JUDGMENT : G.C. Mathur, J. The following question has been referred for opinion to this Full Bench : Whether, within the meaning of Section 19(2)(a) of the U.P. Act IX of 1955, 'operating' presupposes running or plying the vehicles in accordance with law and with a right to do so? 2. A Division Bench of this Court, in Jagat Nath Wahal v. Government of State of U.P. Sp. A. No. 25 of 1970 D/- April 9, 1971, held that the word 'operating' in Section 19(2)(a) of the U.P. Road Transport Services (Development) Act, 1955 must be read to mean validly operating and not invalidly and illegally operating. The correctness of this view was doubted in some cases and it is on that account that this reference has been made to this Full Bench. 3. In order to answer the question referred, it is necessary to notice the legislative history and the circumstances in which the provision came to be enacted. Some time before 1950 the Govt. of U.P. started running its own stage carriages on certain routes under executive instructions. Under these instructions, the transport authorities, under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, were directed not to grant permanent permits or renewals to private operators on routes on which the Government wanted to run its stage carriages. The plying of vehicles by the Government in this manner, the nationalization of certain routes by executive orders and the exclusion of private operators from such routes was challenged in this Court in a number of writ petitions. These writ petitions were allowed by a Full Bench of this Court by judgment reported in Moti Lal v. State of U.P. AIR 1951 All 251. The Full Bench held that in the exercise of its executive power the State Government could enter into the business of plying stage carriages even when there was no legislation empowering it to do so, but that it could not nationalise any route so as to exclude private operators therefrom. It was further held that Government could not ply its stage carriages without obtaining permits under the Motor Vehicles Act. In the result writs of mandamus were issued to the R.T.A. to consider on merits the applications of private operators for permits and renewals, even on routes on which the Govt. had started plying its stage carriages. 4. It was further held that Government could not ply its stage carriages without obtaining permits under the Motor Vehicles Act. In the result writs of mandamus were issued to the R.T.A. to consider on merits the applications of private operators for permits and renewals, even on routes on which the Govt. had started plying its stage carriages. 4. Thereupon the U.P. Legislature enacted the U.P. State Road Transport Act, 1950 (U.P. Act No. II of 1951). This Act came into force on February 10, 1951. Section 3 empowered the State Govt. to declare by notification that the Road Transport Services on any particular route shall be operated by the State Government exclusively or by it in conjunction with Railways or partly by it and partly by others. Section 4 provided for the framing and publication of a scheme in pursuance of the declaration u/s 3. Sections 5, 6 and 7 provided for the filing of objections to the Scheme, for the disposal of the objections and for the publication of the final scheme. Section 13, which is a validating section, reads thus: (Their Lordships then quoted Section 13(1)(a)(i)(ii)(b) and (2) and proceeded on to observe:) In accordance with the provisions of Section 13(1)(b) a notification was published on February 12, 1951, which specified a number of routes including the Meerut-Delhi route, with which this Special Appeal is concerned. The result of this notification was that the routes mentioned in the notification were deemed to be routes specified in a notification u/s 3 and in respect of which schemes were deemed to have been published under Sections 4 and 5 and to have been duly confirmed. The constitutional validity of Act II of 1951 and of the notification issued thereunder was challenged in a large number of writ petitions before the Supreme Court. By its judgment reported in Saghir Ahmad Vs. The State of U.P. and Others, AIR 1954 SC 728 , the Supreme Court held that the Act violated Articles 19(1)(g) and 31(1) of the Constitution and was, therefore, invalid. The Supreme Court delivered its judgment on October 13, 1954. 5. The Supreme Court struck down Act II of 1951 on the ground that it did not make any provision for payment of compensation to private operators, who were deprived of their business of running their stage carriages on the nationalised routes. The Supreme Court delivered its judgment on October 13, 1954. 5. The Supreme Court struck down Act II of 1951 on the ground that it did not make any provision for payment of compensation to private operators, who were deprived of their business of running their stage carriages on the nationalised routes. In order to remove this defect the U.P. Road Transport Services (Development) Ordinance, 1955, was promulgated on February 5, 1955. The Ordinance was replaced by the U.P. Road Transport Services (Development) Act, 1955, (U.P. Act No. IX of 1955). The Act was to operate retrospectively from June 18, 1951. Sections 3 to 9 made provisions for the framing of schemes for the exclusive operation of State Road Transport Services on routes notified by the State Government. Section 10 laid down the consequences of the publication of the scheme and Section 11 provided for payment of compensation for premature cancellation of permits or for curtailment of route or routes of private operators. Section 19 provides for validation of proceedings and actions under Act II of 1951. It reads thus: (Their Lordships then quoted Section 19(1)(a), (b), (c), (2)(a), (b) and (c) and proceeded on to observe:) The validity of Act IX of 1955 was also challenged, but was ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court in Deep Chand Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, AIR 1959 SC 648 . 6. The Appellants made applications before the Transport Authority, Luck-now, for grant of stage carriage permits on the Meerut-Delhi Route. These applications were dismissed mainly on the ground that the route was a notified route and, as such, no stage carriage permits could be granted to private operators. The rejection of the applications was challenged in an appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal U.P. The appeal was allowed and the State Transport Authority was directed to grant the stage carriage permits to the Appellants. The Appellate Tribunal held that there was no valid nationalization scheme in existence in respect of the Meerut-Delhi route. The U.P. State Road Transport Corporation filed a writ petition in this Court challenging the validity of the order of the Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal held that there was no valid nationalization scheme in existence in respect of the Meerut-Delhi route. The U.P. State Road Transport Corporation filed a writ petition in this Court challenging the validity of the order of the Appellate Tribunal. K.N. Singh, J. allowed the writ petition holding that the notification dated February 12, 1951, published u/s 13(1)(b) of Act II of 1951 was validated by Section 19(2)(a) of Act IX of 1955 and, therefore, the Meerut-Delhi route continued to be a notified route with the result that no private operators could be granted any permit thereon. Against the judgment of K.N. Singh, J. this special appeal was filed. 7. One of the questions raised at the hearing of the appeal was that Section 19(2)(a) of Act IX of 1955 applied only to the running and plying of vehicles by the State Government in accordance with law and with a right to do so and not to running or plying illegally. This question, in view of the circumstances set out earlier, has been referred to this Full Bench for opinion. 8. Sri Fanthome, ld. Counsel for the Appellant, contended that the State Road Transport Service Stage Carriages were admittedly plying without obtaining permits from the Regional Transport Authorities, that such plying of stage carriages was illegal, and that the word "operating" in Section 19(2)(a) of Act IX of 1955 did not include such plying as it contemplated operating in accordance with law. According to him, since on no route was the State Road Transport Service operating its vehicles in accordance with law, the nationalization of no route under Act No. II of 1951 was validated by this provision. The learned Advocate General, on the other hand, contended that the word "operating" contemplated only factual operating. We are inclined to agree with the learned Advocate General. It is to be noticed that Section 19(2)(a) talks of operating on the appointed date. Appointed date has been defined in Section 2(1)(a) to mean February 4, 1955. This was a day prior to the date en which the U.P. Road Transport Services (Development) Ordinance, 1955 was promulgated. Therefore Section 19(2) (a) would apply to every route on which the Slate Road Transport Service was operating on February 4, 1955. Admittedly, on this elate, all the State Road Transport Services were operating stage carriages without permits. This was a day prior to the date en which the U.P. Road Transport Services (Development) Ordinance, 1955 was promulgated. Therefore Section 19(2) (a) would apply to every route on which the Slate Road Transport Service was operating on February 4, 1955. Admittedly, on this elate, all the State Road Transport Services were operating stage carriages without permits. Again, admittedly there was not a single route on which the State Road Transport Service was operating its stage carriages after obtaining permits. This state of affairs was fully known to the legislature. The legislature must have intended the provisions of Section 19(2)(a) to apply to the state of affairs existing on 4-2-1955, that is to say, to routes on which the State Road Transport Services were operating on that date without permits. If we were to agree with the learned Counsel for the Appellants that operating in this provision meant operating with permits, then Section 19(2)(a) will not be applicable to any existing state of facts and will be rendered useless. If possible redundancy should not be attributed to the legislature. This is one reason why we think that the word "operating" in Section 19(2)(a) should not be confined to operating with permits. 9. In the second place, the intention of the Legislature seems clear and that is to validate the nationalization of routes which was sought to be achieved earlier. From the historical background set out above, it is clear that after the nationalization of the routes by executive orders was struck down by this Court in Motilal's case, the Legislature stepped in and sought to validate the nationalization of all actions taken pursuant thereto. Section 13(1)(a) of Act No. II of 1951 provided that every Road Transport Service commenced before the coming into force of that Act and operating on any route shall be valid notwithstanding the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. It clearly validated the State Road Transport Services operating contrary to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, i.e. operating without permits. Section 13(1)(b) provided that every route on which the State Road Transport Service was operating on the appointed date was to be deemed to be a notified route under that Act, if the requisite notification was published. Such a notification was published on February 12, 1951. Section 13(1)(b) provided that every route on which the State Road Transport Service was operating on the appointed date was to be deemed to be a notified route under that Act, if the requisite notification was published. Such a notification was published on February 12, 1951. When Act No. II of 1951 was struck down by the Supreme Court in Saghir Ahmad's case, the Legislature again stepped in and sought to validate the nationalization of routes under the 1951 Act. Under the nationalization or routes, both before the 1951 Act and after it the stage carriages of the State Road Transport Service were operating without permits. Inspite of this, the Legislature has manifested an intention to validate the nationalization of the routes and to continue the nationalization sought to be achieved earlier. If we were to hold that the word "operating" in Section 19(2)(a) should be confined to operating after obtaining permits then the intention of the legislature will be frustrated. The word "operating" is a word of wide significance and includes operating legally as well as operating illegally. There is no good reason to cut down its amplitude. There is nothing in the context which compels us to add the word "legally" after the word "operating." On the other hand, in view of the intention of the Legislature, the word "operating" has to be read in its ordinary meaning of factually operating. 10. The matter can be looked at from another angle. Section 19(2)(a) provides: Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of Section 19(1)(a), it is declared that (i) every route, on which the State Road Transport Service was operating on 4-2-1955, shall be deemed to be a route notified in the notification u/s 3; and (ii) every such State Road Transport Service shall be deemed to be operating under a scheme duly prepared and published under and in accordance with Sections 4 to 8. 11. The opening words of Section 19(2)(a) indicates that this provision seeks to specify and declare something which the Legislature had already done u/s 19(1)(a). Section 19(1)(a), inter alia validated the orders made, actions or proceedings taken and directions issued under Act II of 1951, enabling the State Road Transport Services to operate exclusively on certain routes and provided that they shall be deemed to have been made, taken or issued under Act IX of 1955. Section 19(1)(a), inter alia validated the orders made, actions or proceedings taken and directions issued under Act II of 1951, enabling the State Road Transport Services to operate exclusively on certain routes and provided that they shall be deemed to have been made, taken or issued under Act IX of 1955. Section 19(1)(a) thus validated the nationalization of routes under Act II of 1951 and provided for the continuance of such nationalization by saying that it shall be deemed as if it had been done under Act IX of 1955. It is this later part of continuing the nationalization which Section 19(2)(a) seeks to specify and declare by providing that the nationalised routes shall be deemed to be routes specified in the notification u/s 3 and that the services shall be deemed to be services operating under a scheme prepared and finalised under Sections 4 to 8. In this view, the words "every route on which the State Road Transport Service was operating "in Section 19(2)(a) can only refer to the routes which were sought to be nationalised under Act II of 1951 and on which the State Road Transport Services were actually plying their vehicles. Since Section 19(1)(a) validates nationalisation of all routes irrespective of the fact whether the State Road Transport Services were operating on them lawfully or otherwise, Section 19(2)(a) cannot be interpreted in such a way as to cut down the extent of the validation and to confine it to nationalization of those routes only on which the State Road Transport Services were operating lawfully. In fact, after the decision in Saghir Ahmad's case and the striking down of Act II of 1951, all the schemes prepared or deemed to be prepared under that Act became illegal and the operating of the State Road Transport Services in pursuance of those schemes became unlawful. Obviously, the provisions of Section 19 of Act IX of 1955 were intended to validate this unlawful operating o f the State Road Transport Services. 12. It now remains to consider the judgment of the Division Bench in Sp. A. No. 25 of 1970 which has necessitated this reference. Obviously, the provisions of Section 19 of Act IX of 1955 were intended to validate this unlawful operating o f the State Road Transport Services. 12. It now remains to consider the judgment of the Division Bench in Sp. A. No. 25 of 1970 which has necessitated this reference. The Division Bench has given the following two reasons for holding that the word "operating" in Section 19(2)(b) should be read as meaning plying with authority of law and not in violation of law : (i) The Supreme Court has laid down in Budhan Singh v. Nabi Bux 1969 SC 481 that the word "held" occurring in Section 9 of the UP ZA and LR Act, means held lawfully and, therefore, the word "operating" in Section 19(2)(b) of Act IX of 1955 should also be held to mean operating lawfully. (ii) The idea was not and could not be to cure and legalise the plying of Government buses on a route in contravention of law, that is, without obtaining permits or without obtaining exemption for that purpose. 13. So far as the Supreme Court judgment goes, it does not lay down any general rule of interpretation beyond the rule of ascertaining the intention of the Legislature. The Supreme Court noticed several provisions of the Zamindari Abolition Act where the word 'held' had been used in the sense of held lawfully and came to the conclusion that the context, in which the word had been used in Section 9, showed that it was used in the sense of held lawfully. The Supreme Court Judgment, in our opinion, does not help in deciding whether the word 'operating' in Section 19(2)(b) has been used in the sense of operating lawfully or in the sense of operating unlawfully also. 14. With respect to the learned Judges who decided Sp. A. No. 25 of 1970, we are unable to agree with the second reason given by them for their conclusion. It is to be kept in mind that Section 19 of Act IX of 1955 is a validating provision and such a provision normally seeks to validate something which is invalid or unlawful. A. No. 25 of 1970, we are unable to agree with the second reason given by them for their conclusion. It is to be kept in mind that Section 19 of Act IX of 1955 is a validating provision and such a provision normally seeks to validate something which is invalid or unlawful. As stated earlier, the plying of vehicle by the State Road Transport Services on certain routes in pursuance of schemes framed or deemed to be framed under Act II of 1951 had become unlawful on account of Act II of 1951 having been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. The intention of the Legislature clearly was to make lawful what had been rendered unlawful on account of the decision of the Supreme Court. We are accordingly of opinion that Sp. A. No. 25 of 1970 was not correctly decided on this point. 15. For the reasons given above, we are of opinion that the word 'operating' in Section 19(2)(a) of Act IX of 1955 does not presuppose the running or plying of vehicles in accordance with law and with a right to do so. 'Operating' in this provision means actually or factually operating of vehicles of the State Road Transport Services on the routes. We accordingly answer the question referred to this Full Bench in the negative.