Judgment : Sen J. : The undisputed facts in this suit are that the defendant, The Shipping Corporation of India Ltd., at the material time owned a vessel named "THE STATE OF BOMBAY" (hereinafter referred to as the said Vessel). On the 18th November, 1968 between the hours 9-35 and 9-40 A.M. while the said vessel was hauling out from the King Georges'f Dock in the Port of Calcutta on the river Hooghly, she collided with three Buoys at the Kidderpore Dock Mooring and the Hastings Mooring. The vessel also fouled the moorings of No.2, Hastings mooring outer flood Buoy. The said Buoy and the Moorings were the property of The Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta, the plaintiffs, in this suit. 2. The plaintiffs have instituted this suit claiming, inter alia, a decree for Rs. 20, 629-00; interim interest, interest on judgment; costs and other felids. It is alleged in the plaint that as a result of the said collision the said Buoys were considerably damaged. It is alleged that the Kidderpore Docks Entrance Ebb Buoy broke adrift from its moorings and the moorings dropped to the river bed. The Outer flood Buoy of No.2, Hastings Moorings broke adrift and the moorings were lost in the river. The 2nd inner flood Buoy of No.2 Hastings Moorings also broke adrift. Considerable mooring materials were lost. 3. It is alleged that the said collision and/or accident was caused solely by the negligence of the defendants and/or its agents or servants. The particulars of such negligence are alleged as follows- 4. The defendants failed to keep any or proper look out or watch on the said vessel; the defendants failed and neglected to follow or keep to the navigational rules and/or instructions issued from time to time; the defendants failed to keep the said vessel under proper care or control; the said buoys were stationary objects floating on the surface of the river firmly fastened with" chains to the river bed and/or piles driven into the river bank and were clearly visible in broad day light from all sides. The plaintiffs have also invoked the doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" and have stated that they will rely on the fact of the said collision as evidence of negligence. 5. The plaintiffs have also invoked the doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" and have stated that they will rely on the fact of the said collision as evidence of negligence. 5. Pursuant to an amendment effected under an order dated the 12th August, 1974 in this suit, it has been further alleged in the plaint that the defendants' said vessel was under-powered, as a result whereof instead of dragging ,the anchor along with it, the defendants' said vessel swung round the anchor having the latter as a pivot. It is also alleged that the steering of the said vessel was also sluggish which prevented any quick movement of the said vessel in an opposite direction so as to avoit contract with the said buoys. 6. In the premises, it is alleged that the plaintiffs suffered loss and damages aggregating Rs. 20, 629.00p. 7. In the written statement filed on behalf of the defendants it is denied that the alleged collisions were caused by any negligence on the part of the defendants or any of their servants or agents or that there was any failure on the part of such servants or agents to keep a proper look out or to follow the Navigational Rules or instructions or to keep the said vessel under proper care or control. 8. It is further alleged that at all material times, the navigation of the said vessel was under the direction and control of an Assistant Harbour Master, not a servant of the defendants, but an officer employed by the plaintiffs and deputed by the plaintiffs for piloting the said vessel. As the said vessel was being navigated at all material times by the said Assistant Harbour Master, the plaintiffs have full knowledge of the manner in which the vessel was manoeuvered at the material time. 9. The defendants do not addit the nature and extent of damages or the losses alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiffs. In the additional written statement filed on behalf of the defendants subsequent to the amendment of the plaint as aforesaid, it is denied that the engine of the said vessel was unpowered or that her steering was sluggish as alleged. 10. The following issues were raised and settled at the trial – 1. In the additional written statement filed on behalf of the defendants subsequent to the amendment of the plaint as aforesaid, it is denied that the engine of the said vessel was unpowered or that her steering was sluggish as alleged. 10. The following issues were raised and settled at the trial – 1. Was the collision between the vessel "STATE OF BOMBAY" and the plaintiffs' buoys caused by any negligence on the part of the defendants or its servants or agents as alleged in paragraph 3 of the plaint ? 2. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? Additional Issues (i) Was the engine of the vessel underpowered as alleged in paragraph 4(a) of the amended plaint? (ii) Was the steering of the vessel sluggish as alleged in paragraph 4(b) of the amended plaint? The documents and correspondence contained in the Court's brief of documents were admitted by consent of parties without formal proof and tendered as Exhibit B. Of the documents subsequently disclosed by the defendants the following have been similarly tendered and exhibited- (a) Copy extract from Bridge Movement Log Book on 18.11.68 Ext. 1. (b) Copy of Entries pertaining to the accident from Official Log Book-Ext 2. (c) Copy letter dated 19.11.1968 from the Master M.M. TARE to the Harbour Master, Calcutta Port Commissioners-Ext. 3. 11. The only witness to depose in support of the plaintiff was one Kabab Appaji Narayan Rao. He is an Assistant Harbur Master employed under the plaintiffs in the Port of Calcutta and has been working as such for 19 years. Since 1965 he ha5 held a first grade licence of a pilot. He remembered having handled the vessel S. S. "THE STATE OF BOMBY" on the 18th November, 1968. He had to take the ship from the King George's Dock to the Kidderpore Dock on the flow tide. 12. He described the collision in answer to question 27 in his examination in chief as follows : "I had to turn the ship to Kidderpore Dock in order to enter the dock and while doing so, I found that the ship's engines were underpowered, more slow than power, and the steering was very sluggish. While turning the ship round, I had tried to turn the ship at Starboard wheel and it so happened that the ship turned to port instead of to starboard. While turning the ship round, I had tried to turn the ship at Starboard wheel and it so happened that the ship turned to port instead of to starboard. So I tried my best to get out of the spot. I was putting the engines full speed ahead but since I had already let go port anchor, the ship did not move, although she was going in full speed ahead. Any other ship would have dragged the anchor, if I was going in full speed ahead, While turning round, it so happened that it was not possible for me to drag the anchor and the ship came right round On the port wheel after fouling the Ebb buoy and the buoys at No.2, Hastings moorings flood end. Then I was stemming the tide and was ready to go into the dock. Since the ship had not suffered much damage. I decided to take the ship into the dock". 13. He proved his report dated the 18th November,1968 made immediately after the incident to Harbour Master (Ext, B), He admitted, however, that this report was submitted two days after the event. He stated that the steering was sluggish as while putting the rudder over, the vessel did not turn in time as it was expected to do. He stated that the vessel was underpowered because he had the port anchor down and the vessel should have been able to drag the anchor. The reason why the said vessel did not drag the anchor was because the anchor was holding. The difference between any other ship and this vessel was that the engine was under powered. He, however, admitted that if the said vessel did not drag the anchor she should have turned more sharply (question 48). 14. In cross examination he stated that he was in charge of the said vessel right from the time the Berthing Master handed over the ship to him until the time the said vessel went inside the Kidderpore Dock. He further stated that he had navigated the said vessel properly and there was no negligence in the manner the said vessel was navigated. It was put to him that at the flood tide. which was strong, the movement of the vessel became sluggish when it was turning, He did not deny the suggestion. 15. He further stated that he had navigated the said vessel properly and there was no negligence in the manner the said vessel was navigated. It was put to him that at the flood tide. which was strong, the movement of the vessel became sluggish when it was turning, He did not deny the suggestion. 15. The only witness to depose on behalf of the defendants was one Mohan Madhab Tare. He was the Master in command of the vessel S. S. "STATE OF BOMBAY" in November, 1968. In answer to question 32 he gave his version of the collision as follows : "The vessel approached near the viocinity of K.P. Dock entrance. Somewhere in the river the vessel dropped the port anchor. The direction for dropping port anchor was given by the Assistant Harbour Master in order that vessel would stem the tide for entering the Kidderpore Dock entrance. However, the engines were going full ahead and the vessel did not turn quickly and drifted on to the buoys and then came to contact. The engine movement and the helm movement orders were given by the Assistant Harbour Master which were promptly carried out by the Ship's Officers and the crew. Then the vessel was brought to the anchorage - and was about to enter . into the Kidderpore Dock." 16. He further stated, that the said vessel did not turn quickly when the port anchor was dropped though she was expected to turn fast and that is why at that time the engines were directed to run full astern, According to him the vessel did not turn quickly because of the tide and not because the steering was sluggish or because the engines were underpowered. He stated that one Joseph Pulakkar was the Chief Engineer of the said vessel at the relevant time and he was in charge of the engines. The latters duties also included maintenance of the steering of the said vessel. 17. Mr. Sailen Majumder, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs, contended that in the instant case the said vessel belonging to the defendants was at the material time a moving object and she had collided in day light with the buoys belonging to the plaintiffs which were stationary objects. 17. Mr. Sailen Majumder, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs, contended that in the instant case the said vessel belonging to the defendants was at the material time a moving object and she had collided in day light with the buoys belonging to the plaintiffs which were stationary objects. On these admitted facts he contended that the doctrine of "res-ipsa loquitur applied and the onus was on the defendants to show that they had not been negligent in any way whatsoever or alternatively the defendants had to establish the cause of the said accident and then to show that they were in no way responsible for the same. In support of his contentions Mr. Majumder cited several decisions. 18. First, he cited the decision in the case of "The Merchant Ship" reported in 89 Probate at page 179. The facts of that case were that the plaintiffs' vessel "The Catalonia" was at anchor in the Mersey when the defendants' steamer "The Merchant Prince" ran into her in broad day light. In an action on damages by collision the defence taken .was that the steam steering gear of "Merchant Prince" failed to act due to some latent defect or accident which could not have been ascertained or prevented by the exercise of any reasonable care or skill' on the part of the defendants. It was contended on behalf of the defendants that the collision and the damage were caused by inevitable accident. The Court of Appeal held that the defendants were liable, as in order to support the defence of inevitable accident they must first disprove the prima facie evidence of negligence, the burden whereof was on them. 19. Mr. Majumder relied on the observations of Lord Esher MR in his judgment at page 187 in this case as follows :- "Where a ship is under way, and she runs into a ship at anchor, that is prima facie evidence of negligence on her part; that the ship at anchor had only to state the fact, and that it was day-light. or, if it was night, "I had my light up". That is all she has to say; and the mere fact of running into her is evidence of negligence on the other side. Why is that? or, if it was night, "I had my light up". That is all she has to say; and the mere fact of running into her is evidence of negligence on the other side. Why is that? Because after long experience the courts have come to this conclusion, that as a matter of truth and fact the one ship ought to be under perfect command, and therefore able to get out of the way of the other ship if she sees her, and the other is a help-less thing which cannot do anything. The law is laid down from tae palpable truth of the circumstances of such a case." "The only way for a man to get rid of that which circumstances prove against him as negligence is to shew that it occurred by an accident which was unavoidable by him-that is an accident the cause of which was such that he could not by any act of his have avoided its result. He can only get rid of that proof against him by shewing inevitable accident, that is by shewing that the cause of the collision was a cause not produced by him, but a cause the result of which he could not avoid. Inevitable means unavoidable. Unavoidable means unavoidable by him". 20. Mr. Majumder next cited the decision in the case of "The Annot Lyle" reported in 11 Probate at page 114. In this case also there was a collision between a vessel at anchor and one in motion and it was held that the burden of proof was upon the owners of the vessel in motion to prove that the collision was not occasioned by negligence on their part. 21. The next decision cited by Mr. Majumder was in the case of "The Indus" reported in (2) 12 Probate at page 46. In this case all that the plaintiffs proved was that its vessel, namely the Light ship Girdler was anchored in the Thames and that its lights were burning brightly on the night of the 20th June, 1884 when she was run down by the defendant's vessel the Indus. In the Court of Appeal, Lord Esher M. R. held that the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case of negligence against the defendants' vessel by proving that their vessel was at anchor and was showing a proper light at the relevant time. In the Court of Appeal, Lord Esher M. R. held that the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case of negligence against the defendants' vessel by proving that their vessel was at anchor and was showing a proper light at the relevant time. The burden of proof was then upon the defendants to rebut the presumption of liability, by shewing either that the collision was occasioned by no fault on their part, or that it was due to inevitable accident, or that it was solely the fault of a pilot who was on board their vessel by compulsion of law. It was held that the defendants did not discharge such burden of proof. 22. Mr. Majumder also cited the decision in the case of (3) Moore v. R. Fox & Sons reported, in (1956) 1 Q. B. at page 596. The facts in this case were that a workman was killed by an explosion in a de-rusting tank belonging to the defendants while operating the same. It was found that the explosion was due to an accumulation of unburnt gas which was ignited by the burning jet used to light the burner in the tank. The reason for such accumulation of gas was never determined. 23. An action for damages was initiated by the widow of the deceased, alleging negligence on the part of the defendants. At the trial, no negligence was attributed to the deceased by the defendants, who only ca1led four expert witnesses who deposed that the accident was inexplicable. The maintenance man of the defendants whose duty was to inspect the machine once a week regularly was not called to give evidence. It was held by the Court of Appeal by its majority judgment that as the deceased was employed by the defendants to operate this machine, the principle of "res ipsa loquitur" applied and that at the relevant time the machine was under the management of the defendants or their servants. It was held further that the defendants had failed to discharge the onus of proof placed on them merely by showing that the accident was inexplicable. To discharge such an onus they had to go further and either show that they had not been negligent, or give an explanation of the cause of the accident which did not connote negligence on their part. 24. Mr. To discharge such an onus they had to go further and either show that they had not been negligent, or give an explanation of the cause of the accident which did not connote negligence on their part. 24. Mr. Ajit Roy Mukherjee, learned counsel on behalf of the defendants, on the other hand, contended that inasmuch as at the relevant time the said vessel was under the control and/or management of the Assistant Harbour Master, an employee of the plaintiffs, the principle of 'res ipsa loquitur' did not apply in the facts of this case and the burden of proof was on plaintiffs to establish negligence on the part of the defendants. He further contended that, in any event, in order to attract the principle of 'res ipsa loquitur' it must be established that the accident was of such a nature that it would automatically lead to the presumption of negligence. He submitted that in the instant case the nature of the accident did not lead to such a presumption. 25. In support of his contentions Mr. Roy Mukherjee relied on several decisions including an unreported judgment delivered by me in Admiralty Suit No.7 of 1970 in the case of (4) Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta v. India Steamship Company Ltd. 26. In that case I had held that when a vessel was in charge of an officer of the Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta and an accident occurred when the vessel remained in such charge the doctrine of 'res ipsa loquitur' was not invoked. Decisions cited in that case, namely, 'The Indus' (supra). The Benue' reported in 1916 Probate p.88 and 'The Iona' reported in I Appeal Cases (LR) Privy Council p. 146 were distinguished on the fact that the compulsory pilots on board in those cases were not in the employment of the plaintiff. 27. The principle of 'res ipsa loquitur' as stated in the well known Treaties on Negligence by Charlesworth (5th Edition) at page 979 was relied on in that case. 27. The principle of 'res ipsa loquitur' as stated in the well known Treaties on Negligence by Charlesworth (5th Edition) at page 979 was relied on in that case. The statement is as follows:- "The maxim comes into operation (1) on the proof of happening the unexplained occurrence; (2) when the occurrence is one which would not have happened in the ordinary course of the thing without negligence on the part of somebody other than the plaintiff; (3) the circum stances point to the negligence in question being that of the defendant rather than that of any other person. The third requirement is usually fullfilled by showing that the instrument causing the damage was in the management and control of the defendant at the time of the occurrence, but this is not essential". 28. The proposition as laid down in the parent case Scott v. London St. Catherine Docks Company was relied on in that case: The law laid down there was as follows :- "There must be reasonable evidence of negligence, but, where the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as, in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management exercise proper care, it affords reasonable evidence in the absence of explanation by the defendant that the accident arose for want of care'. 29. The case of (5) Easson v. London & North Eastern Railway Co. reported in (1944) 2 All England Law Reports p. 425 was also considered in that case. Where a child travelling by train fell through a door and was injured, it was held that though it was the duty of the Railway Company to inspect the carriage doors and see they were properly fastened before the train left the station the doors were not continuously under their sole control for the doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" to apply. The mere fact that a door came open was not a prima facie evidence of negligence against the Railway Company. 30. Here Mr. Roy Mukherjee relied on and cited other English decisions which were not cited before me in the above Admiralty Suit No.7 of 1970. The first of such decisions was in the case of (6) Campion v. Scruttons, Ltd. reported in 1968 (2) Llyods' Law Reports p. 469. 30. Here Mr. Roy Mukherjee relied on and cited other English decisions which were not cited before me in the above Admiralty Suit No.7 of 1970. The first of such decisions was in the case of (6) Campion v. Scruttons, Ltd. reported in 1968 (2) Llyods' Law Reports p. 469. The facts in this case were that the plaintiff, an experienced dock worker, in the course of his employment was loading oil drums on to a lorry. He heaved an empty oil drum believing it to be full, fell over and injured himself. He contended that the defendants, his employers, were negligent in failing to warn him that the said drums were empty and that the doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur' applied in the facts. The defendants did not adduce any evidence at the trial. It was held that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the defendants were negligent. On appeal Lord Willmer L.J. observed in his judgment at page 471 as follows :- "......as I understand the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it is a rule of evidence which applies only in the case of what 1 may describe as a passive victim, who is injured by a thing or res under the control of the defendant, in circumstances in which the accident is of a kind which does not normally happen without negligence on the part of the person in control. With all respect that seems to me to be remote from the circumstances of this case. We are not here dealing with the owners of the drum............"It does not seem to me that they the defendants were any more in control of these drums than was the plaintiff, who was an active participant in the operation and indeed was the defendants' chosen representative to carry out their contract with the owners of the drum". 31. In a separate judgment Edmund Davies L.J. observed at page 472 of the report as follows :- "The maxim res ipsa loquitur has, in my judgment, no application to cases like the present where the injured party has himself played an active or dynamic part in the incident which gave rise to his injuries. 31. In a separate judgment Edmund Davies L.J. observed at page 472 of the report as follows :- "The maxim res ipsa loquitur has, in my judgment, no application to cases like the present where the injured party has himself played an active or dynamic part in the incident which gave rise to his injuries. If he has, it becomes a straight-forward case of considering the whole body of evidence, and thereupon determining in the ordinary way whether or not negligence has been established against the defendants as the came (or at least a contributory cause) of the injuries which are the foundation of the claim". 32. In support of his other contention that the nature of the accident was such as to preclude the operation of the doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur", Mr. Roy Mukherjee cited a decision of the House of Lords in the case of Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. South Port Corporation reported in (1956) 2 W. L. R. p. 81. The facts in this case were that the vessel Inverpool, an oil tanker, was stranded in a river estuary and to prevent her breaking up the Master jettisoned a large quantity of oil she was carrying as cargo. The oil was carried by the tide to a fore-shore occasioning damage. An action was brought by the owners of the foreshore based on trespass, nuisance and negligence. It was alleged that this stranding was caused by faulty navigation. Negligence was denied in the defence taken. 33. At the hearing, the defendants alleged that the stranding was due to the tanker's stern frame being cracked so that the steering gear was faulty but they called no evidence to show how this condition was caused. The trial judge held that they were not negligent as alleged in the statement of claim and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to succeed in their action. 34. The Court of Appeal, however, held that the doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" applied and that the onus was on the ship-owners to explain why the steering gear went wrong and as they had not done so, they were liable in negligence. There was a further appeal to the House of Lords. 35. 34. The Court of Appeal, however, held that the doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" applied and that the onus was on the ship-owners to explain why the steering gear went wrong and as they had not done so, they were liable in negligence. There was a further appeal to the House of Lords. 35. In this case in the original statement of claim it was only alleged that there had been negligence in navigation of the tanker whereby she was grounded and that her master had taken no sufficient steps to prevent such grounding. Following an amendment, it was further alleged that it was negligent on the part of the ship owners to cause the tanker to enter or navigate in the channel when it was known that the steering of the vessel was erratic. In the House of Lords, Earl Jowitt held that in the facts of that case the decision in the Merchant Prince (supra) did not apply. He observed (in page 85 of the report) "no one has ever suggested that the fracture of the stern frame, which caused the steering of the Inverpool to become defective was in any way caused or contributed to by the negligence of those in charge of the navigation of the ship. There was, and there could be, nothing analugus to the improper adjustment of the chain; nor was there any allegation of unseaworthiness made in the statement of claim; throughout the course of the case no question was directed to the master or Chief Engineer in any way bearing on the question of unseaworthiness; and the case made against the present appellants at the trial rested entirely on their responsibility for the acts of the master as their servant". 36. Lord Radcliff observed in his judgment (at p. 92 of the report) as follows : "I find it impossible to read the statement of claim and the particulars without coming to the clear conclusion that, while the respondents were announcing it to be one of their heads of complaint that the master had brought his ship into the channel with defective control of steering, they were not putting it forward as a ground of complaint that the appellants, the ship owners, had allowed their ship to be at sea in such a defective condition. And that is what they now wish to complain of. 37. And that is what they now wish to complain of. 37. Lord Turcker in his judgment (at p. 93 of the report) discussed the other proposition as follows :- "......... it is, in my view, well settled that, in actions between users of the highway and between the occupier of premises adjoining the highway which have been damaged by a person lawfully using the highway, the person who has suffered damages cannot recover in trespass in the absence of negligence on the part of the person who has caused the damage; see per Lord Blackburn in River Weal Commissioners vs. Adamson, where he says 'My Lords, the common law is, I think, as follows :- property adjoining to a spot on which the public have a right to carryon traffic is liable to be injured by that traffic. In this respect there is no difference between a shop, the railings or windows of which may be broken by a carriage on the road, and a pier adjoining to a harbur, or a navigable river, or the sea, which is liable to be injured by a ship. In either case the owner of the injured properly must bear his own loss, unless he can establish that some other person is in 'fault, and liable to make it good'. This was the principle applied by Mccardie J. in Gayler & Pope Ltd. v. Davies & Son Ltd, in rejecting the contention that the plaintiffs in that case could succeed in trespass in the absence of negligence". 38. Lastly, Mr. Majumdar had also cited the case of Barkway v, South Wales Transport Co. Ltd, reported in (1948) 2 All ER p. 460. A motor omnibus, in that case, belonging to the defendants was carrying passengers including the plaintiff's husband. On the road. the off side front tyre of the vehicle burst causing the vehicle to mount the pavement on the offside of the road, crash into railings and fall down an embankment. The plaintiff's husband along with three other passengers was killed and other passengers were injured. It was found that the tyre burst was caused by an impact fracture on the cord of the outer tyre which could happen without leaving any visible mark on the outer surface and might not be visible even if the tyre had been removed from the rim and examined. It was found that the tyre burst was caused by an impact fracture on the cord of the outer tyre which could happen without leaving any visible mark on the outer surface and might not be visible even if the tyre had been removed from the rim and examined. It was also found that the driver had been during the journey exceeding the legal speed limit but just before the accident the speed did not exceed such limit and the accident was not caused by fast driving. There was no evidence where the fracture occurred. The plaintiff in her action claimed damages from the defendants alleging that her husband's death was caused by the negligence of the defendants or their servants. The plaintiff succeeded at the trial. In the Court of Appeal, the majority held that in the facts found the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was attracted and the defendant had to prove affirmatively that they had exercised all reasonable care. It was not enough for the defendants to show that the immediate cause of the accident was a tyre burst, but the defendants had further to prove either that the burst resulted from a specific cause which did not connote negligence or if they could point to no such specific cause that they had used all reasonable care in the management of the lyres. 39. It was held that the defendants had discharged such burden by proving that they had maintained a reasonable system of inspection of their tyres and that they were not negligent with regard to the maintenace of the tyre in question. 40. This case appears to have been decided on its special facts and no new principle or proposition of law is laid down. 41. In Admiralty Suit No. 7 of 1970 I have already held that the doctrine or principle of 'res ipsa loquitur' was not attracted where an officer of the Commissioners for Port of Calcutta was in charge of the vessel which caused the accident. The facts in the instant case are identical. 42. On a careful consideration of all decisions cited I do not feel inclined to hold otherwise than what I held in Admiralty Suit No. 7 of 1970. The further decisions cited support the view I have already taken on this point. The facts in the instant case are identical. 42. On a careful consideration of all decisions cited I do not feel inclined to hold otherwise than what I held in Admiralty Suit No. 7 of 1970. The further decisions cited support the view I have already taken on this point. Even the case of Moore v. R. Fox & Son (supra) cited on behalf of the plaintiffs support this view. The principle of 'res ipsa loquitur' was in that case held to apply, as the machine which caused the accident was found to be under the management of the defendants or its servants. 43. The alternative contention of Mr. Roy Mukherjee, viz. that the nature of the accident in the instant case was such that it would not by itself lead to the presumption of negligence on the part of defendants is also not without substance. I respectfully agree with the observations of Lord Tucker in the case of Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. (supra). 44. It appears to me that buoys are small objects placed in the waters of the Port and vessels operating in the Port must necessarily go near them, pass close to them and/or manoeuvre between them. A collision between a moving ship and a buoy in not the same thing as a collision between a moving ship and a ship at anchor. The facts and circumstances of this case cannot be compared to the circumstances where a machine normally expected to operate safely explodes or where, as in Scott v. London St. Catherine Docks Company, an object falls from the defendants' premises on the head of an unwary passerby. 45. For reasons as discussed above I hold that the doctrine of 'res ipsa loquitur' is not attracted in the facts of this case and it is for the plaintiff to prove negligence on the part of the defendants in order to succeed in this suit. 46. At the trial the plaintiffs have neither urged nor proved any negligence in the navigation of the said vessel. It has also not been contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that any faulty navigation caused the accident in the instant case. 46. At the trial the plaintiffs have neither urged nor proved any negligence in the navigation of the said vessel. It has also not been contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that any faulty navigation caused the accident in the instant case. The Assistant Harbour Master in his evidence stated positively that there was no negligence in the manner in which the said vessel was navigated, The Master of the said vessel was in the box, and no case of negligent navigation was put to him. 47. The contentions of the plaintiffs are that the engine of the said vessel was underpowered and that her steering was sluggish. Allegations in this regard were made for the first time in the report of the Assistant Harbour Master dated 18th November, 1968 (Ext. B). It is to be noted that in the last line of this report the Assistant Harbour Master recorded :- "It was observed that the steering was very sluggish and the vessel very underpowered". Significatly, it was never recorded that this state of the engine or that of the steering were defects, or that the said vessel was unseaworthy or that the alleged state of the engine and the steering of the said vessel was caused by lack of proper care or maintenance or on account of any negligence on the part of the owners of the said vessel. 48. Apparrently such observations of the Assist Harbour Master were not accepted by the plaintiffs themselves as will appear from the document dated the 11th March, 1969, being a report made by the Harbor Master (Port) to the Director, Marine Department which is a document disclosed by the plaintiffs and contained in Ext. B. It is the finding of the Harbour Master (Port) that "The "S/O Bombay" being a twin-screw vessel, it was to be anticipated that full power of the engines would not be available without going full speed astern on one engine......" 49. Prior to the institution of the suit two letters of demand were issued by the Harbour Master (Port) to the defendants, respectively dated the 25/27th November, 1968 and the 17th March, 1969. These documents have been included in Fxt. B. These are common documents having been disclosed by both the parties. Prior to the institution of the suit two letters of demand were issued by the Harbour Master (Port) to the defendants, respectively dated the 25/27th November, 1968 and the 17th March, 1969. These documents have been included in Fxt. B. These are common documents having been disclosed by both the parties. No negligence was alleged in these letters nor was it alleged or recorded that the engines or the steering of the said vessel were not what they should have been. 50. Even in the original plaint these items were not included in the particulars of the negligence and even after amendment bare allegations have been introduced in the amended paragraphs 4 (a) and 4(b). 51. From the box, the Assistant Harbour Master did not say anything more about the condition of the engine or of the steering of the said vessel than what was stated in his report (Ext. B) and the said paragraphs of the amended plaint. 52. Mr. Majumdar contended that in view of the pleadings and evidence induced on behalf of the plaintiffs it was for the defendants to establish that the said vessel and in particular her engine and steering were properly maintained by the defendants and they should have called the Chief Engineer of the said vessel for the purpose. 53. I am unable to accept such contentions of Mr. Majumdar. It does not appear to me that there was any allegation of negligence by the plaintiffs in regard to the said two items, namely the engine and the steering of the said vessel. It also appear to me that the plaintiffs have not even made out a prima facie case of negligence so as to cast the onus of disproof on the defendants. The same contentions were urged by the plaintiffs in the case of Esso Petrolium Co. Ltd. (supra). The facts and circumstances, as also the pleadings in that case appear to be similar to those in the instant case. Their Lordships in the House of Lords held in that case, in the absence of any allegation of negligence or unseaworthiness, no duty was cast on the shipowners to explain why the steering gear went wrong. 54. In view of the above I hold that the plaintiffs have failed to establish any negligence on the part of the defendants. Their Lordships in the House of Lords held in that case, in the absence of any allegation of negligence or unseaworthiness, no duty was cast on the shipowners to explain why the steering gear went wrong. 54. In view of the above I hold that the plaintiffs have failed to establish any negligence on the part of the defendants. I also hold that the plaintiffs have also failed to make out a prima facie case. In view of my findings as above I answer the issues as follow :- Issue No. 1 is answered in the negative and in favour of the defendants. The additional issues Nos. 1 and 2 are also answered in the negative and in favour of the defendants. 55. By reasons of the answers to the above issues the plaintiffs cannot succeed in this suit. The suit is dismissed with costs.