Judgment :- 1. The petitioners are land-holders in respect of the property in which the second respondent has his kudikidappu. The petitioners filed O. A. No. 180 of 1973 on the file of the first respondent, Land Tribunal, Tellicherry, for shifting the second respondent from the existing kudikidappu to an alternate site offered by the petitioners. This petition filed under the provisions of S.75 (2) read with S.77 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969, was.disposed of by Ext. P1 order dated 3Ist July, 1973 by the first respondent, Tribunal. The Tribunal held, inter alia, that the purpose that the kudikidappu is required for the occupation of residence by the 5th petitioner (who was the applicant before the Tribunal) is not a valid reason for shifting as contemplated under S.75 (2) of the Act. The relevant provision of Sub section (2) of S.75 reads as follows: "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the person in possession of the land on which there is a homestead or but (hereinafter in this sub-section referred to as the landholder) in the occupation as a kudikidappukaran may, if he bona fide requires the land (a) for building purposes for himself or any member of his family including major sons and daughters; require the kudikidappukaran, to shift to a new site belonging to him subject to the following conditions". 2. The counsel for the petitioners submits that in terms of the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of S.75, portions of which have been quoted above, it is not strictly necessary that the petitioners should require it for the purpose of constructing a building for their use or occupation. In other words, the contention is that even in cases where the need is occupation of the homestead or but by the applicant before the Tribunal the requirement of the section should be deemed to be satisfied. In this context the counsel draws my attention to the fact that the word "construction" has hot been used in the relevant provision. It is also argued that it cannot be the intention of the legislature to confine the benefit arising out of the shifting provision to persons who are in a position to construct a house, denying such a right to persons who ate not in a position to build a house for himself. It is also argued that it cannot be the intention of the legislature to confine the benefit arising out of the shifting provision to persons who are in a position to construct a house, denying such a right to persons who ate not in a position to build a house for himself. According to the counsel, the term "building purpose "used in the sub-section should be so interpreted as to include the need for occupying the building for residence or otherwise. 3. As the wording now stands, I am afraid, the interpretation sought to be put by the counsel cannot be given. The section uses the words "if the landholder bonafide requires the land for building purpose"; and on a reasonable construction in the ordinary sense in which those words are understood it can only lead to the conclusion that the sub-section will have application only in cases where the applicant before the Tribunal puts forward a bonafide requirement of the land on which the kudikidappu is situate for the purpose of constructing a home stand. In this view I am inclined to reject the contention put forward by the counsel for the petitioners on that point. The result is that this writ petition is dismissed without any order as to costs. The dismissal of this writ petition will not preclude the petitioners from filing another application on grounds available to them under the provisions of S.75 and 77 if they are so advised in due compliance with the provisions of the Act. If such an application is filed within four months from this date that should be taken up for enquiry by the Tribunal and only after the disposal thereof that the question of granting purchase certificate in O.A. No. 677 of 1970 on its file shall be taken up for consideration. In any event, no purchase certificate shall be granted to the second respondent till the expiry of a period of four months from this date. 4. The counsel for the second respondent submits that the, order cannot be upheld on the ground that the alternate site offered is beyond the limit prescribed by the Act. In the view I have taken, I do not think that it is necessary to go into the merit of this contention at this stage by this court. This writ petition is disposed of as above. In the view I have taken, I do not think that it is necessary to go into the merit of this contention at this stage by this court. This writ petition is disposed of as above. There will be no order as to costs. Carbon copy of this judgment will be issued to the parties if applied for in that behalf on usual terms.