K.D. SHARMA, J.—This appeal filed by Gangada is directed against the Judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jalore, dated 4-3 1974, convicting the appellant under sec. 304, Part I, I.P.C. and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years. 2. The relevant facts, giving rise to this appeal, may be shortly stated as follows:—In the afternoon of 31-8-1973, Ramkin deceased was grazing his camel in the field of Deoji Kalbi, which was situated to the east of Gangadas field at the out-skirt of village Dadusan. Amalakh and Bhinya also were present with their camels in the same field at some distance. Teja son of Dhada, Ladu and another Teja son of Kheta were collecting grass in a nearby field of one Gangada Bhambhi. At that time, the appellant came to the field of Deoji Kalbi and picked-up a quarrel with Ramkin deceased over some money, which the latter owed to the former. During the course of wordy quarrel, Gangada appellant attacked Ramkin and inflicted several blows on his body with a cane-stick. The deceased raised an outcry, e.g. beaten, beaten, which attracted Amalakh, Bhinya, Ladu, Teja son of Dhuda and Teja son of Kheta to the place of occurrence. All those five witnesses saw Gangada causing injuries to Ramkin deceased with a stick. The first blow fell on the left shoulder of Ramkin, the second fell on his left knee and the third hit him on his head. As a result of these blows, Ramkin fell down unconscious. The witnesses rushed towards the deceased but when they were hardly about 2 or 3 paces away from him, the accused disappeared from the place of occurrence. The deceased was found bleeding from his head injury. Teja son of Dhuda and Teja son of Kheta removed Ramkin to his house and stayed with him during the night. Ladu also reached there with the camels of Ramkin. At about mid-night the deceased succumbed to his injuries. On the next morning Teja son of Kheta lodged a written report of the incident with Amar Singh, Head Constable at police station, Sarwana. A criminal case under sec. 302, I.P.C. was registered on the basis of the first information report made by Teja son of Kheta. At about mid-night the deceased succumbed to his injuries. On the next morning Teja son of Kheta lodged a written report of the incident with Amar Singh, Head Constable at police station, Sarwana. A criminal case under sec. 302, I.P.C. was registered on the basis of the first information report made by Teja son of Kheta. The police made the usual investigation into the case and, after collecting necessary evidence, sent the dead body of Ramkin to the Medical Officer, Incharge of the Primary Health Centre, Sanchore, for post-mortem examination. Dr. Ramesh Chandra Purohit conducted post-mortem examination on the dead body of Ramkin and found the following three injuries:— (1) lacerated wound 5 cm x 9 cm on the right side of frontal bone region 7 cm from the right eye brow 11 cm from right external ear 5 cm right to the mid-bone and parallel to it; (2) abrasion 1 cm x I cm on the antero-superior aspect of left shoulder joint.; (3) contusion 6 cm x 3 cm across the upper half region of right side of back. In the opinion of the Doctor the death occurred due to coma caused by extra-dural haemorrhage. The appellant was, therefore, challaned in the court of the Munsiff-Magistrate, Sanchore, for the offence of murder punishable under sec. 302, I.P.C. The learned Magistrate conducted an inquiry, preparatory to commitment, and upon finding a prima-facie case of murder against the appellant, committed him to the court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Jalore. The learned Additional Sessions Judge tried the appellant and found him guilty under sec. 304, Part I. I.P.C. and sentenced him as stated above. Aggrieved by his conviction and sentence, the appellant has come up in appeal to this court. 3................... ......... 4. ... ... ... ... ......... ...... 5. The last contention raised by the learned for the appellant is that looking to the nature of the injury caused on the head of the deceased and the weapon with which it was inflicted, it cannot be safely held that this injury inflicted by the appellant was of a severe nature and was capable of causing his death. It was further argued that the skull was not fractured due to this injury and that the death ultimately resulted chiefly due to coma caused by the extra-dural haemorrhage. It was further argued that the skull was not fractured due to this injury and that the death ultimately resulted chiefly due to coma caused by the extra-dural haemorrhage. The learned counsel, therefore, contended that at the most the appellant could be convicted for causing simple hurt to Ramkin deceased with a cane-stick. In support of his above contention, he referred to Ania Ghanchi vs. State of Rajasthan (S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 595 of 1966, decided on 191-1967). The above contention is devoid of force. On dissection of the dead body of Ramkin, Dr. Ramesh Chandra Purohit, found a large size 12 cm x 12 cm brown coloured blood clot present on the extra-dural portion of right frontal and right parietal region. He noticed haemorrhage from middle meningeal artery on both sides also. Dr. Ramesh Chandra Purohit was examined in the trial court also. In his deposition at the. trial he stated in clear and definite terms that the injury on the head was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased, because the internal effect of this injury was as follows:— "Haemorrhage from the middle meningeal artery present on both side. A large sized (12cm. x 12cm.) brown coloured blood clot present on the extradural portion of right frontal and right parietal region." The Doctor was definitely of opinion that due to this injury there was compression of the brain, which resulted in extra-dural haemorrhage. He further definitely opined that injury No. 1 on the head could be caused by cane-stick Art. 1, if it was used with great force in striking the blow. 6. In the referred to-above Rajasthan authority cited by the learned counsel, Honble V.P. Tyagi J arrived at a conclusion having regard to all the circumstances of that case that it was difficult to hold that Mst. Bhikhi died of the injuries cased by the appellant. The relevant observations made by Honble Tyagi J. at page 6 of the judgment are quoted below in extenso to show that the present case is distinguishable on facts from that case:— "It cannot be denied that shock is the direct result of the injuries, but it is difficult to say that it could be the natural result of the injuries sustained by the deceased at the hands of the accused. The injuries were all simple. The injuries were all simple. The dimensions of the injuries are also such that generally it is not likely to cause such a degree of shock which may result in an instantaneous death. There are various factors which can be responsible for causing shock out of which the subjective condition of a person, is very important. The instances quoted by Modi in his book referred to above (Medical Jurisprudence. 1963 Edn. may cause death in one out of thousand cases but that possibility is there and it cannot totally be ruled out that even the minor injuries of the nature which were caused by the accused in this case could create a condition of shock to a person which may result in the instantaneous death." The question whether death is the direct result of the head injury caused to Ramkin in this case is to be judged from several factors like nature, size and the effect of the injury together with the force with which it was struck on the vital part of the body of the victim of assault. The size and the nature of the injury in this case couple with considerable force, with which it was struck upon the head of the deceased, clearly indicate that the blow was a violent one resulting in extra-dural haemorrhage and causing compression of brain. Hence the contention of the learned counsel that the offence committed by the appellant at the most amounts to an offence of voluntarily causing simple hurt only is not acceptable. 7. The next question that remains to be considered is whether the appellant was rightly convicted under sec. 304, Part I, I.P.C. In this connection, it may be observed that the eye-witnesses are believed to have seen the appellant causing a single blow on the head of the deceased with a cane-stick. It transpires from the prosecution evidence itself that the assault on the deceased was not a pre — meditated one or a calculated move. It appears that the appellant insisted upon the deceased to make immediate payment of the loan which he had secured from the appellant prior to this occurrence. The deceased could not make the payment. Thereupon in a fit of anger the appellant caused a blow on his head with a cane-stick as a result of which he fell down and died on account of extra-dural haemorrhage. The deceased could not make the payment. Thereupon in a fit of anger the appellant caused a blow on his head with a cane-stick as a result of which he fell down and died on account of extra-dural haemorrhage. In these circumstances, I am of opinion that the accused appellant must have known that the blow which he was inflicting on the head of the deceased Ramkin may cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. He should have been, therefore, convicted under sec. 304 Part II, I P.C. As regards the sentence, suffice it to say that a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment only will meet the ends of justice. 8. Accordingly, the appeal is partly accepted and the conviction of the accused-appellant is altered from under sec. 304, Part 1 to one under sec. 304, Part II, I.P.C. and the sentence of ten years rigorous imprisonment awarded to him by the trial Judge is reduced to a sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment only. However, the period during which the appellant remained in detention during investigation, inquiry or trial of the case (i.e.) from 2 9-1973 the date of his arrest to 4 3-1974, the date of judgment of the trial court) shall be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him by the trial Judge on his conviction and his liability to undergo imprisonment shall be restricted to the remainder of the term of imprisonment imposed upon him.