JUDGMENT Nagendra Prasad, Singh, J. This is an application for bail on behalf of the petitioners under sections 439 and 440 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the 'New Code'). 2. It appears that a first information was lodged with the Officer-in-charge of Ramgarh police-station on the 10th July, 1975, stating, inter alia, that on receiving a confidential information to the effect that some members of the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sengh were holding a meeting and were preaching anti-national activities, including to cause disruption of rail, road and telegraph communications and other essential supplies like electricity etc., a police party raided the spot and arrested petitioners 1 and 2, while others escaped. About seven other persons, who have been named, were identified. Petitioner no. 3 is one of them. According to the said first information report, petitioners 1 and 2 are members of the said Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh, an organisation which has been banned under sub-rule (i) of rule 33 of the Defence of India Rules, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules'). The said report goes on to say that the Deputy Commissioner, Hazaribagh, had promulgated an order under rule 69 (1) of the Rules and had banned holding of any such meeting and, as such, the accused persons, including the petitioners, were liable to be prosecuted for contravention of the aforesaid Rules. On the basis of the said first information report, Ramgarh P. S. Case No, 20 (7) 75 under rules 33 (5) and 69 (4), read with section 17 (i) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, was registered and investigation proceeded which is still pending. 3. During the course of investigation, petitioner no. 3 was also taken in custody. An application for bail was filed on behalf of the petitioners before the learned Sessions Judge of Hazaribagh, where, inter alia, it was urged that, in view of the provisions of section 167 of the New Code, the petitioners were entitled to be released on bail, inasmuch as, although the period of sixty days from the date the petitioners were taken in custody had expired, no final form had been submitted. The learned Sessions Judge, in view of the provisions of rule 184 of the Rules, rejected the prayer for bail made on behalf of the petitioners. 4. The learned Sessions Judge, in view of the provisions of rule 184 of the Rules, rejected the prayer for bail made on behalf of the petitioners. 4. Being aggrieved by the said order of the learned Sessions Judge, the present application has been filed in this Court. It was initially placed before a learned Single Judge of this Court, who, by his order, dated the 10th November, 1975, has referred the matter to a Division Bench, for consideration as to whether proviso (a) to sub-section 167 of the New Code is applicable even when an accused is charged with having committed an offence under any rule of the Rules. 5. Proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of section 167 of the New Code incorporates a command of the legislature that an accused person has got to be released on bail after the expiry of sixty days since the date he is taken in custody, if the investigation is not concluded by that time, because no Magistrate can authorize detention of an accused person in custody under the said section for a total period exceeding sixty days since the date of the arrest of the accused. The power to remand under section 309 (2) of the New Code is to be exercised only when cognizance of an offence is taken. This aspect of the matter has been settled by the Supreme Court in the case of Natabar Parida v. State of Orissa A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1965. In view of the aforesaid decision, unless there is any bar to the exercise of the power under the said proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of section 167 of the New Code, the petitioners are entitled to be released on bail, as they have remained in custody for more than sixty days from the dates of their arrest and no final form has been submitted. 6. 6. On behalf of the State, however, reliance has been placed on the provision of rule 184 of the Rules, which reads as follows:- “Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898), no person accused or convicted of a contravention of these Rules or orders made there under shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless- (a) the prosecution has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (b) where the prosecution opposes the application and the contravention is of any such provision of these Rules or orders made there under as the Central Government or the State Government may by notified order specify in this behalf, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such contravention.” Rule 184 has a non obstante clause and it says in so many words that, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Old Code') no person accused of contravention of the Rules shall be released on bail, unless the two conditions mentioned in the said rule are fulfilled. As such, the question for consideration is as to which of the two provisions shall prevail-whether the bar placed under rule 184 of the Rules, or the mandate under the proviso (a) to sub-section 167 of New Code. 7. Before I answer this question, it is advisable to dispose of one of the objections raised on behalf of the petitioners, namely, that in rule 184 of the Rules there is no reference to the New Code (of 1973), rather, it refers to the provisions of the Old Code (of 1898). According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the non obstante clause of rule 184 of the Rules will not apply to the provisions of the New Code and there is no bar on the exercise of the power by the Court under proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of section 167. Apparently, the argument is attractive; but I shall immediately indicate that there is no substance in this contention. 8. Apparently, the argument is attractive; but I shall immediately indicate that there is no substance in this contention. 8. Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, (Act X of 1897) provides that where any Central Act, or Regulation made after the commencement of the General Clauses Act, repeals and re-enacts, with or without modification, any provision of a former enactment, “then references in any other enactment or in any instrument to the provision so repealed shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as references to the “provision so re-enacted.” The New Code is a Central Act, which has repealed the Old Code and it says so in so many words in sub-section (1) of section 484. After the repeal of the Old Code, the New Code was enacted by Parliament as Act, II of 1974 consolidating and amending the provisions of the Old Code. In view of sub-section (1) of section 8 of the General Clauses Act, in any enactment or in any instrument any reference to the Old Code has to be read to mean the provisions of the New Code. This view is supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. M. P. Singh A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 569. In that case a question arose as to whether the reference to Factories Act, 1934 in the definition of commercial establishment' under the Uttar Pradesh Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1947 had to be read as a reference to the Factories Act, of 1948, and it was observed :- “It is true that the reference in the definition by which clerical and other establishments of factories are included is to the Factories Act, of 1934, but by virtue of S8 of the General Clauses Act, x of 1897, it must be construed as a reference to the provision of the Factories Act, LXIII of 1948 which repealed the Factories Act, of 1934 and re-enacted it.” Again, in State of Bihar v. S. K. Roy A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1995, the Supreme Court had occasion to construe the definition of the word "employer" in the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Bonus Scheme Act, 1948. The word "employer" had been defined as the 'owner of a coal mine', as defined in clause (g) of section 3 of the Indian Mines Act, 1923. The Indian Mines Act, 1923 had been repealed and substituted by Mines Act, 1952. The word "employer" had been defined as the 'owner of a coal mine', as defined in clause (g) of section 3 of the Indian Mines Act, 1923. The Indian Mines Act, 1923 had been repealed and substituted by Mines Act, 1952. It was held that, by virtue of section 8 of the General Clauses Act, the definition of 'employer' is to mean "an owner of a coal mine", as defined in the Mines Act, of 1952. A Full Bench of this Court also, in State of Bihar v. G.N. Ojha A.I.R. 1963 Pat. 303 took the same view As such, there is no difficulty in holding that when in rule 184 of the Rues there is a reference to the Old Code, it has to be read as the New Code. 9. Whenever there is a conflict between different Acts and Rules, the Court has to find out, first, as to whether, on the principle of harmonious construction, both can operate without destroying the effect of the other. If however, no such construction is possible, then it has to be found out as to which of the two will prevail. In my opinion, in the instant case, if it is held that proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of section 167 is a provision for bail, then there is a direct conflict between the said proviso and the provisions of rule 184 of the Rules. The rule making authority, by adding a non obstante clause to the said rule, has expressed its clear intention that, in case of any conflict, the provision of rule 184 of the Rules should prevail. This intention is to be gathered not only from rule 184, but also from section 37 of the Defence of India Act, 1971, which reads as follows :- “37. The provisions of this Act, or any rule made there under or any order made under any such rule shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than this Act, or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any enactment other than this Act.” In view of section 37, read with rule 184, it has to be held that, in case of conflict, the provision of rule 184 of the Rules will prevail over the provision of proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of section 167 of the New Code. 10. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners, being faced with these provisions, urged that the provision for release of an accused in accordance with proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of section 167 of the New Code is not a provision relating to bail, and, as such, rule 184 is not at all attracted. In this connection he further submitted that the provisions for bail are contained in Chapter XXXIII of the New Code; proviso (a) to sub section (2) of section 167 occurs in the Chapter relating to investigation and it only vests power in a Magistrate to remand an accused person to custody for a period up to sixty days from the date of his arrest and on expiry of the said period there is no discretion left in the Court concerned to consider as to whether such an accused should be released on bail or not. According to the learned counsel, the provisions regarding execution of bail bonds in such cases are merely formalities for keeping the accused under the control of the Court. In my opinion, it is difficult to accept that, when an accused person is released in accordance with the provision of proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of section 167, he is not released on bail. Proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of section 167 says in so many words that “on the expiry of the said period of sixty days, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter”. Chapter XXXIII no doubt, contains a specific provision for bail and it prescribes conditions under which an accused person can be released Oil bail by different Courts. Those provisions are applicable at different stages of a criminal proceeding. So far as section 167 is concerned, it is applicable only during the stage of investigation and it puts a limit on the period up to which an accused can be kept in custody during investigation after which he has to be released on bail. Those provisions are applicable at different stages of a criminal proceeding. So far as section 167 is concerned, it is applicable only during the stage of investigation and it puts a limit on the period up to which an accused can be kept in custody during investigation after which he has to be released on bail. In other words, it can be said that proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of section 167 adds a further condition to the conditions and grounds mentioned in the different sections of Chapter XXXIII of the New Code, when an accused person can be released on bail. A person in custody can be released before conclusion of trial either on bail or if his detention is held to be without any authority in law. If the detention of an accused after expiry of the period of sixty days was to become ipso facto illegal, there was no occasion to find out whether he was prepared to furnish bail. The proviso in question does not contemplate of releasing an accused, who is not in a position to furnish bail. In my judgment, when an accused person is released on bail in accordance with proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of section 167, he is released on bail. Once it is held that it amounts to release on bail, in my opinion, rule 184 of the Rules is attracted. As such, an accused person cannot be enlarged on bail merely on the ground that the period of sixty days has expired since the date he was taken in custody. He can, however, be enlarged On bail if the Court concerned is satisfied on hearing the parties and on the materials on record that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of contravention of the Rules alleged against him. In the instant case, on the materials on record at this stage” it cannot be said that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the petitioners are not guilty of the alleged contravention. As such, their prayer for bail has to be refused. 11. In the instant case, on the materials on record at this stage” it cannot be said that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the petitioners are not guilty of the alleged contravention. As such, their prayer for bail has to be refused. 11. Before I part with the judgment, I must point out that, merely because there is a provision like rule 184 of the Rules, it does not mean that the investigating officer has been given a blank cheque to keep the investigation alive, even though the circumstances of the case may not demand it. It is expected that the investigation in such cases should be concluded as early as possible. In cases relating to contraventions of the provisions of the Rules, the accused persons must be put on trial as soon as possible because in many cases they are not on bail either during investigation or during the trial. 12. In the result, the application fails and is dismissed. Sarwar Ali, J. I agree. Application dismissed.