Judgement RAMAPRASADA RAO, J:. - A very short question arises in the appeal. Plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of money due on accounts. The plaintiff was admittedly a sole proprietary concern of which one Padmanabhan was the sole proprietor. He was trading under the name and style of M. C. S. Rajan and Company. He had a Manager by name Narayanan. The defendants owed on account and dealings a sum of Rs, 22,361.83. As per the books of accounts, the amount due was arrived at and the plaintiff claimed interest at 12% per annum on the outstandings so struck in the accounts. The plaintiffs gave notice Ex. A-2 prior to the suit and the defendants replied that so much amount was not due as the goods were priced at a very high rate not agreed to specifically between the parties. The plaintiff, therefore on the basis of his accounts came to Court. While instituting the suit, the cause title was correctly given as M.C.S. Rajan and Company and in paragraph 1 thereto, the company was described as the sole proprietary concern of Padmanabhan. It was also stated that the suit was being filed by its Manager M. A. Narayanan. Obviously this was done since the claim will be barred by limitation, if there was any delay in the matter of the filing of the action. The plaint was verified by Mr. Narayanan as Manager of the plaintiff-firm. The plaintiff sought for the usual money decree. The plaint was duly numbered without any objection by the Court. The defendants in their written statement after raising several pleas on merits, said that the suit as framed was not maintainable as it is not made clear as to how the Manager can sue on behalf of the plaintiff's proprietor Padmanabhan who has not filed the suit in his individual name. As in our view it is not necessary to consider the merits in the defence as is presently seen, we are not stating the defence in full. 2. The main question and controversy touched upon by the defendants in their defence was that the suit as framed and as presented by Mr. Narayanan as the Manager of the proprietary concern was not maintainable. The following issues were framed for trial. (1) What is the agreed price of goods? (2) Whether the statement of account of plaintiff is correct? The main question and controversy touched upon by the defendants in their defence was that the suit as framed and as presented by Mr. Narayanan as the Manager of the proprietary concern was not maintainable. The following issues were framed for trial. (1) What is the agreed price of goods? (2) Whether the statement of account of plaintiff is correct? (3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to interest? (4) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? (5) Whether the suit is not maintainable for the reasons stated in para. 10 of the written statement? (6) Whether this court has no jurisdiction to try this suit ? (7) To what reliefs, if any is the plaintiff entitled? 3. On all the issues excepting Issue No. 5, the learned trial Judge agreed with the plaintiff. But on Issue No. 5, he was of the view that as the authority which enabled Narayanan to sign plaint and verify the pleadings was not produced at or about the time when the suit was filed by him, the presentation of the plaint is irregular and the acceptance of the same ought not to have been done and hence no decree can be passed, even though there is no real defence on the merits of the case. The learned trial Judge was of the view that as Padmanabhan has not signed the plaint and as Narayanan did not produce the power of attorney on the day when he signed the pleading and as Ex. A-20, the power of attorney, under which the act of Narayanan was ratified by Padmanabhan was produced late and in particular at the time of trial, the learned trial Judge, while agreeing with the plaintiff on all the other issues, found against it on Issue No. 5 and held that the suit was not maintainable. It is as against this portion of the judgment which has of course resulted in the dismissal of the suit that the appeal has been filed. In our view, this is a case in which the sole proprietary concern whose proprietor was Padmanabhan and whose name also has been disclosed as such is the plaintiff. It is as against this portion of the judgment which has of course resulted in the dismissal of the suit that the appeal has been filed. In our view, this is a case in which the sole proprietary concern whose proprietor was Padmanabhan and whose name also has been disclosed as such is the plaintiff. One way by which a sole proprietor who has a trading style can file a suit in respect of his commercial activity is by signing the plaint himself as proprietor or causing the same to be signed by a person who has a requisite authority to do so. In the Civil P. C., there is no express bar to this procedure. In fact, Order XXX, Rule 10 refers to a suit against a person carrying on business in a name other than his own name. But, there is no express provision in the Civil P. C, for suits filed by persons carrying on business in a name other than his own. Therefore, the regularity or acceptance of such suits by Courts has to be tested by common law principles. No doubt, to some extent Order VI dealing with pleadings and in particular Order VI, Rules 14 and 15 might give a clue. Under Order VI, Rule 14, "Every pleading shall be signed by the party and his pleader (if any): provided that where a party pleading is, by reason of absence or for other good cause, unable to sign the pleading, it may be signed by any person duly authorised by him to sign the same or to sue or defend on his behalf." Order VI, Rule 15, read thus: "(1) Save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force every pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party or by one of the parties pleading or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case, (2) The person verifying shall specify, by reference to the numbered paragraphs of the pleading what he verifies of his own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received and believed to be true. (3) The verification shall be signed by the person making it and shall state the date on which and the place at which it was signed." 4. (3) The verification shall be signed by the person making it and shall state the date on which and the place at which it was signed." 4. Under both the rules, the pleading could be signed or verified as the case may be by any person duly authorised by the person who has to sign the same. In fact, the pleading could be verified by a person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case. The purport of Rules 14 and 15 of Order VI is to avoid impersonation and unauthorised persons ushering in pleadings into Court and cause confusion later on. But in a case where a Manager of a proprietorship concern signs the pleadings and verifies them as a person who has been duly authorised to sign the same and as one who has been acquainted with the facts of the case, then it is reasonable to say that, if at any material point of time and particularly when the defendants raise a specific plea that the pleading has not been properly signed or verified, he produces the requisite authority from the sole proprietor or satisfies the court that he is fully acquainted with the facts of the case, the principle and substance of Rules 14 and 15 are satisfied. The case has to be decided on the elementary principle of ratification of an act by a principal. That the person who signed the pleadings and verified it is the Manager of the concern is not in dispute. It can, therefore be safely presumed that he is acquainted with the facts of the case. The question, however, is whether he was authorised to sign the pleadings by the principal, namely, the proprietor. Ex. A-20 is the power of attorney produced during the trial of the case which establishes that Padmanabhan has appointed and constituted Mr. Nararanan to file a suit against the defendants take all such steps necessary in the matter. He has also expressly stated that any acts done by his attorney in that behalf shall be ratified and confirm by him. Probably, this was the main anticipation which prompted the principal administrative officer of the City Civil Court to accept the pleadings and number the suit. Even assuming that there was an irregular signing of the pleading and a verification of the same, the power of attorney Ex. Probably, this was the main anticipation which prompted the principal administrative officer of the City Civil Court to accept the pleadings and number the suit. Even assuming that there was an irregular signing of the pleading and a verification of the same, the power of attorney Ex. A-20 produced would old plug the laches said to have been created in the situation concerned and old make the pleading a perfect one and also the verification an acceptable one. So long as the principal has ratified an act authorised or unauthorised by him and if there is no dispute by the contesting defendants that there was no such ratification by the principal, then, in our view and in the facts and circumstances of this case, there has been a proper presentation of the plaint by Mr. Narayanan and Ex. A-20 though supervening in point time would date back to the date of presentation of the plaint and would make it a proper presentation of the same by the agent with due authority of the principal. Sections 196 and 199 of the Indian Contract Act make it clear that an act done by one person on behalf of another, but without his knowledge or authority, may be ratified by that other and if that other so elects to ratify, the same effect will follow as if the act was performed by that other. 5. Even so, Section 199 of the Indian Contract Act says that a person ratifying any unauthorised act done on his behalf ratifies the whole of the transaction of which such act formed a part. Even, as we said if the contention of the defendants is accepted for argument's sake, that there was an irregularity in the transaction when Mr. Narayanan presented the plaint, such an irregularity has been cured by the express ratification of that irregular act by Mr. Padmanabhan and this, as we said, has bridged the gulf, if at all there was one, in the matter of proper presentation of the plaint in the court below. The learned trial Judge was, therefore, wrong in having dismissed the suit as not being maintainable. Padmanabhan and this, as we said, has bridged the gulf, if at all there was one, in the matter of proper presentation of the plaint in the court below. The learned trial Judge was, therefore, wrong in having dismissed the suit as not being maintainable. The circumstances of the case prompt us to hold that Narayanan had the requisite authority to present the plaint, sign the same and verify the same and if this is accepted on the broad common law principle based on ratification of the act by the principal then it follows that the suit was maintainable. 6. In fact we entertained a slight doubt about the legal position and we requested Mr. T.R. Rajagopal to assist us as amicus curiae. Apart from the common law principle referred to above by us, he has brought to our notice certain decisions of our Court and other High Courts. In Govindoss v. Muthiah Chetty, (AIR 1925 Mad 660) Srinivasa Aiyangar, J., observed as follows:- "I am not all sure that with the plaint signed and verified as it was by the person who purported to act as the agent of the plaintiff and the order of the learned Judge of this Court granting leave such leave when granted did not relate back to the institution of the suit and cure any irregularity attaching to the signing or verification of the plaint." That was a case where the plaint was presented by a person purporting to act as agent, but without producing the power of attorney. Later, the power was produced and the contention was that the power not having been filed along with the plaint and as the leave to accept the plaint by the administrative officer or the Judge, as the case may be, is a condition precedent and such leave not having been obtained, there was no proper plaint before the Court. The learned Judge did not accept that contention. The learned Judge did not accept that contention. A Division Bench of our High Court consisting of Chief Justice Gentle and Yahya Ali, J., in Subbiah Pillai v Sankarapandiam Pillai, (AIR 1948 Mad 369) in a similar situation following the observation of the Judicial Committee in Mohinimohun Des v. Bungsi Buddan Saha Das, (1890) ILR 17 Cal 580 (PC) observed thus: "Where a plaintiff has not signed a plaint, filed with his knowledge and consent, it is an omission which can be cured, and indeed, should be corrected in the interest of justice. The omission to sign or verify a plaint is not such a defect as could affect the merits of a case or the jurisdiction of the Court and is curable under the provisions of Section 99, Civil Procedure Code." "If the defect is not discovered until the case comes on for hearing before an appellate Court, the appellate Court may order the amendment to be made in that Court. The appellate Court ought not to dismiss the suit or interfere with the decree of the lower Court merely because the plaint has not been signed." Even the Allahabad High Court dealing with a similar situation, but under the old Act, (reported in Maharaja of Rewah v. Swami Saran, (1903) ILR. 25 All 635) in a case where a plaint was filed in the Revenue Court by a person not properly authorised to sign the same at the time of presentation, but which was cured by subsequent sanction, observed as follows: "Where the plaint in a suit filed in a Court of Revenue on behalf of a Ruling Chief was signed by a person who at the time of signing had not been specially appointed by Government for such purpose under Section 432 of Civil P. C. but was so appointed before the period of limitation in respect of such suit had expired, the plaint was a valid plaint for all purposes" Therefore, the finding of the court below this point has to be set aside. As all other issues have been found in favour of the appellant and as there is no one appearing for the respondents before us, the appeal is allowed with costs and the plaintiff appellant would be entitled to the decree as prayed for. 7. We are thankful to Mr. T.R. Rajagopal for the assistance he rendered to this Court.