Dinesh Chandra Gupta v. Kashi Nath Seth — 1975 DIGILAW 215 (ALL)

JUDGMENT Prem Prakash, J. - This first appeal from Order arises from a suit filed by the landlord-respondent for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent against the tenant-appellant, in consequence of an order disentitling the latter to the benefit of Section 39 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (to be hereinafter referred as the Act) in respect of an accommodation not falling within the United Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, but to which the Act it is the common ground became applicable during the pendency of the suit. 2. Shortly stated, the facts, in so far they are relevant for the purposes of the present, are these : the suit was filed on 6th August, 1970, with the averment that the defendant was the tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 40/-, when tenancy had been determined by a notice to quit. While the suit was pending, the Act came into force with effect from 15th July, 1972. The tenant made an application on 25th July, 1972 for relief under Section 39 of the Act, tendering, at the same time, a sum of Rs. 2,509/- and odd split into various items, namely, the arrears of f rent from 1st July, 1968 to 9th February, 1970, damages for use and occupation from 10th February, 1970 to 25 July, 1972, costs of suit (excluding lawyers fee) and interest calculated at 9% per annum on the entire amount of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation. The landlord resisted the application mainly on the grounds that lawyers fee in a sum of Rs. 100/- had not been deposited and the amount of interest was also short of the required amount. The trial court after hearing the parties found that the shop was constructed in the year 1952 bringing the accommodation within the ambit of the Act and about I the deposit made under Section 39 it took the view that the lawyers fee in the absence of a certificate filed by the plaintiff could not be taken to be the costs of the suit. Finding a deficiency of Rs. 10/- and odd in the deposit made, the court directed the defendant to make up the deficiency, it dismissed the suit for ejectment under Section 39 of the Act. Finding a deficiency of Rs. 10/- and odd in the deposit made, the court directed the defendant to make up the deficiency, it dismissed the suit for ejectment under Section 39 of the Act. The lower appellate court set aside the order for two reasons; First, that the trial court was not correct in directing the defendant to make up the deficiency after the expiry of the period prescribed under Section 39 from the date of the commencement of the Act, and secondly, the full costs of the suit should mean costs incurred by the landlord as the pleaders fee, not withstanding the fact that the lawyers certificate had not been filed by the time the application under Section 39 was made. In consequence, the application was rejected and the case was sent back to the trial court to dispose of it afresh in accordance with law. 3. Feeling aggrieved from that order, the tenant has come up in appeal before this Court and at the very threshold, in order to determine the correctness of the rival contentions between the parties, it would be necessary to have a look at Section 39 of the Act which is in the following words : "39. Pending suits for eviction relating to buildings brought under regulation for the first time. In any suit for eviction of a tenant from any building to which the old Act did not apply, pending on the date of commencement of this Act, where the tenant within one month from such date of commencement or from the date of his knowledge of the pendency of the suit, whichever be later, deposits in the court before which the suit is pending, the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent) together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and the landlord's full cost of the suit, no decree for eviction shall be passed except on any of the grounds mentioned in the proviso to Sub-sec. (1) or in clause (h) to (g) of Sub-sec. (2) of Section 20, and the parties shall be entitled to make necessary amendment in their pleadings and to adduce additional evidence where necessary." 4. The decision of this Court in R.D. Ram Nath and Co. (1) or in clause (h) to (g) of Sub-sec. (2) of Section 20, and the parties shall be entitled to make necessary amendment in their pleadings and to adduce additional evidence where necessary." 4. The decision of this Court in R.D. Ram Nath and Co. v. Girdhari Lal, 1975 ALJ 1 comes in the way of the primary contention of the appellant. There it was held (at page 9) that "the expression `full costs of the suit in respect of a pending suit will represent the amount of court fee paid on the plaint and on other documents and other taxable expenses incurred by the landlord by the date of deposit together with such amount of the Advocates fee and the fee of his clerk as is taxable on the contested scale whether any certificate of fee has or has not been filed by the date of deposit." Admittedly, the appellant did not deposit the Advocates fee during the period prescribed by the statute. This being the position, counsel for the appellant has advanced an alternative submission that the amount deposited by him was far in excess of the required amount and, therefore, even if the Advocates fee was not deposited, the amount in deposit with the Court was sufficient to meet the mandatory requirements of the section. The reasoning, on which the argument proceeds, is that the tenant had deposited interest at the rate of 9% on the arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation from the date when they fell due, although Section 39 does not impose such retrospective burden upon the tenant who should be required to pay interest from the date on which the provisions of the Act became applicable to the finding and until the deposit made in the court. It is agreed that if this contention were allowed to prevail, the tenant would be entitled to the dismissal of the suit under Section 39. Counsel for the respondent contends that the language of the section does not warrant such a view being taken. 5. It is agreed that if this contention were allowed to prevail, the tenant would be entitled to the dismissal of the suit under Section 39. Counsel for the respondent contends that the language of the section does not warrant such a view being taken. 5. One of the objects of the Act in particular of Section 39-was to give the tenants of the buildings security of tenure in certain circumstances and to prevent their eviction even in suits, except such or those based on any of the grounds mentioned in the proviso to sub-Sec. (ii) or in Clauses (b) to (g) of sub-Sec. (2) of Section 20, pending on the commencement of the Act. No decree for eviction in such suits would be passed where the tenant deposits in the court, amongst others, "the entire amount of rent and damages together with interest thereon." Counsel for the appellant submitted that in the absence of express words saying that the interest is to be paid for the period before the coming into effect of the Act, they should be construed as restricted to interest after that date. He based his statement on the principle of statute interpretation that unless you can collect from the language of the statute a clear intention to give it a retrospective operation, even to the extent of imposing a a pecuniary liability, you must read it as applying to the future. He referred to the rule of statutory interpretation which is summarised by Maxwell in his work. The Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition, at page 215 : "It is a fundamental rule of English Law that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication." He then addressed me to a forceful argument to this effect: The section does not say "whether before or after the commencement of the Act", nothing short of words to that effect will fasten liability, specially as these words could so easily have been inserted if the Legislature so intended, He has, therefore, urged that it would be wrong to give retrospective effect to the liability to pay interest from the j date when the rent or damages fell due. 6. For the reasons stated in the subsequent, I do not find substantial merit in the argument. 7. 6. For the reasons stated in the subsequent, I do not find substantial merit in the argument. 7. The word "rent" is not defined in the Act or under the General Clauses Act. In the ordinary sense, it is a return in money or kind for the enjoyment of a specific property held by one person under the other. For the purpose of the English Rent Restriction Acts, rent is the whole amount paid by the tenant to his landlord of what is let to him whether described as rent or not (see Property Holding Company Ltd. v. Clark, 1948-1 K.B. 630, Duke of West Minister v. Store Properties Ltd., 1944-1 CH p. 129. In woodfall's Landlord and Tenant, Volume II, 27th Edition, we find a similar meaning assigned to the word rent: "Throughout the history of the Rent Acts, rent has been held to mean rent payable in money alone; it means the actual amount agreed to be so paid, and not merely the balance thereof after deducting so much as is payable in respect of rates or other outgoings borne by the landlord", (page 1484). The rent being thus payable in money and the Legislature gave relief to the tenants who had, at some time exterior to the coming into force of the Act, defaulted in the payment of such rent, the words interest thereon should be construed as to mean interest on the rent or damages as and when it fell due. When the statute operates on an event which took place at a time proceeding the enactment, it should speak from that date in order to determine the rights of the parties. If the Legislature intended that the liability to pay interest would arise after the commencement of the Act, the Legislature could have said so. When the statute operates on an event which took place at a time proceeding the enactment, it should speak from that date in order to determine the rights of the parties. If the Legislature intended that the liability to pay interest would arise after the commencement of the Act, the Legislature could have said so. In order to give the section the limited application for which the appellant contends, we must add by implication after the words "interest thereon" some such words "after the commencement of this Act." I agree with the respondents counsel that if the words "interest thereon" were restricted to interest that accrued due after the commencement of the Act, the landlord finds himself to a great extent in a worse position in as much as even under the general law the landlord was entitled to get interest on the amount of rent, the nonpayment of which had resulted in the forfeiture of tenancy, (vide Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act). 8. In the next place, if effect is given to the section in the manner indicated in the above, it will not take away any "vested right." All that this section does is to prevent the eviction of tenants who defaulted in the payment of rent and against whom suits were pending on the date of the commencement of the Act. I do not think that such a statutory provision takes away either vested rights or the legal character of a past transaction or impairs an existing contract and it is mainly to such enactments that the rule under discussion has been applied: In Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, we find the general rule thus state : "The rule . . . has been applied chiefly in cases in which the statute in question, if it operated retrospectively, would pre-judicially affect" vested rights" or the legality of past transactions, or would impair contracts, or would impose new duties or attach new disabilities in respect of past transactions", (See page 218). In my view, Section 39 did not impose new liability upon the tenant, but, on the other hand, relieved him against his eviction, the cause of action for which had arisen before the commencement of the Act. In my view, Section 39 did not impose new liability upon the tenant, but, on the other hand, relieved him against his eviction, the cause of action for which had arisen before the commencement of the Act. We have, therefore, to give to the section a broad and liberal application commensurate with the intention of the Legislature and, the general law as it then was in force. Viewed in those aspects, I, therefore, arrive at the conclusion that the interest on the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation from the date, when it fell due, is required to be deposited by a tenant availing of the benefit of Section 39 of the Act. 9. The learned Civil Judge has set aside the order of the court below also on the ground that the deficiency of rupees ten and odd could not be required to be made good beyond that expiry of the statutory period. The point is not material for the decision of the appeal because the tenant had failed to deposit the Advocates fee and thus the "full costs of the suit" so as to entitle him to the relief under Section 39; but since the point has been canvassed at the Bar, I must say a few words, with reference to a case where the "full costs" of the suit and the requisite items had been deposited by the tenant, but the amount deposited fell short by a trifling amount. The well settled principle of statutory interpretation is that the law does not concern itself with trifles : de minimis non curat lex. To my mind, where a tenant has made the deposit in substantial compliance with Section 39, but due to some accidental omission or clerical error the amount falls short of the required amount, the trivial error should not be visited with denying the relief to him against eviction conferred upon him by the Act. In Fredco Estates Ltd. v. Brvant, (1969) I WLR 76, notice claiming an increase in rent in respect of increases in rates between 1938 and 1945 stated the increase payable (which was in fact #2 6s. 1d.) as #2 6s. In Fredco Estates Ltd. v. Brvant, (1969) I WLR 76, notice claiming an increase in rent in respect of increases in rates between 1938 and 1945 stated the increase payable (which was in fact #2 6s. 1d.) as #2 6s. od.; the Court of Appeal, distinguishing a dictum of Scrutton, L. J. requiring very strict compliance with the statutory requirements as to these notices declined to hold that this "very slight error-almost a trivial error-in stating what the rates were" made the notice "false or misleading in any material respect" within Section 3(2) of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920. At page 83 Ormerod, L.J., with whom Willmar L.J. agreed, said: "It is argued that in view of the dictum of Scrutton L. J. in Dounrne v. Litten, (1924) 2 KB 10 that these matters must be precisely stated down to the last penny, the notice must be invalid. I do not accept that contention. I appreciate that Scrtton L.J. in using the language he did use was pointing out that these matters must be so accurately stated as to be carried down to the last penny, but I think he was using that language to emphasise the strictness with which the sub-section should be construed, and was not laying down that if in fact, by inadvertence or by a mutual misunderstanding, or for some other like reason, there was an error of one penny in the figures upon which the calculation was based, which would not affect the final figures, therefore, the notice should be invalid." Applying the principle, the deficiency of the kind aforementioned must be subject to do minimis rule and it could not possibly render the deposit invalid for the purpose of Section 39 of the Act. 10. For the discussion in the foregoing, I see, therefore, no force in this appeal which is hereby dismissed with costs. Let the record be sent back to the trial court for its disposal in accordance with law treating the building as an accommodation not governed by Act III of 1947. The record may be sent back without any delay. Stay order, if any, is vacated.