Y. NANDAN, J. This is an appeal against a judgment and order of a learned Single Judge of this Court dismissing the appellants writ petition. The material facts giving rise to the writ petition and to this appeal are, that on August 19, 1973, the premises of the appel lant were searched and 48 quintals of wheat was recovered from the possession of the appellants family, of which the appellant happens to be a member. On the same day, the Prescribed Authority passed an order under sub-clause (1) of clause 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Wheat (Requirement to Sell) Order, 1973 (hereinafter called the Order) or dering the appellant and other members of his family to sell the quan tity held by them in excess to an authorised dealer at the price speci fied in column 3 of Schedule II to the Uttar Pradesh Rabi Foodgrains Requisitioning Order, 1970. The appellant filed a representation against the direction of the Prescribed Authority in accordance with sub-clause (3) of Clause 3 of that Order. By an order dated Septem ber 25, 1973, the Prescribed Authority rejected the representation made by the appellant and made its order passed on August 19, 1973 absolute. Against the order rejecting his representation, the appel lant appealed to the Commissioner of the Division under sub-clause (4) of Clause 3 of the Order. The Commissioner dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant by an order dated March 4, 1974. Aggrieved by the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority and the Commis sioner, the appellant filed a writ petition in this Court. The contention raised before the learned Single Judge during the hearing of the writ petition was that the Prescribed Authority had disregarded the requirements of sub-clause (3) of Clause 3 of the Order inasmuch as it had passed an order without giving an opportunity to the appellant of being heard. The contention was rejected by the learned Single Judge who took the view that during the appeal the appellant had been provided an opportunity by the appellate court of being heard and an opportunity of filing additional evidence was also given to him, and consequently the prejudice, if any, caused by the failure of the Prescribed Authority to give him a hearing, stood nullified. During the hearing of the appeal before us, learned coun sel appearing for the appellant reiterated the submission made by him before the learned Single Judge. According to the facts stated in the petition, on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, on August 25, 1973, the appellant had filed his representation before the Prescribed Authority in accordance with sub-clause (3) of clause 3 of the Order. The counter-affidavit discloses and it is not disputed that on that date the appellant was afforded some sort of hearing by the Prescribed Authority. According to the representation of the ap pellant, he and his father Jai Ram and uncle Bindaban, from whose possession the wheat was recovered, lived separately and were not joint in cultivation and, consequently, the entire amount of wheat recovered from three separate places could not be treated as having been recovered from one single family. In view of the objection raised by the appellant in his representation, the Prescribed Authority called for reports from the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and the Tahsildar concerned. On September 5, 1973, the Tahsildar submitted his re port. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate submitted his report before the Prescribed Authority on September 20, 1973. Both these officers re ported that the appellant and his uncle and father constituted a joint family and lived jointly as well as cultivated lands jointly. On Sep tember 25, 1973, the Prescribed Authority passed an order in the fol lowing terms: "i agree. The objection is decided accordingly. " The contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appel lant, as it was before the learned Single Judge, was that the Sub-Divi sional Magistrate and the Tahsildar submitted their reports without hearing the appellant, and further when the Prescribed Authority passed the order dated September 25, 1973, on the basis of the reports of these two officers, it gave no opportunity to the appellant to dis pute or disprove the correctness of the reports of the Tahsildar and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and thus there had been disregard of the requirements of sub-clause (3) of Clause 3 of the Order. It is true that in the counter-affidavit there is no assertion to the effect that after September 20, 1973, which is the date on which the Sub-Divisional Magistrate submitted his report, the Prescribed Authority gave a hearing to the appellant before passing the order dated Sep tember 25, 1973. If matters had rested there, the appellant would have been perfectly justified in contending that the order of the Pres cribed Authority had been passed to his prejudice in violation of the requirements of sub-clause (3) of Clause 3 of the Order, as well as in defiance of the principles of natural justice. However, when the appellant presented an appeal against the order of the Prescribed Au thority, the Commissioner, who heard the appeal, gave an opportunity to the appellant to produce additional evidence in rebuttal of the re ports of the Sub- Divisional Magistrate and the Tahsildar. The appellant took benefit of the opportunity afforded and filed certified copies of certain revenue records and separate ration cards held by him and his father and uncle. That he was given a hearing by the learned Commissioner has not been disputed by the appellant. On a conside ration of the evidence produced by the appellant before the appellate authority, the Commissioner held that the conclusion arrived at by the Prescribed Authority was correct. The appellate authority has re corded its independent finding on the basis of evidence produced by the appellant that he and his father and uncle constituted a joint fami ly and all lived together and they were joint in cultivation. The Commissioner refused to place reliance on the revenue records pro duced by the appellant as well as on the ration cards produced as additional evidence. Thus, no prejudice has been caused, as held by the learned Single Judge, to the appellant by the failure of the Pres cribed Authority to give him an opportunity of contesting the cor rectness of the reports of the Tahsildar and the Sub- Divisional Ma gistrate. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant further contended, placing reliance on sub-clause (2) of clause 3 of the Order that the Prescribed Authority had no jurisdction to pass an order releasing only 11 quintals of wheat recovered for the consumption of the appel lant and the members of his family, and for their seed requirements. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant further contended, placing reliance on sub-clause (2) of clause 3 of the Order that the Prescribed Authority had no jurisdction to pass an order releasing only 11 quintals of wheat recovered for the consumption of the appel lant and the members of his family, and for their seed requirements. He contended that in view of proviso (iii) to sub-clause (2) of Clause 3 of the Order, since the appellant and the members of his family were producers, the minimum wheat that should have been released in their favour was 20 quintals. The submission also, in our opinion, has no substance and must be rejected. The material part of Clause 3 of the Order runs as follows: " (1) Where the Prescribed Authority has reason to believe that any person has stored or continued to store or acquired for stor age, either directly or indirectly (including storage in a ware house otherwise than by way of a pledge, either in his own name or in the name of his or her spouse or of any minor child), any wheat in excess of his bona fide requirements up to the next wheat harvest, that is to say, requirements for his household in cluding any dependents, servants or farm labourers, and his re quirements for seed for the next sowing, the Prescribed Autho rity may require him to sell the quantity held by him in excess to an authorised agent at the price specified in column 3 of Sche dule II to the Uttar Pradesh Rabi Foodgrains Requisitioning Or der, 1970, as amended from time to time. (2) In order to ascertain the stocks of wheat with any person the Prescribed Authority may, with or without such assistance as it may think fit, enter and search any premises, place, vehicle or vessel, and pass an order under sub-clause (1) on the spot on the basis of the quantity actually found in stock on such entry or search: Provided that no order shall be passed under sub-clause (1) where the total stock of wheat found in any premises, place, vehi cle or vessel does not exceed: - i) in the ease of stock held by a licensed retailer, 200 quin tals; (ii) in the case of stock held by a registered parchauni, 50 quin tals; (iii) in the case of a producer of wheat, 20 quintals; (iv) in the case of any other person, 50 quintals; On a superficial reading of sub-clauses (1) and (2) of clause 3 of the Order, it might appear that no order under sub-clause (1) of Clause 3 can be passed at all if a producer is found to be in possession of wheat not exceeding 20 quintals. A closer analysis of sub-clauses (1) and (2) of clause 3 of the Order leads to a different conclusion. In our opinion, sub-clause (1) and the proviso to sub-clause (2) of Clause 3 of the Order deal with different situations. The third provi so to sub-clause (2) of Clause 3 merely provides that if a producer is found in possession of wheat not exceeding 20 quintals, no order under sub-clause (1) of clause 3 of the Order would be passed against him. This was clearly meant, it appears, to exempt a producer from the consequences contemplated by clause (1) in case he is found at any particular time in possession of wheat not exceeding 20 quintals. In the event of a producer being found in possession of wheat in excess of 20 quintals, the proviso to sub-clause (2) is inapplicable and sub-clause (1) of Clause 3 is immediately attracted and it would be open to the Prescribed Authority to determine the requirements of his household, including any dependents, servants or farm labourers, as well as seed requirements of the next sowing season. In making this determination the Prescribed Authority would naturally take into ac count the number of dependents, servants and labourers which the producer actually has, as Well as the quantity of land which he has to sow. In making the determination under sub-clause (1) of Clause 3 of the Order, the Prescribed Authority has not to be guided by the proviso to sub-clause (2) of Clause 3 of the Order. The appeal lacks merit and is hereby dismissed with costs. .