Judgment :- 1. What is sought for in this Original Petition is a writ of quo warranto or such other appropriate writ, order or direction to the second respondent directing him to satisfy this court as to under what authority he,is holding the post of Additional Advocate General of the State. A declaration that the Governor of the State has no jurisdiction to create the post of Additional Advocate General for the State and therefore the second respondent has no right to hold the office of Advocate General is also prayed for by the petitioner. It is claimed in the Writ Petition that being a citizen of India and tax-payer of the State, the petitioner is interested in seeing that the Constitutional mandates are not violated by any branch of the State. The basis of his contention is the provision in Art.165 of the Constitution, which reads as follows: "165. Advocate General for the State: The Governor of each State shall appoint a person who is qualified to be appointed a judge of a High Court to be Advocate-General for the State. (2) It shall be the duty of the Advocate General to give advice to the Government of the State upon such legal matters, and to perform such other duties of a legal character, as may from time to time be referred or assigned to him by the Governor, and to discharge the functions conferred on him by or under this Constitution or any other law for the time being in force. (3) The Advocate General shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor and shall receive such remuneration as the Governor may determine. The petitioner points out that this Article clearly lays down that the Governor of a State shall appoint'a person' as Advocate General of the State and therefore there can be only one Advocate General for the State. This article, it is contended, does not provide for appointment of more than one person as Advocate General of the State. It is urged that wherever the framers of the Constitution have thought it necessary to leave the discretion of enlarging the number of Constitutional posts, they have clearly left the room vacant for such an accommodation. This article, it is contended, does not provide for appointment of more than one person as Advocate General of the State. It is urged that wherever the framers of the Constitution have thought it necessary to leave the discretion of enlarging the number of Constitutional posts, they have clearly left the room vacant for such an accommodation. But in the case of the post of Advocate General of a State, it is averred, that the Constitutional provisions is very specific and that there can be only one Advocate General for the entire State. 2. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State by the Law Secretary to the Government, it is pointed out that by G.O. Ms. 58/71/Law dated 21-8-1971, Government, among other things, created one post of Senior Government Pleader and by the very same order, the second respondent was appointed to that post. By order dated 22nd July, 1974, the Government redesignated the post of Senior Government Pleader in the High Court as Additional Advocate General. A copy of the said order has been produced along with the counter affidavit marked in the case as Ext. R-5. Ext. R-5 also contains the order that the second respondent who was holding the post of Senior Government Pleader would continue to be Additional Advocate General. It is further provided therein that his duties, remuneration etc., will remain as at present. The counter proceeds to state that even after his appointment as Additional Advocate General, the second respondent continues to be a Law Officer whose conditions of service, duties and remunerations are governed by Ext. R-2 and that the Additional Advocate General appointed under Ext. R-5 does not have any of the powers, duties and privileges of the Advocate General. Even after the appointment of the second respondent as Additional Advocate General, it is contended by the State in the counter that there is only one Advocate General for the State. Again it is stated in the counter affidavit that there is absolutely no violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution of India. The allegation made in the petition that the impugned order has been made to favour the second respondent is also denied in the counter affidavit. Mr. Again it is stated in the counter affidavit that there is absolutely no violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution of India. The allegation made in the petition that the impugned order has been made to favour the second respondent is also denied in the counter affidavit. Mr. Cherian, learned counsel for the petitioner, strongly urged before me that Art.165 contemplates the appointment of only one Advocate General and therefore the appointment of an Additional Advocate General would be in violation of that Article. He has pleaded that though in the counter affidavit it is stated that what has taken place is only a redesignation of the post of Senior Government Pleader as Additional Advocate General, the word 'additional' could have no other significance except to bring out the fact that the person appointed is to perform part of the functions of the Advocate General. He brought to my notice the meaning of the word 'additional' as defined in Webster's Third New International Dictionary. 'Additional' means, "existing or coming by way of addition"; 'addition' means 'the result of adding: anything added." I am not inclined to accept this contention of the learned counsel. In the light of the averments made by the Law Secretary on behalf of the State that what the Government did was only re-designating the post of Senior Government Pleader as Addl. Advocate General and that he does not have any of the powers, duties and privileges of the Advocate General, it may not be correct to make an inference merely from the literary meaning of the word 'additional'. I do not think also that Art.165 bars the appointment of an additional Advocate General. It is not possible to make an inference that the said Article does not contemplate appointment of a second person as Addl. Advocate General or Associate Advocate General as such. The duty of the Advocate General as per Art.165 is to give advice to the Government of the State upon such legal matters, and to perform such other duties of a legal character, as may from time to time be referred or assigned to him by the Governor, and to discharge the functions conferred on him or under this Constitution or any other law for the time being in force. He is to hold the office during the pleasure of the Governor. He is to hold the office during the pleasure of the Governor. Merely because the singular is used it may not be positively held that any second person could not be appointed as Additional Advocate General. It is specifically provided in Art.367 that unless the context otherwise requires, the General Clauses Act, 1897, shall, subject to any adaptations and modifications that may be made therein under Art.372, apply for the interpretation of this Constitution as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of the Legislature of the Dominion of India. S.13 of the General Clauses Act states, that unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, words in the singular shall include the plural, and vice versa. As the Privy Council pointed out in Blue Metal Industries v. R. W. Dilley, (1969) 3 All ER. 437 at page 441 in relation to Companies Act 1961 (N.S.W.) after specifically referring to Interpretation Act, 1897 (N.S.W.) unless the contrary intention appears, words in the singular shall include the plural and the words in the plural shall include the singular. "Such a provision is of manifest advantage. It assists the legislature to avoid cumbersome and over-elaborate wording. Prima facie it can be assumed that in the processes which lead to an enactment both draftman and legislators have such a provision in mind. It follows that the mere fact that the reading of words in a section suggests an emphasis on singularity as opposed to plurality is not enough to exclude plurality. Words in the singular shall include the plural unless the contrary intention appears. But in considering whether a contrary intention appears there need no confinement of attention to any one particular section of an Act. It must be appropriate to consider the section in its setting in the legislation as a whole." This principle should apply to interpretation of Art.165 also. Mr. Cherian stresses on the fact that in certain provisions of the Constitution the singular used cannot take the plural and the plural is used specifically when it is so required. He referred to Art.124, 216 and 324(2) and (3) of the Constitution. I would extract those relevant provisions herein "124. (1). There shall be a Supreme Court of India consisting of a Chief Justice of India and, until Parliament by law prescribes a larger number, of not more than seven other judges. He referred to Art.124, 216 and 324(2) and (3) of the Constitution. I would extract those relevant provisions herein "124. (1). There shall be a Supreme Court of India consisting of a Chief Justice of India and, until Parliament by law prescribes a larger number, of not more than seven other judges. (2) Every Judge of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with such of the judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts in the States as the President may deem necessary for the purpose and shall hold office until he attains the age of sixty five years: Provided that in the case of appointment of a judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of India shall always be consulted: Provided further that (a) a judge may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office; (b) a judge may be removed from his office in the manner provided in clause (4). (2-A) The age of a judge of the Supreme Court shall be determined by such authority and in such manner as Parliament may by law provide. (3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a judge of the Supreme Court unless he is a citizen of India (a) has been for at least five years a judge of a High Court or of two or more such Courts in succession; or (b) has been for at least ten years an Advocate of a High Court or of two or more such Courts in succession; or (c) is in the opinion of the President, a distinguished jurist. Explanation I In this clause "High Court" means a High Court which exercises, or which at any time before the commencement of this Constitution exercised, jurisdiction in any part of the territory of India. Explanation II In computing for the purpose of this clause the period during which a person has been an Advocate, any period during which a person has held judicial office not inferior to that of a District Judge after he became an Advocate shall be included. Explanation II In computing for the purpose of this clause the period during which a person has been an Advocate, any period during which a person has held judicial office not inferior to that of a District Judge after he became an Advocate shall be included. (4) A Judge of .the Supreme Court shall not be removed from his office except by an order of the President passed after an address by each house of Parliament supported by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting has been presented to the President in the same session for such removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity. (5) Parliament may by law regulate the procedure for the presentation of an address and for the investigation and proof of the misbehaviour or incapacity of a judge under clause (4). (6) Every person appointed to be a judge of the Supreme Court shall, before he enters upon his office, make and subscribe before the President or some person appointed in that behalf by him, an oath or affirmation according to the form set out for the purpose in the Third Schedule. (7) No person who has held office as a judge of the Supreme Court shall plead or act in any court or before any authority within the territory of India" "216. Every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other judges as the President may from time to time deem it necessary to appoint." "324.(2) This Election Commission shall consist of the Chief Election Commissioner and such number of other Election Commissioners, if any, as the President may from time to time fix and the appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners shall, subject to the provisions of any law made in that behalf by Parliament, be made by the the President. (3) When any other Election Commissioner is so appointed the Chief Election Commissioner shall act as the Chairman of the Election Commission." However, we will have to interpret each article in its own context. (3) When any other Election Commissioner is so appointed the Chief Election Commissioner shall act as the Chairman of the Election Commission." However, we will have to interpret each article in its own context. In Art.124 and 216 which refers to the constitution of the Supreme Court of India and the High Courts, wherein, it is stated that such courts shall consist of a Chief Justice and other judges, there cannot be any doubt that each such court cannot have more than one Chief Justice. That is an inference which is clearly manifest from the Articles themselves. Similarly under S.324 (2) there cannot be more than one Chief Election Commissioner. That is also clear from the Article itself. I find no illegality in the appointment of the second respondent as Additional Advocate General. The petitioner is not entitled to get any reliefs prayed for in this Original Petition. The Original Petition is dismissed. I make no order as to costs. I may point out here that the Original Petition was heard on 16th September, 1975. In the first instance the learned counsel for petitioner was not present. After hearing Mr. K. S. Paripoornan, learned council for the State, I dictated judgment dismissing the Original Petition. Immediately afterwards Mr. Cherian came in and explained his absence. He prayed for re-hearing of the matter. I re-heard the matter hearing the learned counsel for petitioner and the counsel for the State and the Original Petition is being disposed of by this judgment. Dismissed.