JUDGMENT K. Bhaskaran, J. 1. The petitioner who had till then been working as Assistant Grade I, on the pay scale of Rs. 90-190 in the Secretariat, Trivandrum, was appointed to the post of Block Development Officer on a pay scale of Rs. 310-600, by the 2nd respondent, the State of Kerala, by Ext. P-1 order G.O.Rt. 591/70/DD., Development (E) Department, dated 11th March 1970, on the advice of the 1st respordent, the Kerala Public Service Commission in its letter No. R.II-B(i) 21301/67, dated 27th November 1967. Ext. P-1 provided inter alia that the petitioner appointed, to the post of Block Development Officer, would be on probation for a period of two years within a continuous period of three years He joined duty as Block Development Officer, Panthalayani on 1st April 1970 having been as per Ext. P-2 G.O.Rt. 1051 /PD, Public (Services) A Department, dated 20th March 1970 relieved from the Secretariat on 23rd March 1970. The District Collector, Kozhikode under whom the petitioner was working as Block Development officer by Ext. P-3 letter, P-2/17471 /72, dated 5th September 1973 put up the proposal for the declaration of probation as Block Development Officer in respect of the petitioner, on the basis of which as per Ext. P-10, G.O.Rt. 1273/DD/74, Development (E) Department, dated 3rd August 1974, the petitioner was declared to have successfully completed his probation as Block Development Officer on 1st April 1972. 2. The petitioner was one of the. applicants for the post of Administrative Officer, Grade II in the scale of pay of Rs. 550-900 in response to the 1st Respondent notification Ext. P-6, dated 31st October 1973 published in the Kerala Gazette, Part I-B, dated 13th November 1973. The qualification prescribed for the post reads as follows: "Methods of recruitment and qualifications. ”By recruitment of officers in the grade of Senior Superintendent. Office Manager a- d other non-technical officers in the scale of Rs. 310-600 or higher scale of pay in al1 departments excluding the Secretariat (including Administrative, Finance, Low and Legislature), Revenue Department, and offices of the Public Service Commission, Advocate-General, High Court and Examiner of Local Fund Accounts who have put in not less than 3 years service in a supervisory post carrying the scale of Rs. 310-600 or higher."� Ext. 310-600 or higher scale of pay in al1 departments excluding the Secretariat (including Administrative, Finance, Low and Legislature), Revenue Department, and offices of the Public Service Commission, Advocate-General, High Court and Examiner of Local Fund Accounts who have put in not less than 3 years service in a supervisory post carrying the scale of Rs. 310-600 or higher."� Ext. P-7 is the service certificate, dated 20th December 197, issued by the District Collector, Kozhikode, which shows that the petitioner was working between 1st April 1970 and 31st July 1973 as the Block Development Officer, Panthalayani and thereafter from 1st February 1973 as Block Development Officer, Perambra. Later on, the petitioner received Ext. P-8 letter No. RIID1/42/74/A O., dated 8th February 1974 from the 1st respondent, informing, with reference to his application dated 13th December 1973, for selection to the post of Administrative Officer Grade II, as follows: "Your application has been rejected for the reasons under item 4.” 1. .... 2.. 4. You are not qualified for the post applied for "since officers in the Secretariat are not eligible to apply". The petitioner on 15th February 1974 submitted a representation, copy of which is Ext.P-9, contending inter alia that he possessed all the qualifications required for applying for the post and the rejection of his application by Ext.P-8 order is illegal and unjust. 3. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the validity of Ext.P-8 order of the 1st respondent and praying for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the 1st respondent to consider the petitioner application along with the applications received by the 1st respondent in pursuance of Ext.P-6 notification, quashing Ext.P-8 communication issued by the 1st respondent. Certain other incidental reliefs also have been prayed for in the writ petition. Additional respondents 2 and 3 have been impleaded at their request as they thought that the subject-matter of the writ petition is a matter of interest to them. 4. The main contention of the petitioner, as could be gathered from the averments made in the writ petition and as stated in Ext. P-9 representation to the 1st respondent, is that the petitioner at the material time possessed all the requisite qualifications in terms of Ext. P-6 notification and that the rejection of his application by Ext. P-8 order by the 1st respondent is unwarrented. P-9 representation to the 1st respondent, is that the petitioner at the material time possessed all the requisite qualifications in terms of Ext. P-6 notification and that the rejection of his application by Ext. P-8 order by the 1st respondent is unwarrented. It is pointed out that the requirement that the applicant should have three years service in a supervisory non-technical post in the pay scale of Rs. 310-600 has been satisfied in the case of the petitioner, and that no other consideration would be relevant for the purpose. The whole case of the petitioner is based on a two fold contention: (1) The exclusion of personnel in regard to the application for the appointment is confined to officers in the Secretariat on a pay scale of Rs. 310-600 or of a higher scale; and (2) in any event at the time when the petitioner applied for the post of Administrative Officer Grade II, in pursuance of Ext. P-6 notification, he was not in the Secretariat service. Originally the 1st respondent alone was on the party array as respondent. Subsequently, the State of Kerala was impleaded as additional 2nd respondent. The 2nd respondent filed a counter-affidavit dated 25th January 1975 traversing the contentions raised in the writ petition. In nut-shell, the contention of the 2nd respondent is that the petitioner appointment to the post of Block Development Officer was made on the basis of G.O.Ms. 621/62/DD., dated 26th July 1962 (Copy of which has been produced as Ext. The 2nd respondent filed a counter-affidavit dated 25th January 1975 traversing the contentions raised in the writ petition. In nut-shell, the contention of the 2nd respondent is that the petitioner appointment to the post of Block Development Officer was made on the basis of G.O.Ms. 621/62/DD., dated 26th July 1962 (Copy of which has been produced as Ext. B-2 by the 3rd respondent along with the counter-affidavit filed by him the petitioner has the right to have his lien retained in the Administrative Secretariat; the petitioner is treated as on deputation to the Development Department as Block Development Officer, generally for a period of five years, since it was open to the Development Commissioner to revert the petitioner to his parent department, he cannot claim to be a full member belonging to the services of the Community Development Department; while ordering the promotion of Assistants Grade I as Senior Grade Assistants on a temporary basis under rule 31 (a) (i), the petitioner was also given promotion as Senior Grade Assistant and allowed to continue on other duty as Block Development Officer; he is entitled for the protection of his lien and rank in the Secretariat under rule 8 of the General Rules; there are seven others as Block Development Officers, senior to the petitioner retaining lien in the Secretariat; in the gradation list of Assistant Grade II as on 1st August 1973 approved by the Government, the rank of the petitioner is given as 135; he has been confirmed in the post of Assistant Grade II with effect from 1st January 1968 as per G.O.MS. 11/72/PD., dated 7th January 1972; the fact that the Public Service Commission selected the petitioner for appointment as Block Development Officer, did not mean that he was appointed substantively to a permanent post; of the 144 posts of Block Development Officers, only 77 posts had been made permanent and the petitioner was not senior for a substantive permanent post of Block Development Officer; his rank number in the seniority list of Block Development Officer published as on 1st January 1971 was 105; his appointment as Block Development Officer was made against a temporary post and the posting was subject to the general conditions laid down in G.O.MS. 621/DD., dated 26th July 1962; he will be reverted to the Administrative Secretariat by the Development Commissioner, if the petitioner is found unsuitable to hold the past of Block Development Officer, in order to check the tendency on the part of the Block Development Officers who had been drafted from other departments to seek reversion to their parent departments in case they did not get a convenient posting, the Government called for options of Block Development Officers by Memo No. 20l5/R1/74/DD., dated March 1974 (copy of which has been marked as Ext. P-17 and produced by the petitioner along with O.M.P. 3281 of 1975) and the petitioner had exercised his option to continue in the Community Development department till he is otherwise benefited by viritue of his lien and rank in his parent Department i.e., Administrative Secretariat by option dated 25th May 1974; satisfactory completion of probation is a condition for his continuance as Block Development Officer during the period; he is not a full member in the Community Development Department in terms of rule (2) (7) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, l958 and therefore he is not entitled to plea that his continuation in the Secretariat as a full member would be inconsistent with the provisions contained in rule 26 of the Kerala Service Rules. 5. The 1st respondent, the Kerala Public Service, Commission, has filed a counter-affidavit contending inter alia that the rejection of the petitioner application by Ext. P-8 order is justified by the terms of the Government letter No. 77595/E1/73, dated 1st January 1974, marked as Ext. R-1 and Government letter No. 62/185/Estt. A1- Admn. /72/fin. dated 22nd March 1974 (Ext. R-2) produced along with the counter-affidavit. The 3rd respondent has filed a counter-affidavit dated 21st August 1974 contending that in terms of G.O.Ms. 621/62/DD, dated 6th July 1962, the petitioner is not entitled to the relief sought in the writ petition. He has produced a copy of the extract from Ext. P-6 notification marked Ext. R-1 besides a copy of G.O.Ms. 621/62/DD, dated 26th July 1962 marked Ext. R-2 along with his counter-affidavit. The petitioner on 17th February 1975 filed a reply-affidavit rebutting certain averments made in the counter-affidavit filed by the 2nd respondent. Along with the reply-affidavit, he has produced Ext. P-12 a copy of G.O.Ms. No. 124/64/DD, dated 29th February 1964 Ext. P-13 a copy of G.O.Ms. 621/62/DD, dated 26th July 1962 marked Ext. R-2 along with his counter-affidavit. The petitioner on 17th February 1975 filed a reply-affidavit rebutting certain averments made in the counter-affidavit filed by the 2nd respondent. Along with the reply-affidavit, he has produced Ext. P-12 a copy of G.O.Ms. No. 124/64/DD, dated 29th February 1964 Ext. P-13 a copy of G.O.Ms. No.275/64/DD, dated 6th April 1964, Ext. P-14 G.O.Ms. No. 189/66/A and RDD, dated 22ndJune 1966 and Ext. P-15 G.O.Rt.No.201/70/DD, dated 28th January 1970. The 2nd respondent subsequently filed a rejoinder-affidavit dated 5th April 1975 traversing the averments made by the petitioner in his reply- affidavit dated 14th February 1975. Later on, along with the petition dated 16th July J975, the 2nd respondent produced Exts. A-1 to A-4. Ext. A-1 is a copy of G.O.Ms. No. 267/72/PD, Public (Special) Department dated 7th July, 1972; Ext. A-2 a copy of G.O.Ms. 273/72/PD, dated 14th July 1972 and Ext. A-3, a copy of G.O.Ms. 531/72/PD, Public (Special-B) Department, dated 11th September 1972. Ext. A-4 is a copy of the counter affidavit filed by the State as 1st respondent in O.P.No. 421 of 1974 which was a petition filed by one V.A. Augustine. The petitioner had in the meanwhile filed C.M.P. No. 10786 of 1974 for accepting Exts. P-10 and P-11. Ext. P-10 is a copy of G.O. Rt. 1278/DD/74 Development (E) Department, dated 3rd August 1974 to which reference has already been made. Ext. P-11 is a copy of G.O.Rt. No. 336/69/DD, Development (E) Department, dated 5th February 1969. This petition was allowed as per the order dated 14th August 1974. As per the order dated 7th March 1975, the petitioner prayer for receiving Exts.P-16 and P-17 in G.M.P. 3281 of 1975 also was allowed. Ext, P-16 is a copy of G.O. (Ms) No. 188, Public (Rules) Department, dated 6th May 1966 and Ext. P-17 is the copy of letter No. 2015/E1/74/PD, dated 25th March 1974, with copy of the option form completed by the petitioner; the petitioner has also prayed for receiving Ext. P-18 which is a list showing the rank, number and names of persons who have retired, been promoted, or have returned to parent departments, based on the rank list published by the State of Kerala, as on 1st July 1972, and allowed to be received in evidence as per the order on G.M.P. No. 10811 of 1975, dated 28th August 1975. The petitioner prayer to receive his additional affidavit dated 26th August 1975 as Ext. P-19 has been allowed as per the order of this date. In Ext. P-19, the petitioner has stated that one Ibrahimkutty holding Rank No.2 in the selection list was appointed as Administrative Officer; he was appointed as Block Development Officer while he was working in the Revenue Department; his service in the Revenue Department has not been reckoned by the Government as Administrative Officer; and that his service as Block Development Officer alone has been taken into consideration for appointment. The petitioner prayed for amending the writ petition twice as per order of this Court on C.M.P. Nos. 10913/74 and 10785/74 both dated 13th August 1974. As per the interm direction of this Court in C.M.P.No. 3166 of 1974, the 1st respondent was directed to interview the petitioner along with the other applicants, making it clear that the result of the interview, so far as the petitioner is concerned will be subject to the result of the writ petition. As per the further orders of this Court dated 11th April 1975 the advice list of the Administrative e Officer Grade II, as far as it relates to the petitioner was to be kept alive till the disposal of this writ petition. It is the admitted case that the petitioner had appeared for the written test, and also was included after interview, in the provisional list prepared by the 1st respondent, with Rank No. 1. 6. In the additional counter-affidavit filed by the 2nd respondent, it has been pointed out that the petitioner would not be benefited even if a revised gradation list as suggested by the petitioner is prepared. There are more than 77 persons senior to him in the Community Development Department. The 2nd respondent also filed a further additional counter-affidavit dated 1st September 1975, with reference to the allegations made in Ext. P-19 produced along with C.M.P. 12501 of 1975 that the advice happened to be made by the Public Service Commission in respect of Sri Ibrahimkutti, referred to therein, as he had suppressed the material facts in his application and that this fact had already been brought to the notice of the 1st respondent and that proper action would be taken in the matter. A copy of the relevant provision in the counter-affidavit filed by the State in C.M.P.No. 3422 of 1974 filed by one Kamaluddin Sahib has also been produced (marked as Ext. A-5) along with the further additional counter- affidavit. 7. Coming now to the real question in issue a slight confusion seems to have arisen in regard to the exclusion clause with respect to the personnel entitled to apply for the post because of the omission to put in the original of Ext. P-6 Gazette publication dated 12th November 1973, after the words "Local Fund Accounts� before the word ˜Who. Counsel for the petitioner has vigorously contended that the qualification of service of not less than three years in a supervisory post carrying the scale of pay of Rs. 310-600 or higher goes along with the exclusion clause and therefore even assuming without conceding that the petitioner was at the material time in the Secretariat or was a person having lien in Secretariat service, in as much as he was an Assistant Grade I on a time-scale of Rs. 90-190, the exclusion clause would not operate to his detriment. The learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the 2nd respondent has taken me through the various orders culminating in Ext. P-6 notification. On a careful examination of Exts.A-1 to A-3 and the real purpose behind the exclusion, I feel convinced that it was the intention of the Government to exclude personnel in the Secretariat service from the purview of persons eligible for applying to the post of Administrator Grade II. No doubt, the petitioner counsel has submitted that the real intention of the Government was to exclude persons who had been in a non-technical post of a supervisory cadre drawing a salary of Rs. 310-600 or a higher scale of pay but not to exclude persons of the position of the petitioner who were on the scale of pay of Rs. 90-190 and who had very little chance during their period of service even to rise anywhere near to the scale of Rs. 310-600. 310-600 or a higher scale of pay but not to exclude persons of the position of the petitioner who were on the scale of pay of Rs. 90-190 and who had very little chance during their period of service even to rise anywhere near to the scale of Rs. 310-600. But having considered the real intention of the Government by examining the order Exts.A-1 to A-3 and A-4, I think that the contention of the 2nd respondent has to be accepted and that if, as a matter of fact, the petitioner is found to be in the Secretariat service or he is a person having lien in Secretariat service he has to be excluded from the category of persons eligible for applying to the post of Administrative Officer Grade II, in response to Ext. P-6 notification. 8. Now we will examine whether on the crucial date, 13th January 1973 on which date Ext. P-6 notification appeared in the Gazette, the petitioner was or was not in the Secretariat service or was or was not a person having lien in the Secretariat service. In this context, the Government Pleader has brought to my notice the G.O.Ms. 621/62/DU, dated 26th July 1962. Apart from the preamble part of that G.O., what we are concerned with, would be only paragraphs 8 and 9 of that G.O. In the preamble portion of the said G.O., these sentences are appearing: "Government consider that officers who have been intimately connected with Extension and Training in the field of Community Development, and other Officers belonging to the service which normally provided administrative personnel in the line of General Development Administration should be given an opportunity to work as Block Development Officers. Moreover in the light of the recommendation of the Administrative Reforms Committee that Officers of the Secretariat should be deputed for field service at some stage in their career, so that they may get experience of executive work which will fit them better for the service in the Secretariat, Government consider that a few posts of Block Development Officers should be reserved for being filled up by selection from among the Secretariat staff of such personnel as have an aptitude, for extension and development work."� Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the order are extracted below: "8. Persons selected for the post of Block Development Officers in pursuance of the principles laid down above will be considered as on deputation to the Development Department for a period of five years, the Development Commissioner having the right to revert any of them to his parent Department if his work proves unsatisfactory, and to extend the period of deputation beyond five years in exceptional cases. 9. Government are also pleased to lay down that persons working as Block Development Officers will retain their lien and rank in their parent Department and that their right of promotion in their parent Departments will also be protected. However, the appointment of a person to the post of Block Development Officer will not, by itself, confer on him any preferential right for promotion or seniority in his department."� 9. Sri P. Appa Nair, counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, has stressed that Ext. P-1 appointment order does not expressly speak about a deputation and such an intention cannot even be spelt out by implication. His contention is that to gain eligibility for applying for the post of Administrative Officer Grade II in terms of Ext. P-6 notification, the qualification required are these: He should be an officer in the supervisory cadre in a non-technical post, on a pay-scale of Rs. 310-600, and must have put in three years in such supervisory post. Ext. P-1 begins as follows: "On the advice of the Kerala Public Service Commission the following candidates are appointed as. Block Development Officers on Rs. 310-600 and posted in the Blocks noted against their names."� In paragraph 2 of the same order, what is stated is as follows:” "The persons appointed as Block Development Officers will be on probation for a period of 2 years within a continuous period 3 years."� In Ext. P-2 order by which the petitioner was relieved from the Secretariat service, there is no mention either about the lien or about the deputation. On the basis of Exts.P-1 and P-2, the petitioner counsel would argue that all the formalities and procedure in respect of a direct recruitment viz. advice by the 1st respondent, appointment by competent authority, requirement to be on probation for a period of two years on duty within a continuous period of three years, etc. On the basis of Exts.P-1 and P-2, the petitioner counsel would argue that all the formalities and procedure in respect of a direct recruitment viz. advice by the 1st respondent, appointment by competent authority, requirement to be on probation for a period of two years on duty within a continuous period of three years, etc. are satisfied in this case, and therefore, it cannot be said that from Exts.P-1 and P-2 the intention of the Government to appoint the petitioner on deputation retaining his lien in the Secretariat service could be spelt out. Counsel for the petitioner also relies on Ext. P-3 proposal by the Collector for the declaration of satisfactory completion of probation in respect of the petitioner from 1st April 1972 which subsequently, after the filing of the writ petition has been effected by Ext. P-10 order of the Development Department. It is also argued by counsel for the petitioner that having completed the period of probation on 1st April 1972 and a further period of one year having elapsed by 1st April 1973 which is the maximum period of probation contemplated under Ext. P-1, and the petitioner having been allowed to overstay the probation, it would be too much on the part of the 2nd respondent to take up the position that it is within the competence and discretion of the Development Commissioner to revert him to the parent Department viz. the Administrative Secretariat. In this connection, he would submit that he was having the status of an approved probationer on 1st April 1972, having successfully completed his period of probation prescribed in Ext. P-1 and that after having completed the full period of three years his successful completion of probation should be deemed to have been declared and confirmation in the post also should be deemed to have been declared though no formal order was passed in time. 10. The problem posed before me is not without difficulty. The intention of the Government, as rightly pointed out by the learned Government pleader, to begin with, was to depute personnel from the Secretariat service also, as Block Development Officers, so that they may get proper training and acquaintence with the development and extension work, in order that at some stage in future their such experience may be used in the administrative work in the Secretariat. It is also beyond doubt that the Government intention was only to depute persons, not to make regular appointments, to posts in the Community Development Department. The deputation was intended to be ordinarily for a period of five years and in no event it was to extend beyond ten years. The lien contemplated in paragraph 9 of Ext. B-2 G.O.MS. 621/DD, dated 26th July 1962 is a corollary to the deputation clause contained in paragraph 8 of the order. 11. We find later on by G.O.P. No. 467 dated 15th June 1965 the Government prescribing probation in respect of persons appointed in the Ministerial Subordinate Service to a category by direct recruitment or by recruitment by transfer from any other service for a total period of two years on duty with a continuous period of three years; in the case of appointment by promotion, every person shall be on probation for a period of one year on duty. Later on by G.O.MS. 188 Public (Rules) Department dated 6th May 1966, a copy of which has been produced as Ext. P-16, the Government extended the rule of probation to all services, laying down as follows: "Every person appointed to a category by direct recruitment or recruitment by transfer from any other service shall be on probation for a total period of two years on duty within a continuous period of three years. In the case of appointment by promotion, every person shall be on probation for a total period of one year on duty within a continuous period of two years."� Still later we find the Government further clarifying the position by issuing G.O. Rt. No. 336/69/DD., Development (E) Department, dated 5th February 1969, a copy of which has been marked as Ext. P-11. This G.O. reads Ext. P-16 G.O.MS. 188 and some other letters and G.O. and states as follows: "In the Government order third cited it has been ordered inter alia that an officer appointed to a post by direct recruitment or by transfer from another service before, the issue of the orders in the Government Order first cited need not undergo probation. 2. P-16 G.O.MS. 188 and some other letters and G.O. and states as follows: "In the Government order third cited it has been ordered inter alia that an officer appointed to a post by direct recruitment or by transfer from another service before, the issue of the orders in the Government Order first cited need not undergo probation. 2. The question regarding probation to the post of Block Development Officer has been considered by the Government in the light of the Government Orders cited and it is clarified in consultation with the Public Service Commission that probation is not obligatory in the case of persons appointed as Block Development Officers before 6th May 1965 except in the ease of personnel allotted from Madras on States Reorganisation."� The Government order 3rd cited is G.O.MS. 285/68/PD, dated 11th September 1968 is not on record. An extract of this G.O. found in the decision reported in Padmanabha Iyer v. B. R. Selvaraj and others 174 K.L.T. 569 reads as follows: "The question whether probation can be made obligatory with retrospective effect in view of the protection contemplated in rule 35 of the General Rules has been engaging the attention of the Government. The Government have carefully considered the various aspects of the question with reference to the provisions contained in the General Rules. They are advised that probation prescribed will be obligatory only from the date of the orders prescribing such probation unless otherwise stipulated in the appointment order. The condition regarding probation will not therefore be applicable to art officer in respect of the post (or category of posts) to which he was appointed by direct recruitment or by transfer from any other service before the issue of the orders or rules prescribing the period of probation."� The learned Government Pleader has submitted that G.O.MS. 621/62/DD, dated 28th July 1962 (Ext. R-2) still holds the field as the petitioner himself has no case that either it has been cancelled or superseded. He would therefore contend that merely because he was placed on' probation for a period of two years, it Would not automatically entitle him to claim that he had ceased to be in the Secretariat service. It is also pointed out that as late as in March 1974, the petitioner while exercising his option to continue in the Community Development Department has claimed the benefit of lien in the Secretariat. It is also pointed out that as late as in March 1974, the petitioner while exercising his option to continue in the Community Development Department has claimed the benefit of lien in the Secretariat. In this connection, counsel has drawn my attention to the decision of Supreme Court in The State of Haryana and others v. Rajendra Sareen A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1004, in order to prove the contention that something more than successful completion of the period of probation is required to obtain the status of a full member of the service. He has also drawn my attention to a passage from the decision of the Division Bench of this Court, appearing towards the end of the Judgment reported in Padmanabha Iyer v. B. R. Selvaraj and others 1974 K.L.T. 569 wherein Nambiyar, J. speaking for the Bench, has observed as follows: "As the Rule stand therefore, although by definition an" ˜approved probationer is one who" ˜awaits appointment as full member, and rule 20 ordains consideration of probationer eligibility of full membership, it seems to stop short of a declaration of satisfactory conclusion of probation and, proceed no further. Although to express no final opinion, that consideration of eligibility for full membership, directed by rule 20 is still open, even after declaration of satisfactory completion of probation. And, rule 24, which only directs that an approved probationer shall be appointed to be a ˜full member at he earliest possible opportunity does not appear to stand in the way of such considerations.� Sri Appa Nair, on the other hand would rely on the decision of the Supreme Court in Dharam Singh's case A.I.R. 1968 S.C 1210. which was followed by the Division Bench in Padmanabha Iyer v. B. R. Selvaraj and others 1974 K.L.T. 569. MY attention has been specially drawn to paragraph 3 of the Division Bench ruling referred to above, wherein it is stated as follows: 'No test qualification having been shown to be prescribed the principle of the decision in Dharam Singh's case (A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1210) is squarely attracted. In view of rule 21 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, there is an upper most limit placed for probation, (one year of duty after the period prescribed for probation), and as the appellant had over stayed the said limit, Ext. In view of rule 21 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, there is an upper most limit placed for probation, (one year of duty after the period prescribed for probation), and as the appellant had over stayed the said limit, Ext. P-2 order to the extent to which it declared him an approved probationer seems to be right; and the learned Judge was wrong in quashing the same to that extent.� The Supreme Court in paragraph 5 of the decision reported in The State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1210 has observed as follows: "In the present case, rule 6 (3) forbids extension of the period of probation beyond three years. Where as in the present case, the service rules fix a certain period of time beyond which the probationery period cannot be extended, and an ex-employee appointed or promoted to a post on probation is allowed to continue in that post after completion of the maximum period of probation without an express order of confirmation, he cannot be deemed to continue in that post as a probationer by implication, The reason is that such an implication is negatived by the service rule forbidding extension of the probationary period beyond the maximum period fixed by it. In such a case it is permissible to draw the inference that the employee allowed to continue in the post on completion of the maximum period of probation has been confirmed in the post by implication.� The learned Government Pleader has also cited the decision in The State of Haryana v. Subagh Chander Earwaha and others A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2216, P. C. Abraham v. University of Cochin 1972 K.L.T. 810 and O.P. Yuggal v. The Secretary to Government 1972 (1) Service report (Sept.) part 444 to contend for the position that it is within the competence of the Government either to alter the qualification before the appointment is actually made or even to restrict the number of appointment to be made though the advertisement related to a larger number of vacancies and the select list submitted by the Public Service Commission also related to a larger number. I think the position here is different. There is no case that Ext. P-6 notification has been amended or modified. I think the position here is different. There is no case that Ext. P-6 notification has been amended or modified. The only question is whether the petitioner would fall within the eligible category of applications for the post of Administrative Officer, Grade II, 12. Exts.P-11 and P-16 would indicate that the Block Development Officers were treated as direct recruits. Otherwise I find no justification for extending the requirement of probation to them which was not the position prior to 6th May 1966. As already stated the petitioner was not put on guard by Ext. P-1 order or Ext. P-2 relieving order that he was on deputation for five years or for a maximum period of ten years and thereafter he was liable to be reverted to the Secretariat service. There is no mention about his lien either in Ext. P-1 or P-2. For all practical purpose it would appear that he was appointed to a permanent post in accordance with the definition of that term in section 12(25) of the Kerala Service Rules where it is laid down that permanent post is a post carrying a fixed pay scale and without any limited time. Here, the appointment under Ext. P-1 is not limited to any particular period. The appointment is on a time scale of pay of Rs. 310-600. 13. One other question that has to be considered is the learned Government Pleader contention with reference to Ext. P-17 wherein it would appear that the petitioner had agreed to have him considered as a person having a lien in Secretariat service. In this context, the averments made in paragraph 8 of the reply-affidavit has to be considered. Therein he has stated as follows:” "8. The petitioner has exercised this option in accordance with his wish to continue in development department permanently. The words ˜till I am otherwise benefited etc. are incorporated by the Government and virtually imposed on the petitioner. The petitioner had no other go but to give for the option in the form dictated by the Government. Had the Government given a freehand in exercising the option the petitioner would have opted to continue me in the development department permanently. Ext. P-17 is a document which came into existence after the filing of this writ petition. The petitioner had no other go but to give for the option in the form dictated by the Government. Had the Government given a freehand in exercising the option the petitioner would have opted to continue me in the development department permanently. Ext. P-17 is a document which came into existence after the filing of this writ petition. The object of taking the option was to ensure that the persons either continued in the development department or left it without remaining in a state of uncertainty. The form in which the option was to be exercised was appended to the communication by which the option was sought. What the petitioner seems to have done is to fill in the blank space by writing his name in the appended form to indicate that he had opted to continue in the Community Development. It cannot be construed that Ext. P-17 imposes a new condition of service on the petitioner. No such condition is contained expressly or by necessary implication in Exts.P-1 and P-2. This being the position though the original intention of the Government appears to have been to make only deputation to the post of Block Development Officer, in the circumstances mentioned above, and especially on a consideration of the true implication of Exts.P-1, P-11 and P-16. I do not think that the petitioner who has come out first in the competitive examination should be denied the opportunity to serve is the post of Administrative Officer, Grade II, as he had not been told that his appointment to the Community Development Department on the advice of the Public Service Commission on a time scale was not really a regular appointment but only a deputation retaining his lien in the Secretariat. Ext. P-8 order deserves to be quashed and I do so with a direction to the 1st respondent to consider the petitioner application for selection for appointment to the post of Administrative Officer, Grade II, along with the other applicants in that behalf. 14. The writ petition is allowed as above .There will be no order as to costs.