JUDGMENT : S. Acharya, J.—Miscellaneous Appeal Nos. 171 of 1970 and 182 of 1970 arise out of Miscellaneous Case No. 44 of 1968 and Miscellaneous Appeal Nos. 172 of 1970 and 183 of 1970 arise out of Miscellaneous Case No. 45 of 1968, both the Miscellaneous Cases were disposed of by the Motor Vehicle Claims Tribunal & District Judge. Cuttack by one judgment. The two Miscellaneous Cases were filed u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as it stood before its amendment in 1970 (hereinafter to be referred to as the 'Act'). The two cases were heard together and were disposed of by the one impugned judgment, wherein the merits of the claim and the compensation to be awarded in each case have been separately dealt with. Against the award passed in Miscellaneous case No. 44 of 1968, arising out of the claim preferred by Mahindra Pal Singh Ahluwalia on account of the death of his son in the accident in question, M/s. Construction India Ltd., a partnership firm represented by Appellants 2 to 5, have preferred Miscellaneous Appeal No. 171 of 1970. Union Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd., the insurer of the truck No. ORP. 1170, which caused the accident, has preferred Miscellaneous Appeal No. 182 of 1970 against the award passed in Miscellaneous Case No. 44 of 1968. M/s. Construction India have also preferred Miscellaneous Appeal No. 172 of 1970 against the award passed in Miscellaneous Case No. 45 of 1968 in which Harihar Panda claimed compensation on account of the death of his daughter in the same accident. Union Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. has also preferred Miscellaneous Appeal No. 183 of 1970 against the said award passed in Miscellaneous case No. 45 of 1968. 2. The claims made in both the Miscellaneous cases arose out of one and the same accident; certain matters relating to these two cases are the same there are certain common features in all these appeals, and excepting the question of quantum of compensation to be paid to the claimant in each case, all other question of fact and law involved in these cases are the same. Accordingly, all the four appeals were clubbed together and were heard analogously and are being disposed of by this one judgment. 3. Accordingly, all the four appeals were clubbed together and were heard analogously and are being disposed of by this one judgment. 3. The admitted and undisputed fact on which the said claims for compensation have been made are that on 29.2.68 deceased Sarbajit Singh Ahluwalia (aged 13 years) son of the claimant in Misc. Case, No. 44/68, and deceased Pratima Panda (aged lit years), daughter of the claimant in Misc. No. 45/68, along with some other school students were coming in the pick-up van No. ORN 2719, belonging to the State of Orissa, from Charbatia towards Cuttack to attend their respective schools in the Cuttack town. While that van was proceeding towards the Mahanadi bridge and was on the elevated portion of the road at that place, it met with an accident and rolled down on the road side sloping on its left hand side as a result of which the above mentioned two children died at the spot. 4. The claimants in both the cases have averred and testified to the fact that on the date of occurrence the truck No. ORP 1170 coining from behind the van No. ORN. 2719 at an abnormally high speed and in violation of the traffic rules, struck against the back right hand side of the van, which was on the extreme left side of the road and was moving at a slow speed, as a result of which the van rolled down the road side slope on its left hand side causing the death of the above-named two children and injuring many others traveling in that van. The father of deceased Sarbajit Singh Ahluwalia presented the claim petition in Miscellaneous case No. 44 of 1968 in his capacity as the guardian and on behalf of all the legal representatives of the deceased and claimed a compensation of Rs. 50,000/- for the death of his son Sarbajit. Harihar Panda, the father and guardian of the deceased Pratima Panda, filed Miscellaneous case No. 45 of 1968 on behalf of the legal representatives of deceased claiming a compensation of Rs. 50,000/- for the death of his daughter. The opposite parties in both the Miscellaneous cases are (i) the State of Orissa (O.P. No. 1) being the owner of the van No. ORN 2719; (ii) M/s. Construction India (O. P. No. 2) being the owner of the truck No O.R.P.1170 represented by opposite party Nos. 50,000/- for the death of his daughter. The opposite parties in both the Miscellaneous cases are (i) the State of Orissa (O.P. No. 1) being the owner of the van No. ORN 2719; (ii) M/s. Construction India (O. P. No. 2) being the owner of the truck No O.R.P.1170 represented by opposite party Nos. 3 to 6 and (iii) Union Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. (O. P. No. 7) being the insurer of the truck. 5. The State of Orissa in its written statement has disowned its liability to pay any compensation in this matter by stating that neither the driver of the van nor its owner was guilty of any act of negligence in this connection and so it is not responsible for the accident in any manner. It is stated in the written statement that the accident took place due the gross negligence and rashness of the driver of the truck No. O.R.P. 1170. On that basis it supports the claims in both the cases. 6. The written statements filed by opposite party Nos. 2 and 7 are almost identical. They, apart from taking the usual defences, contest the claims mainly on the grounds that the driver of the truck No. ORP 1170 was not at fault; the accident causing the death of the two children was due to the negligence and carelessness of the driver of the van No. ORN. 2719, and that the claims preferred are excessive and untenable. 7. Opposite party No. 7. the Insurance Company, apart from putting up identical objection as that of opposite party No. 2, has also added that the claimants are not the legal representatives of the two deceased children, and unless the names of the legal representative are disclosed in the claim applications the claims are not maintainable. It has further been asserted by opposite party No. 7 that the truck No. ORP 1170 being a goods vehicle, the liability of the insurer, if any, is limited only to Rs. 20,000/- in terms of the policy read with Section 92(2)(a) of the Act as both the victim children died in one accident. The following three issues were framed: (1) Is the petition maintainable ? (2) Is the Petitioner entitled to compensation ? If so, to what extent ? (3) Are the opposite parties liable to pay any compensation to the Petitioner ? The following three issues were framed: (1) Is the petition maintainable ? (2) Is the Petitioner entitled to compensation ? If so, to what extent ? (3) Are the opposite parties liable to pay any compensation to the Petitioner ? If so, which of the opposite parties and what amount ? 8. On the first issue regarding the main-trainability of the claims, the Tribunal has held that the claims preferred by the claimants for themselves and on behalf of the legal representatives of the deceased are maintainable. With regard to the claim preferred in Misc. Case No. 44/68 the Tribunal held that the claimant is entitled to Rs. 23,400/- as the total compensation, together with 6 per cent simple interest per annum from the date of the award till realisation of the same in full. With regard to the claim put forward in Misc. Case No. 45/68 the Tribunal has held that the claimant is entitled to Rs. 17,535/- together with 6 per cent simple interest per annum on the said amount from the date of the award till its full payment. The Tribunal has held that the owner of the truck as well as the Insurance Company in which the said truck had been insured are jointly and severally liable to pay the aforesaid amounts stated above to the claimants who will receive the same on behalf of their respective wives, and has also ordered that the claimants are entitled to costs proportionate to the sums awarded against the owner of the truck and the Insurance Company together with pleader's fee at Rs. 300/-. The costs in both the cases were ordered to be borne equally as the contest was joint. The claims preferred against the State of Orissa were dismissed without costs. 9. Mr. Basu, the learned Counsel for the Union Co-operative Insurance Society Limited (Opp. party No. 7), Appellant in Miscellaneous Appeal Nos. 182 and 183 of 1970, at the "outset urged that the claimants being fathers of the two victim children were not competent to file the claim petitions as they were not the legal representatives of the deceased as defined under Rule 2(c) of the Orissa Motor Vehicles (Accidents Claims Tribunals) Rules, 1960 and under Section. 2(11), CPC and so they were not entitled to prefer the claims or get any compensation in these cases. 2(11), CPC and so they were not entitled to prefer the claims or get any compensation in these cases. In this connection it is to be noted that opposite party No. 2, the owner of the truck, has not raised the question regarding the maintainability of the claims preferred by the respective fathers of the deceased children- The insurer (Opp. party No. 7) is legally not competent to raise the above question, as the insurer cannot raise any ground in defence except the grounds available to it u/s 96 of the Act. In this connection the decision in M. Ayyappan and Another Vs. Moktar Singh and Another, may be seen. However, the point raised being a mixed question of the law and fact it is better to answer the same by saying that the term 'legal representative' should not be narrowed down to mean only 'the legal heirs'; it must be construed in the context of the provisions of Section 2(11), CPC and the provisions for claim for compensation in the Fatal Accidents Act. Construed thus the parents of the deceased would be entitled to make applications for compensation. The point has been discussed in detail in Kasturilal Gopaldas and Another Vs. Prabhakar Martand Patki and Another, and in M. Ayyappan and Another Vs. Moktar Singh and Another, I fully agree with the view taken on the above aspect of the matter in the said decisions. The above submission of Mr. Basu therefore is without any weight. 10. Mr. Murty, for opposite party No. 2, and Mr. Basu urged that no compensation is to be awarded in this case as on the evidence on record it is not established that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the driver of the truck No. ORP 1170. In this connection it was urged that there is no convincing evidence on record to show that the van which was carrying the victim children was dashed from behind by the truck No. ORP 1170. P. Ws. 3, 4. 8, 10, 11 and 12, O.P. Nos. 3 and 4 are the eye witnesses to the accident in question. 11. P.W. 3 was driving the van when it met with the accident. P.W. 4 was the cleaner of that van. P. Ws. 3, 4. 8, 10, 11 and 12, O.P. Nos. 3 and 4 are the eye witnesses to the accident in question. 11. P.W. 3 was driving the van when it met with the accident. P.W. 4 was the cleaner of that van. Both, of them in very clear and categorical terms have stated that while the said van was coming towards Cuttack form Charbatia on the date of the accident and was the upward gradient of the road just before the Mahanadi bridge on the National Highway, a truck came from behind and dashed against the right back side of the van, as a result of which the van rolled down on the left side slope of the road to about 60 feet down, and due to the said accident both of them (P. Ws. 3 and 4) became unconscious and they regained sense in the S.C.B. Medical College Hospital at Cuttack. Both of them have stated that the van at the time of the accident was moving on the left side of the road and it was moving at a speed of about 10 to 20 miles per hour. P.W. 4 has categorically stated that there was about 20 feet of vacant space on the road to the right side of the van at the place where the truck caused the accident. The evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 4 to the above effect has not been successfully assailed in cross-examination by the opposite parties. P. W. 3 in cross-examination has further stated that the truck which came from behind and dashed against the van did not blow its horn nor flicked its light from behind. P.W. 4, while reiterating in cross-examination his evidence in examination-in-chief to the above effect, has further stated that the front left side of the truck, which was moving fast, hit the right back side of the van. He could not of course state the exact spot on the van where the truck hit the van. P.W. 4, while reiterating in cross-examination his evidence in examination-in-chief to the above effect, has further stated that the front left side of the truck, which was moving fast, hit the right back side of the van. He could not of course state the exact spot on the van where the truck hit the van. One ordinarily would not expect a man sitting inside the van to state the exact spot where the truck hit the van, but if the accident took place in the manner aforesaid he would be able to confidently state that the front side of the truck hit the van on its back side and in the evidence of P.W. 4 to that effect I do not see any unconvincing feature. 12. Both the counsel appearing for the Appellants challenged the evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 4 as unworthy of credit as, while according to P.W. 3 he did not see any cyclist in front of him at the time of the accident, P.W. 4 at one place stated that a cyclist was in the front of the van. On this discrepancy in their evidence I am unable to discard their above evidence regarding the manner in which the truck dashed against the van from behind as stated by them, as their evidence to this effect gets ample corroboration from other witnesses as will be discussed later. Moreover, the presence of a cyclist, if at all, somewhere in front of the van would not create any difficulty in assessing the question of negligence on the part of the driver of the truck, which is the moot question to be decided in this case. There is no evidence on record to show that the cyclist was in such a position that the driver of the van was compelled to move his vehicle towards the right side of the road and on account of that the truck dashed against the van. The suggestion to P.W. 3 is rather to the contrary as it was suggested to him that because of the cyclist the van turned to the left and so it rolled down the road side. The suggestion to P.W. 3 is rather to the contrary as it was suggested to him that because of the cyclist the van turned to the left and so it rolled down the road side. The evidence of O.P.W. 3, the helper in the truck, that as the cyclist came in front of the van it (the van) lost its balance and rolled down the road side, is not worthy of credence as this does not get any support from anybody. O.P.W. 4, the only other eye witness examined on behalf of the opposite parties, does not say that the van lost its balance because of the presence of the cyclist. Both of them have given a completely different picture of the incident absolutely ruling out the possibility of the truck coming in con' tact with the van in any manner whatsoever. Their evidence does not at all inspire confidence, more so because of the after overwhelming evidence on record supporting, in a convincing manner, the claimant's case of a dash by the truck on the back of the van as stated above. 13. Apart from the aforesaid evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 4 to this effect there is on record the evidence of P. W. 8, another driver, who was passing on the road near the Mahanadi bridge at the time when the accident took place. He has stated that he saw the van coming towards Cuttack and the truck No. ORP 1170 was following the van at great speed. He saw from a distance of about 200 feet that the truck dashed against the van at its rear and the van was pushed forward as a result of which it rolled down the slope on the left side of the road. After causing the said accident the truck went ahead hit the parapet of the bridge and dropped down on the river bed. His above evidence stands practically un-assailed, and nothing material has been elicited from him in cross-examination to discredit his evidence to the above effect. In cross-examination it was suggested to him that the van collided against a cyclist. This suggestion indicates that the opposite parties did not have a definite case about the cyclist as while cross-examining P. Ws. His above evidence stands practically un-assailed, and nothing material has been elicited from him in cross-examination to discredit his evidence to the above effect. In cross-examination it was suggested to him that the van collided against a cyclist. This suggestion indicates that the opposite parties did not have a definite case about the cyclist as while cross-examining P. Ws. 3 and 4 it was in effect suggested to them that the said cyclist was in confusion and to avoid him the van turned to the left and rolled down the road side. 14. Apart from the above, the evidence of P.W. 10 lends convincing corroboration to the above-mentioned evidence of P. Ws. 3, 4 and 8. P.W. 10 at the time of his deposition was a student of the Birla Engineering College, and there is nothing on record to show that he was in any way interested in any of the parties to this case. Nothing has even been suggested to him to show that his evidence in any manner is tainted. At the time of the accident he was near about the place of the accident. He had kept his cycle leaning against the bridge on the left side and had gone to attend the call of nature. At that time he saw the van followed by a truck proceeding towards the bridge. Thereafter he heard a sound of crash and soon thereafter the van toppled down and fell on him on the road side as a result of which he became senseless and sustained severe injuries on his person and had to remain in the hospital for fifteen days. His evidence to the above effect stands absolutely unassailed. He has practically not been cross-examined on the important aspects of his above-mentioned evidence. His above unassailed evidence lends convincing corroboration to the evidence of P. Ws. 3, 4 and 8, and there is absolutely no reason to doubt his credibility or the veracity of his evidence. 15. P.Ws. 11 and 12 are the other two eye witnesses to the occurrence. P.W. 11 was a Bridge Erection Khalasi and P.W. 12 was a student of the Marwari High School, Cuttack, and was traveling in the same van on that date. 15. P.Ws. 11 and 12 are the other two eye witnesses to the occurrence. P.W. 11 was a Bridge Erection Khalasi and P.W. 12 was a student of the Marwari High School, Cuttack, and was traveling in the same van on that date. P.W. 11 has stated that on the date of occurrence while he was passing on a cycle on the National Highway from Cuttack towards Kendrapara side he heard a sound of crash from a distance of about 130 feet and then noticed that a van went down the left side of road and a truck came in a zigzag fashion, collided against the parapet of the bridge on the right side and it dropped down on the river bed on the right side of the road. He in his cross-examination very categorically stated that he did not notice any cyclist in between himself and the van, but he saw a broken cycle lying on the eastern side of the place where the pick-up van had toppled down, meaning thereby the road side on which the van rolled down. P.W. 12 has stated that while the van was running on the left side of the road, the front portion of the truck which was coming from behind dashed against the back side of the van. He very frankly stated that he did not see the actual dashing, but he felt the impact of the said dash. Very soon after the said dash the van rolled down the road side and so he became senseless. Nothing material and/or substantial has been elicited from him to discredit his evidence to the above effect. 16. Thus on the eye-witness account of P. Ws. 3, 4,8, 10,11 and 12 it is very satisfactorily established that the van carrying the two deceased and other school children was proceeding towards Cuttack and when it was near about the Mahanadi bridge, the truck No. ORP 1170, which came from behind, dashed against the van on its back side as a result of which the van toppled and rolled down the slope of the left slope of the road on the left side of the van to some distance. 17. 17. Apart from the above eye witness account of the accident, the evidence of the Motor Vehicles Inspector (P.W.6), who visited the spot within a few hours of the occurrences, also lends support to the above-mentioned eye witness account of the accident discussed above. He saw the van and the truck lying respectively on the eastern and western side of the Mahanadi bridge, inspected both the vehicles and prepared his report, a carbon copy of which has been exhibited as Ext. 3 in this case. Apart from other things he has categorically stated: The right rear of the van had been damaged corresponding with the front headlights and mud-guard of the truck which had also been damaged- In my opinion the truck was following the van and the damage on the right rear of the van corresponding to the left front damage of the truck and the van having been pushed over to the east down the road clearly indicate that the truck dashed against the rear right of the van while trying to overtake it. In his cross-examination he, in answering the obvious suggestion of the opposite parties, has stated in a definite manner that merely by dashing against the parapet and falling down on the sand bed the damage to the left mud-guard and left light would not be caused. Mr. Murty contended that his evidence to the above effect is not worthy of credence as the same does not get support and corroboration from his own local inspection report Ext. 3. In Ext. 3 there is of course no specific mention about the damage on the rear right side of the van in the manner as stated by P.W.6 in his deposition in court. But in Ext. 3 it has been stated that the upper portion of the back compartment of the van was completely damaged. The damage on that portion of the van would include the above-mentioned damage deposed to by P.W.6. Moreover, merely because of the said omission in Ext. 3 it is difficult for me to disbelieve the above-mentioned evidence of P.W. 6 testified to on oath. Nothing has been suggested to, much less elicited from, P.W. 6 a public officer, to show that he was any way interested in falsely supporting the cause of the claimants. His above evidence gets support from the eye witness version of P.Ws. 3 it is difficult for me to disbelieve the above-mentioned evidence of P.W. 6 testified to on oath. Nothing has been suggested to, much less elicited from, P.W. 6 a public officer, to show that he was any way interested in falsely supporting the cause of the claimants. His above evidence gets support from the eye witness version of P.Ws. 3, 4, 8,, 10, 11 and 12 and vice versa. Apart from the above opinionative evidence of P.W. 6, only on the eye witness account of the aforesaid witnesses it is established beyond reasonable doubt that, the van carrying the two victim children and other school children was dashed from behind by the truck No. ORP 1170 near the Mahanadi bridge as a result of which the van toppled and rolled down the slope on the eastern side of the road. 18. It is not disputed that Sarbajit, the son of the claimant in Misc. Case No. 44/68, and deceased Pratima, the daughter of the claimant in Misc. Case No. 45/68, were inside the said van when it toppled and rolled down the slope on the road side on the date of occurrence, and that these two children died as a result of the said mishap. P.W.7, the doctor, who held the post-mortem examination on the dead bodies of both, these two children, has stated that there were multiple ante-mortem bleeding injuries on the dead bodies and their death was due to shock and haemorrhage. 19. Once it is found that the truck dashed the van on its back, the presence of the cyclist, if at all, in front of the van would not absolve the driver of the truck of the accusation of negligence and rashness made against him. If the truck driver found a cyclist causing any obstruction in the movement of the van, the truck driver should have slowed down or stopped in order to avoid any dash against the van which was on the left side of the road. Moreover, on the evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 4 it is quite clear that sufficient space was left vacant on the right side of the van for the truck to pass out conveniently leaving sufficient space in between the truck and van. Moreover, on the evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 4 it is quite clear that sufficient space was left vacant on the right side of the van for the truck to pass out conveniently leaving sufficient space in between the truck and van. O.P.W. 3 has said that there was no traffic in front of the truck when the truck swerved to the right and dropped down the bridge. P. Ws. 3 and 4 have both testified to the fact that the truck coming from behind did not blow its horn or flicked its light before the accident. This part of their evidence stands unchallenged. They both have also stated that the truck was coming from behind at a high-speed. This fact is quite evident from the very nature of the accident and the manner in which the van was pushed to its left, and the truck after dashing against the van swerved to its right dashed against the parapet of the bridge and dropped down on the river bed. These facts clearly show that the truck driver was driving the truck very rashly and negligently and dashed the van from behind. 20. Mr. Basu and Mr. Murty contend that the court below was not justified in awarding Rs. 3,000/- in each case as compensation for the loss of happiness, loss of company, mental pain, agony and grief suffered on account of the death of the child. It is urged by them that compensation to be awarded to the claimants in the case of wrongful death must be limited strictly to the pecuniary loss sustained by the claimants. There is weight and substance in the above-mentioned contention in all cases of such wrongful death compensation is to be awarded for loss of pecuniary benefits which would have reasonably devolved on the claimants in case the deceased would have survived till the usual expectancy of life. In the very nature of things there can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of life and the court must make all efforts to exclude considerations of matter which rest in speculation or in fancy. Assessment of pecuniary compensation on account of loss of happiness, loss of company, mental pain, agony and grief is a very difficult proposition, and any effect in that direction will certainly land a man in speculation and conjecture without any proper basis for assessing the same. Assessment of pecuniary compensation on account of loss of happiness, loss of company, mental pain, agony and grief is a very difficult proposition, and any effect in that direction will certainly land a man in speculation and conjecture without any proper basis for assessing the same. Mental agony, loss of happiness, grief on account of the death of a person, and more specially in an accident of this nature, are inherent in the very nature of things, and pecuniary compensation can never serve as a solatium to compensate such grief. In paragraph 6 of the decision reported in C.K. Subramania Iyer and Others Vs. T. Kunhikuttan Nair and Others, it has been held that in ascertaining pecuniary loss caused to the relations mentioned in Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act, it must be borne in mind that these damages are not to be given as solatium, but are to be given with reference to pecuniary loss sustained by them. In paragraph 8 thereof it has been observed that in order to succeed it is necessary for the claimant to show that he has lost a reasonable probability of pecuniary advantage. Their Lordships also referred with approval to the decision in Bamet v. Cohen (1921) 2 K.B. 461 where it has been said: The basis is not what has been called solatium that is to say. Damages given for injured feelings or on the ground of sentiment, but damages based on compensation for a pecuniary loss. It is well settled that the principles laid down for the determination of compensation under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, are to be looked in to while fixing compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. In view of the above considerations therefore the court below was not justified in awarding Rs. 3,000/- as compensation on the above account. Accordingly the amount of Rs. 3,000/- awarded on the account in each case is to be deducted from the total compensation to be paid in each case. 21. Mr. Mohanty for the claimants submitted that solatium was awarded by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the case reported in Parsani Devi Vs. The State of Haryana and Others, and by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case reported in Kumari Deepti Tiwari Vs. 21. Mr. Mohanty for the claimants submitted that solatium was awarded by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the case reported in Parsani Devi Vs. The State of Haryana and Others, and by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case reported in Kumari Deepti Tiwari Vs. Banwarilal and Others, The above mentioned decision of the Supreme Court in 1970 A.C.J, was not cited before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, and the Madhya Pradesh decision was arrived at before the said Supreme Court decision. I do not, therefore, attach any importance to these decision cited by Mr. Mohanty. 22. Mr. Basu and Mr. Murty urged that the court below should have made the usual deduction on account of the order directing payment of the compensation in lump sum, and in support of their contention they cited the decision reported in Sabite Pati and Others Vs. Rameshwar Singh and Another where in paragraph 18 it has, in effect, been observed that ordinarily the lump sum amount of compensation is discounted by its l/6th in view of unforeseen future eventualities. In the decision reported in Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Mrs. Kamal Kamini Das and Others, on account of the order for the payment of compensation in lump sum, l/6th of the same was ordered to be deducted. Of course there is nothing hard and fast in the statute to this effect, though ordinarily l/6th is discounted when compensation is ordered to be paid in a lump sum. But the court in fixing the compensation in such matters has to take into consideration various aspects of the case and should not feel compelled to grant deductions on certain account merely because in some other cases deductions were allowed on similar grounds. In this case the court below, while not deducting anything on account of the order for lump sum payment, has directed deduction to the extent of 15 per cent due to 'uncertainty of life.' The counsel appearing for the Appellants could not show any decision of this Court where a deduction on account of 'uncertainty' of life has been allowed. Apart from the above consideration, in Misc. Case No. 44/68 the court finds that the boy was likely to contribute towards the maintenance of her mother for at least 20 years a sum of Rs. Apart from the above consideration, in Misc. Case No. 44/68 the court finds that the boy was likely to contribute towards the maintenance of her mother for at least 20 years a sum of Rs. 100/- per month and even more with the progressive increase of his salary from year to year in the time scale. Though the court expected contribution of more than Rs. 100/- per month towards her mother's maintenance it did not take that factor into consideration while calculating the compensation amount, and if that would have been taken into account it was bound to arrive at a higher compensation amount. Moreover, the basis of the above assessment is on the unfounded expectation of the court below that the deceased boy would have become a class II officer in his life-time. The court thus has not taken into account the possibility of the Punjabi boy to have taken to some other more lucrative and/or paying profession to which Punjabis are generally attracted when they come of age. However, as there is no cross appeal by the claimant of this case against the quantum of compensation fixed in this case I do not propose to dwell into this aspect of the matter. But one cannot lose sight of the above facts in considering whether in this case deduction account of lump sum payment, not allowed by the court below, should be allowed as now urged by the counsel for the opposite parties. Apart from the above facts in connection with the claim in Misc. Case No. 44/68. It is also to be noted that in none of the memorandums of appeal filed by the opposite parties deduction on the above account has been claimed, one cannot also lose sight of the fact that the claims were made in the year 1968, and orders for payment of compensation were passed in January, 1970. In case the claimants would have received compensation in lump sum as ordered in January, 1970, they would certainly have earned by now interest on the said amount and/or could have invested that amount in some more profitable business. Nonpayment of that amount in 1970 has not only deprived them of such income from the said amounts, but must have also caused hardship to them in various other ways. The depreciation of the value of money in the meantime cannot also be lost sight of. Nonpayment of that amount in 1970 has not only deprived them of such income from the said amounts, but must have also caused hardship to them in various other ways. The depreciation of the value of money in the meantime cannot also be lost sight of. Considering all the above features in these cases and the fact that deduction of 15% has been allowed on account of uncertainty of life, I do not deem it just and proper to order further deduction on account of lump sum payment. 23. It is. urged Mr. Murty and Mr. Basu that the court below was not justified in awarding any compensation on account of the death of Pratima Panda (M.A. No. 172 of 1970), as according to them the claimants and/or any other person were not expected to get any pecuniary benefit from the said girl if she would have survived her normal span of life. I am not prepared to accept the above-mentioned contention in toto. The court below, on a consideration of this aspect of the matter, on good grounds finds that the claimants were likely to derive pecuniary benefits from her if she would have served her full span of life. In this modern age woman folk are taking up various jobs and professions suitable to their sex, and society also is affording enough opportunities to them to independently earn a living. They at times earn sufficient money to support themselves and their other dependents. It is not an uncommon feature that daughter even after marriage give financial aid to their parents and other needy dependants. These days one cannot completely rule out the possibility of pecuniary benefits from female members of the house, add to disallow completely such a claim on the ground as urged above would be an unrealistic proposition. In this case the amount of compensation on account of the death of the girl has been assessed on the basis that the girl on coming of age would have contributed Rs. 75/- or more per month to support the claimants and their dependants. The girl belonged to a middle class family. In this case the amount of compensation on account of the death of the girl has been assessed on the basis that the girl on coming of age would have contributed Rs. 75/- or more per month to support the claimants and their dependants. The girl belonged to a middle class family. All the female members of the family were married, and most likely if Pratima would have survived she would also have been given away in marriage, in which case the parents would have spent some money on her marriage and the possibility of her contributing sufficiently towards the maintenance of her mother and/or other dependants would have lessened. There is nothing on record to show that the girl was well up in her studies, suggesting the possibility of her getting a good remunerative job in life enabling her to render sufficient pecuniary benefits towards the claimants. Off or remote chances of making enormous income not in keeping with her general and normal expectations, are considerations to be avoided in a matter of this nature because they mostly are speculative in nature and may be born out of fanciful or wishful thinking. On a consideration of the normal probabilities and reasonable possibilities of this case I would assess the expected pecuniary benefits to the parents at Rs. 50/- per month instead of Rs. 75/- per month. All other rates fixed by the court below are reasonable and so the compensation amount in Misc. Case No. 45/68, calculated on that basis would be Rs. 11,400/- instead of Rs. 17,100/- assessed by the court below Out of the said sum of Rs. 11,400/- a deduction of 15 per cent, as ordered by the court below has to be made for uncertainty of life. Accordingly, the claimant is entitled only to Rs- 9,690/- plus 6 per cent simple interest per annum on the said amount from the date of the award of the Tribunal, i.e. 31.7.70. 24. Mr. 11,400/- a deduction of 15 per cent, as ordered by the court below has to be made for uncertainty of life. Accordingly, the claimant is entitled only to Rs- 9,690/- plus 6 per cent simple interest per annum on the said amount from the date of the award of the Tribunal, i.e. 31.7.70. 24. Mr. Basu, the learned Counsel for the insurer, at last contended that the order of the court below directing the owner of the truck and the Insurance Company to jointly and severally pay the total compensation amount to the claimant in each case was illegal, as according to Section 95(2)(a) of the Act, as it stood before its amendment given effect to in March, 1970, the total liability of the insurer for this accident was limited only Rs. 20,000/- and the insurer could not be made jointly or severally liable to pay any amount more then its total liability to the above extent. There is force and substance in the above contention. The accident took place on 29.2.68 and so the liability of the insurer in this accident is only upto the extent of Rs. 20,000/- as provided in Section 95(2)(a) as it stood before its amendment in 1970. As the total compensation to be paid in both the above mentioned two cases exceeds Rs. 20,000/-, the insurer has only to pay Rs. 20,000 in all, and that amount is to be distributed between the two claimants in the approximate proportion of the lump sum amounts now assessed to be paid in the two cases. In Misc. Case No. 44/68 the lump sum amount assessed is Rs. 20,400/-, and in Misc. Case No. 4S/68 that amount is Rs. 9,690/-. So, the insurer is to pay Rs. 13,325/- in Misc. Case No. 44/68, and Rs. 6,675/- in Misc. Case No. 45/68. Both the amounts have to be paid with simple interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the order of the court below, passed on 31.7.70, till full payment. The balance of the aforesaid lump sum amount now fixed as compensation in each case is to be paid by the owner of the truck with interest as aforesaid. The insurer, opposite party No. 7 and the owner of the truck, opposite party No. 2, represented by opposite party Nos. The balance of the aforesaid lump sum amount now fixed as compensation in each case is to be paid by the owner of the truck with interest as aforesaid. The insurer, opposite party No. 7 and the owner of the truck, opposite party No. 2, represented by opposite party Nos. 3 to 6, are hereby directed to pay the aforesaid compensation amounts to the claimants in Misc. Case No. 44/68 and 45/68 in the manner as ordered above. The order of the court below regarding payment of costs is also affirmed. 25. The Miscellaneous Appeals are allowed to the extent and in the specific terms as stated above, but in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs of these appeals.