JUDGMENT P. Subramonian Poti, J. 1. The order of the Appellate Authority under the Shops and Commercial Establishments Act in Shop Appeal No. 117 of 1968 is under challenge in these writ petitions. The appeal concerned was preferred against the order of dismissal of one Sri P.M.S. Hameed by the employer, M/s. Popular Automobiles. Sri Hameed was working as a Sales Promoter in the Ernakulam Branch of M/s. Popular Automobiles. He joined service in 1960. On 15th 1968 he was transferred to the Bangalore Branch of the firm, M/s Popular Automobiles. The propriety of the order of transfer was questioned by Sri Hameed on the ground that he was appointed to serve only in anyone of the branches in the Kerala State. He also contended that the transfer was with a view to victimisation as he was the Vice-President of the Union of workers and the Union had put forward some demands on behalf of the workers. On 15th April 1968 he was transferred to the Bangalore branch of the firm M/s Popular Automobiles. When the petitioner failed to join duty in the Bangalore branch, the employer framed charges against him for wilful disobedience of lawful orders and for breach of discipline. A domestic enquiry was held against him and as a result of the enquiry he was dismissed from service. This order was the subject of the Shop Appeal before the Appellate Authority, the Additional Deputy Labour Commissioner, Ernakulam. The Appellate Authority found that since there were no standing orders or written conditions of service, the appellant was bound to accept the transfer, and therefore he should have obeyed the transfer order. The Appellate Authority also held that the domestic enquiry was proper and that all the charges raised against the petitioner had been proved. The Appellate Authority, however, found that considering the long record of service of Sri Hameed a lighter punishment, one other than dismissal from service should have been imposed. The Authority did not direct reinstatement, but directed the employer, M/s Popular Automobiles to pay, 16 months full pay amounting to Rs. 4,560 to Sri Hameed in lieu of his reinstatement as well as claim for back wages. It is this order that is challenged by Sri Hameed in O.P. No. 572. of 1973, while, the same order is challenged in O.P. No. 688 of 1973 by the employer. 2. 4,560 to Sri Hameed in lieu of his reinstatement as well as claim for back wages. It is this order that is challenged by Sri Hameed in O.P. No. 572. of 1973, while, the same order is challenged in O.P. No. 688 of 1973 by the employer. 2. The case of the petitioner in O.P. No. 572 of 1973 is that the Appellate Authority seems to have assumed that an authority to transfer is implicit in the employer in every contract of service, and therefore, unless it is otherwise shown, it should be taken that the employer is entitled to transfer his employee to anyone of his branch offices. This approach, it is said, is unwarranted because the law does not recognise any implied term in every contract of employment empowering the employer to transfer an employee from one place or branch to another. It is also contended that the Appellate Authority has gone wrong in assuming that wherever there is no express prohibition against transfer, power to transfer has to be implied. I think, there is force in that contention. It is also contended by counsel for Sri Hameed that the plea of mala fides has not been properly considered by the Appellate Authority. Two circumstances, it is said, are relevant in determining the question of mala fides; one of them is that the transfer was effected soon after the settlement reached between the workmen and the employees of M/s Popular Automobiles on the one part and the employer on the other in furtherance of some demands, to press home which there was agitation resulting in a lock out. Since the petitioner as the Vice-President of the Employees Union, is said to have taken a very important role in that agitation, the transfer is said to be a consequent act of victimisation. The second is that Sri Hameed was working as Sales Promoter in the Ernakulam branch and if the transfer was to be effective the petitioner had to be Sales Promoter in the Bangalore branch, but there was no Sales Office at Bangalore. 3. The case put forward by the employer in O.P. No. 688 of 1973 is that the Appellate Authority, having found that the charge was proved and the enquiry was proper, should not have held that the employee should be paid any amount as compensation as directed in the impugned order. 3. The case put forward by the employer in O.P. No. 688 of 1973 is that the Appellate Authority, having found that the charge was proved and the enquiry was proper, should not have held that the employee should be paid any amount as compensation as directed in the impugned order. It is also contended that there was no scope for reinstatement under such circumstances, and if so, the direction, regarding the payment of compensation in lieu thereof was unwarranted. 4. It is open to any employer to stipulate as one of the terms of service the right to transfer the employee to any one of the offices of the said employer. If that is done, no question of the right of the employer to transfer the employee will be in controversy since it will then be within the power of the employer to transfer the employee in accordance with the contract of service. If there is no such specified term in the service conditions, then, one will have to look into the attendant circumstances to find out whether the right of transfer of the employee was understood as an implied term or condition of the contract of service. There may be cases where the very nature of the employment may require periodical transfers. The employees working in certain employments would anticipate such transfers in the usual course. Therefore, the question whether the employer has a right to transfer his employee is a matter to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. It cannot be said that the right to transfer an employee is a right inherent in every employer and that irrespective of the absence of any term in relation thereto either express or implied, the employer is free to transfer an employee to any office or concern of his. The question in each case would ultimately depend upon the overall assessment of the circumstances of the case and it may not be possible to lay down any straight jacketed formula, to determine the question whether the right of transfer is implied in a contract of service. 5. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Kundan Sugar Mills v. Ziyauddin and others A.I.R. 60 S.C. 650, the Division Bench of this Court held in the decision reported in Manjumalai Estate v. Its Workmen and others (1963) I L.L.J. 220. 5. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Kundan Sugar Mills v. Ziyauddin and others A.I.R. 60 S.C. 650, the Division Bench of this Court held in the decision reported in Manjumalai Estate v. Its Workmen and others (1963) I L.L.J. 220. as follows:- "It is common ground that if the employer had the right to transfer Vasu from the Manjumalai Estate to another estate of the Travancore Tea Estate Company Ltd., then the order dismissing him for non-compliance with the order of transfer must stand; and that if the employer had no such right; the order of dismissal cannot be sustained and these writ appeals by the employer should be dismissed. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Kundan Sugar Mills v. Ziyauddin and others (1960 I L.L.J. 266: A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 650). "Apart from any statutory provisions, the rights of an employer and an employee are governed by the terms of contracts between them or by the terms necessarily implied therefrom." The question in this case has to be resolved in the light of the agreement entered into between Vasu and the Travancore Tea Estate Company Ltd., on 1st October, 1955."� The decision to which reference was made in the case was one where it was contended for the appellant that the right to transfer an employee from one concern to another is implicit in every contract of service. Referring to this, the Supreme Court observed that the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant in that case that the right to transfer an employee is implicit in every contract of service is too wide the mark. Apart from any statutory provision, the rights of the employer and the employee are governed by the terms of contract between them or by the terms necessarily implied therefrom."� 6. If the Appellate Authority had, on the facts and circumstances of the case before it, decided that the right of transfer was implied in the terms of the contract between the parties, there would certainly be no scope for interference with such a finding of fact by this court. If the Appellate Authority had, on the facts and circumstances of the case before it, decided that the right of transfer was implied in the terms of the contract between the parties, there would certainly be no scope for interference with such a finding of fact by this court. But, if on the other hand, the Appellate Authority had approached the case as if the right to transfer an employee is implied in every contract of employment, and it should be deemed as an inherent right possessed by the employer, certainly, the order passed by the Appellate Authority would call for interference. In the case before me, the Appellate Authority finds in paragraph 8 of its order that in my opinion, the appellant should have obeyed the order of transfer issued by the respondent, especially when many other employees have obeyed the order. Admittedly there was no certified standing orders or written conditions of service and as such, the appellant is bound to accept the transfer orders. The appellant has not produced any piece of evidence to show that his appointment is confined only to Kerala State and that he is not bound to work anywhere outside Kerala State. The order of appointment also (Ext. P-6) does not mention anything about it. In my opinion, the action of the respondent in transferring the appellant is not an act of victimisation, since the transfer of any employee from one branch to another is a normal feature. Simply because Mr. Hameed happened to be the Vice-President of the Union, it does not mean that he can disobey the order which is done in good faith by the respondent.� It is quite evident that the Appellate Authority has not considered the question in the proper perspective. The Appellate Authority proceeded on the basis that the right to transfer an employee from one place to another is an implied right in every contract. In this case there was no written agreement embodying the service conditions. The counsel for the employee contended before me that when there is no such written agreement indicating any term governing the right of transfer, the question whether the employer has a right to transfer his employees to any place of his choice, has to be determined taking into account all relevant facts. 7. The counsel for the employee contended before me that when there is no such written agreement indicating any term governing the right of transfer, the question whether the employer has a right to transfer his employees to any place of his choice, has to be determined taking into account all relevant facts. 7. Sri B. S. Krishnan, learned counsel for the petitioner seeks to place reliance upon the decisions in Syndicate Bank v. Its Workmen (1966) I L.L.J. 440 and Canara Banking Corporations v. Vittal (1963) 11 L.L.J. 354. I do not think these decisions are applicable to the facts of this case. In the cases relied on by counsel matters which were relevant were taken into account to determine whether a right of transfer should be found on the facts of those cases. This would, as I said earlier, depend very much upon the nature of the employment also. In the case of officers of Banks having branches in several parts of the country, the very nature of the employment would be sufficient to imply a right of transfer. Both the cases referred to by counsel relate to employees of Banks. No principle other than what has been discussed in this judgment earlier is seen to have been, laid down in, these decisions. Therefore these may hot be of any support to the case urged by the employer. I do not understand any principle other than that stated in the decision of the Supreme Court in Kundan Sugar Mills v. Ziyauddin A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 650 as having been expressed in the decisions adverted to in this paragraph. 8. The Appellate Authority found that though the charges are proved and enquiry has been held to be regular, the punishment is excessive. The counsel for the employer contended before me, that when once it is found that the concerned employee is guilty of the charges levelled against him and that the enquiry proceedings were regular, there is no scope for directing reinstatement. I am afraid I cannot agree. It is open to the Appellate Authority to examine whether the punishment is excessive. If it is excessive reinstatement would be the proper course for the punishment should then be something other than dismissal. In lieu of reinstatement, 16 months salary has been directed to be paid. I am afraid I cannot agree. It is open to the Appellate Authority to examine whether the punishment is excessive. If it is excessive reinstatement would be the proper course for the punishment should then be something other than dismissal. In lieu of reinstatement, 16 months salary has been directed to be paid. It is not the case of the employer that he would prefer reinstatement, to payment of compensation for 16 months. Therefore there is no scope for the court to interfere in the matter so as to direct reinstatement in place of payment of wages for 16 months. Since I have found that the Appellate Authority was wrong in its approach to the entire question regarding the right of transfer of the employee, and the question of victimisation has not been properly approached I think, the appropriate course would be to direct the Appellate Authority to reconsider the matter in the proper prospective, and in the light of this judgment. For that purpose, the order of the Appellate Authority, which is Ext. P-4 in O. P. No. 572 of 1973 and Ext. P-3 in O. P. No. 688 of 1973 is hereby quashed. The Appellate Authority will dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible, at any rate within four months from this date. The two writ petitions are ordered as shown above. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.