Judgment :- 1. These are motions for certiorari for quashing Ext. P1 proceedings in the respective petitions whereby the Regional Transport Authority, Palghat, who is the 1st respondent in both the petitions granted temporary permits in favour of the 3rd respondent in each of the two petitions. The petitioner is the same person; the routes in respect of which the temporary permits were issued are different as also the grantees, the 3rd respondent in each of the two petitions. The permits were granted as per proceedings of the 1st respondent at its meeting held on 15 71975. Since common questions of law were raised before me I am disposing of these petitions by a common judgment. 2. Ext. P1 decisions in both the petitions are couched in more or less the same language. In O. P. No. 3516 of 1975 this is what the Regional Transport Authority states in Ext. P1 proceedings produced in that case: "Considered the applications and heard objections from K. S. R. T. C. and T.R.T.. SK.M.S. and Balaji. In view of the fast growing traffic on the route Palghat-Trichur and increasing demand from the public, it is felt that there is urgent temporary heed for additional bus service. Hence it is decided to grant the permit applied for a period of 4 months subject to concurrence of R.T. A. Trichur in favour of the applicant." In the other original petition this is what the same authority said: "(A) Considered. RTA. feels that there is urgent temp need on the route for additional bus service in view of the fast growing passenger traffic. Therefore it is decided to grant the permit for a period of 4 months subject to concurrence by R. T. A., Trichur in favour of the applicant". It will thus be seen that the ground on which the temporary permit was issued was that there was 'fast growing passenger traffic' in one case and 'fast growing traffic' in the other. The common question raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner who is, as earlier pointed out, the same person in both the petitions, is as to whether the need stated in the decisions referred to above would be a need corning within the ambit of S.62 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. In fact that is the only question that arises in these cases. In fact that is the only question that arises in these cases. However on behalf of the 3rd respondent in each of the cases, their learned counsel submitted that the files would disclose a need as contemplated by S.62(1)(c), viz., to meet a particular temporary need; according to the learned counsel for the grantees there was need for pucca permit and to meet that unsatisfied demand of the public it was necessary to issue temporary permit and that, therefore, the decisions could be supported on the ground that they were issued to meet a particular temporary need as stated above. 3. In Govindan v. R.T.A., Cannanore (1972 K.L.T. 242) my learned brother Poti J. pointed out the necessity for indicating which one of he several clauses in S.62() was invoked by the Regional Transport Authority, It was stated therein that: "To refer to 'the present rush of traffic' is certainly not to refer to a particular need. The mere qualification of the rush of the traffic as 'present' does not indicate that the rush of traffic is temporary or that there will not be continued rush of traffic in future. Apart from the fact that this is not the way the Regional Transport Authority is expected to speak, when what it is expected to speak about is the particular need, to uphold this order would be to accept the propriety of the Regional Transport Authority granting temporary permits without properly considering the existence of particular needs justifying such grant. That is likely to lead to abuse of the powers vested in the Regional Transport Authorities for the grant of such temporary permits." In O. P No. 4448 of 1973 following the above-mentioned case I said that the grant of a temporary permit "to provide additional facilities to passengers and pilgrims" would not satisfy S.62(1) of the Act. Therein I said: "It goes without saying that every bus plays on a route to provide additional facilities to passengers and to indicate a need in that manner will not be specifying a need as contemplated by S.62(1)." 4. With reference to a temporary permit granted for the reason that 'traffic on this route has considerably increased and there is need to have two temporary permits on the route' my learned brother Poti J. again said in 1975 KLT. With reference to a temporary permit granted for the reason that 'traffic on this route has considerably increased and there is need to have two temporary permits on the route' my learned brother Poti J. again said in 1975 KLT. 602: "If even'present rush of traffic' cannot be a temporary need, I fail to see how increase of traffic could be a temporary need." I again followed the decision in Govindan v. R.T.A. Cannanore (1972 K.L.T. 242) in O.P. No. 3673 of 1975 wherein the purpose for which the permit was required was mentioned as 'for conducting passenger service'. In view of the decisions of this Court referred to above it would be idle to contend that a need as mentioned in the impugned decisions, viz., that there was a fast growing traffic on the route, would satisfy the requirements of S.62(1) of the Act. And as already mentioned the learned counsel for the respondents grantees did not seek to support the decisions on the basis of the words used by the 1st respondent Regional Transport Authority. It was his contention on the other hand that there was temporary need as contemplated by S.62 (1) (c) of the Act as already mentioned. In view of the fact that the public is also interested in questions of the nature that are agitated before me I perused the files placed before me by the learned Government counsel appearing on behalf of respondents Nos.1 and 2 in each of these petitions to see as to whether there was compliance with S.62 (1) of the Act though the concerned statutory authority, viz., the 1st respondent, despite the repeated decisions of this Court, failed to discharge its duty to write a speaking order in both these cases. It is once again necessary recently I had occasion to call attention of these statutory authorities twice for the need to comply with the directions stated by my learned brother Poti J. in Govindan v. R.T.A. Cannanore (1972 KLT. 242) to draw the attention of the concerned authorities and point out to them that time and again the statutory authorities constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act, viz., the Regional Transport Authorities, who are discharging a quasi-judicial function, are not discharging the same as quasi-judicial authorities. 5. 242) to draw the attention of the concerned authorities and point out to them that time and again the statutory authorities constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act, viz., the Regional Transport Authorities, who are discharging a quasi-judicial function, are not discharging the same as quasi-judicial authorities. 5. S.62 of the Motor Vehicles Act requires the authority who is to decide as to whether a temporary permit is to be granted or not under that provision to examine whether the need that is put forward in support of an application for temporary permit is one or the other of the needs falling under clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (1) of that section. The Supreme Court in A. P. State Road Transport Corporation v. K. Venkitaramireddy & Others (1970) 1 S.C.W.R. 617, said that: "There can be no manner of doubt that in the absence of any purpose or reason for which temporary permits were asked for the Regional Transport Authority should have dismissed the application in limini because a temporary permit can be granted only if the permit is required for the purposes or reasons mentioned from (a) to (d) in S.62 of the Act." In Thozhilaly Bus Service v. R. T A. Trichur (AIR. 1974 Kerala 188) I had occasion to refer to the above decision of the Supreme Court and point out that even if the decision of the concerned authority is laconic and not couched in proper language, still the court would be entitled to scan the files to see whether any one of the requirements of a valid application is stated in any one of the documents in the files. But this does not mean that from the files the court can also invariably infer the factual existence of the need, though very often where the temporary need has arisen because of the unsatisfied demand of the public for a pucca permit which falls under clause (c) of S.62(1) aforementioned, the same could be made out from the files. The existence of special occasions such as fairs and religious gatherings as envisaged by clause (a) and season business as envisaged by clause (b) are certainly matters which have to be established before the Regional Transport Authority factually; the authority has to be satisfied of the factual existence of those needs before it could take a decision under S.62 of the Act to grant temporary permit. Again, though the order is not a speaking order, if the files reveal that the R.T.A. applied its mind and that it was satisfied of the factual existence of the temporary need, taking into account the inconvenience that would be caused to the public by directing to write a speaking order (by the time a speaking order is called for, and rendered, very often, the temporary need may not exist at all, as for example, the fair having been closed or the season having ended) the Court may not, though it could, interfere with the temporary permit granted. 6. In O. P. No. 3516 of 1975 the files disclose that the application in Form P.T.A. mentioned the purpose for which the permit was required as "To conduct temp, service to meet the urgent seasonal requirements of the travelling public for the agricultural, harvesting, business, marriage & festival season under S.62(1)(c) of the M. V. Act." The covering letter dated 20th June 1975 stated: "There is no direct private bus service on this route other than the State Transport services and there is necessity for such a service in the interests of the travelling public." The matters made mention of in the application are matters the factual existence of which had to be established before the 1st respondent, the Regional Transport Authority; the 1st respondent had to be satisfied of the factual existence of the matters mentioned therein. Though S.62(1)(c) is mentioned in the application, the matters mentioned therein really fall, it appears to me, under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-s. (1) of S.62. The report of the Motor Vehicles Inspector, Palghat, on which much reliance was placed by the learned Government counsel mentions the need for the grant of temporary permit as the reopening of the educational institutions and commencement of agricultural season for which reason there is a considerable increase in the volume of passenger traffic on the route temporarily. These again are matters the factual existence of which had to be decided upon by the Regional Transport Authority. There is no indication in the decision which will go to show that the 1st respondent had adverted to even the report of the Motor Vehicles Inspector relied on by the learned Government counsel. 7. These again are matters the factual existence of which had to be decided upon by the Regional Transport Authority. There is no indication in the decision which will go to show that the 1st respondent had adverted to even the report of the Motor Vehicles Inspector relied on by the learned Government counsel. 7. In O.P. No. 3520 of 1975 the purpose mentioned is again: "To meet the urgent seasonal requirements of the travelling public for the agricultural, harvesting, business, marriage and festival season under S.62 (1) (c) of the M. V. Act." In the covering letter accompanying that application the 3rd respondent therein stated: "There is no through service at present on this route and the introduction of this through service will avoid transhipment enroute and also save time in the journey." All what I have stated with reference to the application and the covering letter in the other case would equally apply to the application and the covering letter referred to above. The matters on the basis of which temporary permit was sought are matters the existence of which had to be established and the existence of which the 1st respondent had to be satisfied. As in the previous case in this case also the Motor Vehicles Inspector, Palghat, presented the need in his report as: "At present there is is no direct bus service as such on this proposed route. Hence the public from Gopalapuram side due for Trichur has to change over their bus at several intermediate stations and vice versa... Recently the educational institutions have been reopened and also the agricultural season is on. There is a considerable temporary increase of travelling public including the students on this route for which temporary additional travelling facilities is necessitated." I do not think that the report of the Motor Vehicles Inspector just now referred to is in any way different from that which I have discussed while dealing with O. P. No. 3516 of 1975 in the previous paragraph. 8. In view of the discussion made above it is clear that the applicants have not established the factual existence of the grounds on which temporary permits were sought for and that the 1st respondent had not considered as to whether the need put forward does exist or not, though the applications mention them. 9. 8. In view of the discussion made above it is clear that the applicants have not established the factual existence of the grounds on which temporary permits were sought for and that the 1st respondent had not considered as to whether the need put forward does exist or not, though the applications mention them. 9. The only other question that remains to be considered is as to whether there is any evidence in this case which will go to show that there was any unsatisfied demands of the public for pucca permit so as to justify the grant of temporary permit as falling under S.62(1)(c) of the Act as contended for by the learned counsel for the respondents. The learned counsel relying on the applications discussed above, the reports of the Motor Vehicles Inspector mentioned above and also the impugned decisions, submits that these documents will show that there was need for pucca permit which need had not been satisfied and as such there was a temporary need to meet which the impugned decisions were taken to grant temporary permits in favour of the grantees. Even after scanning through the applications and the reports I was unable to see anything mentioned therein about any unsatisfied demand for a pucca permit on the routes in question. The applications as earlier pointed out mentions matters that really fall under clauses (a) and (b) of S.62(1) of the Act. The reports also proceed on that basis - though, there is an additional statement in these reports to the effect that the educational institutions have also reopened. In short no document in the files was placed before me which would in any way support the contention of the learned counsel for the grantees that there was an unsatisfied demand of the public for a pucca permit and the decision to grant a temporary permit could be justified on that count under S.62(1)(c) of the Act. 10. The original petitions have, therefore, to be allowed. I allow them. I quash the impugned orders Ext. P1 in each of the petitions. 11. Perhaps it would have been proper to order costs in these petitions to be paid by the 1st respondent. However I refrain from the same. Allowed.