Judgment Ghose J: 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated January 17, 1974 passed by Ramendra Mohan Datta, J. The appellant is a merchant carrying on business of cloth or garments including lungies of diverse description. The Respondent No. 1 is a body corporate framed under the appropriate laws of Bangladesh By and under a contract bearing No T.C,B/IMP 522/78 dated April 10, 1978 executed by the respondent No. 1 and the appellant the appellant agreed to sell and export to Bangladesh and deliver to the respondent No. 1 staple lungis fully described in the above mentioned contract on she terms and conditions mentioned in the said contract. 2. By and under the said contract the respondent No 1 was to pay to the appellant 3.39,974 to dollars through a confirmed irrevocable and transfer able letter of Credit to be opened by the respondent No.1 in favour of the appellant intimation whereof would be given to the appellant through its Bankers by the opening Bank the Letter of Credit would be opened by the respondent No. 1 within the 2 weeks from the date of receipt of performance guarantee to be furnished by the appellant within 7 days from the date of signing the contract. By and under the said contract the appellant agreed to telegraphically inform the respondent No. 1 and the inspection Agency mentioned in the contract 10 days before such inspection about the readiness of the stores and the place of inspection and the quantity to be inspected. 3. For the due performance of the obligation under the said contract the appellant agreed to furnish a performance guarantee in the form of Bank Guarantee in favour of the respondent No. 1 equivalent to 3% of the total C and P value of the goods within 2 days of the signing of the contract. As per the instruction of the appellant the respondent No. 3 executed a Rink Guauntee for the sum of Rs. 77,796/- in favour of the respondent No.2 the Banker of the respondent No.1. 4. the appellant came to know for the first time on the 14th June. 1973 that a Letter of Credit had been opened in favour of the appellant. 77,796/- in favour of the respondent No.2 the Banker of the respondent No.1. 4. the appellant came to know for the first time on the 14th June. 1973 that a Letter of Credit had been opened in favour of the appellant. By that time the due date of delivery for the 30% of the stores expired and the delivery of the 70% of the contracted goods could not be made within the stipulated period inasmuch as the appellant did not have 10 days' time to arrange for inspection of the goods. On or about July 13. 1973 the scheduled for shipment of the goods wore amended. By mutual agreement between the parties it was agreed that 50% of the goods would be shipped by July. 1973 and the balance by August. 1973 Thereafter on July 23, 1973 the appellant was informed of the amendment of the Letter of Credit under which the agreed date of shipment was extended upto 3rd August. 1973 Subsequently the date for shipment was extended upto 23rd August, and negotiation of Letter of Credit by 6th September 1973 The Letter of Credit it appears was not amended in accordance with the terms of the contract as amended subsequently the appellant authorised the respondent No.3, its bankers to extend the period of performance guarantee bond till Much. 1974 so that the goods could be supplied within that period but the respondent No. 1 refused to extend the period of the Letter of Credit and threatened to enforce the performance guarantee bond furnished by the appellant. 5. It has to be noticed that prima facie at least it appears that due to failure of the respondent No. 1 to give intimation of the amendment and consequential extension of the period of Letter of Credit when it was first amended and later due to the failure of the respondent No. 1 to amend the Letter of Credit in accordance with the amended terms of contract between the parties the appellant could not perform the contract between the parties. 6. The question that arises for determination is whether the respondent No. 1 even then was entitled to enforce the Guarantee Bond. In M/s. Tarapare and Company, Madras Appellant v M/s V/o Tractor Export Moscow & anr. 6. The question that arises for determination is whether the respondent No. 1 even then was entitled to enforce the Guarantee Bond. In M/s. Tarapare and Company, Madras Appellant v M/s V/o Tractor Export Moscow & anr. and connected appeals, AIR 1970 SC 891 , in pursuance of a contract with the respondent Russian Firm for supply of machinery the appellant Indian Firm opend a confirmed irrevocable and divisible Letter of Credit with the Bank of India Ltd. in favour of the Russian Firm negotiable through the Bank for Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R., Moscow. Under the said Letter of Credit, the Bank of India was required to pay co the Russian Firm on production of the documents mentioned in Letter of Credit. The Indian Firm contended that the Russian Firm committed breach of the contract in as much as the machinery supplied by the Russian Firm was not as efficient as represented at time of entering into the contract and in consequence thereof the Indian Firm had incurred and continued to incur considerable loss. In the premise the Russian Firm, according to the Indian Firm, was not entitled to enforce the Letter of Credit or to take away the money covered by the Letter of Credit. The Supreme Court considered the terms of an irrevocable Letter of Caxdit in favour of a person and after noting various authorities came to the conclusion than a Letter of Credit was independent of and unqualified by be contract of sale. A vendor of goods selling against a confirmed Letter of Credit was selling under the assurance that nothing would prevent him from receiving the price. As such the Supreme Court refused to grant any temporary injunction restraining the Russian Firm from operating the Letter of Credit. In the instant case the appellant furnished a Bank Guarantee which was apparently a "Performance Guarantee." The Performance Guarantee, it appears, was furnished as and by way of security for the duo performance by the appellant of the obligation cast upon it under the above mentioned contract. As has been noted earlier the breach committed by the respondent No. 1 prevented the appellant from performing its part of the contract. Prima facie that appears to me to be the case, in as much as the respondent No. 1 had not chosen to deny the allegation made to the petition. 7. As has been noted earlier the breach committed by the respondent No. 1 prevented the appellant from performing its part of the contract. Prima facie that appears to me to be the case, in as much as the respondent No. 1 had not chosen to deny the allegation made to the petition. 7. In the premises it cannot be said that Bank Guarantee has become enforceable Payment under a confirmed Letter of Credit is not dependant upon the performance of an obligation by the seller in a contract for sale of goods But a contract of guarantee is not autonomous like a Letter of Credit. A Bank Guarantee becomes enforceable only if the party at whose instance and on behalf of whom the Bank Guarantee is furnished commits any breach of the contract. (See M & M. Trading Corporation v. Sethi 74 CWN 991). Whether the Bank Guarantee has becomes enforceable by the respondent No 1 can be decided finally at the trial of the suit for the present the appellant has been able to make out a prima facie case that the respondent No. 1 should not be allowed to enforce the Bank Guarantee. For the reasons stated above the appeal must succeed. There shall be an injunction restraining the respondents No. 1 and 2 from enforcing or negotiating the performance guarantee and or the counter (?) guarantee bond mentioned in paragraph is of the petition. The cost of this appeal shall abide by the result of the suit. Certified for two counsels. Hazra J. I agree. Appeal allowed.