JUDGMENT T. Chandrasekhara Menon, J. 1. The petitioner in O.P. 5226/74 (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) was appointed in the K. P. M. High School, Poothotta as a High School Assistant (Hindi) on 14th December 1971 in a maternity leave vacancy. The appointment was approved by the District Educational Officer. She was discharged from service for want of vacancy on 25th February 1972. Qualification of private school teachers in regard to various posts have now been prescribed in Chapter XXXI of Kerala Education Rules (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). This chapter in the rules prescribing qualifications of teachers was added with effect from 5th December 1972 by notification dated 27th October 1972 published in Kerala Gazette dated 5th December 1972. The qualification for a High School Assistant (Hindi) as prescribed therein is that the candidates shall possess any one of the academic qualifications and a training qualification as specified below: "IV. HIGH SCHOOL ASSISTANT (HINDI) A. Academic qualification Praveen of the Dakshina Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabha, Madras with a pass in the S.S.L.C. Examination conducted by the Commissioner for Government Examinations, Kerala, or its equivalent. B. Training qualification The following examinations of the Kendriya Hindi Sikshan Mandal, Agra, namely: (i) Hindi Sikshan Praveen (ii) Hindi Sikshan Parangath (iii) Hindi Sikshan Nishnat Explanation I.Persons who have successfully undergone Pracharak Diploma of the Dakshina Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabha up to and including the academic year 1969-70 shall be considered to possess the requisite training qualification. Explanation II. Before that as per G.O.Ms. 108/Edn., dated 4th March 1966 Government had recognized the following Hindi Examinations with training qualification and S.S.L.C. as sufficient qualification for the post of Hindi Teachers in Upper Primary Schools and High Schools. (The said G.O. has been produced as Ext. P-3 in O. P. 3952/74.) "In consultation with the Public Service Commission Government are pleased to recognise the following Hindi Examinations with S.S.L.C. as sufficient qualification for appointment as Hindi Teachers in Upper Primary Schools in this State: 1. Kovid of the Rashtrabhasha Prachar Samithi, Wardha. 2. Bhushan of the Hindi Prachar Sabha, Hyderabad. 3. Bhasha Ratna of the Bombay Hindi Vidyapeeth, Bombay. 4. Praveen of the Maharashtra Rashtrabhasha Sabha, Poona. 5. Vinit of the Gujarat Vidyapeeth, Ahamedbad. 6. Visarad of the Assam Rashtrabhasha Prachar Samithi Gauhathi. 7. Visarad of the Manipur Hindi Parishad, Imphal. 8. Kabil of the Hindustani Prachar Sabha, Bombay. 9. 2. Bhushan of the Hindi Prachar Sabha, Hyderabad. 3. Bhasha Ratna of the Bombay Hindi Vidyapeeth, Bombay. 4. Praveen of the Maharashtra Rashtrabhasha Sabha, Poona. 5. Vinit of the Gujarat Vidyapeeth, Ahamedbad. 6. Visarad of the Assam Rashtrabhasha Prachar Samithi Gauhathi. 7. Visarad of the Manipur Hindi Parishad, Imphal. 8. Kabil of the Hindustani Prachar Sabha, Bombay. 9. Ratna of the Bharatiya Vidyapeeth, Bombay. 10. Visarad of the Bombay Hindi Sabha, Bombay. 11. Uttara of the Mysore Hindi Prachar Parisha, Bangalore. 12. Sahitya Bhooshan of the Hindi Vidyapeeth, Deoghar. Government are also pleased to recognise with the concurrence of the Public Service Commission the following Hindi examinations with training qualifications and S.S.L.C. as sufficient qualifications for the post of Hindi Teachers in High Schools: 1. Madhyama (Visarad) of the Hindi Sahitha Sammelan, Allahabad. 2. Uttama (in Hindi Sahitha) of Hindi Sahitha Sammelan, Allahabad. 3. Ratna of the Rashtra Bhasha Prachar Samithi, Wardha. 4. Vidwan of the Hindi Prachar Sabha, Hyderabad. 5. Sahitha Sudhakar of the Bombay Hindi Vidyapeeth, Bombay. 6. Pandit of Maharashtra Rashtra Bhasha Sabha, Poona. 7. Sevak of Gujarat Vidyapeeth, Ahamedbad. 8. Vidhan of the Hindustani Prachar Sabha, Bombay. 9. Acharya of Bharatheeya Vidyapeeth, Bombay. 10. Bhoorshan of Bombay Hindi Sabha, Bombay. 11. Ratna of the Mysore Hindi Prachar Parishad, Bangalore. 12. Sahityalankar of the Hindi Vidyapeeth, Deoghar." Section 10 of the Kerala Education Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) has provided that Government shall prescribe the qualifications to be possessed by persons for appointment as teachers in Government and private schools. This court had said in Lakshmi v. A. E. O., 1966 K.L.T. 1042 that section 10 does not postulate that the qualifications for teachers can be laid down only by rules framed by Government under section 36 and that the Government is competent to lay down the qualifications of teachers to be appointed in aided schools by executive orders. 2. The petitioner has passed S.S.L.C. Examination conducted by the Commissioner for Government Examinations in Kerala in 1962 and had also passed the Praveen of the Dakshina Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabha, Madras. She has also got the training qualification inasmuch as she had successfully undergone Pracharak Diploma of the Dakshina Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabha in 1968. She is, therefore, fully qualified to hold the post of a High School Assistant in Hindi. 3. She has also got the training qualification inasmuch as she had successfully undergone Pracharak Diploma of the Dakshina Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabha in 1968. She is, therefore, fully qualified to hold the post of a High School Assistant in Hindi. 3. The petitioner was again appointed to the post of High School Assistant (Hindi) in another leave vacancy. This was also approved by the District Educational Officer. The petitioner was discharged when the vacancy terminated on 4th February 1974. A third time the petitioner worked in a leave vacancy from 5th February 1974 to 15th March 1974. The petitioner also functioned in the school in a new vacancy from 1st August 1974. The last two appointments had also been duly approved by the District Educational Officer. 4. When a leave vacancy arose in the post of the lower grade Hindi Teacher in the same High School from 8th June 1973 to 16th August 1973 the fourth respondent (in O.P. 5226/74) was appointed to the same. She has passed the S.S.L.C. and also passed the Bhasha Ratna of the Bombay Hindi Vidya Peeda. In G.O. Ms. 108/Edn., dated 4th March 1966 Government had recognised the Bhasha Ratna of the Bombay Hindi Vidya Peeda with S.S.L.C. as sufficient qualification for appointment as Hindi Teacher in Upper Primary Schools in the State. But the qualifications laid down by rule 2 of Chapter XXXI of the rules do not accept the above qualification as sufficient for appointment as a Hindi Teacher. The appointment of the fourth respondent in O.P. 5226/74 who happens to be the petitioner in O.P. 3952/74 (hereinafter referred to as the 4th respondent) was not approved by the District Educational Officer. It may be noted that she had been earlier appointed in a short vacancy in the school from 19th January 1970 to 16th March 1970 which appointment had been approved by the educational authorities. 5. Ext. P-5 (in O.P. 5226/74 which is the same as Ext. P-2 in O.P. 3952/74) is the order of the District Educational Officer declining approval of the appointment of the 4th respondent. It is stated therein that the qualification possessed by the 4th respondent is not a recognised qualification for appointment as L.G. Hindi Teacher as per Chapter XXXI of the rules and therefore her appointment is rejected. 6. Fourth respondent filed an appeal to the Regional Director of Public Instruction. It is stated therein that the qualification possessed by the 4th respondent is not a recognised qualification for appointment as L.G. Hindi Teacher as per Chapter XXXI of the rules and therefore her appointment is rejected. 6. Fourth respondent filed an appeal to the Regional Director of Public Instruction. During the school period 1974-75 a post of L.G. Hindi Pandit was sanctioned in the school. The fourth respondent made a claim for appointment to that post. When the petitioner was appointed to that post, fourth respondent filed O.P. 3952/74 praying for quashing the order of disapproval of her appointment by the District Educational Officer, for directing the District Educational Officer not to approve the appointment of the petitioner for the 1974-75 vacancy on the ground that the 4th respondent had a preferential claim to appointment to that post and in the alternative for a mandamus to the Regional Deputy Director of Public Instruction to dispose of her appeal. 7. In the meanwhile on 23rd November 1974 the Regional Director of Public Instruction passed order in the appeal petition, allowing 4th respondent's appeal. Ext. P-6 in O.P. 5226/74 is that order wherein it is held as the 4th respondent was earlier appointed than the petitioner, for the vacancy for the period from 19th January 1970 to 31st March 1970 for which as per G.O. Ms. No. 108/Edn., dated 4th March 1966 she was duty qualified and which appointment had been approved of also, she got a preferential right to appointment to the school. Though under Chapter XXXI of the rules, she was not qualified, in view of proviso to rule 1 of Chapter XXXI the new rules cannot affect her right to appointment. Therefore, the Manager of the concerned High School was directed to relieve the petitioner and appoint the 4th respondent to the post. Her appointment from 8th June 1973 to 16th August 1973 was found to be in order. 8. It is this Ext. P-6 order that the petitioner seeks to quash in O.P. 5227/74. The contention that Sri Sankara Menon, learned counsel for the petitioner strongly pressed is that the Regional Deputy Director has erred in holding that proviso to Rule 1 of Chapter XXXI of the rules enables the 4th respondent to get appointment to the post concerned though she is not qualified under the rule in the Chapter for holding the post of Hindi Teacher. The qualification prescribed for a High School Assistant (Hindi), I had extracted earlier. The qualification prescribed for a language teacher in Hindi in an Upper Primary School is as follows: "(iii) Hindi.A degree in Hindi conferred or recognised by the Universities in Kerala; or A title of Oriental learning in Hindi awarded or recognised by the Universities in Kerala; or Praveen of the Dakshina Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabha, Madras with a pass in S.S.L.C. Examination conducted by the Commissioner for Government Examinations, Kerala or its equivalent; or Sahithyacharya of Kerala Hindi Prachar Sabha with a pass in S.S.L.C. Examination conducted by the Commissioner for Government Examinations, Kerala or its equivalent; or R.B.V. of the Dakshina Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabha with a pass in S.S.L.C. Examination conducted by the Commissioner for Government Examinations, Kerala or its equivalent.'' 9. Rule 1 (1) of Chapter XXXI of the rules is as follows: "The teachers in private schools shall have the educational and professional qualifications prescribed in this chapter. The conditions regarding age, departmental test qualifications, service qualifications and other service conditions shall be governed by the provisions of the Act and the Rules contained in the foregoing chapters: Provided that nothing contained in this chapter shall affect the teachers appointed in private, schools prior to the coming into force of this chapter and who possess the qualifications prescribed under valid orders then in force and whose appointments have been approved as fully qualified teachers: provided further that such persons will be eligible for appointment in any schools." On the basis of the expression "teachers" and "whose appointments have been approved of" in the proviso Mr. Sankara Menon contends that the proviso is intended to be of assistance only to teachers who are actually in service on the date when Chapter XXXI of the rules came into force, namely 5th December 1972; on that day as admittedly the 4th respondent was not in service (her previous appointment was from 19th January 1970 to 16th March 1970) she cannot get the benefit of that proviso. Mr. Mr. Sankara Menon relied on the decision of a Full Bench of this court in Kunhammad Keyi v. Premalatha, 1962 K.L.T. 366, where speaking fur the Bench, Raman Nayar, J. (as he then was) said in construing proviso to section 5 (2) of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) ActKerala Act 16 of 1959: - "Section 5 of the Act, as it stood at the relevant time, runs (so far as is material) as follows: '5. Determination of fair rent.(1) The Rent Control Court shall, on application of the tenant or landlord of a building, fix the fair rent for such building after holding such enquiry as it thinks fit. (2) In fixing the fair rent the court shall take into consideration the property tax or house tax fixed for the building at the time of letting in the property tax register or house-tax register of the local authority within whose area the building is situated: Provided that the fair rent fixed may in proper cases be lower than but shall in no case exceed by more than 15 per cent, the monthly rent on the basis of which the property tax or house tax for the building has been fixed. (3) If there is no property tax or house tax fixed for the building or if it is not based on a rental basis or if the building is situated in an area which is not a city, municipality, panchayat or in any other local authority, the fair rent shall be fixed after taking into consideration the prevailing rates of rent in the locality for similar accommodation in similar circumstances during the twelve months preceding the letting. ** ** ** ** The first question, to consider is whether the Rent Control Court has understood the proviso correctly, whether, it was right in assuming that it was the monthly rent on the basis of which tax was fixed at the time of letting that was material, as if the words, 'at the time of letting' appearing in sub-section (2) were to be read into the proviso so that it would read: 'Provided that the fair rent fixed may in proper cases be lower than but shall in no case exceed by more than 15 per cent, the monthly rent on the basis of which the property tax or house tax for the building has been fixed at the time of letting.' We think it was wrong. The proviso related to the fixing of the fair rent, and it is obvious that the point of time with reference to which it uses the words, "has been fixed" is the point of time when the fair rent is determined which, under the ordinary rule governing legal proceedings would date back to the date when the court was moved for relief. A statute is applied not as on the date of enactment but as on the date of enforcement. Now, has been fixed' is the present perfect tense of the passive voice of the verb, 'fix' and, under the ordinary rules of grammar that tense is used to denote an action that has just been completed or to denote a past action continuing to the present. Therefore, the words, 'house tax for the building has been fixed' used in the proviso can only mean "was and continues to be fixed" and cannot mean something which had been fixed but has ceased to be in force. The time of letting is a fixed past point of time, and, if that were the time of fixing to which the proviso makes reference, it would have used the past indefinite 'was fixed' (not even the pluperfect 'had been' since there is only one past point of time) and not the present perfect, 'has been fixed'. In fact if the words, 'at the time of letting' were to be read into the proviso as shown above, it would be bad English. In fact if the words, 'at the time of letting' were to be read into the proviso as shown above, it would be bad English. "We have written to you yesterday about this matter" is an example given in Wren's High School Grammar of the incorrect use of the present perfect tense." Mr. Sankara Menon also said that the word 'teacher' in contrast to the word 'person' used in the further proviso is clearly indicative that proviso was intended to be of assistance only to teachers who were actually in service on 5th December 1972 when Chapter XXXI of the rules came into force. 10. Though this argument is apparently of some force and is attractive when the following factors are taken into consideration it would be found to be clearly unsustainable: (1) Under rule 51A of Chapter XIVA of the rules a qualified teacher who had been relieved as per rule 49 or rule 52 of the said chapter or on account of termination of vacancies shall have preference for appointment to future vacancies in schools under the same educational agency. This rule had come into force on 12th July 1966 and when the fourth respondent had been relieved in 1970, the right under this rule had accrued to her; she was a qualified teacher at that Time. That vested right cannot be displaced by a new rule, rules as such unless specifically provided in the statute itself cannot have retrospective effect. Reading Rule 1 with the proviso in the manner in which Mr. Sankara Menon wants it to be read would be giving Chapter XXXI retrospective effect which it cannot have. The language of statutes (and naturally of statutory rules also) is not always that which a rigid grammarian would use, as Justice Grove said in Lyons v. Tucker, 1881 (6) Q.B.D. 660 at 664. I would usefully quote the following passage from Craies on Statute Law, 6th Edn. pp. 82 and 83: "It is not the words of the law, said Plowden p. 465, 'but the internal sense of it that makes the law, and our law (like all other) consists of two partsviz., of body and soul; the letter of the law is the body of the law, and the sense and reason of the law is the soul of the lawqum ratio legi sest anima legis'. Therefore as Pollock C. B. pointed out in Waugh v. Middleton, it is by no means clear that, 'if it were laid down as a general rule that the grammatical construction of a clause shall prevail over its legal construction, a more certain rule would be arrived at than if it were laid down that its legal meaning shall prevail over its grammatical construction. In my opinion, continued Pollock, C.B. 'grammatical and philological disputes (in fact, all that belongs to the history of language) are as obscure and lead to as many doubts and contentions as any question of law; and I do not therefore, feel sure that the rule, much as it has been commended, is on all occasions a sure and certain guide. It must however, be conceded that where the grammatical construction is clear and manifest and without doubt, that construction ought to prevail unless there be some strong and obvious reason to the contrary. But the rule adverted to is subject to this condition, that however plain the apparent grammatical construction of a sentence may be, if it be properly clear from the contents of the same document that the apparent grammatical construction cannot be the true one, then that which upon the whole, is the true meaning shall prevail, in spite of the grammatical construction of a particular part of it.' This rule was perhaps better stated by an Irish Judge, Burton, J. in Warburton v. Loveland, in terms quoted with approval by Lord Fitzgerald in Bradlaugh v. Clarke, viz., I apprehend it is a rule in the construction of statutes that in the first instance the grammatical sense of the words is to be adhered to. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any expressed intention or declared purpose of the statutes, or if it would involve any absurdity repugnance, or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended, or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further." And substantially the same opinion is thus expressed by Lord Selborne: "The mere literal construction of a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intentions of the legislature as apparent by the statute, and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction by which that intention can be better effectuated." (2) One should not read rule 1 of Chapter XXXI which would make it void and ultra vires by giving the same retrospective effect. (3) In order to understand the words used therein it is natural to enquire what is the subject matter with respect to which they are used and the object in view. As Chief Justice Lord Goddard said in Barnes v. Jarvis, 1953 (1) W.L.R. 649 a certain amount of common sense must be applied in construing statutes (and statutory rules also as well as any other document). The object underlying has to be considered. Giving the construction which Mr. Sankara Menon wants to accept would be negativing the rights of a large number of teachers whom the law-makers wanted to benefit by enacting rule 51 A. (4) Even in regard to the expression "have been" as Hidayattulla, J., as he then was, said in State of Bombay v. Vishnu Ramachandran, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 307 words, looking to the scheme of the enactment as a whole and particularly the other portions of it, may describe "past actions" and "to borrow the language Fry, L. J., in 1884-(12) Q.B.D. 334 is used to express a hypothesis without regard to time" (5) The word "teacher'' in the context might well take in a person who was a teacher. Therefore, I have no hesitation in overruling the contentions raised by the petitioner. I might state here that Mr. Sankara Menon did not and quite rightly too press the plea that the fourth respondent should be deemed to have waived her right to get fresh appointment in the school by her conduct. Therefore, the decision of the Regional Deputy Director is correct and has to be upheld. I might state here that Mr. Sankara Menon did not and quite rightly too press the plea that the fourth respondent should be deemed to have waived her right to get fresh appointment in the school by her conduct. Therefore, the decision of the Regional Deputy Director is correct and has to be upheld. O.P. 5226/74 is, therefore, dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs. O.P. 3952/74 filed by the 4th respondent in the light of the subsequent events has become infructuous and the same is dismissed as infructuous and without costs.