that the learned Judge of the Small Causes Court also acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction under Order 21, Rule 97. Civil Procedure Code in relation to obstructionists Nos. 2 to 7 and 12 to 21. Although these 16 obstructionist had not appeared before him to satisfy the Court under Rule 99, that these 16 obstructionists, like the five obstructionists who did appear also claimed in good faith to be in possession on their own account or on account of some person other than the judgment-debtor, he dismissed the obstructionist Notice against them also. As to the question of identity of the suit premises, Mr. Samant urged that as the obstructionists clearly claimed through the judgment-debtor Munnavara Begum, there was and could be no difficulty in the ascertainment of the suit premises of which possession was required to be taken under the warrant of possession. Mr. Samant pointed out that the affidavits of respondents Nos. 1, 8 and 10 dated the 9th February, 1968 clearly showed that both parties did not find any difficulty as to the identity of the suit premises which were simply the premises of which the judgment-debtor Munnavara Begum was the licensee and on which the three respondents had, on their own admission, been inducted by her, Mr. 1, 8 and 10 dated the 9th February, 1968 clearly showed that both parties did not find any difficulty as to the identity of the suit premises which were simply the premises of which the judgment-debtor Munnavara Begum was the licensee and on which the three respondents had, on their own admission, been inducted by her, Mr. Samant argued that possession could be taken from the obstructionists of whatever premises they claimed through Munnavara Begum. Mr. V. P. Thosar, the learned Advocate, who appears for the widow of the first obstructions, placed four extentions before me. His first contention was that on the pleadings and facts on record the only order that could be made by lower Court was to discharge the obstructionist Notice against all. His second contention was that the trial Court had come to a finding that the decree was not executable because of want of identify of the suit premises and that this finding should not be disturbed. His third point as to the basis of the obstruction by the obstructionists was somewhat ingenuous, in that the obstructionists were, firstly, tenants of Bai Maulani or Munnavara Begum, secondly, that if they were not tenants, then they were sub-tenants of Bai Maulani or Munnavara Begum; and thirdly, that if they were neither lawful tenants nor lawful sub-tenants, then they were trespassers, the sequeter being that in all these three cases they were protected and could not be touched. In other words, the argument is that if they were tenants or sub-tenants, then, they were protected by the Rent Act and that if they were the trespassers, then they could not be removed in the present suit. The fourth contention of Mr. Thosar was as to the power of this Court to revise an order of the nature passed by the lower Court. Mr. M.M. A. Sayyed , the learned Advocate, who appeared for the two daughters of obstructionist No. 1, went one better. He said that as the 1st Obstructionist was not the judgment-debtor, the ejectment order could not be executed against the two daughters of the 1st Obstructionist, because under Order 21, Rule 35 of the Civil Procedure Code a decree for possession only be executed by removing the person bound by the decree. Mr. He said that as the 1st Obstructionist was not the judgment-debtor, the ejectment order could not be executed against the two daughters of the 1st Obstructionist, because under Order 21, Rule 35 of the Civil Procedure Code a decree for possession only be executed by removing the person bound by the decree. Mr. Sayyids contention was that Order 21 of the Civil Procedure Code constituted exhaustive Code for execution of order and decrees and further that order and decrees could not be executed in any other manner. He contended that there was no power in Court to execute a decree against third persons except as contained in Rule 98 of Order 21, and that as Rule 98 was not applicable to the facts of this case the decree could not be executed against the 1st Obstructionists or his heirs. He added that under the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Code all that was required was that the person in possession should bona fide claim in good faith to be in possession on his own account. Such a claim need not be proved in the strict sense of the word. As to the possession of the 1st Obstructionist, he said that obstructionist No. 1 was a lawful sub-tenants from 1958 of Bai Maulani or Munnavara Begum. He emphasised that it was not required of the person in possession to prove his title but that it was sufficient if he claimed possession on his own account. Later on, during the arguments Mr. Sayyid contended that if an obstructionist proves that he is a lawful sub-tenants, then he is in possession on his own account under the Rent Act; if he fails to prove that he is a lawful sub-tenants, then he would be a person without title and as such once again on his own account. These then are the rival contentions. On the basis of the fact of this case and the rival contentions of the parties appearing before me, that is to say, the petitioners and respondents Nos. 1(1), (widow), 1(2) and 1 (3), (daughters), the following questions arise for my consideration:- (1) Has the lower Court properly exercised it jurisdiction under Order 21, Rules 97, 98 and 99 of the Civil Procedure code and investigated the matter required of it in the manner provided by law ? 1(1), (widow), 1(2) and 1 (3), (daughters), the following questions arise for my consideration:- (1) Has the lower Court properly exercised it jurisdiction under Order 21, Rules 97, 98 and 99 of the Civil Procedure code and investigated the matter required of it in the manner provided by law ? (2) Whether on the facts and circumstances of this case, this civil revision application is maintainable and whether the order of the lower Court should be interfered with? Before these questions can be answered, it is necessary and appropriate to consider the scheme of Order 21, Rules 97 to 103, which appears in the Civil Procedure Code under the sub-heading "Resistance to delivery of possession to decree-holders or purchaser". Rules 97 to 99 read as follows:--- "97. Resistance or obstruction to possession of immoveable property.---(1) Whether the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining possession of the property, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such resistance or obstruction. (2) The Court shall fix a day for investigating the matter and shall summon the party against whom the application is made to appear and answer the same. 98. Resistance of obstruction by judgment-debtor.---Where the Court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without and just cause by the judgment-debtor or by some other person at his instigation or on his behalf, it shall direct that the applicants be put into possession of the property, and where the applicants is still resisted or obstructed in obtaining possession, the Court may also, at the instance of the applicant, order the judgment debtor, or any person acting at his instigation or on his behalf to be detained in the civil prison for a term which may extend to thirty days, and may order the person or persons whom it holds responsible for such resistance or obstruction to pay jointly or severally in addition to costs, reasonable compensation to the decree-holder or the purchaser as the case may be for the delay and expenses caused to him in obtaining possession. Any order made under this rule shall have one same force and be subject to some conditions as to appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree. 99. Any order made under this rule shall have one same force and be subject to some conditions as to appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree. 99. Resistance of obstruction by bona fide claimant.--- Where the Court is satisfied that the existence of obstruction was occasioned by and person (other than the person mentioned in the Rule 95 or 98) claiming in good faith to be in possession of the property on his own account of some person other than the judgment -debtor, the Court shall make an order dismissing the application." Now, when the holder of a decree for possession of an immoveable property seeks to obtain possession by executing a warrant of possession given to him by the Court and the bailiff of the Court is then obstructed by a person or persons in taking such possession of the immoveable property, and an application is made to the Court complaining of such resistance or obstruction, then it is required to the Court complaining of such resistance or obstruction, then it is required of the Court to hold an inquiry as to the nature of the resistance of obstruction. The words used are that "the Court shall fix a day for investigating the matter and shall summon the party against whom the application is made to appear and answer the same". (emphasis supplied). This clearly shows that even though the procedure is summary, there has to be a hearing and the obstructionist is required to appear and answer the summons issued to him. In other words, he must come and tell the Court that notwithstanding the warrant of possession of the relevant immoveable property, he, i.e. the obstructionist, is entitled to remain in possession at least until there is a decision of the Court in a regular suit under Order 21, Rule 103. At the investigation of the matter the Court has to see prima-facie whether there is any just cause for the obstruction, but it need not investigate the question of the obstructionists title in detail as is normally done in a regular suit. The Court has however to investigate (a) whether the obstructionist is factually in possession of the suit property, and (b) if so, whether there is sufficient material on record to show that his possession is either on his own account or on account of some person than the judgment-debtor. The Court has however to investigate (a) whether the obstructionist is factually in possession of the suit property, and (b) if so, whether there is sufficient material on record to show that his possession is either on his own account or on account of some person than the judgment-debtor. If the Court is so satisfied, then as enjoined by Rule 99 it shall make an order dismissing the application preferred by the decree-holder under Order 21, Rule 97. It requires to be noticed that Rule 98 provided for action by the Court when there is resistance or obstruction by a judgment-debtor or by some other person at the instigation of or on behalf of the judgment-debtor. Such resistance or obstruction must be without any just cause. When the Court is to satisfied that the resistance is without just cause, it uses its coercive process for putting the applicant in possession of the suit property. The situation under Rule 99 is somewhat different. This rule comes into operation when the resistance or obstruction is made by a bona fide claimant, who has nothing to do with the judgment-debtor and who is claiming in good faith on his own account or on account of some person other than the judgment-debtor. This Court in Ganesh Narayan v. Ganesh Ramchandra, 72 Bom.L.N. 741 at p. 743, had occasion to consider the provisions of Order 21, Rules 97, 98 and 103. Nain J., who spoke for the Court has made some observations which, though they are said to be obiter, are nevertheless, observations which go to show the scope and ambit of the relevant rules. Which discussing Rule 99, Nain, J., stated that if the Court is satisfied that there was a bona fide claim which contained ingredients referred to in this rule, than the application under Order 21, Rule 97 was required to be dismissed. Nain, J., said :-- "This rule makes it clear that investigating the matter under Rule 97, the Court is only concerned with the fact whether the obstructionist was claiming under the judgment-debtor or not under judgment-debtor. If he was not claiming under judgement-debtor, he may be claiming, either on his own account or on account of some other person. If the Court was satisfied that the obstructionist did not claim under the judgment-debtor, that was enough. The Court has, in that event, to dismiss the application under Rule 97. If he was not claiming under judgement-debtor, he may be claiming, either on his own account or on account of some other person. If the Court was satisfied that the obstructionist did not claim under the judgment-debtor, that was enough. The Court has, in that event, to dismiss the application under Rule 97. The Court is not concerned to see to what title the obstructionist was claiming." My attention has been invited to a judgment of the Calcutta High Court where Single Judge in Deo Karan v. Satyendra, A.I.R. 1959 Calcutta 621, observed as follows :--- "...In order to succeed in defeating the attempt of the decree-holders to get delivery of possession through the coercive process of the Court it is not necessary that the objector, namely the present petitioner must establish definitely his right to be in possession of the property on his own account or on account of some person other than the judgment-debtor. All that the Court has to see in this connection is whether the resistance occasioned by the petitioner can be said to have been by a person who claims in good faith to have a right to be in possession of the property on his own account or on account of some person other than the judgment-debtor...." In Bhagwat v. Kasturi A.I.R. 1974 Madhya Pradesh 26, the scope of the inquiry under the relevant provisions of the act was discussed and the Madhya Pradesh High Court observed that if the decree-holder complains of resistance or obstruction to the execution of the decree for possession under Order 21, Rule 97, then "the executing Court will make an in inquiry, which is summary in nature, and pass an order either under Rule 98 of Rule 99, according to the conclusion reached by it on the facts of the case. If the executing Court holds that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without any just cause by the third person at the instigation of the judgment debtor, the executing Court will put the decree-holder or the purchaser into possession of the property and, if necessary, will take Police help. If the executing Court holds that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without any just cause by the third person at the instigation of the judgment debtor, the executing Court will put the decree-holder or the purchaser into possession of the property and, if necessary, will take Police help. On the other hand, if the executing Court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned by a third person claiming in good faith to be in possession of the property on his own account or on a account of some person other than the judgment-debtor, then the executing Court will refuse to deliver possession to the decree-holder and dismiss the application." Now, it appears to me to be substantially clear that what the Court is enjoined to do when it is hearing an application under Order 21, Rule 97, is to investigate the matter in a summary way and see if the obstruction has made out at least prima facie case that (a) he was not claiming under the judgment-debtor, and (b) that he was claiming in good faith to be in possession of the property on his own account or on account of some person other than the judgment-debtor. In may view it is not sufficient that the obstruction should show that he is in possession and claim that such possession is not under the judgment-debtor. He must also show that prima facie he is claiming in his own right or also prima-facie that he is entitled to claim to be in such possession on account of some person other than the judgment-debtor. It has been suggested that all that an obstructionist has to do in order to drive the decree-holder to a suit under Order 21, Rule 103 is to show that he is in possession and claim either that he is in possession on his own account or on account of a person other than the judgment-debtor, however baseless such a claim may appear to be. In order to succeed under Rule 99 such a person must satisfy the Court that he is claiming in good faith. In order to succeed under Rule 99 such a person must satisfy the Court that he is claiming in good faith. This means that he must set up a prima facie case and procedure sufficient material to satisfy the Court that the matter requires a detailed investigation which is possible only in a regular suit under Rule 103, so that the Court may stay its hands and not take possession from such a person under the coercive process of the Court. It would be idle to suggest that all that on obstructionist has to do is to make a bald (and perhaps untrue) statement that he does not claim under the judgment-debtor but claims on his own account etc. and that is he does so, the Court must forthwith stay it hands and refuse to execute the decree. Of course, if the obstructionist himself states that he came in through the judgment-debtor, then no difficulty arises and possession must to taken from him. If this is the state of the law, then I must now examine the facts of this case and the rival contentions to determine whether the order of the lower Court can stand or is liable to interfered with. In the case before me the record and the facts clearly show that Syed Anwar Hussein Kacharwala, Obstructionist No. 1, Ahmad Hasan Malbari Obstructionist No. 8, and Jagdish Chandra Sharma Obstructionist No. 10 (Obstructionist No. 9, being the wife of Ahmad Hasan Malbari and Obstructionist No. 11 being the wife of Jagdish Chandra Sharma) have claimed through the judgment-debtor. According to their own statements, (already discussed above) they have come in on the suit premises with the permission of the original judgment-debtor Munnavara Begum. Even in the affidavits filed in reply to the Obstructionist Notice the basic plea is that they are the sub-tenants of Munnavara Begum and that they came into possession through her. Their possession is clearly relatable to the judgment-debtor Munnavara Begum. I have already set out the relevant statements made by Syed Anwar Hussein Kachrawala, Ahmad Hasan Malbari and Jagdish Chandra Sharma, when setting out the fact and there can be no manner of doubt that the basic contention of the respondents is that they were allowed into the suit premises and inducted thereupon by Munnavara Begum. During the hearing of this Civil Division Application I enquired from Mr. During the hearing of this Civil Division Application I enquired from Mr. Thosar as to what was his case and his reply was that Obstructionist No. 1 was the tenant or at least a sub-tenant of Munnavara Begum and that it is only if the Court holds that the tenancy or sub-tenancy was unlawful that Obstructionist No. 1 would be trespasser. It is significant that the Court below held and proceeded on the basis that the obstructionists were neither tenants nor sub-tenants. Now, in my view the facts of this case clearly shows that for the purpose of Order 21, Rule 99 obstructionists Nos. 1, 8 to 10 cannot be heard to say that they have shown to the satisfaction of the Court that they were in possession on their own account. It requires to be noticed that the question of their being in possession on a account of some person other than the judgment-debtor does not arise on the facts of this case. Mr. Sayyid, who appears for the two daughters of Obstructionist No. 1, has said the same thing and indeed the pleadings show that is the case of the three obstructionists and it may be presumed that is also the case of wives of Obstructionists Nos. 8 and 10. I should have thought that with the nature of evidence on record the lower Court could have immediately found that as the obstructionists had on their own admission came into possession of the suit premises through Munnavara Begum that took their case out of the purview of Rule 99. Once there was material on record to show that the obstructionists had been inducted on the suit property by the judgment-debtor Munnavara Begum, Rule 99 could not furnish any protection to them. It requires to be mentioned that in his affidavit dated the 30th of August, 1958 Syed Anwar Hussein Kachrawala made a statement on solemn affirmation that he was the lawful sub-tenant of Munnavara Begum. His further submission that he was claiming in his own right and on his own account must be treated as an obvious contradiction. It is for an obstructionists to prove under Order 21, Rule 99 that he is in possession on his own account and not under the judgment-debtor. If he fails to do that, then the obstructionist notice must be made absolute against him. It is for an obstructionists to prove under Order 21, Rule 99 that he is in possession on his own account and not under the judgment-debtor. If he fails to do that, then the obstructionist notice must be made absolute against him. It is appropriate to refer to a suggestion which was made at one stage of the hearing as to the rights of third persons. It was suggested that relevant rules of Order 21 do not cover third persons as such. The suggestion is clearly untenable. Order 21, Rule 99 precisely covers third person, i.e. persons who bona fide claim to be in possession on their own account or on account of person other than the judgment-debtor and have not nexus with the judgment-debtor. If there is a nexus with the judgment-debtor and the obstructionists possession is relatable to the judgment-debtor, then Rule 98 comes into play. There is little difficulty in holding that when a decree for possession is sought to be executed, then any person in occupation of the premises of which possession is sought must also be evicted unless he obstructs and then if and when proceedings under Order 21, Rule 37 are commenced he appears before the Court and satisfies the Court at least Prima facie that he is entitled to remain in possession on his own account etc. so that if the decree-holder wishes to recover possession from him then the decree-holder must file a regular suit under Order 21, Rule 103, where the question of the obstructionists entitlement to remain in possession would be examined at a full trial. The contentions of Mr. Thosar and Mr. Sayyid that obstructionist No. 1 could not be removed from his possession in execution of the decree against Munnavara Begum are liable to be rejected. There was some discussion that if the tenancy or sub-tenancy claimed by the five obstructionists was found to be unlawful then they would be trespassers and, therefore, could be said to be entitled to remain in possession on their own account. The suggestion was that even if the obstructionists were inducted by Bai Maulani and came into possession through her, if it was found that they were neither tenants nor sub-tenants, then they must be treated as trespassers and, therefore, on their own account. The suggestion was that even if the obstructionists were inducted by Bai Maulani and came into possession through her, if it was found that they were neither tenants nor sub-tenants, then they must be treated as trespassers and, therefore, on their own account. Now, first, of all it has all along been the case of the five obstructionists who have appeared to show cause against the obstructionists Notice that they came in with the permission of Bai Maulani, the judgment-debtor. Indeed, it has never been their case that they were trespassers or persons without any vestige of legal title. In my view it was not open to the learned Judge to ignore the pleadings and set up a new case for obstructionists that as unlawful tenants they were really trespassers and thereby in possession of the premises on their own account. Mr. Sayyid in fact went to the extent of saying that the obstructionists would be persons without title which, according to him, meant that they were to possession on their own account. It is appropriate to notice that in Pranlal v. Dinyar, C.B.A. 1934 of 1962 decided on 1-2-1967, on unreported decision of this Court, Palekar, J. while discussing matters arising out of certain ejectment proceedings, observe that " A person bound by the decree is not necessarily the judgment debtor. A person may be bound without being a judgment-debtor if that persons possession is on behalf of or relatable to the judgment-debtor." I find myself in respectful agreement with this statement of the law. In the matter before me it is clear that the obstructionists possession is relatable to that of the judgment-debtor Bai Maulani. Indeed, that is their own case. They have said that they came in through the judgment debtor. They must to out with the judgment-debtor. It can never be contended with any show of reason or validity that a person who came in through the judgment-debtor can remain in possession "in his own right" if it were to be found later on that the judgment-debtor himself, whatever his own possession, could not have legally inducted such a person on the suit premises. It can never be contended with any show of reason or validity that a person who came in through the judgment-debtor can remain in possession "in his own right" if it were to be found later on that the judgment-debtor himself, whatever his own possession, could not have legally inducted such a person on the suit premises. It would, in my opinion, be monstrous to suggest that a judgment-debtor could be evicted by an ejectment order or decree of the Court but that if the judgment-creditor wrongfully handed over possession to outsiders or allowed them to come in, then such outsiders cannot be removed under that ejectment order or decree. On principle and authority such an outsider cannot claim a higher protection from the law than that available to the judgment-debtor through whom he came in. This brings me to the question of the other 16 obstructionists. There is no dispute that there 16 obstructionists, while they did obstruct the Bailiff from taking possession, did not choose to appear at the hearing of the obstructionists Notice, although they were duly served. Now, what is the position regarding these 16 persons ? So far as Rule 99 is connected it is enjoined that the Court shall make an order dismissing the petitioners application when the obstructionists shows cause. But unless there is an investigation and unless the Court is satisfied, an order under this rule cannot be made. It does not require such argument to come to the conclusion that unless the parties resisting delivery of possession come to the Court and satisfy the Court that they are in possession in terms of Rule 99, no order dismissing the application under Order 21, Rule 97 can be made qua them. In that is the correct view, then as far as these 16 obstructionists are concerned there is nothing more to be said. It would be the duty of the Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to proceed against these 16 obstructionists on the footing that they have not chosen to come forward and satisfy the Court that they are entitled to remain in possession. Mr. Thosar made a brave attempt to show that the order discharging the notice against all the obstructionists was the only order permissible. There is no warrant for a such a proposition. Mr. Thosar made a brave attempt to show that the order discharging the notice against all the obstructionists was the only order permissible. There is no warrant for a such a proposition. A third person in possession cannot avoid dispossession by the coercive process of the Court unless he complies with provisions of Rule 99 and satisfies the Court that his possession is of the nature which protects his from dispossession in the execution of the decree obtained by the decree holder against the judgment-debtor. In this view of the matter, the learned Judge obviously failed to exercise his jurisdiction. It was required of him to make the obstructionist notice absolute against these person and order recovery of possession from these person, if necessary with the aide of the police. Even the case at the five obstructionists, who did appear and show cause, the learned Judge clearly failed to carry out the investigation enjoined by Order 21, Rule 97 read with Rule 99. It was his duty to ascertain whether the obstructionists had on sufficient material placed before him satisfied the Court that the obstructionists were claiming in good faith to be in possession not under the judgment-debtor but on their own account. The learned Judge acted with material irregularity in ignoring the sworn affidavits of the obstructionists appearing before him that they claimed under Munnavara Begum, the judgement-debtor. In Mean (H. N. Inspector of Taxes) v. Dendantar Amalganated Colleries. Ltd., (1946)27 T.C. 896, the House of Lords observed that :- ... Unless the Commisioners, having found the relevant facts and put to themselves the proper question, having proceeded to give the right answer, they may be said, on this view, to have erred in point of law. If the learned Judge had asked himself the proper question, viz., whether the obstructionists claimed under the judgment-debtor or not and if had correctly answered the question in the sense that it was the obstructionists own case that they came in through Munnavara Begum, then the only order which the learned Judge could have passed under his jurisdiction was to put the petitioners in possession of the property. The last point for consideration is as to the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Gode. It was contended by Mr. The last point for consideration is as to the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Gode. It was contended by Mr. Thesar that even if the decision of the learned Judge below was wrong in law, there was no power in this Court to revise his order. Mr. Sayyid contended that on the facts of the case this Court had no jurisdiction to revise the order of the learned Judge of the Small Causes Court. Now, it is not really necessary for me to discuss this aspect of the matter because in Ganpati Ram v. Baliram Raghunath, 76 Bom.L.R. 88, considered a Similar question and after discussing relevant authorities, including the decision of the Supreme Court in M.L. Shethi v. N.P. Kapur, A. I. R. 1972 Supreme Court 2372, came to the conclusion that when a lower Court does not make the inquiry which it was enjoined to do, them in acts illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. That was a case under Order 21, Rule 58 of the Civil Procedure Code and there the learned Judge instead of directing the investigation as to the point of possession had taken into matters he was not entitled to take into account and concerned himself with a collateral question as to whose title was superior. Now, in the case before me, the learned Judge did not restrict himself to the inquiry contemplated by Order 21, Rule 97 read with Rule 99, but considered extraneous questions. As the error committed by the learned Judge of the Small Causes Court was clearly in relation to the jurisdictions of the Court, it would follow that this revision application against the order of the learned Judge of the Small Causes Court is maintainable. In the result the order dated the 19th of June, 1969 is set aside. The obstructionist Notice No. 465 of 1968 is made absolute in terms of the prayer made therein. Rule absolute but there will be no order as to costs. ------