Judgment :- 1. Several interesting questions are raised by the appellant in this writ appeal who was the petitioner before the learned single Judge. In the Original Petition he challenged an order of the Land Tribunal, Alangad on an application under S.77 read with S.75 (2) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act 1 of 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The applicant before the Land Tribunal sought the shifting of the kudikidappu of the respondent therein for the purpose of developing an industry which was run by him, that being one of making bricks. The kudikidappukaran who was the respondent in that application contended that the requirement of the applicant was not bonafide, that even in the property in which the kudikidappu was situate there was sufficient area for the Choola intended to be erected by the applicant without disturbing the kudikidappukaran, that the alternate site was not suitable for erecting a homestead and further that the application itself was not maintainable since the notice contemplated under S.77 of the Act was not preceded by a requisition for shifting. The Land Tribunal inspected the site on 13 51972 and found that the applicant was conducting brick business, that the Choola for baking bricks was situate very near the but where the kudikidappukaran was residing and that shifting of the kudikidappu was necessary for development of the industry. On the question whether B schedule property was suitable for erecting a homestead the decision was similarly based on the local inspection made by the Tribunal. The application was allowed and the applicant was directed to transfer ownership of the alternate site offered without fixing a time limit for such transfer. But the respondent was asked to shift his kudikidappu to the new site within two months from the date of the Tribunal's order. The learned single judge while agreeing with the Land Tribunal found that the petitioner need shift to the new site only within two months after the respondent transferred the new site to the petitioner in the Original Petition and deposited the amount of Rs. 750/-towards shifting charges. 2. The contentions raised before us may be enumerated: 1. The petition for shifting was not maintainable in law since there was no requisition preceding the statutory notice under S.77. 2. 750/-towards shifting charges. 2. The contentions raised before us may be enumerated: 1. The petition for shifting was not maintainable in law since there was no requisition preceding the statutory notice under S.77. 2. The findings of bonafide requirement as well as suitability of the alternate site were based solely on the results of local inspection by the Land Tribunal and this was not proper. Consequently the order of the Tribunal should have been quashed. 3. The question of bonafide requirement has not been properly approached. The contention of the appellant, all along, was that there was no necessity for shifting the kudikidappu even for developing the brick business and the appellant's case is that the approach to the question by the Land Tribunal was wrong in the light of the decisions of this Court. 4. The direction for transfer of B schedule property without fixing a time limit therefor was quite inequitable as it will operate harshly upon the appellant-kudikidappukaran. 3. It is true that the kudikidappukaran has to be requested to shift from his kudikidappu and it is only on non-compliance with such requisition that the question of issue of statutory notice would arise. There is no case in the objection by the kudikidappukaran that no such requisition was made. All the same it was argued that the absence of mention of such requisition having been made in the statutory notice issued under S.77 of the Act would be fatal. We fail to appreciate this plea, for, there is no requirement that there should be mention in the statutory notice of a requisition having been made and that having not been complied with. We feel that there is no substance in this contention raised by the appellant. 4. Time and again this court had occasion to point out that local inspections by officers who are to decide causes are not for the purpose of collecting evidence. Judicial and quasi-judicial Tribunals are bound to dispose of cases before them on the basis of evidence let in by the parties. 4. Time and again this court had occasion to point out that local inspections by officers who are to decide causes are not for the purpose of collecting evidence. Judicial and quasi-judicial Tribunals are bound to dispose of cases before them on the basis of evidence let in by the parties. If by local inspections they seek to gather evidence and make use of such evidence for coming to a decision in the cause it will be highly inequitable, for, the normal process of placing the material gathered before the parties so as to enable them to answer such material would not be available in the case of any material that the presiding officers may gather by local inspection. They cannot be subjected to cross-examination on their reports, for, if they are subjected to such examination, they become disqualified to decide the cases before them. So long as decisions do not depend upon subjective satisfaction of such Tribunals, local inspections conducted with a view to ascertain the truth or otherwise of the plea of either party would be ill-advised. The position of a Land Tribunal sitting to adjudicate on a dispute under the Land Reforms Act would not in this respect be in any way different from a court functioning under the Code of Civil Procedure. R.18 of 0.18 of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers a court at any stage of a suit to inspect any property or thing concerning which any question may arise. This is notwithstanding the power of the Court to issue a commission for the purpose. There is a good deal of case-law interpreting the scope of this provision in the Code of Civil Procedure. It is well settled that the object of the power given to the court to inspect property is to enable it to understand questions arising in the case and to follow as well as apply the evidence. The judge who conducts local inspection is not expected to perform the functions of a commissioner under 0.26 R.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Though there is no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure that the judge who makes the local inspection should record notes of inspection that would be desirable. But it is obligatory that he should not record his impressions or opinions. Making such local inspections must be with due notice to the parties and not behind their back. Though there is no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure that the judge who makes the local inspection should record notes of inspection that would be desirable. But it is obligatory that he should not record his impressions or opinions. Making such local inspections must be with due notice to the parties and not behind their back. In short, the purpose of local inspection by a court is not to use any material gathered by it or the impression gained by such local inspection in deciding the case one way or the other. That should depend upon the evidence in the case. Possibly in some cases such evidence could be properly appreciated with the assistance of a local inspection of the property and the purpose to be served by such inspection is merely to understand the evidence on record properly and in the correct perspective. 5. R.137 of the Kerala Land Reforms (Tenancy) R.1970 seems to be modelled on R.18 of 0.18 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for, it is worded similarly. R.137 reads: "Power to inspect: The Land Tribunal or the Land Board or any other authority or officer may, at any stage of the proceedings, inspect any property or thing concerning which any question may arise." It is thus similar to the provision in the Code of Civil Procedure. The duties of Land Tribunal call for a judicial approach to the questions before it. It goes without saying that the Land Tribunal should act fairly and that would involve an obligation not to use the local inspection for the purpose of collecting evidence or forming impressions which are to weigh with the Tribunal in the ultimate decision of any issue in the case. It may make local inspection as a Civil Court may, the object being to understand the evidence in the case in the proper setting. 6. What we have said here has been stated by this Court on more than one occasion. Our learned brother Viswanatha Iyer J. dealt with this question in Ayisha v. Kunhathukutty,1973 K. L. T. 57 and the learned Chief Justice in Abdullakutty v. Land Tribunal, 1974 K. L. T. 4 approved and followed the view indicated by Viswanatha Iyer J. in Ayisha v. Kunhathukutty,1973 K. L. T. 57. Our learned brother Viswanatha Iyer J. dealt with this question in Ayisha v. Kunhathukutty,1973 K. L. T. 57 and the learned Chief Justice in Abdullakutty v. Land Tribunal, 1974 K. L. T. 4 approved and followed the view indicated by Viswanatha Iyer J. in Ayisha v. Kunhathukutty,1973 K. L. T. 57. One of us has referred to these decisions and applied the same rule in Sreedharan Namboodiri v. Land Tribunal, 1974 K.L.T. 532. 7. Before we close our discussion on this point it is necessary to notice some observations of our learned brother Vadakkel J. in the decision in Amina v. Land Tribunal, Badagara,1974 K. L. T. 496 It was argued before the learned judge on the strength of certain observations in Mahin v. Collector of Customs, 1967 K. L. T. 539 and particularly certain passages from the decision in Regina v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner, Ex Parte Moore, 1965-2 W. L. R.89 extracted in that decision that there was a vast difference between rules of evidence governing proceedings before a Tribunal and those applicable to proceedings in court and "...that one of the objects, if not the very object, of creation of administrative tribunals is to avoid the cumbersome rules of procedure and evidence." The following passage from the judgment of Justice Mathew in Mahin's case may, in that context, be noticed: "The burden of gathering evidence and presenting it rests on the parties, not on Judges But in many quasi-judicial proceedings, on the other band, the burden of finding the truth rests on administrative officers The rules of evidence to be applied in any proceeding before an administrative authority must be selected in part with regard to the degree of precision, needed in the particular fact-finding. Some of inquiries require maximum precision, others only a rough approximation. Where precision is needed, rules of evidence must be more exacting. Where approximation suffices, less reliable information may be admitted." The contention of counsel in that case was that in view of the scheme of the Act, so far as it concerns Kudikidappukars, being one of social welfare, an enquiry in a matter under S.77 of the Act is one where a rough approximation alone was possible and sufficient. It appears to have been urged that this led to the logical conclusion that the Tribunal is entitled to base its decision on evidence gathered by itself by local inspection. It appears to have been urged that this led to the logical conclusion that the Tribunal is entitled to base its decision on evidence gathered by itself by local inspection. We are noticing this particularly because our learned brother Vadakkel J. observed that the argument was certainly attractive and not without force and the question would have been referred for an authoritative decision by a larger Bench, but on the facts of that case that was not called tor. 8. It appears to us that it is one thing to say that rules of evidence need not be 'exacting' in the case of certain authorities or Tribunals dealing with particular types of actions and another to say that no evidence is called for or that what would not be evidence otherwise could be treated as evidence. There is no objection to a local inspection by Tribunals and in fact so long as rules provide for such local inspection there can be no objection. But the rule does not provide for the Tribunal collecting evidence by such local inspection. To assume that it can nevertheless collect such evidence would run counter to well established notions of judicial procedure, for, then the Tribunal would be a witness as well as the judge, two roles which it cannot combine in itself. Logically it means that the Tribunal would be acting beyond its powers in assuming an incompatible role, the role of a witness which will have direct impact and repercussion on its role as a judge in the cause. In the context the question is not in the realms of strict application of the rules, but the competency of a Tribunal to gather evidence. Therefore we do not think that the decision in Mahin v. Collector of Customs, 1967 KLT 539 has relevance on the question with which we are concerned in this case. 9. In the case before us the order of the Tribunal indicates that it rested its decision on the question of bonafide requirement of the site as well as the suitability of alternate site entirely on the inspection made by the Tribunal and as such we do not think that its conclusion can be sustained. 10. 9. In the case before us the order of the Tribunal indicates that it rested its decision on the question of bonafide requirement of the site as well as the suitability of alternate site entirely on the inspection made by the Tribunal and as such we do not think that its conclusion can be sustained. 10. We may also notice the absence of a proper consideration by the Tribunal of the question whether the site of the Kudikidappu was required in this case for one or other of the purposes mentioned in S.75 (2) of the Act. On this question this court has spoken on several occasions though always not in one voice and that is the reason why we propose to consider the question here in detail. 11. The Kerala Land Reforms Act 1 of 1964 as amended from time to time confers fixity on a tenant and also gives the tenant a right to the assignment of the title and interest which vest in Government under the provisions of the Act. A similar scheme is envisaged in the Act in regard to kudikidappukarans. S.75 (1) confers fixity on the kudikidappukaran subject to certain exceptions. S.80A confers on the kudikidappukaran the right to purchase the kudikidappu occupied by him and the land adjoining thereto. The exceptions to the right of fixity are enumerated in sub-section (1) of S.75. Where the kudikidappukaran has alienated his right of kudikidappu to a person other than a member of his family or a person other than one who has no other homestead or any land in possession either as owner or as tenant on which the kudikidappukaran could erect a homestead and whose annual income does not exceed two thousand rupees, he forfeits his right to fixity. Similarly leasing out of the entire kudikidappu to another person for a period of not less than two years or ceasing to reside h the kudikidappu continuously for a period of two years or having another kudikidappu or obtaining ownership and possession of land which is fit for erecting a homestead five kilometres from his kudikidappu are all grounds which operate as exceptions to the rule of fixity. A kudikidappukaran who is entitled to fixity may have to shift his kudikidappu in case the landlord seeks such shifting for certain specified purposes mentioned in sub-section (2) of S.75. A kudikidappukaran who is entitled to fixity may have to shift his kudikidappu in case the landlord seeks such shifting for certain specified purposes mentioned in sub-section (2) of S.75. Considering the scheme envisaged in these provisions it cannot be said that the right given to the person in possession of the land on which the kudikidappu is, situate (for sake of convenience we may refer to him here as landowner) to move for shifting of a kudikidappu is such that it is fairly destructive of the right conferred on the kudikidappukaran, that of fixity in regard to his kudikidappu. Fixity being the rule, when a person seeks to shift the kudikidappu it is up to him to show the existence of the conditions specified in S.75 (2) which gives him the right to move the court for shifting. One of the conditions is that the landowner bonafide requires the land for building purposes for himself or any member of his family including major sons and daughters. It is not sufficient if the landowner claims the land for such purpose but the requirement must be bonafide and if the matter comes before a court or Tribunal and the parties are at issue on this question, this calls for a decision. Can it be said that though the landowner is possessed of other lands in which he could conveniently construct buildings if he desires to construct the building in the very site where the kudikidappu is situate his requirement is bonafide within the meaning of S.72 (2)? Even in the property in which the kudikidappu is situate there may be sufficient area to construct a building without disturbing the kudikidappu. Could it be said that simply because the landowner really desires to construct a building in the site where the kudikidappu is situate he would be entitled to seek shifting of the kudikidappu? May be the need for construction of a house for himself or for any member of his family is bona fide. The landowner may honestly want to constructs building for such purpose and therefore the requirement of construction could be said to be bonafide. But he may have other available land and there may be no particular reason why he should choose the site of the kudikidappu for constructing the building. The landowner may honestly want to constructs building for such purpose and therefore the requirement of construction could be said to be bonafide. But he may have other available land and there may be no particular reason why he should choose the site of the kudikidappu for constructing the building. In that event though the requirement for construction purpose is bonafide the requirement of the site where the kudikidappu is situate cannot be bonafide. 12. The earlier part of S.75 (2) reads: "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the person in possession of the land on which there is a homestead or but (hereinafter in this sub-section referred to as the landlord) in the occupation as a kudikidappukaran may, if he bonafide requires the land -" The land on which there is a homestead or a but may be extensive covering an area much more than what the kudikidappukaran would be entitled to claim by way of assignment under S.80A of the Act May be there would be no difficulty in such a case for the landowner to construct any building in that land even without shifting the kudikidappu. No question of requirement of the land need then be decided because only when the landowner requires the land, i. e. the land in which the kudikidappu is situate does any conflict or issue arise. The question of shifting arises only if the site of the kudikidappu is required for one or other of the purposes mentioned in S.73(2). Therefore the words "if he bonafide require the land" refer to not any land but the site of the kudikidappu. The proof therefore should be of requirement bona fide of the site of the kudikidappu. That would mean that it is not sufficient for an applicant seeking shifting of a kudikidappu merely to show that he has a bonafide intention to construct a building for himself or for a member of his family and that he requires some land for such construction but further that the land so required bonafide is the very site in which the kudikidappu is situate. In cases where a landowner has other suitable lands in his possession or there is sufficient area in the holding in which the kudikidappu is situate wherein he can construct a building without shifting the kudikidappu the bona fides of his requirement of the site of the kudikidappu may have to be proved by showing that such other land may not satisfy the requirement and for good reasons the site of the kudikidappu itself is necessary for the construction. In such cases, notwithstanding the rule of fixity conferred on a kudikidappukaran, the right of shifting would operate as an exception thereto. In the scheme of the Kerala Land Reforms Act this construction of the sub-section appears to be plain. The language of S.72 also warrants this construction. Hence in every case where there is an application under S.75 (2) (a) of the Act, it is for the person in possession of the land in which the kudikidappu is situate to establish that the site of the kudikidappu is required by him bonafide for building purposes. It is not sufficient to show that he bonafide requires some land for such purpose. May be, by reason of the peculiar situation of the site in which the kudikidappu is situate and the relevance of such situation to the need of the petitioner his requirement is necessarily of the site of the kudikidappu. In such a case he can exercise his right to call upon the kudikidappukaran to shift to an alternate site which satisfies the requirements laid down by the statute. In other cases he may not succeed. 13. Our learned brother Eradi J. has explained the earlier decision of the same learned judge in Janaki v. Land Tribunal, Tellicherry,1973 KLT 923 in the later decision in Rehiman v. Ramu,1974 KLT 741. One of us sitting single has referred to this decision in Varkey Thomas v. Land Tribunal, Pampakuda,1974 KLT 759 and has expressed the same view. In that case the decision of our learned brother Isaac J. in O. P. 1665 of 1973 was brought to the notice of the court and that decision was distinguished on the facts of that case. In that case the decision of our learned brother Isaac J. in O. P. 1665 of 1973 was brought to the notice of the court and that decision was distinguished on the facts of that case. Learned counsel for respondents 2 and 3, the landowners, draws our attention to the observation of the learned judge in that judgment "The landowner must have his own choice of the land where he may put up a residence for his purpose. It cannot be dictated by the Kudikidappukaran." If, as contended by learned counsel, the distinction sought to be made in the judgment reported in Varkey Thomas v. Land Tribunal, Pampakuda,1974 KLT 759 cannot be real and what the learned judge has said is to be read as meaning that irrespective of any question of the requirement of the site of the kudikidappu by the applicant he is entitled to seek shifting of the kudikidappu, we must, with great respect, dissent from the view taken by the learned judge. 14. In the case before us, apart from the fact that the Tribunal has based its decision solely on the local inspection report, there is no consideration of the question whether the particular site of the but in which the kudikidappukaran was residing was required for the development of the business of manufacturing bricks which was the case set up by the petitioner. There has not been an approach to this question in the light of the decisions of this court in Rehiman v. Ramu.1974 KLT 741 and Varkey Thomas v. Land Tribunal, Pampakuda,1974 KLT 759 the ratio in which is being reiterated by us here. The order of the Land Tribunal calls for interference. 15. The last of the contentions raised by the petitioner is that the direction for transfer of B schedule property without a time limit will operate quite inequitably. Of course that would be so. If no time limit is fixed by a court for transferring the alternate site to the kudikidappukaran and the order is therefore operative for all time to come the kudikidappukaran will have to live under the apprehension that he may have to shift at any time at the choice of the landowner. Of course that would be so. If no time limit is fixed by a court for transferring the alternate site to the kudikidappukaran and the order is therefore operative for all time to come the kudikidappukaran will have to live under the apprehension that he may have to shift at any time at the choice of the landowner. It is only fair and reasonable that the court fixes a time limit within which the landowner is asked to convey the alternate site to the kudikidappukaran and deposit such amounts as are payable by him as a condition precedent to the shifting so that on compliance therewith the kudikidappukaran may be able to construct his building in the alternate site and shift thereto. The Tribunal was certainly in error in fixing no time limit for the transfer by the applicant of the ownership and possession of the B schedule property and at the same time directing the kudikidappukaran to shift the kudikidappu to the new site within two months from the date of the Tribunal's order. This was in fact unworkable, for, the kudikidappukaran will not be able to shift to the new site until and unless the landowner transfers the ownership and possession of the new site to the kudikidappukaran. Even the direction made by the learned single judge may not be sufficient to meet the situation as the only direction made by the learned judge was that the petitioner need shift to the new site only within two months after the respondent transfers the new site to the petitioner and deposits the shifting charges. As we have indicated here, a time limit should necessarily be fixed for such transfer by the applicants. The above discussion leads us to hold that the appellant is entitled to succeed in the appeal. The order of the Tribunal, Ext. P3, is set aside and the Land Tribunal, N Parur is directed to dispose of the application for shifting of the kudikidappu in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this judgment. In the circumstances of the case parties are directed to suffer costs in this appeal as well as in the proceedings before the learned single judge. Allowed.