JUDGMENT DBARMADHIKARI J.-As both these cases involve common quest ions of law and fact and common arguments were advanced before us, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. In Special Civil Application No. 957 of 1975 co-option to the Board of Studies for economics has been challenged. The facts as well as the questions of law raised in this petition are practically the same to one in Special Civil Application No. 1128 of 1975. At the initial stage the names of Shri S. R. Ozerkar and Shri R N. Kharche were proposed for the election of Working Chairman of the meeting. Each of them got 5 votes, and therefore, lots were drawn. Shri Kharche was then elected as the working Chairman of the meeting. Then the meeting considered the question of co-option. In all 4 names were proposed. In the election Dr. Khandewale got 6 votes and therefore, he was declared elected. However, Dr. Deshpande and Professor Kherde got 5 votes each. The Working Chairman Shri Kharche, therefore, used his casting vote in favour of Shri Kherde and he was declared to be elected as member to be co-opted in category of teachers. It was contended in the petition that this whole procedure followed was illegal and the casting vote was also used by Shri Kharche in mala fide exercise of his power in favour of Shri Kherde, who also belongs to Shivaji Education Society. It was also contended by the petitioners that Dr. Deshpande was more qualified than Professor Kherde. Then the question for co-opting 3 members with specialised knowledge who are not the teachers of the Nagpur University or any other University was taken up. In all names of 6 persons were proposed and all of them got 5 votes each. Therefore, Shri Kharche used his casting vote in favour of Shri Yawalkar, Shri Bhishikar and Dr. Korpe and they were declared to be co-opted on the Board. In this case also it is alleged by the petitioners that Shri Kharche has used his casting vote in favour of persons who belong to his group According to the petitioners, the co-option of all these members was illegal. However, it seems from the record that the persons who were declared to have been co-opted were not joined as parties to the petition, and therefore, a preliminary objection in that behalf was raised by the respondents Nos. However, it seems from the record that the persons who were declared to have been co-opted were not joined as parties to the petition, and therefore, a preliminary objection in that behalf was raised by the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 in their returns. In view of the objection raised, an amendment application is filed by the petitioners for joining these co-opted persons as parties to the petition. 3. In Special Civil Application No. 1128 of 1975, petitioner No.1 Shri P. L. Shende, who is a Professor at Anand Niketan College, Warora, was an elected member under section 29 (2) (ii) of the Nagpur University Act, 1974, referred to hereinafter as the Act, of the Board of Studies known as Board of Studies in business administration and business management in the faculty of commerce. After the elections were held under section 29 (2) (i) and (ii) of the Act, a meeting was convened vide notice issued by the Deputy Registrar, Nagpur University, dated 30th June 1975. The meeting was scheduled to be held on 16th July 1975 for the purposes of co-opting-members under sub-clauses (iii) and (iv) of section 29 (2) of the Act. In the meeting held on 16th July 1975 the members present decided to elect a Working Chairman as till then the Chairman of the Board of Studies under sub-section (4) of section 29 could not be elected. The names of pro P. J. Deshmukh and Professor W. S. Kale were suggested for the said post. It seems from the minutes of the meeting that both of them got equal votes, and therefore, lots were drawn. Ultimately Professor W. S. Kale was declared elected as the Working Chairman. After the election of the Working Chairman was held, some of the members, including the petitioner No. 1 before us, raised an objection that the Chairman, Professor Kale, should not use his casting vote in case equal votes are polled by the, respective contestants. This objection was ruled out by the Chairman, who held that it was within the rights of the Chairman to exercise his casting vote and a, such he would use the same in case it becomes necessary. Thereafter the members who objected to the said procedure attended the meeting under protest. In all 3 members were to be elected. This objection was ruled out by the Chairman, who held that it was within the rights of the Chairman to exercise his casting vote and a, such he would use the same in case it becomes necessary. Thereafter the members who objected to the said procedure attended the meeting under protest. In all 3 members were to be elected. One Shri Mohta secured 6 votes, whereas Shri Bhandarkar, Shri Sen, Shri Thengdi and Shri Tatod got 5 votes each. The Working Chairman, therefore, declared Shri Mohta elected as he had secured highest number of votes and so far as other candidates, who secured equal Dumber of votes, were concerned, the Working Chairman used his casting vote in favour of Shri Sen and Shri Thengdi. By virtue of this casting vote they secured 6 votes each, and therefore, they were declared elected. Thereafter co-option took place to elect 2 members from amongst the teachers, who were not Heads of Departments under section 29 (2) (iv) of the Act. For this in all 4 nominations were received. All the four contesting candidates obtained 5 votes each. Therefore, the Working Chairman used his casting vote in favour of Shri D. S. Meghe and Shri B. U. Thakare, and therefore, they were declared as duly co-opted on the Board of Studies, referred to hereinbefore. It is these, co-options which are challenged in these writ petitions. 4. Shri Mohta, the learned counsel for the petitioners in Special Civil Application No. 1128 of 1975, contended before us that as no procedure has been prescribed either by the Ordinance or the Statute or by the Act itself as to how the members are to be co-opted, the procedure prescribed for the election ought to have been followed in this behalf. He further contended that in view of the provisions of section 11 of the Act it was the Vice Chancellor alone who could have presided over the meeting of the Board of Studies, he being an Ex-Officio Chairman of the Board of Studies. As a corollary of this argument he further contended that, therefore, notice of the meeting for co-option to the Vice Chancellor was necessary and as no notice was issued to the Vice Chancellor and that the person who was not authorised to preside over the meeting had presided over the said meeting, the proceedings of the said meeting are ab initio void. According to Shri Mohta, in any case the Chairman was not authorised to use his casting vote because the process contemplated has an element of election and the casting vote is unknown to the process of election. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the lots should have been drawn in case of equality of votes. In substance, therefore, he contended that the exercise of the casting vote by the Working Chairman was in itself illegal and the same has materially affected the result of the co-option. It was also contended by Shri Mohta that the Working Chairman, Shri Kale, has exercised his right of casting vote mala fide in favour of the persons belonging to his group or institution. 5. For properly appreciating the contentions raised before us, it will be necessary to make a reference to certain provisions of the Act. The term "election" or "co-option" is not defined in the Act itself. Section 3 of the Act provides for incorporation of the University. Then section 19 of the Act lays down the authorities of the University, which includes Board of Studies. Section 11 of the Act defines powers and duties of the Vice Chancellor and then comes section 29 which deals with the constitution of Board of Studies. The relevant provisions of section 11 (1) and section 29 read as under: "11 (1) The Vice Chancellor shall be principal executive and academic officer of the University, and shall, in the absence of the Chancellor, preside at the meetings of the Senate and at any convocation of the University. He shall be an ex-officio member and Chairman of the E1tecutive and Academic Councils, the Board of University Teaching and Research, the Committee for Selection of Teachers of the University, the Committee for recognition of Teachers of the University, the committee for appointment of Examiners, the Committee for Academic Planning and Evaluation, the Finance Committee, Library Committee and such other authorities and bodies as are provided by or under this Act. He shall be entitled to be present, with the right to speak, at any meeting of any other authority or body of the University, but shall not be entitled to vote thereat unless he is a member of that authority or body. He shall be entitled to be present, with the right to speak, at any meeting of any other authority or body of the University, but shall not be entitled to vote thereat unless he is a member of that authority or body. 29 (1) There shall be a Board of Studies for every subject or group of subjects, as prescribed by the Statutes, (2) The Board Shall consist of- (i) The Heads of University Departments concerned; (ii) not more than ten Heads of Departments in Colleges teaching the subjects at the special principal or major level, to be elected from amongst themselves, as prescribed by the Statutes; (Hi) three persons to be co-opted by the Board, who have specialised knowledge in the subjects and are not teachers in this University or in any other University or in any College; and (iv) two persons to be co-opted by the Board, from amongst the, Teachers who are not Heads of Departments. I (3) The term of office of members under clauses (ii), (Hi) and (iv) of sub-section (2) shall be three years. (4) The Chairman shall be elected by the members of the Board from amongst themselves From the bare reading of section 11 of the Act it is quite clear that the Vice-Chancellor is the principal Executive and Academic Officer of the University. Further, he is an Ex-Officio member and a Chairman of the Executive and Academic Councils, the Board of University Teaching and Research, the Committee for selection of Teachers of the University, the Committee for recognition of Teachers of the University, the Committee for appointment of Examiners, the Committee for Academic Planning and Evaluation, the Finance Committee, the Library Committee and such other authorities and Bodies as are provided by or under the Act. It is pertinent to note that the Board of Studies is not included in these Committees or Bodies. It further appears from the various provisions of the Act that whenever the Legislature thought it expedient that the Vice-Chancellor should be treated as an ex- officio member and Chairman of a Body or a Committee, a specific provision in that behalf is made in the Act. In this context reference could be usefully made to sections 23, 25, 31, 33 and 34 of the Act. In this context reference could be usefully made to sections 23, 25, 31, 33 and 34 of the Act. In contra-distinction to these provisions if the provisions of sections 28 and 29 are read, it is quite clear that neither the Boards of interdisciplinary studies or Board of Studies provide that the Vice Chancellor will either be an ex-officio member or Chairman of these Boards. In the Act whenever a provision is made for constituting the various Bodies referred to in section 11, a specific provision has been made that the Vice Chancellor will be either an ex-officio member and a Chairman of the said Bodies or Committees. Such a provision is not made in section 29 of the Act. 6. However, it is contended by Shri Mohta as well as Shri V. M. Kulkarni, the learned council for the petitioners, that in view of the provisions of section 11, the Vice Chancellor will become an ex-officio member and the Chairman of all the authorities and Bodies which are provided by or under the Act. It is contended by the learned counsel that the Board Of Studies is provided by section 19 of the Act, and therefore, if the provisions of sections 11, 19 and 29 are read together, on the proper construction of these provisions it will have to be held that the Vice Chancellor is not only an ex-officio member, but is the Chairman of the Board of Studies also. 7. For the reasons already stated hereinbefore it is not possible for us to accept these contentions. If the various provisions of the Act, including sections 11, 19 and 29, are read harmoniously, it is quite clear that whenever the Legislature wanted that the Vice Chancellor should be made an ex-officio member and a Chairman of a Body a specific provision in that behalf is made. Such a provision is not a made in section 29. Section 29 deals with the constitution of the Boards of Studies, which shall consist of various members referred to in section 29. This does not include the Vice-Chancellor. On the contrary, sub-section (4) of section 29 clearly indicates the intention of the Legislature. This sub-section provides that the Chairman of the Board of Studies is to be elected by the members of the Board of Studies from amongst themselves. This does not include the Vice-Chancellor. On the contrary, sub-section (4) of section 29 clearly indicates the intention of the Legislature. This sub-section provides that the Chairman of the Board of Studies is to be elected by the members of the Board of Studies from amongst themselves. A specific provision has been made in this behalf by section 29 of the Act. Therefore, it is obvious to us that the Chairman elected under subsection (4) of section 29 of the Act will be the Chairman of the Board of Studies and the general provisions, if any, made in section 11 will have no application. This clearly indicates that the Vice-Chancellor is neither an ex-officio member of the Board of Studies nor is he an ex-officio. Chairman, though under section 11 of the Act he is entitled to be present with a right to speak in such a meeting, but in that case also he shall not be entitled to vote thereat as he is not a member of the said Body or the authority. In this view of the matter, it ill not possible for us to accept the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that the Vice-Chancellor alone was entitled to preside over the meeting or in absence of any notice to him the meeting itself is illegal. 8. Then it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the process of co-option contemplated by section 29 is analogous to the process of election. According to the learned counsel, section 29 deals with the constitution of a Body. When in the field there are more than one person, then necessarily the process of election is contemplated. According to the learned counsel, in the present case names of more than one person were suggested for the posts, and therefore, the process of selection involved. If this is so, according to the learned counsel, though the word used is "co-option", by necessary implication it means that in the cases where names of more persons than the seats available are proposed, then the seats can be filled in by election only. He further contended that as no procedure for co-option is provided by the Act, the procedure provided for the election alone should have been followed. In this context they have relied upon the provisions of section 78 of the Act which provide for a procedure for election. He further contended that as no procedure for co-option is provided by the Act, the procedure provided for the election alone should have been followed. In this context they have relied upon the provisions of section 78 of the Act which provide for a procedure for election. It is not possible for us to accept this contention. 9. It is obvious from the phraseology used in section 29 of the Act itself that though some element of process of selection or election is inherent in the process of co-option also, in our opinion, the co-option cannot be equated with the election. In section 29 (2) (ii) of the Act the procedure contemplated for choosing not more than ten Heads of Departments in Colleges teaching the subjects is concerned, the words used are "to be elected from amongst themselves as prescribed by the Statutes." While in sub-sections (iii) and (iv) of section 29 (2) the phraseology used is "to be co-opted by the Board." Therefore, the Legislature has used a different phraseology when it intended that the seats should be filled in by process of election. Whenever it is thought expedient by the legislation that the process of election should be followed the words used are "to be elected from amongst themselves". Whenever the legislation thought that the process of election should not be followed and the process of co-option should be followed, the phraseology used is "to be co-opted by the Board." When such a different phraseology is used by the Legislature, obviously the Legislature did not mean that "election" and "co-option" should mean the same thing. Section 78 of the Act, to which a reference has been made by the learned counsel, deals with the process of election and not with the process of co-option. Therefore, in our opinion, for co-opting a member on the Board of Studies the procedure prescribed by section 78 of the Act cannot be made applicable. 10. However, in support of his contentions Shri Kulkarni has, relied upon the dictionary meaning of the term "co-optation". In Encyclopaedia Britanica the term "co-optation" is defined as meaning election to vacancies on a Legislature, administrative or other body by the votes of the existing members of the body instead of by an outside constituency. 10. However, in support of his contentions Shri Kulkarni has, relied upon the dictionary meaning of the term "co-optation". In Encyclopaedia Britanica the term "co-optation" is defined as meaning election to vacancies on a Legislature, administrative or other body by the votes of the existing members of the body instead of by an outside constituency. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines the word "co-opt" as meaning to elect into a body by votes of its existing members and "co-optation" as meaning election into a body by votes of its existing members, formerly, election choice, adoption. Webster's New Twentieth Century dictionary defines the word "co-opt" to -mean to add (a person) to a Board, Committee etc. by vote of those already members. In Corpus Juris Secundum, "co-optation" has been defined as a concurring choice, also the election, by the members of a close corporation of a person to fill a vacancy. Therefore, two broad distinguishing features of the process of co-option apart from other features, are that no one has a right of being co-opted as is the case with election and the person to be co-opted to a Body must be other than the persons who are already members of that Body. These dictionary meanings indicate that to some extent the process of election is contemplated in a process of co-option also. However, it is quite clear that co-option cannot be equated with the election. How a seat is to be filled in or how that addition to the body is to be made will, therefore, obviously depend upon the constitution of a Body and the Statute which prescribes the manner or procedure for the same. We do-not mean to suggest that whenever a Body is called upon to act as a Body for the purposes of co-option, a Statute cannot lay down that a process analogous to election should be followed. But in this case we are not concerned with the general theory as to how the process of cooption is, to be followed. We are on a limited issue as to whether the present Statute indicates that while co-opting members on the Board of Studies under section 29 of the Act, the procedure for election as contemplated by section 78 of the Act should be followed or not. As already observed, the Legislature has used two different phraseologies in this behalf and one cannot be equated with another. As already observed, the Legislature has used two different phraseologies in this behalf and one cannot be equated with another. 11. As to what is the meaning of "co-option" has been considered by this Court in Deolal v. K. M. Galat Patil1. In this context this Court observed as under: "It is difficult to uphold the contention that a process of co-option is to all intents and purposes similar if not the same, as the process of election. In an election a certain procedure is required to be followed. There has to be previously given a notice Sufficiently wide that there shall be an election so that persons who are entitled to vote and eligible to contest may know about it This is followed by inviting nomination of candidates for the post or the office to be filled by election. Then there is a scrutiny of the nomination or the nomination paper. In some cases a withdrawal of the nomination, i.e. withdrawal from the contest is permitted within the prescribed time. Then follows generally a provision for declaration of a person as elected if the number of nominations received is equal or less than the number of seats to be filled. If more persons names are nominated than the seats required to be filled then there has to be a poll or a voting. There are various methods of voting; generally by ballot, if not, by some other method is prescribed. Then this is followed by counting of votes cast in favour of each candidate and generally a candidate who obtains a majority of votes is declared elected. Thus the important feature that distinguishes the process of election from the process of co-option is that a person, who is eligible to fill a particular office by election has a right to be nominated and bas a right to be elected. This cannot possibly be contended in the case of an office to be filled by co-option. Nobody can claim that he or she has a right to be co-opted. This cannot possibly be contended in the case of an office to be filled by co-option. Nobody can claim that he or she has a right to be co-opted. Another distinguishing feature is that in an office to be filled by co-option, even if a person's name is suggested for co-option and no other name is suggested, it does not follow that, that person automatically gets co-opted; the matter has to be put to vote and if the majority decides against the proposal, the person whose name is proposed for co-option does not become a co-opted person or a co-opted member. The person who is not co-opted has no further right of challenging, except in very limited circumstances, as in the present case. We must, therefore, reject the contention that the process by which persons are required to be selected or chosen as co-opted members under clauses (C), (d) or (e) of sub-section (1) of section 57 can at all be equated to a process of election or that a co-opted person can be called an elected person. In our opinion, the provision made for co-option of the different categories of persons enumerated in clauses (c), (d) and (e) of sub-section (1) of section 51 is nothing but a method of appointing persons described in those categories as members by choice of majority of the elected members." This decision was subsequently followed by another Division Bench of this Court in Shantabai Kisanrao v. Commissioner, Nagpur Division2. Therefore, it is quite clear to us that the process of co-option contemplated by section 29 of the Act is not the same as the process of election as contemplated by section 78. Section 29 of the Act clearly contemplates that the concerned Board of Studies should co-opt persons. The persons are to be co-opted by the Board itself. In the cases before us, when the first meeting for co-option was held, the persons belonging to the categories (i) and (ii) of section 29 (2) alone were in the field. Therefore, these members were entitled to co-opt the members to the Board. This may not be the position when the subsequent vacancy is to be filled in, because at that stage other members on the Board may also' be available for filling the vacancy by process of co-option. Therefore, these members were entitled to co-opt the members to the Board. This may not be the position when the subsequent vacancy is to be filled in, because at that stage other members on the Board may also' be available for filling the vacancy by process of co-option. From the bare reading of section 29 it is quite clear that the co-option is contemplated by the Board. It is pertinent to note that no procedure has been prescribed by the Statute as to bow the co-option is to take place. As to how the Board is to act is provided by Statute 48 of the Statutes framed under the Nagpur University Act. The procedure of the meetings of the Board of Studies is prescribed by Statute 48. Under clause 5 of Statute 48 the Registrar of the University is authorised to decide hours of the meeting. Then clauses 9 and 10 of the said Statute provide as under: "9. In the absence of the Chairman of the Board, the members present shall elect a Working Chairman from amongst themselves. 10. All questions coming up or arising before the meeting shall be decided by the majority of such members as are present and vote thereat. In case of equality of votes, the Chairman shall have a second or casting vote." Therefore, in the absence of any specific provision in this behalf it is obvious that the provisions of Statute 48 will apply to the meetings of Board of Studies convened under section 29 of the Act. In the present case a meeting of the elected members of the Board of Studies was convened for the purposes of cooption. Therefore, in the absence of anything else it is obvious that the procedure prescribed by Statute 48 will apply to such a meeting also. 12. At the initial stage in the meeting scheduled to be held for the purpose of co-option, the Chairman of the Board of Studies could not preside because his election under sub-section (4) of section 29 comes later on. Therefore, in the absence of the Chairman of the Board under section 29 (4) the members present were entitled to elect a Working Chairman from amongst themselves. This is what exactly has been done in the present case. Therefore, in the absence of the Chairman of the Board under section 29 (4) the members present were entitled to elect a Working Chairman from amongst themselves. This is what exactly has been done in the present case. It seems from section 29 itself that in the first meeting scheduled to beheld for the purpose of constituting tile Board itself by co-opting the members the Chairman elected under sub-section (4) of section 29 is not available at that stage. Therefore, only alternative left is to elect a Working Chairman from amongst the/members present. In the cases before us as there was a tie between the two candidates for the post of Working Chairman. In view of this tie the working Chairman was elected by drawing lots. This was the only course which could have been followed at that stage. It is pertinent to note that the present meeting was convened by the Registrar, and the Deputy Registrar was presiding over the meeting. The Deputy Registrar was neither a Chairman nor a Working Chairman of the Board. He was also not a member of the Board of Studies. Therefore, obviously if he had no right to vote, then the question of his casting vote or exercising second vote will not arise. This being the position, the only alternative left was to draw the lots and accordingly in the said meeting the lots were drawn and Shri Kale was elected as the Working Chairman. The procedure followed in this behalf, therefore, was obviously in conformity with clause 9 of Statute 48. Then clause 10 of Statute 48 provides that questions coming up or arising before the meeting are to be decided by the majority of such members as are present and vote thereat. In case of equality of votes, the Chairman shall have a second or casting vote. In the present case Professor Kale himself was a member of the Board of Studies. Therefore, initially he exercised his right of vote as a member; and in view of the equality of votes, he then exercised his right of a second or casting vote. Once it is held that the meeting convened for the purpose of co-option is also governed by Statute 48, as no other procedure is prescribed, then, in our opinion, no exception can be taken to the procedure followed in the meeting. Once it is held that the meeting convened for the purpose of co-option is also governed by Statute 48, as no other procedure is prescribed, then, in our opinion, no exception can be taken to the procedure followed in the meeting. Such a view has been taken by this Court in Shantabai Kisanrao v. Commissioner, Nagpur Division as well as Deolal v. K. M. Galat (cit. supra). In these cases it was held by this Court that the procedure prescribed for meeting was to be followed in the meeting convened for the purpose of co-option also. This Court further observed that if there is equality of votes, then such majority can be arrived at by the Presiding authority casting his second vote. This is one of those classes of cases where the power given to the Presiding authority to have a second or casting vote is coupled with a duty to make use of that power and to cast a vote in cases where there is an equality of votes. In the present cases the same power is exercised by the working Chairman, and therefore, in our opinion, the procedure followed was perfectly in accordance with Statute 48. 13. A reference was also made by Shri Kulkarni to a decision of this Court in Somnath v. Municipal Council, Arvi3. In our opinion, the observations made by this Court in the said decision are of no assistance while construing tl1e provisions of section 29 and other provisions of the Nagpur University Act. As a matter of fact, after making a reference to the various meanings (jf the word "co-optation" as given in the dictionaries, in the said decision this Court observed that "how the vacancy is to be filled or how that addition to the body is to be made may depend upon the constitution of the Corporation or upon the Statute which prescribed the manner of co-option". In that case this Court was dealing with the provisions of the Municipalities Act and the Rules framed thereunder and after making a detailed reference to the various provisions of the Act and the Rules this Court observed that the principle of election is incorporated in the Rules themselves. In that case this Court was dealing with the provisions of the Municipalities Act and the Rules framed thereunder and after making a detailed reference to the various provisions of the Act and the Rules this Court observed that the principle of election is incorporated in the Rules themselves. The Rules provide that where the eligible candidates exceed the number of seats voting has to take place and that voting must be by the system of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote. Therefore in the said case rules themselves provided that the procedure of election should be followed while co-opting the members. In the case before us section 29 provides for a co· option by the Board of Studies itself. It does not lay down any independent procedure to be followed for the purpose of co-option. If this is so, then, in our opinion, the process of election contemplated by section 78 of the Act will not be applicable. On the contrary, from the bare reading of section 29 it is quite clear that the matter is left to the Board itself and they are to co-opt a person on the Board of Studies from amongst the classes specified in sub-clauses (iii) and (iv) of section 29 (2) of the Act. If this is so, in our opinion, it being the function of the Board, it could be completed in a meeting itself and if the process of co-option is to take place in a meeting of the Board, then obviously Statute 48 should apply to such a meeting also. In this view of the matter, in our opinion, the process of cooption followed in the present case is perfectly legal and in accordance with law. 14. However, it was contended by the learned counsel that the Presiding Officer, namely, Professor Kale, has exercised his right of casting vote or a second vote in mala fide exercise of his power, namely, in favour of the persons belonging to Shri Shivaji Education Society, in which he himself is working. According to the learned counsel, therefore, this casting of second vote is vitiated because of the bias and mala fide exercise of the said power. In our opinion, there is no substance in this contention also. According to the learned counsel, therefore, this casting of second vote is vitiated because of the bias and mala fide exercise of the said power. In our opinion, there is no substance in this contention also. If the Presiding Officer or the Chairman of the meeting has got a second or the casting vote, then in whose favour he exercised the said vote is irrelevant. Even if he has exercised the said vote in favour of a person belonging to his group, it cannot be said that the power has been exercised by him either mala fide or with a bias. When there are more than one person in the field and one is to be chosen, obviously a vote is to be cast in favour of one or the other. This is inherent in the process itself. If this is so; only because a person chosen belongs to one of the Colleges or institutions of the Society, to which the Working Chairman belonged, in our opinion, it cannot be said that the Working Chairman had exercised his right of second vote or casting vote either mala fide or with bias. 15. It was then contended by Shri Kulkarni that while casting the second vote it was obligatory on the part of the Chairman of the meeting to have found out as to who was more qualified amongst the contesting persons. In our opinion, this enquiry is also not germane for deciding the question in these petitions. Section 29 (2) (iii) contemplates that persons with specialised knowledge in the subjects should be co-opted on the Board. There is no challenge if the petitions or before us that the persons in whose favour the casting or the second vote is used by the working Chairman are not the persons who have specialised knowledge in the subjects. Therefore, obviously all the persons in the field were duly qualified and were eligible to be co-opted. In this view of the matter, in our opinion, if the second or the casting vote is exercised in favour of a person who is eligible and duly qualified, it cannot be said that the exercise of the second vote or the casting vote was in any way illegal. In this view of the matter, it is not possible for us to accept this contention also. l6. In this view of the matter, it is not possible for us to accept this contention also. l6. In the result therefore, both the Special Civil Applications fail and are dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.