Judgment :- 1. The meaning to be attributed to the words "the person in possession of the land" occurring in sub-s. (2) of S.75 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, for short, the Act, is the question that arises in this Original Petition, a case which has been referred to a Division Bench by Bhaskaran J., on the submission of counsel that the decision in Rev. Fr. Mathew Fabian v. Additional Land Tribunal, Quilon & others 1973 KLT. 423 requires reconsideration. 2. The petitioner is the Thrikkaruva Kuttiyazhikom Devaswom represented by by its Joint Secretaries. They sought the shifting of three kudikidappus situated in the land belonging to the Devaswom to a new site belonging to the Devaswom under sub-s. (2) of S.75 of the Act. Respondents 1 and 2, the kudikidappukars, objected on various grounds: (1) The application was lacking in bona fides, (2) the alternate site offered was unsuitable for erecting of homestead and (3) that the Devaswom is not a "person" within the meaning of that expression in S.75(2) of the Act. The contentions of the 1st and 2nd respondents on points (1) and (2) above have been found against by the Land Tribunal but the 3rd contention has been accepted by reason of the ruling in Rev. Fr. Mathew Fabian v. Additional Land Tribunal, Quilon & others 1973 KLT. 423. The question that arose before the court in that decision was whether an application made by a religious institution for the purpose of expansion of the church compound and of a cemetery would fall under S.75(2) of the Act. It was held that the section would not apply and the following observation in the judgment has been relied on in support of the submission that this application by the Devaswom is also not maintainable: "It is obvious that it was not in the contemplation of the legislature when it enacted S.75 (2)(a) that its provision should be availed of by a religious institution for the purpose of expansion of the church compound or of its cemetery; the intention manifestly is that the benefit of the said clause should be available only to private individuals including families for the purpose of construction of buildings for their use." This view has been taken on the wording of S.75(2)(a). We shall extract S.75(2)(a), (b) and (c): "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-s. (1), the person in possession of the land on which there is a homestead or but (hereinafter in this sub-section referred to as the landlord) in the occupation as a kudikidappukaran may, if he bona fide requires the land (a) for building purposes for himself or any member of his family including major sons and daughters; or (b) for purposes in connection with a town planning scheme approved by the competent authority; or (c) for any industrial purpose, require the kudikidappukaran, to shift to a new site belonging to him subject to the following conditions, namely: - (i) the landholder shall pay to the kudikidappukaran the price of the homestead, if any erected by the kudikidappukaran; (ii) the new site shall be fit for erecting a homestead and shall be within a distance of one mile from the existing kudikidappu; (iii) the extent of new site shall be the extent of the existing kudikidappu subject to a minimum of three cents if within the limits of a city or a major municipality, five cents if within the limits of any other municipality and ten cents if in any panchayat area or township; (iv) the landlord shall transfer ownership and possession of the new site to the kudikidappukaran and shall pay to him the reasonable cost of shifting the kudikidappu to the new site. Where the above conditions are complied with the kudikidappukaran shall be bound.' to shift to the new site." 3. When "the person in possession of the land" is read with "if he bonafide requires the land for building purposes for himself or any member of his family including major sons and daughters" unless 'person' is read distributively as applicable to all those that have been included in the definition of 'person' in S.2(43) of the Act as applicable to the first part of S.75(2)(a), and 'person' meaning only an individual, as applicable to the latter part, "for building purposes for any member of his family including major sons and daughters", the sub-section creates some difficulty of interpretation. Perhaps to some extent there is impropriety that the first part of the clause must apply to every person coming within the definition in S.2(43) and the second part should apply only to an individual and bis major sons and daughters or his family. Perhaps to some extent there is impropriety that the first part of the clause must apply to every person coming within the definition in S.2(43) and the second part should apply only to an individual and bis major sons and daughters or his family. We shall at this stage read the definition of "person" in S.2(43) of the Act: "person" shall include a company, family, joint family, association or other body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, and any institution capable of holding property;" 4. The first rule of interpretation requires that we must give the natural literal meaning to the words used in the section. If there are anomalies resulting or ambiguities following, it would be necessary to apply the well-established principles laid down as early as in the 16th century in the celebrated Heydon's case to find out the real and true intention of the legislature. Those principles required the consideration of the following factors: (1) What was the common law before the making of the Act, (2) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide, (3) What remedy the Parliament bath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth, and (4) The true reason of the remedy. These tests have been applied more or less uniformly and accepted by the Supreme Court as well. But such a method of interpretation need and can be resorted to only in cases where the wording of the statute is not clear and there is ambiguity. If there is no such ambiguity we have to give the reasonable meaning attributable to the words and in cases such as the one before us we may have to give different meanings to the word 'person'. In this case 'person' may have to be read attributing to the word the wider meaning as defined so far as the first part of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of S.75 is concerned and the same word may have to be read as applicable only to individuals in so far as the second part of clause (a) of sub section (2) of S.75 is concerned. We conceive that there is nothing wrong in reading the section like that unless, as we said, we are compelled by reason of confusion resulting from the wording of the section to adopt other principles of interpretation. 5. We conceive that there is nothing wrong in reading the section like that unless, as we said, we are compelled by reason of confusion resulting from the wording of the section to adopt other principles of interpretation. 5. The point can be easily illustrated by reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madhya Pradesh and Bhopal v Sodra Devi (1957) 32 I.T.R. 615 dealing with S.16 (3) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. In construing the section the Court was divided; the majority took the view that the section was clearly ambiguous and therefore a resort to the principles laid down in Heydon's case was necessary to solve the problem of finding out the true intent of the legislature. Justice S. K. Das on the other hand, was categorical that the section was not ambiguous, that no violence will be done if the expression "such individual" occurring in the section is read distributively as applicable to the father and the mother when the words had to be related to a "minor child" and as applicable only to a father or husband when it was related to a 'wife'. We shall extract S.16 (3) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922: "In computing the total income of any individual for the purpose of assessment, there shall be included - (a) so much of the income of a wife or minor child of such individual as arises directly or indirectly (i) from the membership of the wife in a firm of which her husband is a partner; (ii) from the admission of the minor to the benefits of partnership in a firm of which such individual is a partner; (iii) from assets transferred directly or indirectly to the wife by the husband otherwise than for adequate consideration or in connection with an agreement to live apart; or (iv) from assets transferred directly or indirectly to the minor child, not being a married daughter, by such individual otherwise than for adequate consideration; and (b) so much of the income of any person or association of persons as arises from assets transferred, otherwise than for adequate consideration to the person or association by such individual for the benefit of his wife or a minor child or both." 6. We shall now refer to certain passages from the majority judgment. We shall now refer to certain passages from the majority judgment. We have to quote rather extensively to understand what has been said, the passages from page 625 which run thus: "The Legislature, however, chose to adopt a peculiar mode of enactment either for the purpose of economy of words or structural beauty and mixed up both these sets of provisions into the enactment of clause (a) of S.16(3) of the Act as it stands at present It rolled in both these sets of cases and used the words "a wife" or "minor child" of such "individual" raising thus the question of construction which has got to be determined by us "Such individual" as is talked of in S.16(3) (a) may have a wife, may have a minor child or may have both a wife a minor child. When "such individual" is thought of in connection with a wife, it can only be a male of the species, but when "such individual" is thought of in connection with a minor child it can be both a male as well as a female of the species though of course, when "such individual" is thought of in connection with "both" then again it would have to be a male of the species and certainly not a female. Such an interpretation would lead to the interpretation of the same words "such individual" as meaning two different things in two different contexts. They would mean one thing when used in relation to "a wife" and would mean another thing when used in relation to a "minor child". They would be capable of being understood in a narrower sense when used in connection with "a wife" and would be capable of being understood in a wider sense when used in connection with a "minor child". One may as well question the elegance or the propriety of such user of the words "such individual" where the words "as the case may be" are necessarily to be imported in order to understand the true import of these words, when again they are used not in different parts of the same section but at one place only. If one turns to S.16(3)(b) the words used therein are "transferred by'such individual' for the benefit of his wife or a minor child or both". There is the indefinite article "a" used before the words "minor child". If one turns to S.16(3)(b) the words used therein are "transferred by'such individual' for the benefit of his wife or a minor child or both". There is the indefinite article "a" used before the words "minor child". If that indefinite article "a" had not been used, the expression would have run "for the benefit of his wife or minor child or both" thus leaving no doubt at all that in clause (b) at least the words "such individual" meant only a male of the species. It is urged, however that the use of the indefinite article "a" shows that the words "his wife" and "minor child" and "both" have been used disjunctively and should be read in the same manner as in S 16 (3) (a) of the Act. The words "his wife" would appropriately go with a male of the species but the words "a minor child" would appropriately go with a male as well as a female of the species, though the word 'both" could only be appropriate in relation to a male of the species and not a female who can have a minor child but not both a wife and a minor child The same want of elegance or propriety can be predicated of this expression also and the use of such expressions both in S 16 (3) (a) and S.16 (3) (b) raises questions of construction whether what was meant by the Legislature was only a male of the species in both these contexts or a male and/or female of the species, as the case may be, applying one or the other in accordance with the circumstances attendant upon the computation of the total income of "any individual" for the purpose of assessment. We are of opinion that the very manner in which all the four sub-clauses have been grouped together in S.16 (3) (a) and the manner in which the expression "for the benefit of his wife, a minor child or both" is used in S.16 (3) (b) renders the words "any individual" or "such individual" ambiguous. We are of opinion that the very manner in which all the four sub-clauses have been grouped together in S.16 (3) (a) and the manner in which the expression "for the benefit of his wife, a minor child or both" is used in S.16 (3) (b) renders the words "any individual" or "such individual" ambiguous. There is no knowing with certainty as to whether the Legislature meant to enact these provisions with reference only to a male of the species using the words "any individual" or "such individual" in the narrower sense of the term, indicated above or intended to include within the connotation of the words "any individual"' or "such individual" also a female of the species, wherever appropriate which would of course only be possible in the cases contemplated in sub clauses (ii) and (iv) of S.16 (3) (a) and in one of the three cases contemplated in S.16 (3) (b). The Legislature certainly was guilty of using an ambiguous term in enacting S.16(3) of the Act as it did. In order to resolve this ambiguity therefore we must of necessity have resort to the state of the law before the enactment of the provisions; the mischief and defect for which the law did not provide; the remedy which the Legislature resolved and appointed to cure the defect; and the true reason of the remedy within the meaning of the authorities referred to above." Having said so, their Lordships analysed the law as it stood before the change, the defect that was sought to be cured and the remedy which the legislature resolved and appointed to cure the disease and the true reason of the remedy "and their Lordships concluded thus: "It is clear from the above extracts that the evil which was sought to be remedied was the one resulting from the widespread practice of husbands entering into nominal partnerships with their wives and fathers admitting their minor children to the benefits of the partnerships of which they were members. This evil was sought to be remedied by the enactment of S.16(3) in the Act. This evil was sought to be remedied by the enactment of S.16(3) in the Act. If this background of the enactment of S.16(3) is borne in mind, there is no room for any doubt that howsoever that mischief was sought to be remedied by the amending Act, the only intention of the Legislature in doing so was to include the income derived by the wife or a minor child, in the computation of the total income of the male assessee, the husband or the father, as the case may be, for the purpose of assessment. 7. The learned judge who wrote the dissenting judgment on the other hand, held that the wording of the section created no ambiguity and stated thus at page 637: "It has been argued that clause (a) must be interpreted noscitur a sociis, and as the expression "a wife or minor child" is capable of meaning only when used in connection with a male individual, the whole sub-section must be confined to a male individual. I am unable to accede to this argument. The collocation or association of the words "a wife or minor child", in connection with the words "such individual" in the opening sentence of clause (a) does not necessarily mean that the individual contemplated is a male individual only. I agree that the word "or" in between the words "wife" and "minor child" must be there, even when the individual talked of is a male only; in other words, the use of the disjunctive word "or" does not necessarily clinch the issue. But I do not see any real difficulty in reading the opening sentence of clause (a) distributively so as to mean a male individual when the wife is being talked of, and either a male or a female individual when a minor child is talked of. I do not think that such a construction does any violence to the words used; on the contrary, in my opinion, it gives effect to the plain meaning of the word "individual". I do not think that such a construction does any violence to the words used; on the contrary, in my opinion, it gives effect to the plain meaning of the word "individual". His Lordship however then proceeded to analyse the legislative history and came to the conclusion that even looking at the history, the purpose or intent of the legislature could not be said to be anything other than what has been stated by His Lordship namely, that "such individual" when it is related to a wife would only mean a male of the species but in relation to 'a minor' such individual would take in both a male and a female. 8. The approach made by the learned judges clearly indicates the approach to be made in interpreting such provisions. In interpreting S.75(2) the first step is to find out whether there is any difficulty to understand the expression "the person in possession of the land" occurring in S.75(2) of the Act. The second step would be to see whether there was any contrary indications in the context which necessitates the adoption of a meaning for the expression 'person' other than that given to it by the definition in S.2(43). To see whether there are contrary indications we have to understand the scheme of the Act and will have to refer to other relevant provisions in the Act as well, we must also remember in this connection the purpose for which the statute has been passed. The object of the statute, as far as kudikidappukars are concerned, has been to confer fixity of tenure on a kudikidappukaran; to ensure that he is not sent out of his but or homestead which he had erected or which he had been permitted to occupy though the one or the other was situated in the land which was in the possession of another. The statute went further and conferred absolute right to a small extent of land, three or five or ten cents depending upon the location of the land on which the but or homestead was situate: whether it was in the Corporation area or municipal area or Panchayat area. Having conferred these rights on a kudikidappukaran, the statute also deliberately provided that the person in possession of the land may seek a shifting of the kudikidappu from the land on which it was situate to some other land. Having conferred these rights on a kudikidappukaran, the statute also deliberately provided that the person in possession of the land may seek a shifting of the kudikidappu from the land on which it was situate to some other land. We must bear in mind that the kudikidappu rights have been conferred as against all types of persons who come within the definition of the term 'person' in the statute. It is admitted that the Devaswom is a person for the purpose of the application of the definition of the term Kudikidappu in S.2(25) of the Act. But for the purpose of S.75(2) it is said that the Devaswom is not a person. If we glance at S.75(3) we find there is no difficulty in attributing to the word 'person' therein the meaning given to it by S.2(43). Nor do we find any difficulty in applying to the same meaning to the same expression in S.75(4). It is also clear that for the purpose of clauses (b) and (c) of S.75(2) there is no difficulty in giving to the word 'person' the meaning attributed to it by the definition. However, when we come to S.75(2)(a), we find that the latter part of clause (a) cannot apply to a Devaswom or to any other institution though Devaswom and institution will fall within the definition of 'person' in S.2(43) because the words used, are "any member of his family including major sons and daughters". With reference to this part we have necessarily to understand the word 'person' in a different way from that in which the word has to be understood for the other parts of the section. This situation results from the fact that in the context of the expression "any member of his family including major sons and daughters" occurring in the latter part of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of S.75 it becomes necessary to understand "a person in possession" as a human being, an individual. But one has also to remember that the object of the section is to widen the circumstances under which shifting can be sought. Not only the needs of the person in possession but those of the members of his family including major sons and daughters have been taken into account. But one has also to remember that the object of the section is to widen the circumstances under which shifting can be sought. Not only the needs of the person in possession but those of the members of his family including major sons and daughters have been taken into account. The question is, does this necessarily mean that the whole sub-section should be read attributing to the word 'person' the meaning individual thereby drastically curtailing the ambit and scope of the sub-section. This attempt on the part of the legislature to widen the ambit of the latter part of clause (a) of sub-section 2 of S.75 cannot have the result of drastically curtailing the ambit of clauses (b) and (c) of that sub-section. If that is the result that too creates an anomalous situation. We have therefore to understand S.75(2) in a manner consistent with the object and purpose of the Act. We are not able to discern from the statute any reason why the kudikidappukars of persons like the petitioner must be given such an immunity from being shifted. The shifting can be for "building purposes for himself". The first part of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of S.75 can apply to all "persons" as defined, if 'himself in that part is also understood as 'itself' as occasion demands. This will have to be done if that part is not to get unnecessarily abridged. 9. We may now refer to S.98A of the Act which is in these terms: "98A. Interpretation: For the purposes of this Chapter, the term "person" shall not include a co-operative society or an institution of a public nature for religious and charitable purposes established and maintained by a religious denomination or any section thereof or the Board of Trustees for the Improvement of the City of Trivandrum constituted under S.3 of the Trivandrum City Improvement Trust Act, 1960." Where the legislature wanted a limited meaning, a meaning other than that given in the definition to the expression ‘person' it has specifically said so. As we have already pointed out sub-sections (3) and (4) of S.75 can be understood without any difficulty by attributing to the word 'person' in those subsections the meaning in the definition in S.2(43) for 'person'. As we have already pointed out sub-sections (3) and (4) of S.75 can be understood without any difficulty by attributing to the word 'person' in those subsections the meaning in the definition in S.2(43) for 'person'. To reconcile all the provisions, and to carry out the intent and purpose of the statute as discernible from its scheme and purpose fixity of tenure subject to the right of the person in possession of the land to have the kudikidappu shifted we have to give to the word 'person' occurring in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of S.75 different meanings. We do not think that we will be doing violence to the language of the section in so interpreting the section. The question actually did not arise before the learned judge who decided the case in Rev. Fr. Mathew Fabian v. Addl. Land Tribunal, Quilon and others 1973 KLT. 423. The applicant therein did not satisfy any of the clauses in S.75(2). No doubt there are observations in the judgment which indicate a view different from that we are inclined to take. With great respect we are unable to agree with the view expressed by the learned judge in Rev. Fr. Mathew Fabian v. Addl. Land Tribunal, Quilon and others 1973 KLT. 423. Justice Bhaskaran bad no hesitation in giving the wider meaning as denned in S.2(43) to the word 'person' for purposes of S.75(3) in Akhila Kerala Vala Samudhaya Samithy v. State of Kerala 1975 KLT. 123. 10. We hold that the applicant is entitled to have the kudikidappus of the two respondents Nos.1 and 2 shifted. We therefore set aside the two orders Exts. P1 and P2 and direct the Land Tribunal to pass final orders under S.77 of the Act as envisaged in the decision of this Court in Ayyankutty v. George & Others 1974 KLT. 127. 11. This Original Petition is ordered on the above terms. There will be no direction regarding costs. Allowed.