K. C. AGRAWAL, J. This is a defendants revision directed against the order of the trial Court dated September 24, 1973 striking off the defence of the appellant. The applicant is admittedly a tenant of the premises belonging to the opposite party. The opposite party filed a suit for eviction of the applicant on May 10, 1971. The suit was subsequently transferred to the court of the Judge Small Cause on January 27, 1973. The first hearing of the suit was fixed for April 12, 1973. The applicant admittedly did not make any deposit towards the arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation on or before the aforesaid date. The opposite party, thereafter, filed an application on September 14, 1973 for striking off the defence of the applicant. This application was made under Order 15, Rule 5, Civil Procedure "code, as amended by the U. P. Civil Laws Amendment Act (Act No. 37 of 1972 ). In this application the opposite party alleged that as the applicant had not made deposits required by the aforesaid rule 5 of Order 15, C. P. C. the written statement filed by the applicant was liable to be struck off. The application was contested by the applicant. He, however, also filed an application on September 19, 1973 for permission of the court to deposit Rs. 224 J -. According to the case of the defendant, the op posite party was not entitled to get the rent claimed by him in the suit. In support of this plea the defendant asserted that he had spent a huge sum in repairs of the house and as per the agreement he was entitled to adjust the amount spent by him on repairs. He, thus al leged hat in case the amount claimed by him was adjusted, the plain tiff opposite party was not entitled to get anything by way of arrears of rent or damages. The application was decided by the trial court on September 24, 1973. By the said judgment the trial court found that the applicant had not paid to the opposite party since March 1969. Therefore, the defence of the applicant was liable to be struck off. The trial court also found the total amount of rent payable by the applicant from March 1969 to April 12, 1973, which was the first date fixed for hearing came to Rs. 576/ -. Therefore, the defence of the applicant was liable to be struck off. The trial court also found the total amount of rent payable by the applicant from March 1969 to April 12, 1973, which was the first date fixed for hearing came to Rs. 576/ -. In the opinion of the trial court, the defence of the applicant was liable to be struck off also on the ground that the appli cant did not make monthly deposits after April 12, 1973 towards the damages. On this view of the matter the application made by the op posite party was allowed whereas the objections filed by the applicant were rejected. The applicant filed revision against the judgment of the trial court before the District Judge under Section 25, Small Cause Courts Act. The revision was dismissed and the judgment of the trial court was maintained. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders of the two courts below, the present revision has been filed by the defendant. In this case the sole question involved is about the scope and am bit of Order 15, Rule 5, C. P. C. as amended by the U. P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act (Act No. 37 of 1972 ). Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders of the two courts below, the present revision has been filed by the defendant. In this case the sole question involved is about the scope and am bit of Order 15, Rule 5, C. P. C. as amended by the U. P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act (Act No. 37 of 1972 ). The following Rule 5 was added in Order 15 of the Civil Procedure Code: " (5) Striking off defence on non-deposit of admitted rent, etc.- In any suit by a lesser for the eviction of a lessee from any immov able property after the determination of his lease, and for the re covery from him of rent in respect of the period of occupation thereof during the continuance of the lease, or of compensation for the use or occupation thereof whether instituted before or after the commencment of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws Amend ment Act, 1972, the defendant shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, (or in the case of a suit instituted before the com mencement of the said Act), the first hearing after such com mencement deposit the entire amount of rent, or compensation for (use and occupation admitted by him to be due, and thereafter throughout the continuance of the suit, deposit regularly the amount of monthly rent or compensation for use and occupa tion, due at the rate admitted by him, and in the event of any default in this regard, the court may unless after considering any representation made by him in that behalf it allows him further time on security being furnished for the amount, refuse to enter tain any defence or, as the case may be, strike off his defence. (2) The provisions of this rule are in addition to and not in derogation of anything contained in rule 10 of Order XXXIX. " It will be seen from the above provision that the defendant of a suit filed for the recovery of rent and eviction has been directed to deposit the entire amount of rent or damages for use and occupation admitted by him to be due. This amount admitted to be due has to be calculated upto the date fixed for first hearing of the suit. The question that now arises for determination is as to the meaning of the words admitted by him to be due. This amount admitted to be due has to be calculated upto the date fixed for first hearing of the suit. The question that now arises for determination is as to the meaning of the words admitted by him to be due. The learned counsel for the applicant contended that in the instant case the applicant did not ad mit that the rent for the period before the first hearing to be due on him, therefore, the aforesaid provision was not applicable to the in stant case. It appears from the written statement that the applicant had pleaded that he had spent more than what was due to the opposite party on repairs for the period mentioned above and as an ag reement had been arrived at between the applicant and the opposite party, he was entitled to adjust the rent towards the amount spent on repairs. It is no doubt true that the defence could be sruck off in case the applicant would have admitted that the rent claimed by the opposite party was due on him. But as the claim of the oppo site party was being disputed by the applicant and he did not admit that rent was payable by him to the opposite party, it cannot be said that the aforesaid provision would still be applicable. For the pur pose of making a defendant liable to pay the amount under this clause, it is absolutely essential to establish that the rent was due. But if the liability of payment of rent is denied the defence of such a defen dant cannot be struck off. The ground on which the defendant is as serting that the rent is not payable by him to the landlord is, however, immaterial. What is material for the purpose of attracting the aforesaid clause is that the rent must have been admitted by the defendant to be due only then it becomes payable to the person entitled to get it. As the power to strike off defence brings about serious consequences the same has to be resorted to only when the requirements of the said provision have been strictly proved. The legislature cannot be imput ed with the intention of providing that the defence of a tenant can be struck off despite the fact that he is disputing the claim of a landlord made for the recovery of rent. The legislature cannot be imput ed with the intention of providing that the defence of a tenant can be struck off despite the fact that he is disputing the claim of a landlord made for the recovery of rent. Accordingly, I am not pre pared to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the oppo site party that the liability of the rent must be held to have been ad mitted irrespective of the adjustment which was being claimed by the applicant. Accepting the above argument would not only des troy the object of the Act but also lead to unjust results. It is, therefore, not correct that what was material to be seen was that the defendant was a tenant and the moment the tenancy was establish ed at a certain monthly rent the tenant was liable to make the depo sit. It is not possible to draw such a conclusion. In my opinion as the applicant did not admit the amount claimed by the opposite party, there is no justification for making an order striking off the defence. The courts below committed an error of jurisdiction in doing so. The other aspect which deserves to be considered is about the future monthly rent. The trial court as well as the learned Judge in revision found that the applicant had not made monthly deposits after April 12, 1973 towards the rent. The fact that the applicant did not regularly deposit monthly rent upto September 1973 has not been dis puted by the learned counsel for the applicant before me. The qu estion, therefore, is whether the trial court had jurisdiction to strike off the defence merely because the future monthly deposits had not been made by the applicant after April 12, 1973. Considering the case one cannot rule out the possibility that had the trial court taken a correct view of the provision of Order 15, Rule 5 of the Civil Pro cedure Code it might not have directed for strikng off the defence of the applicant. The provisions of Order 15, Rule 5 also confers po wer on a court to grant further time for making the deposit. But the court below misconceiving the scope of its power rejected the ap plication made by the applicant. Thus the trial court can be deem ed to have declined jurisdiction having failed to exercise it. The provisions of Order 15, Rule 5 also confers po wer on a court to grant further time for making the deposit. But the court below misconceiving the scope of its power rejected the ap plication made by the applicant. Thus the trial court can be deem ed to have declined jurisdiction having failed to exercise it. In my opinion the present was a fit case where the applicant should have been granted further time to deposit monthly rent for the period after December 12, 1973. It may be mentioned here that the applicant had filed the application on September 19, 1973 for permission to deposit the rent. If the trial court would have granted the permisison to the plaintiff making the deposit in the sum of Rs. 224/- that would have met the requirement of making the monthly deposits towards the rent. In the result the revision succeeds and is allowed. The orders of the trial court as well as of the District Judge striking off the de fence are set aside. The application made by the applicant is allow ed. He is directed to deposit the amount mentioned therein within a month from the date of the receipt of the record by the court be low. The applicant will further deposit damages for use and occu pation for the period from May 1, 1973 to June 30, 1975 within two months of the receipt of the record by the trial court. He will also go on making monthly deposits for the period not covered by this order in accordance with order 15, Rule 5, C. P. C. No order as to costs. Revision allowed. .