Judgment :- 1.This appeal by the defendant in a suit for partition arises under the following facts: 2. The suit property belonged to one Kunhithiyan, who sold it on 15-7-1960 to two persons, Appa and Paradeshi. On 2111-1960 the defendant obtained an order Ext. B5 against Appa and Paradeshi from the Tahsildar that he was holding the suit property including the building therein under an oral lease granted by Kunhithiyan. Appa and Paradeshi thereupon filed a suit, O.S. 55 of 1961 in the Munsiff's Court, Hosdrug for cancelling the order Ext. B5 and for possession of the property alleging that the defendant was merely a tenant of the building under a rent-chit of 1949 and that he had wrongfully trespassed on the land, in the wake of Ext. B5. After the suit Appa who was the first plaintiff died and his legal representatives were brought on record, as additional plaintiffs 3 to 6 and additional defendants 2, 3, 5, 7 and 10 to 12. Pending the suit the defendant purchased the half share of Paradeshi, who was plaintiff 2, as also the rights of certain heirs of Appa. Besides contending that he was a Kuzhikanamdar of the property and not merely a tenant of the building, the defendant set up these assignments, pleading that he was entitled to 17/22 shares in the property. The learned Munsiff found that the oral kuzhikanam was untrue and that the defendant was a mere trespasser. As to the subsequent assignments, it was held that they were vitiated by lis pendens and could not therefore be set up to defeat the lights of the plaintiffs. He also found that additional defendant 10, Choyichi was not the legally wedded wife of Appa. The learned Munsiff granted the plaintiffs a decree as prayed for, leaving the defendant to establish his rights in other appropriate proceedings. Exts. Al and A3 dated 26-2 -1964 being respectively the judgment and decree in that case. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge confirmed the finding, that the defendant was a trespasser and had no kuzhikanam. The learned Munsiff granted the plaintiffs a decree as prayed for, leaving the defendant to establish his rights in other appropriate proceedings. Exts. Al and A3 dated 26-2 -1964 being respectively the judgment and decree in that case. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge confirmed the finding, that the defendant was a trespasser and had no kuzhikanam. He however held that while defendants 10 to 12 were not the heirs of Appa defendant 10 not being the legally wedded wife and defendants 11 and 12 who are her children, not being the legitimate issue of Appa and that the assignment by them could convey no rights to the defendant, the other assignments in his favour were valid and not vitiated by lis pendens. As these shares outnumbered those of the plaintiffs and as the defendant was in possession, the Subordinate Judge thought that he should not be driven to a fresh suit. Plaintiffs 3 to 6 and defendant 5 - heirs of Appa who had not assigned their shares to the defendant - were thus given a decree for symbolical possession of the property with a direction that they should file a suit for partition. The appellate decree Ext.A4 (Ext. A2 is the judgment) is dated 20-7-1966. 3. In 1967 the five plaintiffs who were plaintiffs 3 to 6 and defendant 5 in O. S.55 of 1961 brought the present suit for partition and separate possession of 5/16 shares with mesne profits. The defendant resisted the suit contending that he was entitled in all to 18/22 shares including the shares of Choyichi, Madhavi and Sulochana (who were defendants 10 to 12 in O. S.55 of 1961) and the share of plaintiff 2 which he had purchased after the suit. By an additional written statement he put forward a further defence that he was entitled to the benefit of S.7 of the Land Reforms Act (Act 1 of 1964). 4. The trial court held that the defendant was entitled only to 12/16 shares as Choyichi, Madhavi and Sulochana were not heirs of Appa. It also negatived his claim for protection under S.7 of Act 1 of 1964. The court accordingly passed a decree allowing the plaintiffs to get partition and recovery of 4/16 shares with mesne profits. This decision has been confirmed by the learned Subordinate Judge in appeal. 5. It also negatived his claim for protection under S.7 of Act 1 of 1964. The court accordingly passed a decree allowing the plaintiffs to get partition and recovery of 4/16 shares with mesne profits. This decision has been confirmed by the learned Subordinate Judge in appeal. 5. Taking the shares to which the defendant is entitled, the only question is whether Choyichi. Madhavi and Sulochana are the heirs of Appa, so that they could assign their rights to him. The first plaintiff is admittedly the wife of Appa and his alleged marriage of Choyichi, who has given evidence as D W. 2, is subsequent to that earlier marriage. There is no plea or evidence that the marriage with the first plaintiff had been dissolved, when he is said to have married D.W. 2. There is also no custom pleaded or proved which permits polygamy in his community. It must necessarily follow that even if Appa had gone through some form of marriage with D.W. 2, it had no validity and she was no wife. It further means that Madhavi and Sulochana are illegitimate children of Appa. The concurrent findings of the courts below on this point have therefore only to be upheld, even if the appellant is right in his contention that the finding to the same effect in Ext. A2 is not res judicata. 6. Still it was argued that Madhavi and Sulochana at least are heirs of Appa, under the Hindu Succession Act as the Act makes no distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children of a Hindu male in the matter of inheritance. It was further argued, that even apart from the Act, they would succeed to Appa as he was a Sudra and his illegitimate children are also his heirs. In support of this latter contention, counsel for the appellant relied upon Singhai Ajit Kumar and another v. Ujayar Singh & others, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1334, where it has been held that "an illegitimate son has the status of a son under the Hindu Law and he is a member of the family". 7. I am unable to accept these contentions. For one thing it is not clear whether Appa was governed by Hindu Law; indeed in the lower appellate court it appears to have been argued that he was a Marumakkathayee. 7. I am unable to accept these contentions. For one thing it is not clear whether Appa was governed by Hindu Law; indeed in the lower appellate court it appears to have been argued that he was a Marumakkathayee. Even if Appa was governed by Hindu Law, still these daughters are not his heirs for, "The illegitimate daughter, even of a Sudra, has no rights of inheritance to her father". (Mulla's Hindu Law, 14th Edition, page 114) To the same effect is the statement in C. V. Gupte's Hindu Law of Succession, page 45, 2nd edition, where it is said that an illegitimate daughter could not, succeed to her putative father. Whatever be the position of the illegitimate son an illegitimate daughter has therefore no right of inheritance upon her putative father's estate. 8. It remains to examine the position under the Hindu Succession Act, for Appa died after the commencement of that Act. Here again the short question is only whether the expression "daughter" occurring in Class I of the. Schedule to the Act takes in an illegitimate daughter so as to make her an heir under clause (a) of S.8, which deals with succession to the estate of a Hindu male who dies intestate. Now the Act does not in terms equate an illegitimate daughter with a legitimate daughter for purposes of S.8 and so the expression "daughter" must mean a legitimate daughter. "In the absence of an express provision to the contrary the normal rule of construction of the words 'child' 'son' or 'daughter' occurring in a statute is to include only legitimate children ie. born in wedlock": Gulraj Singh and another v. Mota Singh, AIR 1965 SC. 608. 9. There can be no doubt therefore that a daughter with reference to S.8 read with the Schedule must mean a legitimate daughter. It is worth noting that the Act while by S.30) defines the term "related" as meaning related by legitimate kinship has added a proviso, "that illegitimate children shall be deemed to be related to their mother and to one another, and their legitimate descendants shall be deemed to be related to them and to one another; and any word expressing relationship or denoting a relative shall be construed accordingly". It is obvious that with the father what the Act contemplates is a legitimate relationship, unlike with the mother. It is obvious that with the father what the Act contemplates is a legitimate relationship, unlike with the mother. On the terms of the Act and in the light of the rule of construction noticed above, an illegitimate daughter is no heir of her putative father. 10. The same view has been expressed in learned Commentaries as well. "The illegitimate daughter of a male Hindu dying intestate is not entitled to any share of the inheritance; not even in case of a Shudra. But she is entitled to inherit to her mother." (Mulla, page 870) 11. In the Commentary on S.8, Gupta (page 499) also states: "An illegitimate daughter is not entitled to succeed". 12. I reject the appellant's contentions on this point. 13. The appellant then contends that he should be treated as a "deemed tenant" under S.7 of the Land Reforms Act and that he is protected against eviction, on account of his occupation of the property for not less than two years within a period of twelve years immediately preceding the 11th day of April 1967. That he has been in occupation for the requisite period is clear, but the courts below denied him the protection of the Section holding that being a trespasser it could not be held that he was in occupation honestly believing himself to be a tenant. Notwithstanding this concurrent finding, the appellant contends that in view of the explanation to S.7, it ought to be presumed, until! the contrary is proved, that he has been in such occupation honestly believing himself to be a tenant. The presumption, it is obvious, is rebuttable and it can be rebutted by direct or circumstantial evidence. Now the trial court found in O. S.55 of 1961 that the appellant was a trespasser and that finding was confirmed by the appellate judge in Ext. A2; indeed Ext. A2 shows that the appellant did not even challenge the finding of the trial court against the oral kuzhikanam which he had set up. The effect of these adjudications was thus to hold that he was no kuzhikanamdar but a trespasser, a finding which he even accepted. In the present suit the learned Munsiff has specifically negatived honest belief of tenancy in the defendant, a finding with which I fully agree. The effect of these adjudications was thus to hold that he was no kuzhikanamdar but a trespasser, a finding which he even accepted. In the present suit the learned Munsiff has specifically negatived honest belief of tenancy in the defendant, a finding with which I fully agree. On the evidence, the prior decisions and the circumstances there is enough proof to rebut the presumption which the appellant seeks to invoke. The appellant's claim to the protection of S.7 has been rightly dismissed by the courts below. 14. It was lastly submitted that the appellant might be given the benefit of the improvements made by him in the property. This, I think could be granted. I therefore direct that, to the extent possible, portions of the property which the defendant had improved would be allotted to him in the partition, without of course causing any prejudice or injustice to the plaintiffs. 15. Subject to the above direction about the allotment of property the judgments and decrees of the courts below are confirmed and the appeal is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.