JUDGMENT - G.N. VAIDYA, J.:---Petitioner No. 1 is the father of petitioner No. 2 The Petitioners have filed the above Special Civil Application, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the validity of the judgment and decrees passed by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nandurbar, dated September 22, 1970 and by the District Judge, Dhulia dated September 23, 1971, directing the Petitioners to be evicted from the suit plot on the ground of non-payment of rent of Rs. 5/- per month. When this petition was called out, neither the Petitioners nor their Advocate were present. However, this is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India; and looking into the ground and the judgments of the two courts below, I called upon Mr. Desai, the learned Counsel for the respondent , to support the judgment of the two courts below and particularly of the learned District Judge. The fact that the petitioner No. 1 had taken the suit plot on lease, on October 1, 1967, was not in dispute. There was a dispute in the trial Court between the parties about the standard rent. The landlord was contending that the rent of suit plot was Rs. 5/-. The petitioners were contending that the rent of the suit plot Rs. 3/-. The landlords case was that the Petitioners were in arrears of rent since October 1, 1967, notwithstanding that there was an earlier suit No. 158 of 1967, in which there was a compromise dated September 16, 1969, in which the standard rent was fixed at Rs. 5/- p.m. The suit was resisted by the Defendants contending that the plot was taken on lease at Rs. 3/-. per month about 35 years ago; the compromise was arrived at by them due to pressure brought upon the Petitioners; and further that they had paid Rs. 60/- after service of notice of termination on them; but no receipt was given by the landlord. On these pleadings the parties examined themselves. On behalf of the landlord the plaintiff-landlord examined himself and produced the judgment in the previous suit No. 152 of 1967 and some other documents to show that the standard rent was Rs. 5/- per month. On behalf of the Defendants, Shanker Parsaram Marathe, petitioner No. 1 was examined; and he stated that the suit plot was taken on lease by his father Parsharam at Rs. 3/-. 5/- per month. On behalf of the Defendants, Shanker Parsaram Marathe, petitioner No. 1 was examined; and he stated that the suit plot was taken on lease by his father Parsharam at Rs. 3/-. per month; and he had built a house which was a two storeyed residence worth about Rs. 10,000/-. It may be noted that even the Plaintiff admitted that there was a two storeyed house on the suit plot; but according to him the value of the suit house was Rs. 1,500/- only. The learned Civil Judge considered this evidence and held that as the standard rent in the earlier suit was not decided on merits, it was open to the Court to fix the standard rent ; the standard rent was Rs. 5/- per month; and the Defendants, having failed to prove that they had paid any amount during the pendency of the suit, the suit fell within the ambit of section 12(3)(a), as it could not be paid that the dispute about the standard rent was a real dispute; and the plea of standard rent was false having regard to the compromise decree passed between them, the absence of an application made by the tenant under section 11; and non-payment of any amount during the pendency of the suit. The learned District Judge in an appeal filed by the tenants did not agree with the trial Judge in so far as the applicability of section 12(3)(a) was concerned. According to the learned District Judge in spite of the compromise decree it was open to the Petitioners to raise a dispute about the standard rent. He held that the learned trial Judge was not right in holding that there was no bona fide dispute merely because the Court held on merits that the standard rent was Rs. 5/- per month, particularly because section 12(3)(a) does not contemplate categorically that the dispute must be bona fide. In fact, the learned District Judge has observed in pare 6 of his judgment that the Advocate appearing for the landlord did not support that part of the judgment of the trial Court dealing with the applicability of section 12(3)(a). 5/- per month, particularly because section 12(3)(a) does not contemplate categorically that the dispute must be bona fide. In fact, the learned District Judge has observed in pare 6 of his judgment that the Advocate appearing for the landlord did not support that part of the judgment of the trial Court dealing with the applicability of section 12(3)(a). However, the learned Judge confirmed the decree for eviction on the ground that section 12(3)(b) applied to the case ; and the tenant had not complied with the provisions of that section by depositing arrears of rent and costs as required by that section. There was considerable doubt about the procedure to be followed by the courts regarding compliance of section 12(3)(b), till the decision of the full Bench of this Court, in (Dattu Subhana v. Gajanan Vithoba)1, 73 Bom.L.R. 371. In that case it was held : (1) that in a proceedings under section 12(3)(a), it is open to the tenant to contend that section 12(3)(a) does not apply and section 12(3)(b) of the Act must apply ; (2) and that it was open to the tenant to raise a dispute as to the standard rent, even after a suit is filed against him for eviction, on the ground of non-payment of rent for more than six months, by his written statement, and that would be a dispute for the purpose of section 12 of the Act. Both the courts below did not have the benefit of this judgment; and therefore, they approached the law with considerable hesitancy and the arguments based on earlier decisions which were somewhat difficult for the lower courts to follow. If section 12(3)(b) applies, the following consequences must follow : (1) no decree for eviction shall be passed in any such suit if, on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the Court may fix, the tenant pays or tenders in Court the standard rent and permitted increases then due: and (2) thereafter continues to pay or tenders in Court regularly such rent and permitted increases till the suit is finally decided and also pays costs of the suit as directed by the Court. This provision requires the Court not to be a passive spectator of the manoeuvres between the landlord and the tenant. This provision requires the Court not to be a passive spectator of the manoeuvres between the landlord and the tenant. The Court is expected, where the tenant does not pay an amount at the hearing of the suit, to fix the day for payment of standard rent. The words and thereafter are very important. It means that it is only where the tenant has paid or tendered payment on first hearing of the suit or the Court has fixed the amount that should be paid by the tenant, that the tenant should thereafter continue to pay regularly till the suit is finally decided. Further he must also be directed by the Court to pay the costs. Where the Court failed to give these direction till the passing of the decree, it is the duty of the Court under that section first to direct the tenant to pay all the arrears and costs before it can pass a decree for eviction. The Court has no jurisdiction to pass straightway decree of eviction as appears to have been done by the two courts below under section 12(3)(b) which applies to the present case. Mr. Desai, the learned Counsel for the respondent landlord, however, vigorously urged that the learned District Judge erred in reversing the findings of the trial Court under section 12(3)(a). He argued that section 12(3)(a) applies to the present case as there was no bona fide dispute between the landlord and tenant about the standard rent having regard to the compromise decree, the failure of the tenant to make an application under section 11 and even to his not paying a single paise during the pendency of the suit. In support of his argument, he relied on a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in (Yashbai Gangadhar v. Ganpat)2, 76 Bom.L.R. 278, where a view appears to have been taken that, notwithstanding the absence of the words bona fide before dispute in section 12(3)(a), the Court must in the ends of justice or in accordance with previous practice of this Court and stare dicesis which compels judges to follow previous precedents even if erroneous, the word dispute contemplated in section 12(3)(a) must be read as bona fide dispute to enable the tenant to claim benefit under that section. It is not open to Mr. It is not open to Mr. Desai to urge such a point as no such point was urged in either of the courts below. It was not the contention of the landlord that the dispute was not bona fide. It was the contention of the tenant that the standard rent of the premises was Rs. 3/- per month. The landlord contended that the rent was Rs. 5/- p.m. Even assuming that on the ground of state decisis the courts are expected by legal Rules to go on adding in section 12(3)(a) world bona fide as held in the above case, there can be no better case of bona fide dispute than the present one, where it is alleged by the tenants, that on account of some coercion, they had entered into a compromise earlier in 1967, two years before the present suit to pay Rs. 5/- per month. The learned District judge, in my opinion, was quite right in holding that the mere fact that the Court came to the conclusion that, considering the evidence, the standard rent was Rs. 5/- p.m. was not sufficient to hold that there is no bona fide dispute. The learned trial Judge has losely described the nature of the dispute. Once he says that there was no real dispute notwithstanding that the dispute was the subject-matter of an issue ; and he had devoted several pages to consider the dispute. It is very difficult to understand what the learned trial Judge held by saying that there was no real dispute when there was a serious dispute between the landlord and the tenants. Later on in the very para of his judgment, viz., para 11, he says that the plea of standard rent was false. That he was entitled to say after considering the plea of dispute; but the mere fact that the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the plea was false does not mean that there was no bona fide dispute. The only evidence considered on the point consists of the testimonies of the landlord and tenants and some documents which must also be considered having regard to the welfare legislation intended by the Rent Act in the light of the provisions of the Rent Act. The only evidence considered on the point consists of the testimonies of the landlord and tenants and some documents which must also be considered having regard to the welfare legislation intended by the Rent Act in the light of the provisions of the Rent Act. The fact that the tenant did not pay a single paise during the pendency of the suit was totally irrelevant to determine the bona fides of the dispute as no order was passed by the Court to that effect. The trial Court had wrongly held that because an application under section 11 was not made, there was no bona fides on the part of the tenants. It was open to the Defendant-tenants, as held by the full bench of this Court, to raise the plea, even in the written statement, filed in the suit for eviction, filed by the landlord. Mr. Desais contention that section 12(3)(a) applies to the facts of the case must, therefore, be rejected as there was a serious dispute. Even if the Division Bench decision adding bona fide before dispute is to be preferred to what has been expressed by the Legislature, it must be held to be a bona fide dispute between the landlord and tenant, in this case. Hence section 12(3)(a) can never apply to such a case. It was next contended by Mr. Desai that it was the duty of the tenants before seeking relief under section 12(3)(b) to comply with these provisions by expressing readiness and willingness to pay the rent, deposit all arrears of rent and costs in the Court; and as it was found by both the courts below that not a single paise was paid, the finding that tenant was not entitled to relief under section 12(3)(b) cannot be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and also having regard to the well settled principles that even on appeal the Appellate Court cannot reverse the findings recorded by the trial Court with regard to the credibility of the witnesses and the parties. There is no substance in this contention. The Rent Act is an Act under which certain duties are cast on the parties as well as on the courts. There is no substance in this contention. The Rent Act is an Act under which certain duties are cast on the parties as well as on the courts. The courts cannot ignore that the Rent Act is intended to protect the tenant notwithstanding the termination of the contractual tenancy and very often in contravention and violation of the express terms of the contractual tenancy. Thus, whatever might be the agreed rent, the Court has the power and duty to fix the standard rent when called upon to do so. Whatever might be the common law and pre-Rent Act provisions of the law of landlord and tenant regarding eviction decrees, the courts are prevented from passing eviction decrees expressly if section 12(3)(b) applies, except in accordance with the procedure laid down in any law. Whatever may be the grounds of termination in the contractual tenancy or under lease, it is only if one of the grounds under section 13 is established, the courts are given powers to evict the tenants. The Rent Act has become a necessity in most of the cities in the world with chronic scarcity of urban accommodation. Statutory protection is given to the tenants by way of security of accommodation and prevention and protection from the horrid evils which go with such scarcity in human society. That is why the Rent Act is often described as welfare Legislation. It should be liberally construed and faithfully applied by a Judge to cases before him. It is not open to the courts to ignore the statute just because the Judges in the courts do not agree with the legislative provisions and pass any decrees they like as has been done in the present case by the courts below. The courts must construe a statute as it stands without imposing their personal like and dislikes of landlords and tenants or the law. It was incumbent on the learned District Judge who rightly held that section 12(3)(b) applied to fix a date for payment of the arrears and costs before he could pass a decree for eviction as that is the clear scheme under section 12(3) (b) as explained above, even where the parties had not moved the Court for fixing interim standard rent or arrears of rent. Such Welfare legislation is not carefully considered and liberally interpreted. Such Welfare legislation is not carefully considered and liberally interpreted. The tenants do not know what to do and how to comply with the statutory obligations under the Rent Act. Unfortunately, the conflicting interpretation of such law which have become a phenomena of modern India, after Independence, adds to the difficulties of the lawyers in guiding the tenants in such matters. The intention of the Legislature is to give benefit to the class of tenants having disputes about the standard rent in a particular way. It is defeated when the relief is totally denied to the tenants on account of misinterpretation or misconception of specific provisions contained for reliefs in the provisions of law like section 12(3)(b). It is true that the Appellate Court should not ordinarily interfere with the credibility of the witnesses on the basis of which the trial Court came the to the conclusion. In the presence case, the two courts below have misconceived the law and ignored their own statutory duties of determining the amounts of arrears of tent for payment under section 12(3)(b). The defaults are not merel of tenants but also of the landlord and the courts. The Court did not comply with the provisions. Neither the landlord nor the tenant cared to move the Court for passing the necessary and proper orders under section 12(3)(b). It may be that the landlords would not move the Court because the landlord in this case, as generally in most cases suing for eviction for non-payment of rent contend that section 12(3)(a) applies, and the disputes about the standard rent are not bona fide or are false. That does not however mean that the courts can ignore the provision of section 12(3)(b) which requires them to pass order in a particular way. In any event, Mr. Desai is not right in assuming that the order of the two courts below are being reversed with regard to any of their findings of credibility of witnesses. Their orders are being reversed because they have not properly applied the provisions of section 12(3)(b) to the facts of the case and not because of the credibility of the witnesses. The errors committed by the two courts below are errors of jurisdiction. The trial Court committed an error in assuming that this was a case where it had jurisdiction for passing a decree of eviction under section 12(3)(a). The errors committed by the two courts below are errors of jurisdiction. The trial Court committed an error in assuming that this was a case where it had jurisdiction for passing a decree of eviction under section 12(3)(a). That error was committed and rightly corrected by the learned District Judge by applying section 12(3) (b). The learned District Judge also committed an error of jurisdiction in assuming that he could pass a decree for eviction without first fixing the date for payment of arrears of rent and costs. Therefore, he wrongly exercised the jurisdiction which he could not have done under section 12 (3)(b). Mr. Desai submitted that nothing was paid by the tenant towards arrears of rent and costs and, therefore, this Court should not, in exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, set aside the decree for eviction passed by the learned District Judge. In ground No. 3 of the petition filed in this Court, it is stated that the Petitioners have paid the entire rent due along with the costs of the suit in the lower Court. That statement is not controverted by the landlord by filing any affidavit in reply. When this petition was admitted, interim stay on usual terms was granted. The report sent by the Civil Judge, Nandurbar, on February 12, 1972, on the writ of this Court shows that the petitioners had deposited all arrears of rent upto December 1971 and undertook to deposit further rents as and when due. The undertakings given by the Petitioners are enclosed with the report. The landlord-respondent had not filed any petition in this Court complaining of any breach of undertakings. The submission of Mr. Desai that nothing was paid by the petitioners is therefore, inconsistent with what is stated in the petition and the report sent by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nandurbar. However, as the petitioner and their Advocate had not cared to appear, the ends of justice require that a proper inquiry should be made with regard to the arrears of rent and costs; and an opportunity should be given to the Petitioners to deposit the arrears and costs which may still be unpaid. However, as the petitioner and their Advocate had not cared to appear, the ends of justice require that a proper inquiry should be made with regard to the arrears of rent and costs; and an opportunity should be given to the Petitioners to deposit the arrears and costs which may still be unpaid. The argument that the discretion of this Court should not be exercised to that effect must be rejected because for many years the Petitioners have a residential house on the plot built by themselves and it would be against the provision of section 12(3)(b) to throw them out of the premises without giving them an opportunity to deposit all arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 5/- per month as fixed by the two courts below and the costs in all the three courts of this litigation. In the result, the judgment and decrees passed by the two courts below are set aside. The rule is made absolute subject to the following orders : (1) No decree for eviction shall be passed against the Petitioners if the Petitioners deposit all arrears of rent which may still remain unpaid upto the date of their payment in Court for which the trial Court shall hold an inquiry within a fortnight after the receipt of the write of this Court in the trial Court and fix a date under section 12(3)(b) thereafter for payment of the amounts so decided to be payable by the Petitioners; (2) If the Petitioners fail to deposit the arrears of rent, if any, as ordered by the trial Court in pursuance of what is directed hereinabove, a decree for eviction shall be passed against the Defendants-Petitioners directing them to vacate the plot and deliver possession thereof after removing the structures thereon within a period of two months from the date of decree. (3) The Petitioners shall deposit the costs of all the three courts in the trial Court within a fortnight after receipt of the writ in the trial Court; and if the Defendants-Petitioners fail to do so also a decree for eviction, as per direction in (2) above, shall follow. -----