Judgment :- 1. The writ petitioner is the owner of a plot of 55 cents of land comprised in R. S. No. 595/5 of Azhikode Village in Cannanore District. The 2nd respondent is a kudikidappukaran residing in the said plot. On the ground that the petitioner required the land bona fide for constructing a house for her son the petitioner filed O. A. No 208 of 1972 before the Land Tribunal, Cannanore praying that the 2nd respondent should be directed to shift his kudikidappu from the A schedule property where it now exists to the B schedule property which the petitioner has offered as an alternate site for locating the kudikidappu. That application was dismissed by the Land Tribunal as per its order Ext. P1 dated 29th August, 1972. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking to quash Ext. P1. 2. The writ petitioner's application for shifting the kudikidappukaran was dismissed by the Land Tribunal mainly on the basis of its findings entered on points Nos. (i) and (vi) set out for decision in the order Ext. P1. Point No. (i) concerned the question whether the applicant bona fide, required the A schedule property for building purposes for her son. The Land Tribunal has decided this point against the writ petitioner principally on two grounds. Firstly, it held that the petitioner's son is now having a joint interest in the house where he is residing along with, the petitioner and her other children. The second aspect put against the petitioner by the Land Tribunal is that even after setting apart 10 cents for the kudikidappukaran there is a balance of 45 cents of land in the A schedule property and this portion could be utilised by the petitioner for the construction of the building for her son. Though the Special Revenue Inspector who had submitted a report after inspecting the property had stated in that report that the said balance area of 45 cents lies on three sides of the kudikidappu and hence it will not be possible to construct another, building there, the Land Tribunal expressed its inability to agree with the said report stating that "an extant of 45 cents of land is fairly a big plot and by making structural adjustments a building could be constructed there without shifting the kudikidappu". On these two grounds the Land Tribunal proceeded to hold that "the applicant does not bona fide require the portion of the land in the occupation of the kudikidappukaran for the purpose of constructing a building to her son". The finding entered by the Land Tribunal on points Nos. (vi) and (viii) is that the writ petitioner bad only a leasehold right in the B schedule property and that hence the mandatory requirement of S.75 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) that the alternative plot should have belonged to the person seeking to shift the kudikidappukaran on the date of issue of the notice is not satisfied in the present case. On points Nos. (iii) to (v) the Land Tribunal found that the B schedule land is fit for erecting a homestead, that its extent is equal to the extent of the existing kudikidappu and that it is within a distance of one mile from the kudikidappu situated in the A schedule property. 3. In my opinion, the petitioner is well-founded in his contention that the findings entered by the Land Tribunal on points Nos. (i), (vi) and (viii) are unsustainable in law and that the dismissal of the writ petitioner's application for the shifting of the kudikidappu on the basis of those findings was without jurisdiction. It has been repeatedly pointed out by this court that it is unnecessary for a person who applies under S.75(2) of the Act to shift a kudikidappukaran to establish that either he or the member of the family for whom the requirement of construction of the building is pleaded, is completely without any roof over his or her head and is thus in dire need of being provided with a building. All that is required to be established under the Section is that the applicant bona fide requires the land for the purpose of putting up a building for himself or a member of his family and this condition will be satisfied if it is shown by satisfactory evidence that the circumstances are such as to justify a reasonable and honest desire and intention to construct a building for the applicant or the particular member of the family The existence of a facility for the applicant or the member of the family to reside in a building belonging to some one also or to himself jointly along with others is not, therefore, a ground on which the plea of bona fide requirement can be negatived. Hence the first reason stated by the Land Tribunal for finding point No. (i) against the writ petitioner is unsustainable. 4. The next ground mentioned by the Land Tribunal is that even after allotment of 10 cents to the kudikidappukaran from out of the A schedule property a balance of 45 cents would be left and that the applicant could very well make use of the same for putting up a building for her son. This reasoning also cannot obviously stand in view of the later pronouncement of a Division Bench of this court in Writ Appeal No. 102 of 1975 where it has been laid down that when once it is established that the applicant requires the land in question for building purposes the claim for shifting should be allowed unless it could be stated that the applicant is being unreasonable in demanding the whole of the land as required for the building purposes. The Division Bench also pointed out that going by the indications contained in the Act itself, ordinarily, the claim for shifting a kudikidappu from a land cannot be regarded as unreasonable if the extent of the land in which the kudikidappu situates is not more than one acre. This court had also pointed out in the earlier decision reported in Abdul Rahiman v. Ramu,1974 KLT. This court had also pointed out in the earlier decision reported in Abdul Rahiman v. Ramu,1974 KLT. 741, the correctness of which was affirmed by the Division Bench, that in cases where bona fide requirement does exist it is for the land-owner to decide where he will put up the building for himself or for the concerned member of his family and that the Land Tribunal cannot superimpose its subjective opinion as to where the building should be located. In the present case it is seen from the statements in the Land Tribunal's order itself that the Special Revenue Inspector who had inspected the land has stated that it will not be possible to construct another building in the A schedule property in view of the lie of the kudikidappu. But, in spite thereof the Land Tribunal has held that by making suitable structural adjustments a building could be constructed in the plot without shifting the kudikidappu. It is not clear on what materials this observation of the Land Tribunal is based. As already pointed out, it is not for the Land Tribunal to decide how and where the applicant should construct his building. Hence the second reason stated by the Land Tribunal for negativing the writ petitioner's plea of bona fide requirement is also unsound and untenable. 5. There is yet another ground mentioned by the Land Tribunal for finding point No. (i) against the writ petitioner and that is that the writ petitioner had failed to prove that she requires the portion of the land in the occupation of the kudikidappu for the purpose of constructing a building for her son. This reasoning also cannot stand in view of the aforesaid pronouncement by the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 102 of 1975 wherein it has been held that "the expression 'the land' occurring in S.75 (2) refers to the whole of the land on which the kudikidappu situates and not the particular portion which actually constitutes the kudikidappu." In other words, what the. applicant in this case has to establish is that she requires the A schedule land for the purpose mentioned in the application, namely, for putting up the building for the applicant's son It was unnecessary for the applicant to make out that she requires for the said purpose the particular portion of the A schedule property which is in the occupation of the kudikidappukaran. The third reason mentioned by the Land Tribunal is also thus erroneous. Hence it follows that the finding entered by the Land Tribunal on point No. (i) that the writ petitioner has not made out her plea of bona fide requirement for building purpose for her son has to be set aside. 6. Admittedly the writ petitioner had a tenancy right over the B schedule property as on the date on which the notice Ext. P-1 was issued. By virtue of that tenancy right the writ petitioner was entitled to fixity of tenure and he was in a position to transfer permanent possession of the property in favour of the kudikidappukaran. A jenmom sale deed had been executed in favour of the applicant by the jenmi as per Ext. P4 dated 25-7-1972. But, even apart from that the applicant had been conferred a right under the Act to get the jenmom right assigned in his favour by moving the Land Tribunal with an appropriate application in that regard. That a property held by a person on tenancy right with the aforesaid incidence can be validly offered as alternate site for the purpose of shifting a kudikidappukaran has been held by this court in Amina Land Tribunal, Badagara, 1974 Badagara, 1974. 496. I am in respectful agreement with the said view. It therefore follows that the finding entered by the Land Tribunal on points Nos. (vi) and (viii) also cannot be allowed to stand. 7. In the result, the order Ext. P1 will stand set aside and there will be a direction to the Land Tribunal, Cannanore to dispose of O. A. No. 208 of 1972 afresh in the light of the observations contained in this judgment. It is made clear that no interference is made by this court with the findings already entered by the Tribunal on points Nos. (ii) to (v) and (vii) and that only the remaining points need be considered afresh by the Land Tribunal during the fresh adjudication to be conducted by it after hearing both sides. 8. The original petition is allowed as above. The parties will bear their respective costs. Allowed.