JUDGMENT - B.M. SAPRE, J.:---These are two appeals, one filed by the State and the other by the original complaint against an order of acquittal. The original accused No. 1 Vilas Desharath Shate is the son and the original accused No. 2, Desharath Dadoba Shate is his father. They are running a grocery shop at Kolhapur. Accused No. 2 is the licence-holder of the said shop. On 25th July 1972, Parulekar, who was then serving as Food Inspector, Kolhapur Municipal Corporation, and who is the original complainant, visited the shop of the accused. After disclosing his identity to accused No. 1, who alone was present in the shop, he purchased Dhana Dal weighing 450 gms. from the shop. He divided the quantity in three equal parts and, as per the prescribed procedure, sent one part weighing 150 gms, to the Public Analyst for Analysis. In due course, the report of the Public Analyst was received to the effect that the sample contained coal tar dye, namely, tartraizine. Thereafter, the two accused were prosecuted. There is no dispute that the article in question, namely, Dhana Dal, is food as defined in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, hereinafter referred to as "the Act". The offence which the accused were said to have committed was under section 16(1)(a)(i) read with section 7 of the Act. In short, they are said to have stored and sold an adulterated article of food. The adulteration complained of is one falling under section 2(i)(j), which says that an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated if any colouring matter other than that prescribed in respect thereof and amounts not within the prescribed limits of variability is present in the article. Under Rule 28 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, hereinafter referred to as "the Rules", certain coal tar dyes are permitted to be used in food. Tartraizine is one of such coal tar dyes, the use of which is permitted under Rule 28. It is not in every kind of food that the use of permitted coal tar dyes is allowed. Rule 29 provides that use of permitted coal tar dyes in or upon any food other than these enumerated in the Rule is prohibited. Clause (f) of Rule 29 enumerates "fruit products". Clause (m) enumerates "flavouring agents". It is not in every kind of food that the use of permitted coal tar dyes is allowed. Rule 29 provides that use of permitted coal tar dyes in or upon any food other than these enumerated in the Rule is prohibited. Clause (f) of Rule 29 enumerates "fruit products". Clause (m) enumerates "flavouring agents". Even where the use of permitted coal tar dyes is allowed under Rule 29, the maximum limit of these is prescribed by Rule 30. In acquitting the two accused, the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Court No. 1, Kolhapur, before whom they were tried, took the following view:- What was found in the Dhana Dal stored and sold by the accused was Tartraizine. The use of this coal tar dye in food is permitted by Rule 28. It is true that the use of permitted coal tar dyes is totally prohibited under Rule 29 in all foods other than these enumerated in that Rule. But the article in question fell both under Clause (m) Flavouring agents and Clause (f) Fruit products. In holding that the article in question fell under Clause (m) the learned Magistrate acted on the evidence of the Food Inspector Parulekar (P.W. 1), who incidentally was the only witness examined in the case. He stated in cross-examination that Dhana Dal is generally consumed after meals and as a flavouring agent. It was solely on the basis of this evidence that the learned Magistrate held the article in question to be falling under Clause (m) of Rule 29. For holding that it also fell under Clause (f), the learned Magistrate relied upon a decision of the Gujarat High Court in (Bhogilal Hargovandas Patel v. The State of Gujarat)1, 8 Guj.L.R. 64, where a learned Single Judge of that Court had taken the view that Dhana Dal is a fruit product. The learned Magistrate thus held that what was found by the Public Analyst in the article in question was tartraizine, the use of which was permissible under Rule 28. The use of the said permitted coal tar dye was allowed under Rule 29 if the article fell under one of the clauses mentioned in that rule and the article in question fell either in Clause (m) or Clause (f) of that Rule. The use of the said permitted coal tar dye was allowed under Rule 29 if the article fell under one of the clauses mentioned in that rule and the article in question fell either in Clause (m) or Clause (f) of that Rule. Then, the only situation in which the article in question could be called adulterated was if the permitted coal tar dye was found in excess of the maximum limit prescribed by Rule 30. But the report of the Public Analyst (Ex. 10) was silent on the question of the percentage of tartraizine found in the article and all that the report mentioned was that the sample contained an extraneous coal tar dye, namely, tartraizine and, therefore, it did not conform to Rule 29 of the Rules. That did not show that the maximum limit of the permitted coal tar dye prescribed by Rule 30 had been exceeded. In the result, the learned Magistrate acquitted the two accused on the ground that the Dhana Dal in question was not proved to be an adulterated article of food. It is the correctness of this order of acquittal that is being challenged in these two appeals. Mr. Heble for the complainant does not dispute that if Dhana Dal falls under Clause (m) or Clause (f) or any other clause of Rule 29, then, the report of the Public Analyst being vague in regard to the requirement of Rule 30, the benefit of it must go to the accused and in that case the order of acquittal would be correct. On the other hand, according to him, if Dhana Dal does not fall under any of the clauses of Rule 28, it means that the use of permitted coal tar dyes (tartraizine in this case) was totally prohibited and if some quantity of tartraizine was found in the article, which is the case here, then the article would be adulterated and it is immaterial if the Public Analyst had failed to determine further the percentage of the permitted coal tar dye in the article Mr. Deshmukh, the learned Public Prosecutor on behalf of the State, however, did not concede the position that if the article in question falls under one of the clauses of Rule 29, then, because of the vagueness in the report of the Public Analyst, the accused are entitled to an acquittal. Deshmukh, the learned Public Prosecutor on behalf of the State, however, did not concede the position that if the article in question falls under one of the clauses of Rule 29, then, because of the vagueness in the report of the Public Analyst, the accused are entitled to an acquittal. His submission is that the report of the Public Analyst mentions that the sample does not conform to Rule 29 of the Rules. According to him, this means that the maximum limit prescribed by Rule 30 of tartraizine in the article in question had been exceeded. There would have been some substance in this submission had the Public Analyst stated in his report that the sample does not conform to Rule 30. But he has not referred to Rule 30 at all. All that he has referred to is Rule 29. His statement that the sample does not conform to Rule 29 can only mean that the article does not fall under any of the clauses of Rule 29. The report of the Public Analyst, therefore, does not support the argument of Mr. Deshmukh that even if the article in question falls under one of the clauses of Rule 29 and, the use of tartraizine was permitted, the maximum limit of the permitted coal tar dye in the article in question, as prescribed by Rule 30, had been exceeded. In order to hold that the accused stored or sold an adulterated article of food, the short question that will have to be decided is whether the article falls under one of the clauses of Rule 29. As already noted, what was found in the article was tartraizine which is a coal tar dye permitted to be used in food by virtue of Rule 28. Its use is totally prohibited in articles of food which do not fall under one of the clauses of Rule 29. In other words, the use of tartraizine in articles of food enumerated in the several clauses of Rule 29 is permitted. Since there is no evidence that the maximum limit of permitted coal tar dye prescribed by Rule 30 had been exceeded, there will be a complete defence in favour of the accused if it is found that the Dhana Dal in question falls under one of the clauses of Rule 29. Since there is no evidence that the maximum limit of permitted coal tar dye prescribed by Rule 30 had been exceeded, there will be a complete defence in favour of the accused if it is found that the Dhana Dal in question falls under one of the clauses of Rule 29. The learned trial Magistrate had held that Dhana Dal is a flavouring agent within the meaning of Clause (m) of Rule 29. For this he has relied only upon the evidence of Food Inspector, Parulekar, who is stated to have admitted in cross-examination that Dhana Dal is generally consumed after meals and as a flavouring agent. It is true that this statement finds place in the memorandum of evidence made by the learned Magistrate in English. The language of the Courts in the mofussil, however, is Marathi and it is in that language that the witness had given his evidence. It was that evidence that was read over to the witness and was admitted by him to be correct. The memorandum of evidence made by the learned Magistrate in English is not required to be read over to the witness nor was it in this case so read over to the witness and there was no question of the witness being required to state whether what was recorded was correct. Therefore, when a question arises as to what exactly the witness had stated in his evidence, it is the Marathi deposition of the witness which has to be taken into account. In the Marathi version of the evidence of the witness, the English rendering of which in the memorandum of evidence prepared by the learned Magistrate was relied upon, he had stated : "which means that the Dhana Dal is ordinarily consumed after meals in order to leave a pleasent taste in the mouth". In this evidence there is no claim by the witness that Dhana Dal is a flavouring agent. On the so-called admission given by the Food Inspector, therefore, the learned Magistrate was in error in holding that Dhana Dal was a flavouring agent within the meaning of Clause (m) of Rule 29. The term flavouring agents has not been defined in the Rules. We will have, therefore, to fall on the commonsense meaning of flavouring agent in order to see whether Dhana Dal can be a flavouring agent within Clause (f). The term flavouring agents has not been defined in the Rules. We will have, therefore, to fall on the commonsense meaning of flavouring agent in order to see whether Dhana Dal can be a flavouring agent within Clause (f). It may be noted that in the definition of "food" in section 2(v) of the Act, a flavouring matter is included in that definition. But the term "flavouring agent" obviously is narrower that "flavouring matter". Taking the common sense view that a flavouring agent can only be something which is used as a means to flavour some basic article of food, one of the tests can be whether the article is directly consumed or its use is limited to add flavour to another article. If is the former, it cannot be a flavouring agent. But if it is the letter, it will be a flouring agent. There are several articles of food which have flavour. They cannot be flavouring agents on that account or even for the reasons that by some process they can be converted into an article which cannot be directly consumed and can be used only to add flavour to some other basic article of food. Take the example of mango or orange. Both these fruits have their respective flavour. At times, they may be even used to add flavour to some other basic article of food, but they are mainly consumed directly and, therefore, , they cannot be called flavouring agents. But if by some process, an essence of mango or an essence of orange is made out of these fruits, then that essence, because it is not directly consumed and can be used only to add flavour to some other basic article of food, will be a flavouring agent. As is the evidence in the case, Dhana Dal is directly consumed and it is not an article which is only used to add flavour to some other basic article of food even though the possibility may not be ruled out that Dhana Dal can be put to this other use also. In this view of the matter, Dhana Dal cannot be a flavouring agent within the meaning of Clause (m) of Rule 29. There is no dispute that Dhana Dal is a product of Dhana or coriander. Mr. Ganatra, therefore, submitted that since coriander is a flavouring agent. In this view of the matter, Dhana Dal cannot be a flavouring agent within the meaning of Clause (m) of Rule 29. There is no dispute that Dhana Dal is a product of Dhana or coriander. Mr. Ganatra, therefore, submitted that since coriander is a flavouring agent. Dhana Dal, which is made out of coriander and the basic material in its preparation is coriander, Dhana Dal would also be a flavouring agent. He has referred to several authorities to show that coriander and coriander oil are flavouring agents. It need not be disputed that coriander and coriander oil are flavouring agents. But from this it does not follow that Dhana Dal is in the preparation of which the basic material used is coriander would also be a flavouring agent. No direct authority was referred to by Mr. Ganatra to show that Dhana Dal is a flouring agent. On the evidence adduced in the case, it cannot be a flavouring agent. The next question is whether Dhana Dal is a fruit product within the meaning of Clause (f) of Rule 29. In support of the view that Dhana Dal is a fruit product, the learned trial Magistrate has relied upon the decision in Bhogilal Hargovandas Patel v. The State of Gujarat. Mr. Ganatra also supports that decision. It is a very short judgment consisting of just two paragraphs and the only discussion in that judgment on the point is that Dhana Dal is a product of Dhana or coriander, which is a fruit, which is popularly known as seed. Dhana Dal is, therefore, a product of food. There is no detailed discussion in the judgment as to how Dhana Dal is a product of fruit within the meaning of Clause (f) of Rule 29. Mr. Ganatra took me through several standard textbooks on the subject to show that the coriander plant bears what is described as fruit. On the basis of this data, he has argued that since Dhana Dal is prepared from that part of the coriander plant which is described in the textbooks as fruit, it is a product of fruit within the meaning of Clause (f) of Rule 29. Now, in Websters Third New International Dictionary, we get two definitions of the word fruit. In the widest sense it means a product of plant growth useful to man or animals, as grain, vegetable, cotton flax, etc. Now, in Websters Third New International Dictionary, we get two definitions of the word fruit. In the widest sense it means a product of plant growth useful to man or animals, as grain, vegetable, cotton flax, etc. In the narrow sense it means the edible or more or less succulent product of a perennial or woody plant consisting of ripened seeds and of adjacent tissues or of the letter alone. In my view, the word fruit used in Clause (f) of Rule 29 falls under the narrow definition of fruit and cannot fall under the widest definition of the word as mentioned above. To hold that it has to be understood in its widest sense would mean that some of the products of plants known as fruits may not be known as fruits in commonsense and some of them may not even be edible and, therefore, may not fall in the definition of food. The word fruit in Clause (f) has, therefore, to be understood what is the commonsense meaning of the word. I am fortified in this conclusion by a reference to the various products of fruit which fall under fruit products in A.16 in Appendix-B in the Rules. The various products which have been enumerated under this item all fall under the limited or commonsense meaning of the word fruit. The word fruit in Clause (f) cannot, therefore, be taken to have the widest meaning, namely, that it is a product of a plant which is described as a fruit in standard text books irrespective of the fact whether it is known as fruit in commoparlance and is edible and, therefore, a food within the meaning of the Act. I am, therefore, unable to agree with the view expressed in the Gujarat decision or with the argument of Mr. Ganatra that the Dhana Dal is a fruit product within the meaning of Clause (f) of Rule 29. Mr. Ganatra has then submitted, though this is not the basis of the judgment of the learned trial Magistrate, that Dhana Dal would also fall under Clause (e) of Rule 29. Under that clause, so far as it is material for our purposes, permitted coal tar dye can be used in savouries like Dal Moth, Mengra, Phul Gulab, Papper, Sago or plain Dal Biji, wafer and similar products. The above portion was added in Clause (e) by G.S.R. 553, dated 22-4-1972. Under that clause, so far as it is material for our purposes, permitted coal tar dye can be used in savouries like Dal Moth, Mengra, Phul Gulab, Papper, Sago or plain Dal Biji, wafer and similar products. The above portion was added in Clause (e) by G.S.R. 553, dated 22-4-1972. That was before the Date of the alleged offence. According to Mr. Ganatra, Dhana Dal is a savoury. For this he relies upon three things. The first is the dictionary meaning of savoury. The second is the oral evidence of the Food Inspector. The third is that the list of savouries given in Clause (e) is illustrative and not exhaustive as the use of the words like and similar products will show. Now, the dictionary meaning given by Webster of savoury is "a cooked or uncooked dish of stimulating flavour served usually at the end of dinner, but sometimes as an appetiser before the meal". The evidence of the Food Inspector is that Dhana Dal is generally consumed after meals in order to leave a pleasent taste in the mouth. Bearing this evidence in mind (there is no other evidence before me on the point). Dhana Dal cannot be said to satisfy the definition of the word savoury given in Webster. It cannot be called a dish of stimulating flavour served at the end of dinner (emphasis supplied). Dish would be something which would be part of the dinner, though coming as a last course. The words "at the end of dinner" again would suggest that it is something served during the course of the dinner, though it may be served as a last course. Going by the dictionary meaning, therefore, Dhana Dal cannot be called a savoury. The same conclusion follow from the evidence of the Food Inspector. It is true that the list of savouries given in Clause (e) is not exhaustive and it is only illustrative in view of the use of the word like and similar products. But in finding out whether Dhana Dal would be a savoury within the meaning of that clause, the rule of ejusdem generis will have to be followed. How, out of the specific articles mentioned in the clause, only Dal Moth, papper, sago and wafer are known in common parlance but Dhana Dal cannot be considered to be an article like those articles or a product similar to them. How, out of the specific articles mentioned in the clause, only Dal Moth, papper, sago and wafer are known in common parlance but Dhana Dal cannot be considered to be an article like those articles or a product similar to them. In regard to the remaining specific articles mentioned in the clause, Mr. Ganatra was unable to shed light as to what those articles are and whether Dhana Dal would be an article like them or a product similar to them. Rule 29 is in the nature of an exception. The rule is that use of permitted coal tar dyes in or upon any food is prohibited, except in those enumerated in the rule. Under section 105 of the Evidence Act, when a person is accused of any offence, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances for bringing the case within any exception in any law defining in the offence is upon him and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances. As Mr. Ganatra was not able to show that Dhana Dal is an article like any of the articles specifically mentioned in the clause or a product similar to them, it will have to be presumed that Dhana Dal does not fall under Clause (e) which containing the exception to the general rule about permit coal tar dyes in food being prohibited. In this view of the matter, Dhana Dal will not fall even under Clause (e) of Rule 29. If the case were to rest here, the order of acquittal could not have been sustained. Mr. Ganatra, however, has raised some more points in support of the order of acquittal. His first submission is that in this case the mandatory provisions of Rule 22 have been violated and, therefore, no conviction of the accused can be based on the report of the Public Analyst. Rule 22 is regarding the quantity of sample to be sent to the Public Analyst for analysis. There is no dispute that the quantity of the sample sent to the Public Analyst in this case was 150 gms. There are four items in Rule 22 which have to be considered. Item No. 14 is in respect of "prepared food" and the approximate quantity to be supplied to the Public Analyst is 500 gms. There is no dispute that the quantity of the sample sent to the Public Analyst in this case was 150 gms. There are four items in Rule 22 which have to be considered. Item No. 14 is in respect of "prepared food" and the approximate quantity to be supplied to the Public Analyst is 500 gms. Item No. 17 relates to spices and the approximate quantity to be supplied to the Public Analyst is 150 gms. Item No. 18 is in respect of fruit products and the approximate quantity to be supplied to the public Analyst is 300 gms. Then, there is the residuary clause, item No. 23 (as it stood on the date of the alleged offence) which relates to foods not specified in any of the items earlier mentioned and the approximate quantity to be supplied to the Public Analyst is 200 gms. The Supreme Court in (Rajaldas C. Pamnani v. State of Maharashtra)2, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 189, held that non-compliance with the quantity to be supplied causes not only infraction of the provisions but also injustice. The quantities mentioned are required for correct analysis. Shortage in quantity for analysis is not permitted by the state. My brother Naik in (Criminal Revision Application No. 49 of 1975), held that Rule 22 is mandatory and although the quantity to be supplied to the public Analyst is referred to as approximate in the rule, if the quantity is less by 50 gms. or so, that amounts to shortage in quantity for analysis not permitted by the statute within the meaning of the ratio in Rajaldass case. This position of the law is not disputed before me. It, therefore, follows that only if the Dhana Dal in question can be brought under Item No. 17 relating to spices, the requirement of Rule 22 can be said to have been satisfied and in all other cases, it will have to be held that the requirement of the Rule was not satisfied. It has been contended both by Mr. Heble and by Mr. Deshmukh that Dhana Dal falls under Item No. 17 as it is a spice. It is contended that Dhana Dal is a product of coriander and coriander is, undoubtedly, a spice. Dhana Dal would, therefore, be also spice. It has been contended both by Mr. Heble and by Mr. Deshmukh that Dhana Dal falls under Item No. 17 as it is a spice. It is contended that Dhana Dal is a product of coriander and coriander is, undoubtedly, a spice. Dhana Dal would, therefore, be also spice. Reliance is also placed on the dictionary meaning of spice which is "one or other of various strongly flavoured or aromatic substances of vegetable origin obtained from tropical plants, commonly used as condiments or employed for other purposes on account of their fragrance and preservative qualities". Reliance is also placed on the dictionary meaning of condiment which is "anything of pronounced flavour used to season or give relish to food, or to stimulate the appetite". It is contended that having regard to these definitions of spice and condiment and the evidence of the Food Inspector, it will have to be held that Dhana Dal is a spice. It is difficult to accept this submission. As in the case of flavouring agent, in order to find out what would fall under spice in Item No. 17 of Rule 22, we will have to go by the commonsense meaning of the term, namely, what is understood as a spice in common parlance. A spice would ordinarily be not the basic article of food which is consumed directly but which is only added to some basic article of food to add flavour or aroma to it. The evidence of the Food Inspector is that Dhana Dal is directly consumed. It may contain spicy substances, but on that account Dhana Dal itself cannot become a spice. Similarly, the mere fact that the basic material from which Dhana Dal is prepared, namely, coriander, is a spice, will not mean that the product known as Dhana Dal is also spice. Mr. Heble contended that the test whether an article can be directly consumed or not may not prove profitable in deciding whether any article is a spice. He gave the illustrations of cloves and caddamom, both of which are consumed directly and also used as spice. He is right in regard to these two specific articles. Mr. Heble contended that the test whether an article can be directly consumed or not may not prove profitable in deciding whether any article is a spice. He gave the illustrations of cloves and caddamom, both of which are consumed directly and also used as spice. He is right in regard to these two specific articles. But, in the absence of any evidence that Dhana Dal is used as a spice for adding flavour or aroma to some other basic article of food and in the face of the positive evidence that Dhana Dal is consumed after meals to give a pleasent test in the mouth, it is difficult to hold that it can be brought under Item No. 17 of Rule 22 as a spice. If it does not so fall, then, as already stated, there is violation of the mandatory requirement of Rule 22 and no conviction can be based on the report of the Public Analyst to whom the requisite quantity of the article was not sent for analysis. The next submission of Mr. Ganatra is that there is also violating of the mandatory requirement of Rule 18 and on this ground also the order of acquittal is correct. Under Rule 17, the sample for analysis to the Public Analyst has to be sent by registered post, amongst other modes, in sealed packet, enclosed together with a memorandum in a para VII in an outer cover addressed to the Public Analyst. Under Rule 18, a copy of the memorandum and specimen impression of the seal used to seal the packet has to be sent to the Public Analyst separately by registered post, amongst other modes. The object behind Rules 17 and 18 is clear from Rule 7, according to which the Public Analyst on receipt of the package containing the sample for analysis has to compare the seals on the container and the outer cover with specimen impression received separately and has to note the condition of the seals thereon. This is to ensure that what he is going to analyse is the same material which the Food Inspector had sent to him for analysis and there has been no tempering of the package containing the sample in the meanwhile. This is to ensure that what he is going to analyse is the same material which the Food Inspector had sent to him for analysis and there has been no tempering of the package containing the sample in the meanwhile. As the offences under the Act are absolute and they mostly depend on the report of the Public Analyst, the procedure prescribed in Rules 17 and 18 has been held by courts to be mandatory and the non-compliance with these rules fatal to the prosecution. In the instant case, the Food Inspector in his evidence has referred to the compliance with Rule 17, but has said nothing in respect of compliance with Rule 18. In other words, he has not stated in his evidence that he had sent a copy of the memorandum and specimen impression of the seal used to seal the packet containing the sample to the Public Analyst separately by registered post. Naturally, when the Food Inspector in his examination-in-chief did not speak about having complied with the requirements of Rule 18, no questions on that aspect of the matter were directed in his cross-examination also. It is true that in memorandum (Ex. 9) in Form VII sent with the sample, the Food Inspector had stated that a copy of the memorandum and a specimen impression of the seal used to seal the packet of sample were being sent separately by registered post. But this was his present intention of something to be done in future and from a more recital of that intention it cannot be assumed or held that he had carried out that intention into effect and led, in fact, sent a copy of the memorandum and a specimen impression of the seal used to seal the packet separately by registered post. Mr. Heble and Mr. Deshmukh, however, strongly rely upon the recitals in the report of the Public Analyst (Ex. 10) that the seal fixed on the container of the sample tallied with the specimen impression of the seal separately sent by the Food Inspector and, according to them, this was sufficient evidence to show compliance with Rule 18. Under sub-section (5) of section 13 of the Act, the report of the Public Analyst may be used as evidence of the facts stated therein. Under sub-section (5) of section 13 of the Act, the report of the Public Analyst may be used as evidence of the facts stated therein. It is contended that the part is the report, stating that the seal fixed on the container of the sample tallied with the specimen impression of the seal separately sent by the Food Inspector are only facts stated in the report of the Public Analyst and can be received as evidence under sub-section (5) of section 13. However, sub-section (5) of section 13 cannot be read in isolation. It has to be read along with sub-section (1) which controls it. Sub-section (1) of section 13 says that the Public Analyst shall submit a report to the Food Inspector of the result of the analysts of any article of food submitted to him for analysis. Sub-section (1) thus restricts the report to the result of the analysis of any article of food submitted to the Public Analyst for analysis and the words "the facts stated therein" used in sub-section (5) must be confined to the result of the analysis contained in the report. Sub-section (5) of section 13 is in the nature of an exception which makes a document admissible in evidence without the maker of the document being called to give evidence to prove the contents of the document and, therefore, it has to be construed strictly. Ordinarily, the maker of the document is called to give evidence to prove the document and stand the test of cross-examination. The part in the report that the seal fixed on the container of the sample tallied with the specimen impression of the seal separately sent by the Food Inspector forms no part of the report of the Public Analyst as to the result of the analysis of the article of food submitted to him for analysis and cannot, therefore, go into evidence without formal proof of the document by calling the person to give evidence in regard to the said recitals. It was contended that the Supreme Court in (Mangaldas v. Maharashtra State)3, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 128, has held that under sub-section (5) of section 13 of the Act, the report of the Public Analyst is admissible in evidence and the Supreme Court has not made any distinction as to some part of the report being admissible and other parts of the report being inadmissible in evidence. That decision, however, has to be read in the light of the controversy raised before the Court. The controversy was centred around the result of the analysis of the Public Analyst of the article of food submitted to him for analysis and the Court was not required to go into other portions forming part of the report. That decision is, therefore, no authority for the view that is sought to be propounded. It was next contended that there was no challenge at the trial to the compliance with Rule 18 and, at any rate a presumption could be drawn under section 114 of the Evidence Act that the prescribed procedure had been followed by the Food Inspector. Both these submissions must be rejected. There are several ways in which the accused can make known his challenge that certain mandatory provision of law was not followed and one of these is to make a suggestion to that effect in the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses. It is true that to the Food Inspector no suggestion was made in cross-examination that he had not complied with the provisions of Rule 18, but there was no question of making any suggestion, because in his examination-in-chief itself the Food Inspector did not say anything regarding the requirements of Rule 18 having been complied with. From the mere absence of a suggestion in the cross-examination of the Food Inspector, therefore, it cannot be said that there was no challenge by the accused to the provisions of Rule 18 having been complied with. It was also contended that under Rule 7, a duty is cast on Public Analyst to compare the seals on the container and the outer cover of the sample with the specimen impression of the seal received separately and, therefore, when he makes a statement in his report that he had complied with the requirements of Rule 7, that part of the report is admissible in evidence without formal proof. It is submitted that on the question whether Rule 7 had been complied with, the Food Inspector obviously cannot say anything and it is only the Public Analyst who can say whether he had complied with the requirements of Rule 7. It is submitted that on the question whether Rule 7 had been complied with, the Food Inspector obviously cannot say anything and it is only the Public Analyst who can say whether he had complied with the requirements of Rule 7. If a question were therefore, to arise whether the requirements of Rule 7 had been complied with, it is only the recitals in the report regarding compliance that can go in as evidence. This argument introduces a fallacy. If there is a challenge by the accused that the provisions in Rule 7 have not been complied with, then the Public Analyst has to go into the witness box and stand cross-examination in regard to the compliance with the requirements of Rule 7. On the other hand, if there is no challenge, it is the want of challenge regarding compliance with Rule 7 that dispenses with the proof that the provisions of Rule 7 had been complied with and it is not the recitals in the report of the Public Analyst that can be said to be the evidence on the question. The result, therefore, is that the only evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove that the requirements of Rule 18 had been complied with the recitals in the report of the Public Analyst (Ex. 10), but those recitals cannot go in evidence without formal proof of the document by examining the Public Analyst. That being the position, it is a case where there is no proof that the mandatory requirements of Rule 18 had been carried out and on this ground also, the report of the Public Analyst cannot be the basis for the conviction of the accused. Mr. Ganatra made some more submissions in support of the order of acquittal passed by the learned Magistrate in favour of the accused. But it is not necessary to go into these submissions, because, it is possible to reach that conclusion even on the two submissions of Mr. Ganatra which I have dealt with. The result therefore, is that the order of acquittal of both the accused is correct and these appeals must fail. Both the appeals are, therefore, dismissed and the order of acquittal passed in favour of the two accused is confirmed. -----