JUDGMENT - G.N. VAIDYA, J.:---This Special Civil Application bristles with the difficulties felt in the city of Bombay in interpreting section 28 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 and the controversies resulting therefrom and the manoeuvres between the persons who claim protection under that Act and those who want to deny or deprive them of the protection under that Act. The petitioner claimed to be a lawful subtenant of Flat No. 5, Second Floor, "Jer Villa", Road No. 9, Parsi Colony, Dadar, Bombay 14. The respondent claimed to be a tenant in respect of that flat and alleged that one bedroom in that flat was given to the petitioner as a paying guest on payment of Rs. 350/- per month after the petitioner approached her for that purpose sometimes in or about May 1972 under an agreement of leave and licence dated June 1, 1972. Within a short time the Maharashtra Legislature amended the Act by Maharashtra Act No. 17 of 1973 with a view to control the charges for licences of the premises, etc. as stated in the amendment to the preamble and inter alia giving protection under section 15-A inserted by that amendment, which provided : "15-A(1) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or anything contrary in any other law for the time being in force, or in any contract, where any person is on the 1st day of February, 1973 in occupation of any premises, or any part thereof which is not less than a room, as a licensee he shall on that date be deemed to have become for the purposes of this Act, the tenant of the landlord, in respect of the premises or part thereof, in his occupation. (2) ............" By the amendment in section 5(4-A) the definition of licensee was given, which runs as follows : "(4-A) Licensee, in respect of any premises or any part thereof, means the person who is in occupation of the premises or such part, as the case may be, under a subsisting agreement for licence given for a licence fee or charge, and includes any person in such occupation of any premises or part thereof in a building vesting in or leased to a co-operative housing society registered or deemed to be registered under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, but does not include a paying guest, a member of a family residing together a person in the service or employment of the licensor, or a person conducting a running business belonging to the licensor, or a person having any accommodation in a hotel, lodging house, hostel, guest house, club, nursing home, hospital, sanatorium, dharamshala, home for widows, orphans or like premises, marriage or public hall or like premises, or in a place of amusement or entertainment or like institution, or in any premises belonging to or held by an employee or his spouse who on account of the exigencies of service or provision of a residence attached to his or her post or office is temporarily not occupying the premises, provided that he or she charges licence fee or charge for such premises of the employee or spouse not exceeding the standard rent and permitted increases for such premises, and any additional sum for services supplied with such premises, or a person having accommodation in any premises or part thereof for conducting a canteen, creche, dispensary or other services as amenities by any undertaking or institution ; and the expressions "licence", "licensor" and "premises given on licence" shall "be constructed accordingly;" Sub-section (6-A) was also inserted in section 5 defining "paying guest" as follows : "(6-A) "paying guest means a person not being a member of the family, who is given a part of the premises in which the licensor resides, on licence;" In sub-section (11) of section 5 such a licensee, as are deemed to be tenants for the purpose of Act by section 15-A were included in the definition of tenant. Section 28(1) was amended so as to include any suit or proceeding between a licensor and a licensee relating to the recovery of the licence fee or charge. As soon as the Act was amended, it seems that there was a hectic activity of filing suits in this city. So far as the instant suit is concerned, the petitioner rushed to the Small Causes Court and filed a Declaratory Suit No. 1690 of 1973, on April 4, 1973, in the Small Causes Court, at Bombay, praying : (1) that the Small Causes Court may declare him to be a lawful sub tenant of the suit premises, viz. Flat No. 5, Second Floor, Jer Villa, Road No. 9, Dadar, Parsi Colony; (b) the Court may fix the standard rent at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month and (c) that the Court may grant him an order and injunction restraining the defendant permanently from taking forcible possession and disturbing with the suit premises without due process of law; and for certain incidental and interim reliefs, which need not be stated here. The petitioner alleged in the plaint in that suit that the plaintiff was an Engineer, who had completed his studies at Ahmedabad and had come to Bombay in search of a job. He got himself employed in M/s. Consolidated Pen Maker and Engineer (P.) Ltd., Dr. S.S. Rao Road, Parel; and then he began to search for residential accommodation for himself and for the members of his family; and for that purpose inserted an advertisement in the Times of India. In response to that advertisement, the defendants in the suit, viz. (1) Miss Maneck Gustadji Burjorji Reporter, who is the respondent in the above petition and defendant No. 3 Gustadji Burjorji Reporter contacted the petitioner through one Mrs. Mini Poncha and thereafter put the plaintiff in exclusive possession of the suit premises as a lawful tenant from May 24, 1972. He claimed to be in exclusive possession of the premises since then subject to the agreement between the parties to enter into a regular agreement of tenancy. According to him, the defendant told the plaintiff that the regular agreement would be executed in due time, but for that purpose, they had also taken his signature on a blank paper. But no regular agreement of tenancy was executed and the blank paper was not returned to the petitioner. According to him, the defendant told the plaintiff that the regular agreement would be executed in due time, but for that purpose, they had also taken his signature on a blank paper. But no regular agreement of tenancy was executed and the blank paper was not returned to the petitioner. The petitioner alleged that the defendants are charging rent at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month which was more than the standard rent. The petitioner further alleged that taking into account the cost of the land, when the building was constructed and the materials used for the construction of the building and on the basis of workmanship the standard rent of the premises could not exceed Rs. 50/- per month. It was also disclosed from the municipal records that the total rent collected for the building was Rs. 240/- per month. It was alleged that the defendants were falsely and dishonestly telling the plaintiff that they had given the premises on the basis of leave and licence agreement and not on the basis of tenancy and, therefore, the petitioner was entitled to a declaration that he was a lawful sub-tenant of the suit premises, where he was residing with his mother for some months, but he was residing alone at the time of the suit. The plaintiff apprehended that as he had to leave the premises after locking for going to his office, taking advantage of his absence the defendants might try to take forcible possession of the suit premises or otherwise interfere with his possession and, therefore, he prayed for an injunction. Immediately after filing the said suit it seems that the petitioner took out on April 25, 1973 a notice of injunction for restraining the defendants from interfering with or disturbing possession of the suit premises and applied for fixation of standard rent, which was fixed ex parte at Rs. 50/- per month. That suit is pending in the Small Causes Court. 50/- per month. That suit is pending in the Small Causes Court. In the meanwhile, on April 26, 1973, the respondent filed in the Bombay City Civil Court Suit No. 3413 of 1973 against the petitioner praying (a) that it be declared that the defendant had no right, title or interest in Flat No. 5 : (b) that the defendant be ordered by mandatory injunction to remove himself together with his articles, belongings and things from the said premises; (c) that the defendant be restrained by an order and injunction from entering upon and/or interfering with or disturbing the plaintiffs possession of the flat; (d) that the defendant be decreed and ordered to pay to the plaintiff Rs. 735/- being the arrears of compensation and mesne profits from October 1, 1972 at the rate of Rs. 350/- per month till June 30, 1974 and accruing mesne profits from July 1, 1974, and for further incidental and interim reliefs as mentioned in the plaint. The respondent alleged in the plaint filed in the City Civil Court that the petitioner was given only one bedroom in the flat subject to the terms and conditions mentioned in the Paying Guest Agreement of Leave and Licence dated June 1, 1972 between her and the petitioner. She was described in the agreement as Licensor and he was described as a licensee and paying guest in the body of the agreement, and it provided : "(1) The licensor will permit the Licensee as from the 1st day of June, 1972 to utilise and occupy as PAYING GUEST one bedroom with all furniture and articles contained therein and all fixtures and fittings and also a furnished kitchen and a bathroom in the said premises (hereinafter referred to as the portion of the said premises) for a period of eleven months upon and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter contained. 2. The licensee covenants with the Licensor to observe and perform the following conditions, viz. (a) To pay to Licensor every calendar month at Bombay on the 1st day of each month a monthly compensation fee as PAYING GUEST for the use of the aforesaid portion of the said premises at the rate of Rs. 350/- per month only; (b) to deposit and keep deposited with the licensor an amount of Rs. (a) To pay to Licensor every calendar month at Bombay on the 1st day of each month a monthly compensation fee as PAYING GUEST for the use of the aforesaid portion of the said premises at the rate of Rs. 350/- per month only; (b) to deposit and keep deposited with the licensor an amount of Rs. 1050/- till the revocation or determination of this licence; (c) to pay proportionate charges for gas and water consumed by him upon the portion of the said premises; (d) to pay for the electricity consumed by him upon the portion of the said premises; (e) to keep the interior of the portion of the said premises and the furniture and fictures and fittings therein in good and tenable condition. In case of any portion caused to any part of the above portion of the said premises and the furniture and fixtures and fittings cost of the same shall be collected from the licensee from the deposit kept with the licensor. (f) not to do or suffer to be done anything in or about the premises which is likely to be a nuisance or annoyance to the tenants and occupiers of the neighbouring premises of the said building. It was further stated in Clause 5 of the said agreement that : "5. Upon the expiry or sooner determination of the said licence the licensee will forthwith remove himself and hand over all the furniture and fixtures and other articles lying in the said premises in good order and condition to the licensor." It is necessary to refer to the other clauses of the agreement of leave and licence, which have been incorporated in it, and which are generally incorporated, when people enter into leave and licence agreement in the city of Bombay in English language, as those clauses are not very material for the disposal of this special civil application. As a result of the filing of these two counter suits, as stated above, one for securing the benefit of the amendment of the Rent Act; and the other for denying or depriving the petitioner of the benefit of the amendment, the proceedings and counter-proceedings started between the parties, which ultimately ended in a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Civil Revision Application No. 279 of 1975 as a result of which and as a result of the earlier judgment of Gandhi; J., in an appeal against an interlocutory order the City Civil Court suit was heard earlier; and the learned Judge of the City Civil Court framed issues Nos. 3 to 10 and recorded his findings. The said issues and findings read as under : "Issues Findings 3. Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant is a paying guest of the room in Flat No. 5, at Jer Villa, Dadar, Parsi Colony, Bombay 14 ? Yes. 4. Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant was paying compensation at the rate or Rs. 350/- per month as alleged ? Yes. 5. Whether the City Civil Courtdefendant is deemed tenant and protected under the Bombay Rent Act? Yes. 6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration prayed for ? Yes. 7. Whether the Plaintiff proves that the defendant is not entitled t remain in the premises as the agreement argument has come to an end by efflux of time and liable to remove himself as alleged in paragraph 6-A of the plaint ? Yes. 8. Whether the Plaintiff proves that the defendant is liable to pay compensation and/or mesne profits from 1.10.72 till 30.6.1974 amounting to Rs. 7,350/- and for further period at the rate of Rs. 350/- p.m. ? Yes. 9. Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant has agreed and is not entitled to bring in any other person except himself in the room given to him as a paying guest as alleged in paragraph 4-A of the Plaint ? Yes. 10. What order ? 7,350/- and for further period at the rate of Rs. 350/- p.m. ? Yes. 9. Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant has agreed and is not entitled to bring in any other person except himself in the room given to him as a paying guest as alleged in paragraph 4-A of the Plaint ? Yes. 10. What order ? As per order." In the light of arguments made by the parties and the evidence led by them, although he recorded the finding Yes as against issue No. 5, in the body of his judgment (para 26), the learned Judge has recorded the finding as under : "Hence on 1st February, 1972 the defendant was residing in the suit flat not as licensee within the meaning of Clause 4-A of section 5 of the Bombay Rent Act but only as a paying guest within the meaning of sub-section 6-A of section 5 of the Bombay Rent Act. He is, therefore, not entitled to the protection of section 15-A of the Bombay Rent Act. As admittedly the period of licence expired on 30th April, 1973 the plaintiff is entitled to evict him." The learned Judge, therefore, passed on August 1, 1975 his judgment and decree declaring that the petitioner had no right, title or interest in the suit flat, that he was only a paying guest in respect of one room and that his licence to use the said room and also the bathroom, kitchen and the toilet has expired on 30-3-1973; he directed the defendant by mandatory injunction to remove himself forthwith together with his articles, belongings and things from the suit premises and further ordered the defendant to pay to the Plaintiff Rs. 6300/-, being the arrears of compensation for the period from 1-10-72 to 30-7-74 at the rate of Rs. 350/- per month and determined future mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 350/- per month. 6300/-, being the arrears of compensation for the period from 1-10-72 to 30-7-74 at the rate of Rs. 350/- per month and determined future mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 350/- per month. The said judgment and decree are challenged as null and void in this special civil application filed by the petitioner in this Court on October 30, 1975 under Article 227 of the Constitution of India praying (a) that this Court may call for the record and proceedings in S.C. Suit No. 3413 in the Bombay City Civil Court and quash and set aside the decree and judgment passed therein and also the proceedings in Declaratory Suit No. 1690 of 1973 in the Court of Small Causes at Bombay and other interlocutory notices therein and confirm the reliefs prayed for by the petitioner therein : (b) pending hearing and final disposal of the petitioner : the execution of the decree in Suit No. 3413 of 1973 in the Bombay City Civil Court be stayed. Mr. Morje, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, states that although the petitioner has made an application for certified copy of the decree, so far, it is not yet supplied to the petitioner ; and the original record in the City Civil Court, which is here does not show that any decree has been drawn up and filed in the proceedings. Mr. Kanade, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff says that he has got a certified copy of the decree, which he produced only for showing to the Court and took back. It showed that it was applied for by the plaintiff on August 4, 1975; it was ready for delivery on October 23, 1975 and was delivered also on October 23, 1975 to the plaintiffs Advocate Mr. Ganatra. It further showed that it was sealed on October 22, 1975 and was signed by the Registrar on October 22, 1975. The copy shown by Mr. Kanade also bears an endorsement to the effect that on November 7, 1975 the defendant-petitioner deposited Rs. 1400/- in the Court on August 27, 1975 and the amount was withdrawn by the plaintiff on 22-10-1975 in part satisfaction of the amount due under the said decree without execution. The copy shown by Mr. Kanade also bears an endorsement to the effect that on November 7, 1975 the defendant-petitioner deposited Rs. 1400/- in the Court on August 27, 1975 and the amount was withdrawn by the plaintiff on 22-10-1975 in part satisfaction of the amount due under the said decree without execution. In the petitioner filed by the petitioner in this Court under Article 227 it is contended that as the petitioner had filed Suit No. 1690 of 1973 on April 4, 1975 in the Small Cause Court at Bombay and had obtained interlocutory order on April 23, 1973 by injunction notice No. 2403 of 1973 restraining the respondent, her father, agents and servants from interfering with or disturbing or taking forcible possession of the premises, notice No. 3545 of 1974 restraining the plaintiff, her father, agents and servants from interfering with or cutting or withholding water and electricity supply in the suit premises, notice No. 4819 of 1974 for restoration of kitchen room ; notice No. 5281 of 1974 for contempt of Court, all of which were pending in the Court of Small Causes ; the City Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try and entertain suit No. 3413 of 1973, as even by reading the plaint alone, as held by the Division Bench of this Court in Civil Revision Application 229 of 1975, the City Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide any point involved in the suit and in particular (1) whether the petitioner was a paying guest as defined in the Rent Act; (2) whether he was a licensee, who was deemed to be a tenant as defined in the Rent Act; (3) whether the standard rent should be fixed in respect of the suit premises, and if so (4) what part of the premises, if any, was exclusively in possession of the petitioner. Although the grounds are set out in great detail, the effect of all these contention is that the City Civil Court had no jurisdiction to pass judgment and decree having regard to section 28 of the Rent Act, which in terms says that no other Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit. Application or determine any claim or question, which are referred to in section 28(1) of the Rent Act. Application or determine any claim or question, which are referred to in section 28(1) of the Rent Act. A grievance is also made on behalf of the petitioner that although it is not stated so in the petition, it cannot be disputed, that as a result of the judgment of the City Civil Court, the Small Cause Court vacated the interim order fixing interim rent under sections 11(3) and 11(4) of the Rent Act. The petition was order to be circulated in the office during October Vacation and on October 31, 1975 pending admission stay, in terms of prayer (b) was granted till November 27, 1975. On November 8, 1975 Mr. Ganatra, the learned Counsel for the respondent appearing before the learned Vacation Judge Mr. Justice Dighe, moved for vacating the interim stay. The following order was passed by my learned brother Dighe, J. on that day :--- "Mr. Ganatra for the respondent, Mr. Chodankar for the petitioner holding for Mr. Morje, Mr. Chodankars request for adjournment for a few days because the courts are re-opening and because Mr.. Morje has left for Bangalore yesterday evening even before the notice of the respondent was received is rejected, as the facts disclosed do not show that the matter may be adjourned. In this case the lower Court has held the petitioner a paying guest. The judgment was delivered on 2-8-75 and three months time was given to appeal. Although the copy was ready for delivery on 9-9-75, no appeal is filed till this date. Spl.C.A. is filed on 30-10-1975. This speaks of both the diligence and the tactical method adopted by the petitioner. Since the alternate remedy is available the Special Civil Application is not maintainable. Again although the stay today was obtained on 31-10-1975, it was not served on the party. The Registrar, City Civil Court was informed by letter dated 6-11-1975 received by him yesterday. This is, therefore, considered a fit case to vacate the ad interim relief. Mr. Ganatra is directed to file an affidavit of the respondent , embodying the facts relied upon. In the circumstances the ad interim order of stay dated 31-10-1975 is vacated. At the request of Mr. Chodankar (for Morje) fixed for admission of 10-11-1975." Accordingly on November 10, 1975 on the reopening of this Court the matter came before me. On the motion of Mr. Chodankar, for Mr. In the circumstances the ad interim order of stay dated 31-10-1975 is vacated. At the request of Mr. Chodankar (for Morje) fixed for admission of 10-11-1975." Accordingly on November 10, 1975 on the reopening of this Court the matter came before me. On the motion of Mr. Chodankar, for Mr. Morje, in the presence of Counsel for the respondent, the matter was allowed to stand over till Thursday, as Mr. Morje was out of Bombay and the interim stay of the execution of the decree was granted. On November 13, 1975 in the presence of the Counsel for both the parties, it was again allowed to stand over till November 14, 1975, when Mr. Kanade, the learned Counsel for the respondent appeared and waived notice for the respondent ; and the matter was fixed for final hearing on what was described as preliminary objection on November 17, 1975. The matter was accordingly heard yesterday and was fixed today for judgment. The first so called preliminary objection raised by Mr. Kanade, the learned Counsel for the respondent was that as Dighe, J. has already held that the alternative remedy is available and the special civil application was not maintainable, the only course open to me was to dismiss the petition as a logical consequence of that finding. It was urged that it is not open to me to review the order and the finding passed by my learned brother, Dighe J. There is no merit in this contention because, as stated above, the above order passed by my learned brother Dighe J. was in connection with the motion for recording the interim stay made by Mr. Ganatra, the learned Counsel for the respondent, in the absence of Mr. Morje, who appears to have gone out of Bombay at the relevant time. If at all Dighe J. wanted to dismiss the petition as not maintainable, and if he had dismissed it, it was a different matter. The order passed by Dighe J. was only an interlocutory order and not a final order. Dighe, J. appears to have been impressed by the fact that no notice of the interim stay was served on the other side, though the notice was issued on October 31, 1975 keeping the interim in operation till November 27, 1975 and Mr. The order passed by Dighe J. was only an interlocutory order and not a final order. Dighe, J. appears to have been impressed by the fact that no notice of the interim stay was served on the other side, though the notice was issued on October 31, 1975 keeping the interim in operation till November 27, 1975 and Mr. Morje left Bombay without caring to see that the notice was served; and this was what the learned Judge described as tactical methods adopted by the petitioner. There is no general mandatory rule that a petition under Article 227 must be dismissed in every case, where there is an alternative remedy. In the present case, it is difficult to see what alternative remedy can be there when the two courts are invested with the powers to decide the matters at the instance of these parties, one claiming to attribute jurisdiction under the Rent Act to the Small Causes Court and the other claiming to deny before the City Civil Court the jurisdiction under the Rent Act to that Court as stated above : and the petition is filed in respect of both the suits in both the courts and not merely against the judgment and decree of the City Civil Court. Article 227(1) lays down : "227(1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction." There can be no doubt that the High Court has jurisdiction both with regard to the City Civil Court and the Small Cause Court in Bombay. There is, no doubt, an overlapping between the powers of the High Court under Article 227 and the powers of the High Court under Civil Procedure Code. Though the constitutional power under Article 227 is not fettered by any conditions, the nature of the power conferred by it is neither appellate nor revisional. But where question of jurisdiction or irregularities of jurisdiction arise, a citizen is entitled to invoke this jurisdiction to set right irregular or illegal exercise of jurisdiction or usurpation of jurisdiction, particularly when a citizen contends, as in the present case, that the City Civil Court, had no jurisdiction and had usurped the jurisdiction, which it never had ; and which if it had was barred by the special statute, like the Rent Act and the judgment and decree are a nullity. If Dighe, J. had passed an order dismissing the petition on the ground that an alternative remedy was available, it would have been a different matter, as stated above. But he did not dismiss the petition. He fixed it for admission on November 10, 1975. It is well established that the judgment or order, which is null and void need not even be challenged by a party. It can even be ignored by a party against whom order is purported to be passed. See (1) (Abdullamiyan Abdularehman v. Government of Bombay)1, 44 Bom.L.R. 577; (2) (Huseinmiya Dosumiya v. Chandubhai Jethabhai)2, 55 Bom.L.R. 946 and (3) (Warvansingh and another v. Amarnath and another)3, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 215 and (4) (Nagindas v. Dalpatram)4, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 471. If, with a view to settle the jurisdictional battles between the City Civil Court and the Small Cause Court, a citizen invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227, his petition cannot be dismissed on the technical ground that there is some alternative remedy against the judgment, which according to him, is null and void and which should not prevent his suit in the Small Cause Court from going on. The second so called preliminary objection, that was raised was that the question of jurisdiction between the Small Cause Court and the City Civil Court was finally and conclusively decided by the Division Bench of this Court on February 11, 1975, in Civil Revision Application No. 229 of 1974, referred to above, after referring to all the previous decisions, and, therefore, the City Civil Court had jurisdiction in the matter; and in any event, sitting as I do as a Single Judge, I cannot question the propriety or correctness of the decision of the Division Bench, which held that the City Civil Court had jurisdiction; and, therefore, the only remedy against the judgment and decree passed by the City Civil Court was to file an appeal after paying Court-fee stamp on the appeal. Mr. Morje appearing for the petitioner has contended that the Division Bench judgment only related to the preliminary issues 1 and 2 relating to jurisdiction and valuation of the suit. Mr. Morje appearing for the petitioner has contended that the Division Bench judgment only related to the preliminary issues 1 and 2 relating to jurisdiction and valuation of the suit. He also contended that it merely declared the law regarding the reading of the plaint and not the written statement for determining what the Division Bench called prima facie jurisdiction of the Court; and, therefore, it did not have the effect of conferring, under section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act, on the City Civil Court, finally or conclusively jurisdiction, which it did not have under that section. He argued that the High Court has not got in the process of interpreting section 28 the legislative power to make the City Civil Court the venue for determining the questions under the Rent Act. He submitted that the judgment of the Division Bench suffers from several fatal infirmities. He argued that it was a judgment per incurium and it ignored statute and judgments of Supreme Court and was not binding even on a Single Judge ; and for this purpose he argued that the Supreme Court decisions were not properly referred to and misunderstood in the said judgment ; and the judgment did not even consider the effect of the last words in section 28(1) of the Rent Act ........no other Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any such suit, proceeding or application or to deal with such claim or question, the words of section 85 of B. T. A. L. Act and when distinguishing the decisions of this Court and those of the Supreme Court cited before the Division Bench relating to the indentical or in pari materia provisions in the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948; and further the judgment did not consider the averments made by the respondent in para 6 of the plaint itself. Mr. Kanade, the learned Counsel for the Respondents petitioner on the other hand submitted that every aspect was considered by the learned Judges of the Division Bench; and it was not open to me as a Single Judge to differ from them or to deal with the so called infirmites in that judgment and to assume that the City Civil Court had no jurisdiction or to encourage the petitioner to have any doubt about the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court in the matter. Ordinarily, Single Judge of the High Court is bound by the decision of the Division Bench or a larger Bench as held in (Tribhuvandas Thakar v. Ratilal Patel)5, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 372 and (Dhanki Mahajan and others v. Rana Chandubha, etc.)6, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 69. It is, therefore, not necessary and proper for me to consider the infirmities in the Division Bench judgment, which were exphasised by Mr. Morje. Even if the view taken by the Division Bench is unassailable before a Single Judge, however, all that is said to be binding on the parties and a Single Judge in the said judgment, which was pronounced at an interlocutory stage of this case was what they without evidence prima facie found as under :--- ".......one room was given to the defendant to occupy as a paying guest and, therefore, he was clearly in possession of the part of the premises which were in possession of the plaintiff-licensor as a tenant of the original landlord." They found further that the learned Judge of the City Civil Court who had merely read the plaint was right in holding that prima facie he had jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. The ratio of that decision as far as I can understand it, is that the Court must shut its eyes to the written statement and in effect even to section 28 of the Rent Act and decide the preliminary Issues Nos. 1 and 2 prima facie on what is stated in the plaint. Left to myself I would have no hesitation in holding that para 6 of the plaint in the City Civil Court raises issues under the Rent Act even applying the decision of the Division Bench to the facts of this case. Para 6 of the plaint in the City Civil Court reads as follows : "The plaintiff says that in his Advocates letter and in the notice taken out in the Small Causes Court suit, the Defendant has falsely averred and alleged that he was put in exclusive possession of the entire flat as a sub-tenant that he was staying with his mother and other relatives in the said flat and falsely alleged that the plaintiff was trying to dispossess him without reasonable cause. The plaintiff says that actually the defendant was taken as a paying guest and allowed to occupy only one room. The plaintiff says that actually the defendant was taken as a paying guest and allowed to occupy only one room. No other relations were staying with him and sometime in or about April 1975 the defendant called his father and mother from Ahmedabad, ostensibly with a view to creating false evidence that a portion was sub-let to him." If these are not claims or questions within the meaning of section 28 of the Rent Act, I fail to understand what other claims or question can be there under that section. Whether petitioner is licensee or whether statutory tenancy was conferred or a paying guest as defined in the Rent Act are questions to be decided under the Rent Act. If that is so, the only Court which has jurisdiction in the city of Bombay for deciding these questions under section 28 was the Small Causes Court. However, I would not like to decide this special civil application on my view of the meaning of para 6 of the plaint in the matter. I would follow, with respect, the ratio of the Division Bench judgment that the Court must look at the plaint to decide the question of jurisdiction. Looking at the plaint, which is filed by the petitioner in the Small Causes Court and applying the judgment of the Division Bench, which is binding on these parties, it must be held that the Small Causes Court has "prima facie" jurisdiction to decide what was in issue under the Rent Act in that suit. That was an earlier suit, but on account of the expediting order, which the plaintiff in the Civil Court had obtained in this Court and other facts and circumstances, the City Civil Court appears to have decided it earlier. The Small Causes Court suit is still pending. The Division Bench has only decided what is described as "prima facie jurisdiction. The Legislature has prescribed that the final or conclusive jurisdiction in all matters relating to questions arising under the Rent Act is with the Small Causes Court in the City of Bombay. The Small Causes Court suit is still pending. The Division Bench has only decided what is described as "prima facie jurisdiction. The Legislature has prescribed that the final or conclusive jurisdiction in all matters relating to questions arising under the Rent Act is with the Small Causes Court in the City of Bombay. It is unnecessary to resolve the patent conflict between the Legislature and the Division Bench interpreting the section, at this stage, because what the Division Bench decided as "prima facie jurisdiction applies also to the Small Causes Court and the ends of justice will be met in this case if I stay the execution of the decree passed by the City Civil Court till the decision of the suit in the Small Causes Court. The petitioner has taken the risk of filing not a regular first appeal but the above special civil application against the judgment and decree of the City Civil Court on the basis of the suit which he has filed in the Small Cause Court ; and he is at liberty to take the risk of what he and his Counsel assume to be the correct construction of section 28 and suffer the consequences that may follow in the event of the Small Cause Court arriving at the same conclusions as the City Civil Court. With regard to his claim of statutory tenancy under the Rent Act and the status alleged by the respondent of a paying guest under the Act. Another objection taken by Mr. Kanade as a preliminary objection was that once the City Civil Court which had prima facie jurisdiction, as held by the Division Bench, recorded a finding that the petitioner was a paying guest and not a licensee, who should be deemed to be a tenant within the meaning of the Rent Act, it was not open to the Small Cause Court to arrive at a different finding or a contrary finding as the judgment of the Division bench operates as res judicata, Prima facie does not mean final or conclusive or exclusive. As stated above, the Division Bench only decided what was "prima facie" jurisdiction at preliminary stage. Mr. As stated above, the Division Bench only decided what was "prima facie" jurisdiction at preliminary stage. Mr. Kanade has relied in this connection on a decision of the Supreme Court in (Satyadhan Ghosal and other v. Smt. Deorajin Debi and others)7, A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 941 where it is laid down that between the two stages in the same litigation even an interlocutory order may operate as res judicata. The case is distinguishable because we are not concerned here with the same litigation but the two litigations, one is the Small Cause Court, on which Court an exclusive jurisdiction is conferred under section 28 and the other in the City Civil Court, which has no jurisdiction under that section but is said to be having "prima facie" jurisdiction as held by the Division Bench in view of the plaint of the respondent. If one looks at the findings of the learned Judge of the City Civil Court, it seems he has virtually converted that Court into a Court acting and functioning under section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. Issues 3 to 10 could very well be the issues in that Court under section 28. I however, do not wish to express any opinion finally on this matter at this stage because this controversy may not survive if the Small Causes Court comes to the conclusions of facts and evidence similar to the ones recorded by the City Civil Court. It is open to the Small Causes Court to arrive at such conclusion or to conclusions contrary to those arrived at by the City Civil Court, as it deems proper upon due consideration and with regard to all the facts and circumstances the evidence led before it and in the light of the law under the Bombay Rent Act. If the Small Cause Court agrees with the findings of the City Civil Court, which it is not bound to do, having regard to its exclusive jurisdiction under section 28 , then, of course, whatever may be the other remedies available to the petitioner against the judgment of the Small Cause Court, it may be said that having regard to the decision of the Division Bench the decree by the City Civil Court is not without jurisdiction. I, however, do not propose to speculate as to what would happen in the event of the Small Cause Court recording such findings. At present it is enough to serve justice and the law under section 28, if I direct stay of the execution of the decree of the City Civil Court till the Small Cause Court decides the suit filed by the petitioner earlier, without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties after the decision of the Small Cause Court in respect of the judgments of the two courts. In the result, the petition is allowed. The decree passed by the City Civil Court shall not be executed by the respondent till the Small Cause Court decides Suit No. 1690 of 1973, for the reasons stated above and subject to what is stated above. I am told that suit is fixed for hearing on November 26, 1975. I direct that the suit shall be heard and decided by the Small Cause Court as early as possible and as far as possible from day-to-day till it is disposed of in accordance with law, and in any event before the end of February 1976. The amounts, which are so far deposited by the petitioner, may be withdrawn by the respondent from wherever they are deposited, whether in this Court or in the City Civil Court or in the Small Cause Court, subject to the same being accounted and subject to what is stated hereinabove. The petitioner shall go on depositing Rs. 50/- per month, as interim rent, during the pendency of the suit in the Small Cause Court, as it is admitted that the rent of the whole flat being paid by the respondent to the landlord is only Rs. 66/- per month; and it is the case of the respondent that the petitioner is in possession of only one bedroom out of the two bedrooms. Rule absolute. The costs in the petition shall be the costs in the Small Cause Court suit. ------