Judgment JHA, J. 1. The plaintiff is the appellant. The defendants respondents had filed an application under Sec.34 of the Arbitration Act for staying further proceedings in the suit on the ground that the subject-matter of the suit was covered by the arbitration clause in the deed of contract. The appellant had objected to stay being granted. The Court below by the impugned order dated the 3rd of October, 1969 has stayed further proceedings in Money Suit 61 of 1969 of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Darbhanga, out of which this appeal arises. 2. The appellant has filed the aforesaid money suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 89,951.93 P. from the respondents. Out of the aforesaid sum, Rs. 27,540 is said to be lying with the respondents to the credit of the appellant as security deposit. The balance of the amount claimed was so done as the price shingles and broken materials supplied by the appellant when he agreed to construct an aerodrome in the vicinity of Darbhanga town under the National Project Construction Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter called the Corporation), respondent No. 1. The Chief Engineer and General Manager of the Corporation and the Additional Chief Engineer (Planning thereof are respondents 2 and 3, respectively. The Union of India required construction of an aerodrome in or about the year 1963 for urgent defence work in the vicinity of Darbhanga under the respondents. The respondents established an office under the supervision and control of the Darbhanga Unit (Eastern Zone) of the Corporation. The Construction Superintendent of the aforesaid Unit was given full powers to take all steps for the construction of the aerodrome including the power to enter into and sign and execute contract of collection of materials on behalf of the Corporation. The appellant entered into an agreement for collection of shingles and transport of the same from quarry side to Darbhanga railway station. The shape and size of the shingles were mentioned in the deed of agreement. This agreement was entered into, according to the plaintiff appellant, with an understanding that the respondents would arrange for transport by rails, for taking shingles and broken materials from quarry side to Bhikhanatori railway station. It is alleged that the respondents did not arrange for transport by providing rail communication from the quarry side. This agreement was entered into, according to the plaintiff appellant, with an understanding that the respondents would arrange for transport by rails, for taking shingles and broken materials from quarry side to Bhikhanatori railway station. It is alleged that the respondents did not arrange for transport by providing rail communication from the quarry side. As the work was of urgent national importance, the appellant did it at his own cost and supplied shingles and broken materials from quarry side to Darbhanga railway station. According to the further case of the appellant, he had to pay freight charge at higher rate also besides surcharge. In pursuance of the terms of the agreement, the appellant had to deposit a sum of Rs. 27,540 as security. When the work was finished as per the work orders given to the appellant the respondents office was shifted from Darbhanga to Delhi. Thereafter, the appellant submitted his bill. According to the appellant, in spite of his repeated request and demand, his bills for various amounts had not been passed, nor had the security money been refunded. These amounts and the security money deposited by the appellant constitute the total claim of the appellant in the suit. At this place, it is pertinent to take note of condition No. 4 of the agreement which admittedly runs as follows:- "Except where otherwise provided in the contract, all questions and disputes relating to the meaning of the specifications, designs, drawings and instructions and as to the quality of workmanship of materials used on the work, or as to any other question claim, right, matter or things whatsoever, in any way arising out of or relating to the contract designs, drawings, specifications, estimates, instruction, orders or these conditions or otherwise concerning the work or the execution or failure to execute the same, whether arising during the progress of the work, or after the completion or abandonment thereof shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the Planning Officer, National Projects Construction Corporation Ltd. and if the Planning Officer is unable or unwilling to act, the sole arbitration of some other persons appointed by the Planning Officer and willing to act as arbitrator. The award of the arbitrator so appointed shall be final, conclusive and binding on both the parties to the contract." It is said by the appellant that on his insistence to have all his bills paid the respondents submitted a copy of final accounting, by which they had turned down the claim put forward by the appellant and had instead demanded something as being due against the appellant. This compelled the appellant to serve a notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, after due service of which the present suit was instituted in 1969. 3. Respondent No. 1, in view of the arbitration clause in the agreement, quoted above, having taken no step after appearance, filed an application for stay under Sec.34 of the Arbitration Act, alleging that the suit as filed by the appellant was not maintainable and further proceedings in it ought to be stayed, because, according to clause 4 of the agreement quoted above, all disputes between the parties shall be referred to arbitration, and the award of the arbitrator shall be final and conclusive between the parties. The appellant, according to the respondents case, did not adhere to the stipulation in clause 4 and instead of getting the dispute settled by an arbitrator, he had rushed to the Court, trying to retrace from the choice of the parties regarding the forum where the dispute had to be settled. The points that were canvassed before the learned Subordinate Judge were, firstly, that respondent 3 must be held to have been influenced by bias which had disqualified him or any of his nominees to arbitrate upon the matter. Secondly, it had been argued that the respondents had not shown their readiness and willingness at all material times to abide by the arbitration clause in the agreement, and, lastly that it was not a fit case in which the discretion under Sec.34 for grant of stay by the Subordinate Judge should be exercised in favour of the respondents. The learned Subordinate Judge recorded the following findings. Respondent No. 3 was not in any way disqualified on account of any bias said to have been entertained by him against the appellant. Secondly, the respondents had been able to show that they were willing to refer the matter to arbitration and that they are still willing to refer the matter to arbitration under the terms of the agreement. Respondent No. 3 was not in any way disqualified on account of any bias said to have been entertained by him against the appellant. Secondly, the respondents had been able to show that they were willing to refer the matter to arbitration and that they are still willing to refer the matter to arbitration under the terms of the agreement. It was further held that there was no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred in accordance with the arbitration agreement. On these findings, further proceedings in the suit were stayed. 4. Mr. Kailash Roy, learned counsel for the appellant, urged in support of this appeal, firstly, that the finding regarding the mind of respondent No. 3 not being vitiated by any bias was erroneous on the materials on record. Secondly, the Court below ought to have held on the facts on record that the respondents had not proved that they had at all material times been ready and willing to do any such things that were necessary for the proper conduct of arbitration proceedings. Thirdly, it was submitted that at least a part of the claim to the tune of Rupees 6,542.55 P. must be held to have been made by the appellant de hors the contract and not under it and that, therefore, this was not a fit case in which stay ought to be granted. 5. The first two points raised by learned counsel for the appellant should better be dealt with jointly, as the materials on the basis of which submissions in support of those contentions have been made are, more or less, common. The third point urged by learned counsel being predominantly a question of law, I would like to dispose of that point first and then deal with the first two points raised by learned counsel. But before I do that, I think it worthwhile to recapitulate the law which is well-settled in the matter of application for stay of proceedings in a suit under Sec.34 of the Act. It is well-established that in order that stay may be granted under the Act the following conditions must be fulfilled: (i) There must be a valid arbitration agreement covering the question in dispute. It is well-established that in order that stay may be granted under the Act the following conditions must be fulfilled: (i) There must be a valid arbitration agreement covering the question in dispute. (ii) The applicant for stay must be entitled to rely on the terms of the agreement; that means he must be either a contracting party or one claiming under such a party. (iii) No step must have been taken the applicant after appearance in the suit, for participation in any proceedings or appearing would be deemed to be an act of waiver on the part of the applicant. (iv) The applicant for stay must be ready and willing to go in for arbitration at the commencement of the proceedings. And (v) Finally, the Court must be satisfied that there is no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement. If these pre-requisite conditions are fulfilled, then it is for the party who wishes the matter to be litigated in Court, rather than to have it settled before a Tribunal or a forum of his own choice, to show that the matter is one which ought not to be so referred or which does not warrant a stay of proceedings. These propositions are so well-settled that no authorities need be cited in their support. 6. Apropos the third point raised on behalf of the appellant, the argument was that a part of the claim was at least not under the terms of the contract but de hors it. To be more specific, it was argued that the total claim in the suit was for a sum of Rs. 89,951.93 P. This included a claim to the tune of Rs. 6,542.55 P. on account of extra payment for broken material supplied at the request of the Construction Superintendent as shingles according to specification could not be collected owing to advent of rains. Our attention was drawn to para, 23 of the plaint, wherein the appellant had averred that in refusing the claim to the extent of Rupees 6,542.55 P. mentioned above there had been a clear breach of the oral agreement which had fixed the rate of such supplies at Rs. 15/- for each 100 cft. Our attention was drawn to para, 23 of the plaint, wherein the appellant had averred that in refusing the claim to the extent of Rupees 6,542.55 P. mentioned above there had been a clear breach of the oral agreement which had fixed the rate of such supplies at Rs. 15/- for each 100 cft. It was submitted that a breach of such an oral agreement on the part of the contracting party, namely, the Construction Superintendent, otherwise called the Executive Engineer, was not covered by the terms of the contract and on this ground alone stay should be refused. Having given the matter an anxious consideration I find that though the argument is attractive, there is actually no substance in it. In the first place, it must be pointed out that this point, although incidentally involved questions of fact, was not taken before the learned Subordinate Judge nor in the rejoinder filed by the appellant in the Court below to the application under Sec.34 filed on behalf of the respondents. Even in the memorandum of appeal here no such point has been taken. It was only towards the conclusion of the arguments on the second day of the hearing that learned counsel took this plea. All the same, I do not wish to reject the contention merely on this technical ground. From the arbitration clause incorporated in clause 4 of the agreement quoted above, it can very well be seen that it is an all-embracing agreement of arbitration. All questions and disputes relating to the meaning of the specifications, designs, drawings and instructions and as to the quality of workmanship of materials used or as to any other question, claim, right, matter or thing whatsoever in any way arising out of or relating to the contract have been agreed to be referred to an arbitration. A general reference of all disputes by a contract with an arbitration clause is generally limited by the nature of the instrument to disputes arising out of or in connection with the main articles of the agreement. In such case, the question often arises in proceedings to stay the action or to enforce or set aside the award, whether the arbitration clause covers a particular dispute or claim. In such case, the question often arises in proceedings to stay the action or to enforce or set aside the award, whether the arbitration clause covers a particular dispute or claim. It is well-settled that matters not strictly arising out of the contract but intimately connected with it have been held to be within the scope of the arbitration agreement. A reference of "all disputes from time to time arising out of or under or in relation to the contract" has been held to be much wider in application than a reference of "all disputes arising under the contract." The former expression, it is too well settled, includes claims on a quantum meruit, claims on a frustrated contract and claims for consequential services. The meaning of the expression "any dispute or difference arising or occurring between the parties in relation to any thing or matter arising out of or under the agreement" came up for consideration before the House of Lords in the case of Heyman V/s. Darwins Ltd., (1942) 1 All ER 337. While dealing with such an expression in contra-distinction to a narrower expression "any dispute arising under the contract". Sellers, J. succinctly summed up the law in the case of Government of Gibraltar V/s. Kenney, (1956) 3 All ER 22 at page 26 thus; "The distinction between matters arising out of and under the agreement is referred to in most of the speeches in Heyman V/s. Darwins Ltd., (1942) 1 All ER 337 and it is quite clear that arising out of is very much wider than under the agreement. This clause incorporates a difference or dispute in relation to anything or matter arising out of as well as under the agreement, and, in my view, everything which is claimed here in this arbitration can be said to be a dispute or difference in relation to something arising out of the agreement." Claims for consequential services, such as the claim in regard to the sum of Rs. 6,000 odd preferred by the appellant in the instant case is, in my view, certainly a dispute arising out of or in relation to the agreement of which the arbitration clause is but a part. 6,000 odd preferred by the appellant in the instant case is, in my view, certainly a dispute arising out of or in relation to the agreement of which the arbitration clause is but a part. I must hasten to add that I must not be misunderstood as laying down that the arbitration clause stands on the same footing as the other clauses, for it is too well settled by the highest Court of this land that an arbitration clause has to be construed quite independently of the other terms of the agreement. As to the circumstances which may warrant such an independent consideration, we are not concerned with in the present case. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said, as was argued by Mr. Roy, that the claim with regard to extra material supplied on oral instructions of the contracting party, namely, the Construction Superintendent, did not arise out of or was not in relation to the terms of the agreement. This point put forward on behalf of the appellant must, therefore, fail. 7. Reverting to the first two points raised by learned counsel, it will be seen from the arbitration clause that all disputes arising out of the contract were agreed to be referred to the sole arbitration of the Planning Officer of respondent No. 1, or a nominee of his if he was unable to undertake the task. It is not very clear as to whether the Planning Officer is the same person as the Additional Chief Engineer in charge of planning, respondent No. 3, I shall, however, assume, as was assumed by the Court below, that it was so. The question then to be seen is as to whether there can be said to be any reasonable apprehension in the mind of the appellant regarding the biassed attitude of respondent No. 3. Mr. Roy rightly, in my opinion, referred to the well-settled principle of law as summed up in Halsburys laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 2, page 291, paragraph 566: "An order to stay will be refused if it can be shown that there is good ground for apprehending that the arbitrator will not act fairly in the matter, or that it is for some reason improper that he should arbitrate on the dispute. But in the case of an agreement to refer future disputes a stay may be refused notwithstanding that the party opposing the stay knew or ought to have known that the arbitrator, by reason of his relation to any other party to the agreement or of his connection with the subject referred, might not be capable of impartiality." As a proposition of law no one can combat this position. The real question is the application of the well-settled principles to the facts of this case. The grievance of the appellant is that the Additional Chief Engineer of Planning (respondent No. 3) may not, as reasonably apprehended by the appellant, act fairly in the matter, since he has checked and passed the bills of the appellant and the final settlement, whereby his claim has been refused, has also been made by respondent No. 3. As such, the apprehension is that he may not have a fair mind in the matter. In this connection as also in connection with the other matter regarding the readiness and willingness of the respondents to join the arbitration proceedings, it is useful to make reference to some of the documents on record. 8. On 18th of September 1964 the appellant wrote a letter to the Chief Engineer (respondent No. 2) of the Corporation (respondent No. 1) stating therein: "On going through the records, you will see that my rate was Rs. 82,50 P. per 100 cft. F. O. R. Darbhanga and this was a clear understanding that N. P. C. C. will pay the freight on my behalf and that amount will be recovered from my bills at the rate of Rs. 123.37 P. per wagon being charged by Bhiknathore Station Master at that time. I started the work on 2-2-1963 under the above clear understanding without going into any agreement with your Corporation, but when my first bill was prepared I found a recovery of railway freight of Rs. 26,230.00 for 209 wagons @ Rs. 125.50 per wagon from my bill and I made an objection to your Construction Supdt, that I am only responsible for the railway freight of Rs. 25,783.84 for 209 wagons @ Rs. 123.37 charged by Bhiknathore Station Master on R/R handed over to you as per my settlement. 26,230.00 for 209 wagons @ Rs. 125.50 per wagon from my bill and I made an objection to your Construction Supdt, that I am only responsible for the railway freight of Rs. 25,783.84 for 209 wagons @ Rs. 123.37 charged by Bhiknathore Station Master on R/R handed over to you as per my settlement. Your Construction Supdt, considered over the matter and assured me that he was referring the case to the Railway Authorities and if the claim of Darbhanga Station Master was genuine and entertained, then the difference (Rs. 125.50 minus Rs. 123.37) of Railway freight charged by Darbhanga Station Master and shown by Bhikanathore Station Master would be added to my rate which was Rs. 2.13 per wagon." It will be seen from this document that the claim of the appellant was being considered by the Construction Superintendent and the appellant lad been making representations to him and he had given assurances that he will take up the matter with the Railway authorities. There is a letter of the 27th of April 1965 4th May from respondent No. 3 to the appellant in continuation of the correspondence on the subject of carriage of shingles and Bajri from river bed to Rail head at Bhiknathori. In that letter to the appellant, respondent No. 3 has clearly stated: "We find that your case for extra payment for carriage of shingles from river bed to Rail head of Bhiknathori has already been considered by the Construction Superintendent, Darbhanga Unit and you were informed vide his letter No. 1271/1.05/04 dated 4-5-1963. We have, however, again examined the case. The work order given to you provided inter alia for the collection of the specified sizes of shingles screened to be free from dust and foreign materials and loaded into wagons and transport to destination F. O. R. Darbhanga. Your claim for making your payment of transport charges from river bed to rail head is untenable and is, therefore, rejected." Again from this document it is clear that all cases regarding extra payments or matters in relation to the settlement of the bills of the appellant which were being considered at all material times were considered by the Construction Superintendent of Darbhanga Unit. Another important document in this connection to which a reference may be made is a lawyers notice dated June 2, 1965, sent on behalf of the appellant to the Corporation (respondent No. 1), wherein it has been stated, after quoting the relevant clause 4 of the agreement in paragraph 5 of the letter: "That since disputes have arisen between you and my client, my client wants to refer the same for the arbitration of your Planning Officer in accordance with the arbitration clause. My client would like you to join him in this connection. Should you agree, the matter may be referred to your Planning Officer for arbitration." In reply to this letter, respondent No. 3 wrote a letter dated June 8/14, 1965, to the lawyer for the appellant. In that letter, it has been very clearly stated that: "Since final payment or final settlement of the account of your client for the work in question has not been made which will be done in a short while as informed personally to him, it cannot be said that disputes, if any, have become clearly defined. Once the final payment or final settlement of account is made by the Corporation, it is open to your client to have recourse to arbitration in pursuance of condition No. 4 on the reverse of the work order No. 187/282 dated 28-2-1963, if any dispute or disputes arise on the basis of that payment" Chronologically, the next relevant document is the notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure sent on behalf of the appellant to the respondents. In that letter it has been said on behalf of the appellant that a demand for payment of Rs. 92,000 odd was being made as final payment for collection and transport of shingles and broken materials for Bhikhnathori Railway Station F. O. R. Darbhanga Railway Station in terms of contract dated 1-3-1963 and further orders passed by the Construction Superintendent of the Corporation. This notice it seems, was sent on behalf of the appellant after the final settlement of the bills by which certain claims made by him were not entertained as valid. In reply to this notice, a letter dated May 26, 1966, was sent by the Superintending Engineer (Claims) of the Corporation to the appellants lawyer. This notice it seems, was sent on behalf of the appellant after the final settlement of the bills by which certain claims made by him were not entertained as valid. In reply to this notice, a letter dated May 26, 1966, was sent by the Superintending Engineer (Claims) of the Corporation to the appellants lawyer. It has been said in that letter: "As per clause 4 of the Work Order No. 187/282 dated 28-2-1983 issued to your Client, all disputes between him and N. P. C. C. are to be referred to the sole arbitration of Additional Chief Engineer (Planning) or some other person by that Officer. Under the circumstances you are advised to instruct your client to act in accordance with the provisions of the agreement and apply for arbitration by the said Officer or his Nominee." 9. From the contents of the documents referred to above it would appear that all claims put forward on behalf of the appellant were at all relevant times being considered after necessary checking and verification by the Construction Superintendent (the Executive Engineer) who was a contracting party. On his refusal to favourably consider the claim put forward by the appellant, he made representations either to respondent No. 2 or to respondent No. 3. When the appellant found that his claims, which were just in his opinion, were not finding favourable consideration at the hands of the respondents he first sent a lawyers notice, demanding that the disputes in question, and it was conceded that by disputes what was meant was the disputes which are now the subject-matter of the suit, ought to be referred to the arbitrator, under clause 4 of the agreement. In reply thereto, the respondents wrote back saying that since the final settlement of claims or final payments of the bills of the appellant had not been made yet, there was no clearly definite dispute at the moment and that, therefore, any such reference to arbitration may await the final settlement of the bills. The culminating part of the correspondence was the notice under S. 80 of the Code to the respondents, in response to which the Superintending Engineer of respondent No. 1 wrote back, since all the claims had finally been settled according to the respondents, to have all the disputes referred to the arbitrator mentioned in Cl. 4 of the agreement. The culminating part of the correspondence was the notice under S. 80 of the Code to the respondents, in response to which the Superintending Engineer of respondent No. 1 wrote back, since all the claims had finally been settled according to the respondents, to have all the disputes referred to the arbitrator mentioned in Cl. 4 of the agreement. That was as far back as on the 26th of May 1966. In spite of that, the appellant chose to wait for a period of about three years before coming to the Court and instituting the suit. 10. From the aforesaid discussions it is obvious that the appellants plea of bias against respondent No. 3 was merely an after-thought in order to wriggle out of the arbitration clause of the agreement. Apart from the documents discussed above, the Court below has rightly relied upon an affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent stating therein categorically that respondent No. 3 never prepared nor checked the bills; these matters fell to him merely in a routine manner. The affidavit standing by itself the mind of the a to have been sufficient but coming as it does after all the documents referred to above, there is no reason not to accept the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents and to hold that it was the Construction Superintendent of the Corporation who actually used to consider, accept, modify or reject the claims put forward by the appellant; and the matter, if at all at any stage went to respondent No. 3, it was as a routine matter to a departmental head. I do not feel persuaded to hold on the materials on record that there is any good or reasonable apprehension in the mind of the appellant that respondent No. 3 has disqualified himself on account of any bias entertained against the appellant. As a matter of fact, it is ridiculous to take that stand after the lawyers notice dated June 2, 1965, addressed to the respondents. It states that the appellant wanted to refer the disputes for arbitration of the Planning Officer of the Corporation in accordance with the arbitration clause. As a matter of fact, it is ridiculous to take that stand after the lawyers notice dated June 2, 1965, addressed to the respondents. It states that the appellant wanted to refer the disputes for arbitration of the Planning Officer of the Corporation in accordance with the arbitration clause. The appellant knew fully well, if at all respondent No. 3 was instrumental in being a party to the rejection of his claims, that his claims had been so rejected and even so complete faith is expressed to have been reposed in respondent No. 3 in that notice, for the appellant seeks to have the matter arbitrated upon by respondent No. 3. If at that time there was no apprehension, much less any reasonable apprehension, in the appellants mind with regard to the past attitude of respondent No. 3 nothing has transpired since after that to improve the appellants case on this score. 11. As to the other interconnected point, namely, whether the respondents were not at all material times ready and willing to abide by the arbitration clause of the agreement to join as a party for the successful conduct of the arbitration proceedings, suffice it to say that the first demand for arbitration was made on behalf of the appellant in the lawyers notice dated June 2, 1965. In response thereto respondent No. 3 wrote back that once the final payment or final settlement of account was made by the Corporation it would be open to the appellant to have recourse to arbitration in pursuance of condition No 4 of the agreement. After the final settlement of the account in response to the notice under Section 80 of the Code dated March 22, 1966, the respondents without any delay wrote back to the appellant in their letter dated May 26, 1966, that he should act in accordance with the provisions of the agreement and apply for arbitration by the officer named in the arbitration clause or his nominee. There was no inaction on the part of the respondents at any time since the proceedings commenced. If the appellant conveniently chose to sit tight over the matter for a period of three years, he has himself to thank for it. It could not be said that the respondents were in any way guilty of any laches. There was no inaction on the part of the respondents at any time since the proceedings commenced. If the appellant conveniently chose to sit tight over the matter for a period of three years, he has himself to thank for it. It could not be said that the respondents were in any way guilty of any laches. In their response to the notice under Section 80 they had given out their mind that they were willing to go in for arbitration and had also stated so in their letter in response to the lawyers earlier notice dated June 2, 1965. Learned counsel for the appellant invited our attention to the decision in the case of Food Corporation of India V/s. M/s. Thakur Shipping Co., ( AIR 1975 SC 469 ) in order to invoke the principle that where a party to an arbitration agreement chooses to maintain silence in face of repeated requests by other party to take steps for arbitration, the case is not one of mere inaction. Failing to act when a party is called upon to do so is a positive gesture signifying unwillingness or want of readiness to go for arbitration. As a pure question of law, the validity of this principle cannot for any moment be doubted, but the application thereof will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. In the case of Food Corporation of India, their Lordships of the Supreme Court were dealing with a different set of facts altogether, having no affinity to the facts obtaining in the instant case. In that case on the 24th of January, 1970 the final claim was made. On the 2nd of July 1970 a telegram was sent by the Food Corporation to defendant No. 2 of that case for arbitration. No reply was sent thereto. On the 8th of July 1970 again a telegram was sent to defendant No. 2. In reply thereto, on the 9th of July 1970 defendant No. 2 directed the Food Corporation to contact defendant No. 1. On the 10th of July 1970 the Food Corporation sent another telegram to defendant No. 1, to which no reply was given. On the 25th of July 1970 another telegram was sent to defendant No. 2 to nominate the arbitrator. Again, the defendants maintained their silence. On the 10th of July 1970 the Food Corporation sent another telegram to defendant No. 1, to which no reply was given. On the 25th of July 1970 another telegram was sent to defendant No. 2 to nominate the arbitrator. Again, the defendants maintained their silence. Ultimately, on the 31st of August 1970 the Food Corporation had no option but to institute the suit. On these facts, their Lordships held that since the defendants had chosen to observe complete silence on repeated telegrams being sent by the Food Corporation of India and since they had failed to act when they had been called upon to do so for nominating an arbitrator or to take steps for arbitration, the case was not one of mere inaction. The observance of silence on the part of the defendants would result in the only irresistible inference that they were neither ready nor willing to act upon the arbitration clause. In that view of the matter, the Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court by which stay had been granted under Sec.34 of the Act. 12. From the discussion of facts set out above, it would be seen that in the present case the respondents were neither silent at any stage nor did they so conduct themselves as to warrant any suspicion, even, of any gesture on their part showing their unwillingness and unreadiness to act under the arbitration clause. On the contrary, to repeat, in response to the notice under Section 80 they categorically stated that the appellant should invoke the arbitration clause of the agreement which must mean that they were ready to join hands with him. Mr. Roy urged rather vehemently that the appellant waited for nearabout three years and it was only when limitation would have expired in a few months that he had to institute the suit. But this, in my view, is no indication of any negative attitude on the part of the respondents in the matter of joining hands for having the disputes settled by arbitration. But this, in my view, is no indication of any negative attitude on the part of the respondents in the matter of joining hands for having the disputes settled by arbitration. I, thus, find no infirmity in the findings of the Court below that there was neither any good or reasonable apprehension in the mind of the appellant that respondent No. 3 had disqualified himself on account of any bias from acting as an arbitrator, and that the respondents were at all material times and ever since the proceedings commenced ready and willing to abide by the arbitration agreement. 13. I, thus, find no merit in this appeal; it is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. SINGH, J. 14 I agree.