JUDGMENT - B.N. DESHMUKH, J.:---This is an application under Article 227 of the Constitution. A very few facts need to be noted for the disposal of this application. The present petitioner is the opponent in a proceeding under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code pending before the Executive Magistrate and Sub-Divisional Officer, Bombay. That proceeding is numbered as No. 1 of 1975. It is alleged in the petition by the present respondent No. 1 as applicant that he was forcibly disposed of the premises, viz. Simla Star Bakery situated at Plot Nos. 85, 86 and 89, Squatters Colony Malavani Colony, Malad (West). On December 23, 1974 the present respondent No. 1 applied to the police by way of a complaint, but no action seems to have been taken by them. He therefore, moved the Magistrate on January 3, 1975, by filing the present Criminal Proceedings No. 1 of 1975 under the provisions of section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Respondent No. 1 also applied in that petition for the attachment of the premises. The application was rejected, but the Executive Magistrate passed a preliminary order under section 145 and issued show cause notice to the present petitioner. Parties appeared in due course and after taking some time filed their written statements. On February 24, 1975, respondent No. 1 again applied for attachment of the premises on the ground that the rolling shutter of the disputed premises was removed by the present petitioner. The only order passed by the then Presiding Magistrate was that the rolling shutter, if found, be attached, but the attachment of the premises themselves was refused. It appears that the shutter was found with a third person and was attached. In due course that third person made an application for releasing the shutter and it was released in his favour. It is stated before us that the learned Executive Magistrate, who was presiding over the Court, was transferred and one Mr. Karnik, now presiding over the Court, was posted in his place. In the afternoon of 30th July, 1975, present respondent No. 1 again made an application before the new Magistrate for the attachment of the disputed premises. He did not mention in that application that two previous prayers for the attachment in January and February had already been rejected by the earlier Magistrate. The new Magistrate, Mr. In the afternoon of 30th July, 1975, present respondent No. 1 again made an application before the new Magistrate for the attachment of the disputed premises. He did not mention in that application that two previous prayers for the attachment in January and February had already been rejected by the earlier Magistrate. The new Magistrate, Mr. Karnik, passed an ex parte order of attachment, and the same was carried out on 31st July, 1975. The premises were sealed after the attachment was levied by the police. The petitioner immediately moved the Executive Magistrate Mr. Karnik by his application dated 1st August 1975, to vacate that order. Both the parties were heard. The attachment was vacated by the Magistrate by his order dated 7th August, 1975. He gave a direction to unseal the premises. However, added a rider that this be done in the presence of both the parties. Though the petitioner moved the police to unseal the premises, respondent No. 1 did not make himself available and the order could not be executed. The petitioner again moved the Magistrate on 9th August, 1975, at about 12.00 noon that respondent was not making himself available, that there is a police report to that effect, and that the premises be unsealed without the presence of the respondent. However, within a short time, respondent No. 1 appeared before any orders were passed on that application and applied to the same Magistrate though his Advocate for stay of execution of the order dated 7th August, 1975. The learned Executive Magistrate, who was then at Borivali, passed an oral order to stay the execution till 4.00 p.m. on 11th August, 1975. Sometime on 11th August, 1975, respondent No. 1 filed revision application in the Sessions Court. No orders were received by the Executive Magistrate till 4.0 p.m. on that day and as per the oral order of stay the time expired and the police executed the order of vacating the attachment and handing over possession to the petitioner. Admittedly unsealing of the premises and handing them over to the petitioner was over by about 6.00 p.m. or 7.00 p.m. on 11th August, 1975. The revision application of respondent No. 1 was placed for motion hearing before the Additional Session Judge, Greater Bombay (Mr. Thakkar) on 12th August, 1975. Admittedly unsealing of the premises and handing them over to the petitioner was over by about 6.00 p.m. or 7.00 p.m. on 11th August, 1975. The revision application of respondent No. 1 was placed for motion hearing before the Additional Session Judge, Greater Bombay (Mr. Thakkar) on 12th August, 1975. He passed a stay order, after observing that the provisions of section 146(1) have not been observed by the Magistrate, as he has not recorded a satisfaction that there was no longer likelihood of breach of peace. In the circumstances, he could not have vacated his own order of attachment. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, therefore, felt that the revision ought to be heard. He issued notice of the revision application, but in the meanwhile, he also directed that the operation of the impugned order be stayed. A regular order was drawn up and an application was presented before the Executive Magistrate again on the same day for resealing the premises. After having pointed out the history of the dispute and after including the entire drawn up order as passed by the Additional Session Judge, the operative two paragraphs, which has become the matter of the dispute are as follows : "5. It was brought to the notice of the learned Additional Judge that the premises, viz., the new Simla Star Bakery at Kharodi, has been unsealed at 6.00 p.m. on 11th August, 1975, pursuant to the order given to the Police by Your Honour. 6. The learned Additional Judge at the Honble Sessions Court has directed us to inform Your Honour regarding the stay order and also to make this application before Your Honour for resealing the said premises, viz. New Simla Star Bakery for giving effect to the said stay order. Hence, I prefer this application before Your Honour for the necessary orders." It is upon this application that the learned Executive Magistrate wrote a letter to the Inspector of Police, Malad Police Station which itself is the only order on record. In this letter, the learned Executive Magistrate ordered the Police Officer that the disputed premises, viz. New Simla Star Bakery on Plot Nos. 85, 86 and 89 at Squatters Colony at Malvani Colony, Malad, (West), should be resealed after drawing up panchanama and inventory of the articles lying there till further orders. In this letter, the learned Executive Magistrate ordered the Police Officer that the disputed premises, viz. New Simla Star Bakery on Plot Nos. 85, 86 and 89 at Squatters Colony at Malvani Colony, Malad, (West), should be resealed after drawing up panchanama and inventory of the articles lying there till further orders. When such an ex parte order was passed and the premises were resealed the petitioner moved the learned Magistrate on 18th August, 1975, to again unseal and deliver back possession to the petitioner as the learned Additional Session Judge has never given any such directions as were represented to him by respondent No. 1. On such an application an order is passed on 23rd August, 1975, whereby the learned Executive Magistrate says that he had resealed the premises on the application of respondent No. 1 as per directions of the Sessions Court, as stated in the said application. Hence, the request of the present petitioner to unseal the disputed premises cannot be considered. He rejected that application. Being aggrieved, an application under Article 227 was presented to this Court, which came up for first order before the learned Single Judge, who directed that such applications lie before a Division Bench, and hence has come to us. The mere narration of facts given by us above will make it clear that so far as merits are concerned, the petition not only deserves to be admitted, but straightway allowed. The manner in which the order dated 30th July, 1975, came to be passed by the present Executive Magistrate is very difficult to understand. It may be that he had recently taken charge of his office. However, it was an application for resealing the premises for attaching and sealing the premises in an application which was already pending before him. It was No. 1 of 1975. A mere look at the record would have shown him that this application is pending since January, 1975, and twice such attempt has failed. Unless, therefore, some new development of facts were seriously alleged and proved, an ex parte order of the type, which was already refused twice, was ordinarily unthinkable. To say the least, it was an unjudicious order. A mere look at the record would have shown him that this application is pending since January, 1975, and twice such attempt has failed. Unless, therefore, some new development of facts were seriously alleged and proved, an ex parte order of the type, which was already refused twice, was ordinarily unthinkable. To say the least, it was an unjudicious order. We are also surprised that though the opponent No. 1 in his selfish interest suppressed the facts of the two earlier attempts, the Sheristedar, who is supposed to present such an application was bound to bring to the notice of the learned Magistrate the record of the case and the two earlier attempts which are failed. The whole matter at the level of the Sheristedar appears to be fishy and at the level of the Magistrate most unjudicious. The only saving grance so far as that Magistrate is concerned was that he was apprised of that situation by an application dated 1 August, 1975 and he had the goodness to vacate that order by his order dated 7th August, 1975. It is hereafter that a very peculiar situation has developed and that has led ultimately to the filing of the present application. Once the order dated 7th August, 1975, was passed, the Magistrate had merely to tell the police to go, unseal the premises and hand over possession to the present petitioner. We are at a loss to know what propriety was there in directing to unseal the premises in the presence of the present respondent. When the premises were attached and sealed obviously it was the petitioner who was in possession. The premises were taken and possession from him and they were merely to be handed over back to him. What was the propriety or necessity of directing that the premises be unsealed in the presence of the respondent is difficult to understand. Obviously the respondent merely avoided to be present and the order could not be executed for two long days. On the 9th of August, the Magistrate is again required to be moved that his own order is becoming infructuous because the respondent is not remaining present. There is a police report to that effect. Obviously the respondent merely avoided to be present and the order could not be executed for two long days. On the 9th of August, the Magistrate is again required to be moved that his own order is becoming infructuous because the respondent is not remaining present. There is a police report to that effect. It is at that stage that the Magistrate seems to have realised that he was carrying the matters too far and, therefore, gave an order that unless stay order was received as prayed by respondent No. 1 from some superior Court, the order should be executed after 4.00 p.m. on 11th August, 1975. As no such order was received, the order was executed and the petitioner was restored to possession sometime between 6.00 and 7.00 p.m. on 11th August, 1975. The matter should have again ended here. But a further complication developed by what took place in the Court of the Additional Session Judge and thereafter before the learned Executive Magistrate. Respondent No. 1 filed a revision Application being Revision Application No. 222 of 1975 in the Sessions Court, Greater Bombay. That application was filed on 11th August, but was not placed for orders before any Judge on that day. It came up for orders next day, i.e. August 12th, 1975. By the time the learned Session Judge was entertaining this revision application, the impugned orders were already executed and there was nothing to stay. Inspite of that fact, the learned Session Judge felt that the requisite satisfaction under section 146(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code was not recorded by the Magistrate and the order dated 7th August, 1975, directing the levying of the attachment and unsealing is unlawful. It is therefore, requires to be reconsidered. He, therefore, entertained the revision application and directed the stay of the impugned order in the meanwhile. Even here, the matter should have ended and no complications should have developed. However, a peculiar application came to be made before the learned Executive Magistrate on 12th August, 1975, on which a certain order has been passed by him and that created a further situation which requires to be now considered. The learned Executive Magistrate was told by a written application dated 12th August, 1975, that the learned Session Judge was apprised of the fact that the order dated 7th August, 1975, was already executed by 6.0 p.m. on 11th August, 1975. The learned Executive Magistrate was told by a written application dated 12th August, 1975, that the learned Session Judge was apprised of the fact that the order dated 7th August, 1975, was already executed by 6.0 p.m. on 11th August, 1975. However, the learned Session Judge directed respondent No. 1 to inform the Executive Magistrate regarding the stay order and also to make the application before the Executive Magistrate for resealing the said premises, viz. New Simla Star Bakery for giving effect to the said stay order. It appears that this application was construed by the learned Executive Magistrate or he was so induced to believe that a direction has been given by the learned Session Judge orally to the Magistrate to reseal the premises. From what we have already quoted from his letter earlier, it is obvious that the learned Magistrate inform the Police Officer that his own order dated 7th August, 1975, has been stayed pending the disposal of the revision application before the Session Judge and because of that stay order, he directed the Police Officer to reseal the premises after drawing panchnama and making an inventory etc. Naturally, the Police Officer had to carry out the order and on the same day the premises were again attached and sealed by the police. The mind of the learned Magistrate is not so clear from the letter dated 12th August, 1975, when the merely stated the fact of the stay order being issued by the Additional Session Judge, Greater Bombay, and at once went on to pass his own positive order. When the present petitioner, however, brought to his notice by an application dated 18th August, 1975, the fact that the stay order passed after the execution of the original order cannot have any effect and the learned Magistrate was in utter error in resealing the premises. At that stage, he wrote an order which indicated how he understood the earlier order or how he was induced to accept the meaning of that application by respondent No. 1 as the petitioner before him. He recorded below that application that he heard the learned Advocate Mr. Vasani for the present petitioner. At that stage, he wrote an order which indicated how he understood the earlier order or how he was induced to accept the meaning of that application by respondent No. 1 as the petitioner before him. He recorded below that application that he heard the learned Advocate Mr. Vasani for the present petitioner. He clearly stated that since the resealing was done of the disputed premises as per directions of the Sessions Court, as stated in the said application, the request of the petitioner to unseal the disputed premises cannot be considered. It is after all this happened that the present petition came to be filed, which we entertained under Article 227 and that at the motion hearing stage passed an ex parte interim order by which we vacated the interim attachment dated 12th August, 1975. We directed that the premises should be unsealed at once and possession should be handed over to the present petitioner forthwith. The order has already been carried out and only the hearing of this petition had remained. The very summary of events that have occurred till now, as given by us above will, show how gross is the case and why it is necessary that this Court should exercise its extra-ordinary powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution and interfere in the interest of justice, with the patently erroneous, unjudicious and illegal orders passed by the courts and Tribunals below. The first glaring circumstances in the case is that the present presiding learned Magistrate Mr. Karnik had no reason whatsoever to pass an ex parte order dated 30th July, 1975 granting the attachment and sealing of the premises. He could not have shut his eyes to the record and without knowing the previous history, he should not have passed the order. This is the very first glaring error committed by the Executive Magistrate so far as the present case is concerned. However, as we have pointed out earlier, this injustice was rectified by vacating the order on 7th August, 1975. An order of attachment and sealing of the disputed premises is an order in a pending petition under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Obviously, therefore, this was an interlocutory order. However, as we have pointed out earlier, this injustice was rectified by vacating the order on 7th August, 1975. An order of attachment and sealing of the disputed premises is an order in a pending petition under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Obviously, therefore, this was an interlocutory order. The second glaring error that has been committed in the proceedings is that the learned Additional Session Judge entertained the revision application under section 397 of the present Code inspite of the provisions of sub-section (2) thereof. The provisions are clear. Sub-section (2) of section 397 says that powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. We should emphasise the fact that the powers of revision of the Session Judge and that of the High Court are now the same so far as the present Criminal Procedure Code is concerned. If the provisions of section 399 are read with section 401, it would be obvious that the powers of entertaining revision applications and to dispose them of finally which were not vested in the Session Judge before, have now been vested in them by the Parliament. It must be remembered that great the power greater must be the circumspections with which they are used. The learned Session Judge should have, therefore, opened up this Chapter XXX of the new Code, as one has to acquaint oneself with the current laws which govern the procedure, if he had looked into section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, he would not have entertained this revision application at all. However, merely entertaining the revision application did not cause any harm. He had passed a stay order, which meant that the execution of the order dated 7th August, 1975, was to be stayed pending the revision application. Ordinarily it is a well know procedure and we except, should have been known by the Sub-Divisional Officer, who must be acting as a Magistrate for quite sometime, that a stay order received from a superior Court, after the original order is already executed, has to be merely certified with the remarks that the original orders were already carried out and there was nothing to be stayed. If further action of a positive nature is to be taken, it is for the superior Court, which is seized of jurisdiction at that stage, to pass appropriate direction and orders. However, from the peculiar circumstances that developed it surpasses our imagination how an application of the type, which was made on 12th August, 1975, could have been made and further how the learned Magistrate should persuade himself to accept a certain implied direction of a superior Court to him. What is done is, that respondent No. 1 makes an application on the same day, viz., 12th of August, 1975, whereby he informs the Executive Magistrate that stay order has been passed. The learned Executive Magistrate is informed that while passing the stay order the learned Sessions Judge was already apprised of the fact that the order dated 7th August, 1975, was actually carried out by 6.00 p.m. on 11th August, 1975. Even then, after passing the stay order, the learned Sessions Judge is supposed to have said orally that an application be made before the Executive Magistrate apprising him to the stay order passed and the application should claim resealing of the premises. During the course of this hearing, when we found that such allegation were made in the written application dated August 12, 1975, presented on behalf of respondent No. 1, we waited for sometime and sent the whole record to the learned Sessions Judge for his remarks on the broad points touching his conduct and an interim order was passed by this Court apprising the learned Sessions Judge of the proceedings and calling for his report on the two disputed points, viz. (1) whether he was apprised of the fact that the Executive Magistrates order dated 7th August, 1975, was already carried out and (2) whether he told any Advocate who appeared before him orally that an application be made before the Executive Magistrate in pursuance of the stay order for releasing the premises. The report has now been received yesterday, and in this report the Additional Sessions Judge says in unmistakable terms that he was never apprised of the fact that the order of the Executive Magistrate dated 7th August 1975, had already been executed at 6.00 p.m. on 11th August, 1975. The report has now been received yesterday, and in this report the Additional Sessions Judge says in unmistakable terms that he was never apprised of the fact that the order of the Executive Magistrate dated 7th August 1975, had already been executed at 6.00 p.m. on 11th August, 1975. He then states that he never told the petitioners Advocate orally that an application be made before Executive Magistrate for resealing the premises in pursuance of the stay order. Having answered the two quarries in this manner, the learned Sessions Judge adds that he may be permitted to say that had he been informed by the Advocate that the Executive Magistrates order had already been executed, he would not passed the stay order. We may note that the application on behalf of present respondent No. 1 was made and signed by two Advocates Mr. M.V. Mulik and Miss S.T. Farooqui. Out of these two Advocates Miss. Farooqui has also placed on record an affidavit dated 16th October, 1975, in which she says that she had brought the fact to the notice of the learned Sessions Judge of the earlier order being carried out and she was directed to file an application on the basis of the stay order. Mr. Poddar, learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 in this Court, told us that Mr. M.V. Mulik is a young lawyer of one year standing and Miss Farooqui has hardly one and half year standing at the Bar. However, he tried to insist upon saying that the affidavit be accepted and it be held that the discussion as alleged in the affidavit must have taken place before the learned Sessions Judge. We are prepared to make considerable allowance in this case because of the inexperience of the very junior members of the Bar. However, it is impossible for us to assume that any experienced Judge will ever pass the kind of order as has been attributed to the learned Additional Sessions Judge. We are expecting that if a Court is informed that the order, which it seeks to stay, is already executed, no stay order would originally be granted. It would entirely be different matter that the Court might itself grant an order of attachment if the justice of the case requires. It would not pass an order which is meaningless and could never be carried into effect. It would entirely be different matter that the Court might itself grant an order of attachment if the justice of the case requires. It would not pass an order which is meaningless and could never be carried into effect. When the learned Additional Sessions Judge says that he would never have passed the stay order if he were apprised of the earlier order being already executed, we think that would be the normal behaviour of any Court with some experience. The other point which occurs to us is that a revisional or an Appellate Court of some experience will never give any oral instructions to a party. That is the job reserved exclusively for the lawyers engaged by the parties and courts do not give gratituous advice. We therefore, accept the report of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Mr. Thakkar, that he never gave any direction that an application of resealing be made on the basis of the said order, which has already become ineffective. If we were to take a very charitable view of the matter, in view of the utter juniority of the Counsel involved, the maximum that can be said is that at times side talk takes place in the Court and Judges as human beings are used to blurt out some expressions. It is possible that the learned Additional Sessions Judge said "The impugned order is ineffective. You may try from the Executive Magistrate, but I will not give any further order. Such a loose talk may have been misconstrued by the junior Counsel as directions to them to make an application. Even this would be on the basis of a very charitable view, but we do not think that there could be any occasions for any experienced Court to pass oral order. It is again a matter of surprise to us that the learned Executive Magistrate should have been so willing to accept the application and pass an ex parte order of attachment of the premises. We assure that at least at that stage the learned Executive Magistrate should have cared to look into the record before passing any order. He could have seen that from 3rd January, 1975 attempt after attempt is being made to somehow or other to put a seal to the premises, but the premises have also remained in the physical possession of the petitioner. He could have seen that from 3rd January, 1975 attempt after attempt is being made to somehow or other to put a seal to the premises, but the premises have also remained in the physical possession of the petitioner. From 3rd January, 1975 to 12th August, 1975, no untoward incident had happened inspite of the fact that the present petitioner was in possession. If the Magistrate felt that there was such a direction as represented ex parte by a party, it was his bounded duty to have heard other side, which was already represented by an Advocate and thereafter pass orders. When he was so approached on 18th August by an application, he again sticks to the same position that there was an oral direction of the learned Additional Sessions Judge. We find it difficult to persuade ourselves that the Executive Magistrate of some experience could ever believe that superior courts give oral orders when serious consequences like deprivation of property from a party and attachment thereof is to be effected. This conduct of Mr. Karnik, the learned Executive Magistrate is mysterious and difficult to understand, and we must keep on record our strong disapproval of the manner in which orders are being passed by Mr. Karnik from time to time in this litigation. It shows utter want of judicious approach and seems to be too willing to pass an order whenever any application comes from respondent No. 1. In the circumstances, we allow this application and make the rule absolute. Order dated 12th August, 1975 passed by the Executive Magistrate, Greater Bombay, resealing the premises is quashed. We also quash the proceedings in Revision Application No. 22, of 1975 before the learned Additional Sessions Judge as they are entertained without jurisdiction. We further direct that Executive Magistrate Mr. Karnik shall not bear the original case, when the papers go back. Hence we direct District Magistrate to transfer proceeding No. 1 of 1975 under section 145 Criminal Procedure Code to the file of some other Executive Magistrate in Greater Bombay who is competent to try and dispose of the matter. -----