JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) IN this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of india, the petitioners challenge the imposition of a licence fee on the petitioners for carrying on the trade in plastic and rubber goods at Rs. 36 per annum, on the ground that the said impost is not authorised by section 248 of the Madhya pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, and that it unduly interferes with the petitioners freedom of trade, as per Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. ( 2. ) THE first petitioner is a partnership firm and the second petitioner is the managing partner. The petitioners carry on the trade of selling plastic and rubber articles, such as buckets, toys, holi bottles and various other household articles like glasses, spoons, tumblers, dishes, soap cases, jar, ropes, flowers, baskets etc. , the respondents have imposed a licence fee of Rs. 36 per year for any trader dealing in plastic and rubber goods under the Dangerous to life, health or property Bye-laws, knows as "bhayaprad Tatha Udvejak Vyapar avam Karkhana (Niyaman Tatha Paryavekshan) Upavidhia, framed under section 248 (c) read with section 427 of the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. ( 3. ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that for applicability of section 248 of the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, it is necessary that the requirements of the section should be fulfilled namely, that the articles in which a person trades should be dangerous to life, health or property or is likely to create a nuisance either from its nature or by reason of the manner in which and the conditions under which the same may be carried on. It is pointed out that in Schedule 1 and 2, framed under the said Bye-laws mentioned above, there are many articles, which do not fulfil the test as required by section 248 (c) of the Act, particularly Entries Nos. 16 (13), relating to plastic and 16 (30) relating to rubber or rubber goods, are challenged on this ground. In this connection we may observe that we cannot accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the test is purely subjective. The municipal Commissioner at his sweet-will cannot have the articles included in the Schedules under the Bye-laws merely because he chooses to apply a subjective test. In this connection we may observe that we cannot accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the test is purely subjective. The municipal Commissioner at his sweet-will cannot have the articles included in the Schedules under the Bye-laws merely because he chooses to apply a subjective test. The test, in our opinion, is objective as per the wording of section 248 (c) of the Act and it will be sufficient if some nexus is established between the requirements of section 248 of the Act and the various items mentioned in the Schedules under the Bye-laws. In our opinion, sufficient nexus is established because it is common knowledge that plastic is inflammable-some types of plastic may be highly inflammable, while some other types may not be highly inflammable. The same position obtains with rubber or rubber goods. It may be that these may be the articles of daily use. We may further observe that there are many such items mentioned in the two Schedules, which contain articles of daily use, such as Panwallas keeping bidis and Cigarettes. But merely because, they are articles of daily use, will not help the petitioners case. What is really necessary is that some kind of nexus ought to be established between the articles mentioned in the Schedule and the requirements of section 248 of the Act. While examining this the test will certainly be objective and not merely subjective. But it is also clear that this court will certainly be objective and not merely subjective. But it is also clear that this Court will not sit as an appellate authority over the decisions of the corporation or the decision of the Commissioner in including the articles in the schedules under the Bye-laws. Therefore, as we feel that sufficient nexus has been established between the two, the petitioners cannot challenge the said entries in the Schedules under the Byelaws, particularly, Entry No. 16 (13) and entry No. 16 (30), relating to plastic and rubber or rubber goods. ( 4. ) ANOTHER ground on which the said impost is challenged is that this constitutes an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of trade, particularly when the Entries in the Schedules under the Byelaws do not mention the quantity or the qualities of goods, which a trader may keep. ( 4. ) ANOTHER ground on which the said impost is challenged is that this constitutes an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of trade, particularly when the Entries in the Schedules under the Byelaws do not mention the quantity or the qualities of goods, which a trader may keep. We may observe that mention of the quantity or the quality might have been relevant if an ad valorem tax had been intended to be imposed. The impost is merely a licence fee for carrying on trade in such goods which fall within the ambit of section 248 of the act. Under the circumstances, quantification or mentioning of qual:ties or varieties is not at all necessary. ( 5. ) BEFORE we consider the other questions, we think it proper to reproduce section 248 of the Act, which is as under: "s. 248. Regulations of dangerous and offensive trades. Except in accordance with the provisions of this Act, no person shall- (a) store or keep in premises any articles mentioned in any Bye laws made under this act as dangerous or offensive, or as being, or likely to be a nuisance to the public or dangerous to life, health or property, (b) store or keep in any premises the hide or any part of any carcass of any animal afflicted at the time of its death with infectious or contagious disease, or (c) carry on or allow to be carried on any premises, any trade, manufacture, industry or operation mentioned in any bye laws under this Act as dangerous to life, health or property or as likely to create of nuisance, either from its nature or by reason of the manner in which and the conditions under which the same may be carried on: provided that nothing in this section shall effect the provisions of the Indian Explosives act, 1884, or the Petroleum Act, 1934. " To conclude, we would hold that mention of Items Nos. 16 (13) and 16 (30) in the Schedule I under the Bye laws would be perfectly legal. ( 6. ) AS regards the charging of licence fee, we may advert to section 366 of the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, the relevant sub-sections of which are as follows :- "s. 366. 16 (13) and 16 (30) in the Schedule I under the Bye laws would be perfectly legal. ( 6. ) AS regards the charging of licence fee, we may advert to section 366 of the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, the relevant sub-sections of which are as follows :- "s. 366. Licences and permission.- (1) Whether it is prescribed by or under this Act that the permission of the Commissioner is necessary for the doing of any act, such permission shall, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, be in writing, (2) Every licence and written permission granted under this Act, or under any rule or bye-law made thereunder, shall be signed by the Commissioner and shall specify- (a) the date of the grant thereof, (b) the purpose and the period, if any for which it is granted, (c) the restrictions and conditions, if any, subject to which it is granted, (d) the name of the person to whom it is granted, (e) the tax or fee, if any, paid for the licence renewal of the same day be made, (f) the date by which an application for the renewal of the same day be made. (3) Except when it is otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in any rule or bye law made thereunder, a fee for every such licence or written permission may be charged at such rate as may be fixed by the Commissioner and such fee shall be payable by the person to whom the licence is granted ". ( 7. ) THE said section authorises imposition of fee for granting a licence. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners was that as fee is charged for granting licence, the Municipal Corporation must establish a quid pro quo and also should indicate what services it renders in lieu of such fee. In this connection we may observe that the fee to be charged under section 366 of the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, is for a specific purpose, that is, for granting a licence in exercise of regulatory power conferred on the Corporation. As such, the fee for granting a licence will be different from a fee to be charged for services to be rendered. As such, the fee for granting a licence will be different from a fee to be charged for services to be rendered. This distinction has been drawn in Article 110 (2) of the Constitution of India, which provides as under : " (2) A bill shall not be deemed to be a Money Bill by reason only that it provides for the imposition of fines or other pecuniary penalties, or for the demand or payment of fees for licences or fees for services rendered, or by reason that it provides for the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or regulation of any tax by any local authority or body for local purposes. " The same distinction we find in Article 199 of the Constitution of India, wherein sub-clause (2) of the said Article provides as under:- "a bill shall not be deemed to be a Money Bill by reason only that it provided for the imposition of fines or other pecuniary penalties, or for the demand or payment of fees for licences or fees for services rendered, or by reason that it provides for the imposition abolition, remission, alteration or regulation of any tax by any local authority or body for local purposes. " Therefore, these two Articles of the Constitution envisage a distinction between fees for licences and fees for services rendered. The two concepts are distinct and there ought not to be any confusion while considering these two phrases in different enactments. ( 8. ) THIS distinction was first noted by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Shannnon and ors. v. Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board (1938 AC 708=air 1939 PC page 36.), wherein their Lordships observed as follows: "but if licences are granted, it appears to be no objection that fees should be charged in order either to defray the costs of administering the local regulation or to increase the general funds of the Province, or for both purposes. " It cannot, as their Lordships think, be an objection to a licence plus a fee that it is directed both to the regulation of trade and to the provision of revenue. ( 9. ) THIS pronouncement of their Lordships of the Privy Council was approved of by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in The Corporation of calcutta and another v. Liberty Cinema (AIR 1965 Ss 1107. ). ( 9. ) THIS pronouncement of their Lordships of the Privy Council was approved of by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in The Corporation of calcutta and another v. Liberty Cinema (AIR 1965 Ss 1107. ). In that case the maintenance of a cinema house required a licence; and the Calcutta Municipal Corporation had increased the licence fee from Rs. 400 Rs. 6,000 per year in the year 1958. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down that the levy was not invalid as being violative of Article 19 (1) (f) or Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. It was in that case that their Lordships noticed first the distinction between the licence fee on the one hand and fees for services rendered. Naturally, licence fee cannot be confused as fees for services to be rendered. Ultimately, their lordships held that licence fee in that case was in the nature of a tax and although it was a tax their Lordships upheld the impost made by the Calcutta municipal Corporation; that was the majority view, although the minority view may be in support of some of the propositions propounded by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the present case. ( 10. ) THE learned counsel for the petitioners further urged that as a fee, the impost must satisfy the test of quid pro quo. As already observed by us earlier, the test of quid pro quo will be applicable to fees, which may be charged in lieu of the services to be rendered. But the element of quid pro quo will not be necessary where a licence is granted and in lieu of such regulatory power, a fee is also charged. There is a specific provision in the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, authorising to Corporation to charge such fee as per section 366 of the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. Therefore, we would hold that such fees can be charged by the Corporation and such fees need not fulfil the test of quid pro quo because they are not fees for services rendered, but they are in the nature of a tax. ( 11. Therefore, we would hold that such fees can be charged by the Corporation and such fees need not fulfil the test of quid pro quo because they are not fees for services rendered, but they are in the nature of a tax. ( 11. ) HOWEVER, the learned counsel for the petitioners further urged that if the licence fee is considered to be in the nature of a tax, it was necessary for the Municipal Corporation to have followed the procedure laid down by section 133 of the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, for imposition of the tax. We may observe that the procedure laid down in section 133 of the Act is for imposition of the taxes mentioned in section 132 of the Act. Evidently, licence fee does not fall within any of the items mentioned in the different taxes as per section 132 of the Act. For licence fee there is a separate provision contained in section 366 of the Act and as such, it was not incumbent on the municipal Corporation to have resorted to the procedure prescribed by section 133 of the Act in the matter of imposition of taxes. Whether considered as a fee or as a tax, the Municipal Corporation has ample authority to charge such fee under section 366 of the Act. In this view of the matter charging such licence fee, in our opinion, cannot at all be challenged on the grounds urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners. ( 12. ) LASTLY, the learned counsel for the petitioners invited attention to the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in The Indian Misa and micanite Industries Ltd. v. The State of Bihar ( AIR 1971 SC 1182 ). In that case Rule 111 of the rules framed under section 90 of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915, required that a licence should be obtained for possessing denatured spirit used by manufacturer in his process, it was more or less assumed that the licence fee for the purpose was a fee for services to be rendered. The argument that licence fee need not fulfil the test of quid pro quo, was not at all advanced. The argument that licence fee need not fulfil the test of quid pro quo, was not at all advanced. On that assumption their Lordships of the Supreme Court remanded the case to the high Court for ascertaining whether any services were actually rendered and to what extent The case of The Corporation of Calcutta and another v. Liberty cinema (supra) was also noted by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, but no argument was advanced on the basis of the said Supreme Court case. We may observe that the case of The Corporation of Calcutta and another v. Liberty cinema (supra) will squarely govern the present case, which cannot be put on a par with the case of The Indian Misa and Micanite Industries Ltd. v. The State of Bihar (supra ). ( 13. ) AS a result of the discussion aforesaid, we are of the opinion that the imposition of a licence fee charged by the respondents for issuing a licence for trade in plastic and rubber goods, cannot be challenged by the petitioners on any ground whatsoever. ( 14. ) CONSEQUENTLY, this petition fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsels fee in this Court shall be Rs. 100. The outstanding amount of the security deposit, after deduction of costs, shall be refunded to the petitioners. Petition dismissed.