JUDGMENT - M.H. KANIA, J.:---This petition, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, raises a question under section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 hereinafter referred to as the said Act). The dispute relates to Shop No. 5 in Block No. 1 on the ground floor of a building called Nanik Nivas at Bhulabhai Desai Road, Bombay-26. In 1949-50 the petitioner became a member of the Shyam Co-operative Housing Society Limited, a Society registered under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, and therefore, deemed to be registered under the said Act, which society is respondent No. 8 before us. The petitioner was allotted flat No. Some six shops were constructed in the said building and Shop No. 5 out of these six shops was allotted to the petitioner as a member in 1951. The case of the petitioner is that by an agreement dated 10th January, 1955 entered into by the petitioners brother, one Vassan, on behalf of the petitioner, with one Ambalal Mistry, Ambalal Mistry was given leave and licence to occupy the suit shop as a licensee for a period of eleven months on the terms and conditions contained in the agreement of licence. The petitioners brother, Vassan, died some-time prior to 31st March, 1955, and hence a fresh agreement of leave and licence containing similar terms was entered into between the petitioner and Ambalal Mistry on 31st March, 1955. On 2nd August, 1960 another agreement of leave and licence was entered into between the petitioner and the said Ambalal Mistry relating to the suit shop, the only material alteration in the terms and conditions of the licence being that the compensation amount was raised from Rs. 160/- p.m. to Rs. 190/- p.m. The period of the said licence expired on 22nd July, 1961. As Ambalal Mistry did not vacate the suit shop as called upon by the petitioner, after giving notice the petitioner filed a suit in the Bombay City Civil Court being Suit No. 4647 of 1961 against Ambalal Mistry for his eviction from the said shop and for mesne profits. Ambalal Mistry died during the pendency of the suit and respondents Nos. 1 to 7 before us were brought on record as the defendants in the suit as the heirs and legal representatives of the said Ambalal. Ambalal Mistry died during the pendency of the suit and respondents Nos. 1 to 7 before us were brought on record as the defendants in the suit as the heirs and legal representatives of the said Ambalal. On 1st March, 1965 a Division Bench of this Court delivered the judgment in the case of (I.P. Hingorani v. Pravinchandra)1, 67, Bom.L.R. 306 Pursuant to the view taken in this decision, by way of abundant caution the petitioner filed an arbitration case against respondent Nos. 1 to 7 before respondent No. 9 herein, being at the material time the District Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bombay, in which the some reliefs were prayed for as in the said suit. Respondents Nos. 1 to 7 then took out a Notice of Motion, on or about 21st July, 1967, to restrain the petitioner from proceeding with the said arbitration case filed by him. This Notice of Motion was, however, dismissed in view of the decision of this Court in Hingoranis case. The learned Judge of City Civil Court, however, framed a preliminary issue as to whether that Court had jurisdiction to entertain and try the said suit filed by the petitioner. The learned Judge of the City Civil Court held that the subject-matter of the dispute in the said suit fell within the scope of section 91 of the said Act and as such that Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. As a result of the finding on this issue, the learned Judge dismissed the suit, following the aforesaid decision in Hingoranis case. As far as the arbitration case filed by the petitioner was concerned, on 22nd January, 1968 one Shri R K. Saklikar, Officer on Special Duty recorded a finding under sub-section (2) of section 91 of the said Act holding that the reference filed but the petitioner, viz. The aforesaid arbitration case, disclosed a dispute within the meaning of the said term in section 91 of the said Act. On revision, this order was confirmed by respondent No. 10, the Commissioner for Co-operation and Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Poona, on 30th May, 1968. Respondent Nos. The aforesaid arbitration case, disclosed a dispute within the meaning of the said term in section 91 of the said Act. On revision, this order was confirmed by respondent No. 10, the Commissioner for Co-operation and Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Poona, on 30th May, 1968. Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 went in revision against this order to the State of Maharashtra, respondent No. 12, respondent No. 11, who heard the said revision application, by his order dated 12th September, 1969 reversed the order passed by the Officer on Special Duty which has been confirmed by respondent No. 10 as aforesaid and held that the matter in dispute lay within the jurisdiction of a competent Court under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rate (Control) Act, 1947. The material part of the decision of respondent No. 12, however, is that the arbitration case filed by the petitioner did not disclose a dispute within the meaning of the said term in section 91 of the said Act. It is against this decision that the petitioner has filed the present Special Civil Application. The first submission of Dr. Naik, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, was that the impugned order passed by respondent No. 12, was illegal and disclosed an error apparent on the face of the record as reliance was placed for the same on the decision of the Supreme Court in (Deccan Merchants v. Dalichand)2, 72, Bom.L.R. 418. It was submitted by Dr. Naik that the ratio of this case is that the word dispute in section 91(1) of the said Act covers only those disputes which are capable of being resolved by the Registrar or his nominee. It is doubtful whether it includes a dispute between a landlord society and a tenant when the landlord society had not been set up for the purpose of constructing or buying and letting out houses. It was pointed out by Dr. Naik that the only reliance which could have been placed by respondent No. 12 on this decision was for giving a narrower meaning to the word "dispute" in section 91 of the said Act. It was submitted by him that respondent No. 12 had committed a patent error in holding that the present case was completely covered by the decision in Deccan Marchants case. In our view, it is not necessary to go into the correctness of this submission of Dr. It was submitted by him that respondent No. 12 had committed a patent error in holding that the present case was completely covered by the decision in Deccan Marchants case. In our view, it is not necessary to go into the correctness of this submission of Dr. Naik, because what we are really concerned with is not whether the reliance placed on the decision in Deccan Merchants case was wrong, but whether the decision of conclusion arrived at by respondent No. 2 in the impugned order discloses any error apparent on the face of the record. It was next submitted by Dr. Naik that where there is a dispute between a licensee and licensor, the licensor being a member of a Co-operative Society registered under the said Act, the dispute falls within the scope of section 91 of the said Act, sub-section (1) of section 91 of the said Act, as it stood at the relevant time, provided that in order that a dispute could be filed before the Registrar, it was, inter alia, necessary that the dispute must be one touching the Constitution, election of the office bearers, conduct of general meetings, management or business of a society. In the present case, the only question which has to be considered is whether the dispute is one which touches the business of the respondent No. 8-Society, there being no contention that it would otherwise fall within the scope of section 91 of the said Act. In this regard, it might be useful to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in (Aabharwal v. Guna Amrit)3, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1893. It is a little interesting to note that the dispute there related to a licence agreement regarding a flat in Shyam Niwas, which belonged to the very Society, which is respondent No 8 before us. In that case, respondent No. 1 was what is commonly known as the owner of a flat on the second floor of Block No. 8, Shyam Niwas, Warden Road, Bombay, and was a member of the said Society. Respondent No. 1 put the appellants Sabharwal Brothers in possession of the said flat for a period of eleven months on payment of Rs. 510/- per month. There was an agreement in writing purporting to show that the possession was given on leave and license basis. Respondent No. 1 put the appellants Sabharwal Brothers in possession of the said flat for a period of eleven months on payment of Rs. 510/- per month. There was an agreement in writing purporting to show that the possession was given on leave and license basis. As the appellants did not vacate as the end of the period of the agreement, respondent No. 1 filed a claim before the Registrar of Co-operative Societies on the ground that there was a dispute within the meaning of section 91 of the said Act which required adjudication. There was a challenge by the appellants to the jurisdiction of the nominee of the Registrar, to whom it was referred. In connection with the determination of this question, the Supreme Court referred to bye-law No. 2 of the Society which showed that the objects of the Society were, inter alia, to carry to the trade of buying, selling, hiring and letting land in accordance with the co-operative principles and also referred to Regulation No. 5 in form A printed at the end of the bye-laws, which provided that “No tenant shall assign, underlet, vacate or part with the possession of the tenant of any part thereof without the consent in writing of the Society." It was observed by the Supreme Court as follows : ".....But we are not able to see how letting by a member to another member would touch the business of the society which included inter alia the trade of buying, selling, hiring and letting land in accordance with co-operative principles. The letting of flat by respondent No. 1 was a transaction of the same nature as the Society itself was empowered to enter into but letting by itself did not concern the business of the society in the matter of its letting out flats." It appears to us that, to a large extent, this decision answers the question raised before us, and in view of this decision, it must be held that the dispute raised by the petitioner was not a dispute touching the business of respondent No. 8-Society. It is true that in the present case, the petitioner has averred that under the regulations and bye-laws of respondent No. 8, he was entitled to part with the possession of the flat with the permission of respondent No. 8 and that he had done so accordingly. It is true that in the present case, the petitioner has averred that under the regulations and bye-laws of respondent No. 8, he was entitled to part with the possession of the flat with the permission of respondent No. 8 and that he had done so accordingly. This, however, does not help the petitioner in any manner. If at all it would show all the more that the dispute in question did not touch the business of respondent No. 8. If in a case where a member has parted with possession of the premises allotted to him against the bye-laws of the Society it was held that the dispute between that member and his licensee regarding possession of the said premises did not touch the business of the Society, in a case where such parting is done allegedly with the permission of the Society or pursuant to a right given to such member, it would still less touch the business of the Society. Dr. Naik sought to distinguish this decision of the Supreme Court on the ground that there are certain statements at the end of paragraph 9 of the report of the said judgment, which, according to Dr. Naik, suggest that the Supreme Court was under an erroneous impression that the flat in question had been sold to respondent No. 1 in the case before the Supreme Court. Three statements referred to by Dr. Naik have, however, been explained in the decision of a Divisions Bench of this Court in (Kalawati Ramchand v. Bhankarrao)4, 76, Bom.L.R. 718 at 726 where it has been pointed out that these statements, apparently sound somewhat out of tune with the trend of the judgment and, at any rate, cannot have the effect of eroding the clear ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Sabharwals case. In Kalawati Ramchands case the Division Bench of this Court, after referring to the various decisions, has held that a dispute between a member of a Co-operative Housing Society and his licensee with regard to the possession of flat does not fall within the four corners of section 91 of the said Act. In Kalawati Ramchands case the Division Bench of this Court, after referring to the various decisions, has held that a dispute between a member of a Co-operative Housing Society and his licensee with regard to the possession of flat does not fall within the four corners of section 91 of the said Act. This is so because (1) in a dispute touching the business of the Society itself should raise the dispute and be a disputant; (2) a member entering into a leave and licence agreement with a third person cannot by his own act touch the business of the society in its narrower sense (Deccan Merchants case), unless, of course, the society objects and raises a dispute with regard thereto; (3) even if such a dispute between the licensor-member and licensee occupant may ultimately "affect the business of the society" if licence be granted in contravention of the bye-laws or the rules, still this falls too short of "touching the business of the society"; (4) as long as the occupant-licensee remains in possession complying with the conditions attached to the premises and the requirements and demands of the society in the same manner as the licensor-member could have complied, the society can have no objection unless such licensing is specifically prohibited; (5) in a dispute which exclusively affects the member and his licensee the society cannot come into the internal management of the society even remotely though it may affect its business and impel the society to move to evict the member and his licensee or his licensee alone, and lastly (7) on a parity of reasoning adopted in Manohars case 63 Bom.L.R. 1001 -F-B. and Deccan Merchants case the dispute between the licensor and the licensee in such a case must be deemed to be outside the purview of section 91 of the said Act. This decision in Kalawati Ramchands case is the decision of a Division Bench decision of this Court and should normally be regarded as binding upon us; and we see no reason to take a different view from the one which has been taken there, particularly in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Sabharwals case, which we have referred to earlier. The last submission of Dr. The last submission of Dr. Naik was that, in any event, the matter should be remanded to the Officer on Special Duty to enable the petitioner to lead evidence to show that there was a dispute within the meaning of the said term in section 91 of the said Act. We are afraid, we cannot accept this submission of Dr. Naik either. In the first place, when the matter was being heard by the Officer on Special Duty, there was nothing which prevented the petitioner from leading such evidence as he desired. No grievance has been made that the petitioner was, at any stage, prevented from leading any such evidence. Hence, it would not at all be proper to remand the matter to enable the petitioner now to lead the same evidence which he could have led before. Quite apart from this, we fail to see what evidence the petitioner could possibly lead on this question in view of the averments made by him in paragraph 9 of the plaint filed by him before the District Deputy Registrar, which paragraph deals with the facts and submissions as to whether there was a dispute as contemplated by section 91 of the said Act. All that is alleged in the said paragraph is that there is no landlord-tenant relationship between the petitioner and the said Ambalal Mistry within the meaning of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1917, or the Transfer of Property Act and there is also no landlord tenant relationship between the respondent No. 8 and respondents Nos. 1 to 7 inter se. It is further alleged that the petitioner is a member of respondent No. 8 Society. Even if the petitioner were to make good all these contentions of fact, we fail to see how the dispute could fall within the scope of section 91 of the said Act. No. allegations of fact have been made in paragraph 9 of the plaint on the basis of which it could be said that the dispute raised was one which touched the business of respondent No. 8 Society and hence the question of permitting the petitioner to lead any evidence to establish this does not arise. Before parting with the matter, there is one other contention of Dr. Naik which should be noted. It is pointed out by Dr. Before parting with the matter, there is one other contention of Dr. Naik which should be noted. It is pointed out by Dr. Naik that there is an observation in the impugned order passed by respondent No. 12 to the effect that when a member parts with possession of his premises by creating a tenancy of leave and licence, such a matter has to be decided by a Court of competent jurisdiction under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947. It was submitted by Dr. Naik that this conclusion is clearly erroneous. It appears to us that there is substance in this contention. It is true that if the relationship found is the relationship of landlord tenant, it is the rent Court, which would have jurisdiction to entertain the case. If, however, the relationship is found to be one of licensor and licensee, the jurisdiction to determine the dispute raised by the petitioner would lie with a competent Court of ordinary civil jurisdiction. This, however, does not make any difference to the result of this petition. In our view, the petition fails and the rule is discharged. Looking to all the facts and circumstances of the case, we feel that the parties should bear their own costs and we order accordingly. ------