JUDGMENT R. S. Pathak, C. J.-—Bratu applied to the Compensation Officer under section 11 (1) of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953, for the acquisition of the right, title and interest of the landowner Bhekhu in the land of the tenancy held by him under the landowner. Tek Chand, the son of the landowner, filed an application stating that the landowner was of unsound mind and incapable of understanding the import of the proceeding and, therefore, a guardian should be appointed for the purposes of the proceeding. The Compensation Officer held that the landowner was not insane, and he made an order granting proprietary rights in favour of Bratu. On appeal, the learned District Judge found that the landowner was in fact insane and that the circumstances called for the appointment of a guardian ad litem. He set aside the order of the Compensation Officer and remanded the case. The Compensation Officer now appointed Tek Chand as the guardian ad litem of the landowner. Tek Chand filed an objection pleading that the landowner was insane and incapable of earning his livelihood and was, therefore, entitled to the benefit of section 11 (2) of the Act. If the benefit of section 11 (2) was given, the right, title and interest of such landowner was excluded from the operation of section 11 (1). The Compensation Officer found that the landowner was entitled to the benefit claimed and, therefore, dismissed the tenants application by bis order dated November 30, 1970. The tenant appealed, and the learned District Judge has held while allowing the appeal that the landowner had sufficient land, other than the parcel of land in question, which could serve as a means of livelihood. By his order dated June 31, 1971, the learned District Judge allowed the tenants application and granted him proprietary rights in the land claimed by him. Bhekhu, the landowner, then filed the present second appeal. 2. On May 13, 1972, during the pendency of this appeal, Bhekhu died and on application made by his legal representatives have been substituted in his place. The legal representatives, who are his heirs, include his widow and widow of his pre-deceased son. 3. Bhekhu, the landowner, then filed the present second appeal. 2. On May 13, 1972, during the pendency of this appeal, Bhekhu died and on application made by his legal representatives have been substituted in his place. The legal representatives, who are his heirs, include his widow and widow of his pre-deceased son. 3. The appellants contend that the findings of the learned District Judge in relation to Bhekhu are no longer relevant and what the Court is concerned with now will be whether the heirs belong to the categories of persons mentioned in section 11 (2) and their circumstances bring them within the terms of that provision. It is said that if the present appellants are found to be entitled personally to the benefit of section 11 (2) of the Act the respondent tenants application for the acquisition of proprietary rights must fail. It is pointed out that the appellants appear on the record as Bhekhus heirs. Reliance is placed on Dareppal Alagouda v. Malloppa Shivalingappa, AIR 1947 Bom. 307, where a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court has ovserved that if a legal representative wants to raise any new point which the deceased party could not have raised he can do so on getting himself impleaded in his personal capacity. Reference has also been made to Yeshwantrao Sabnis v Bhalchandrarao, AIR 1952 MB 207, 4. To appreciate the validity of the appellants contention it is necessary to examine the scheme of section 11 of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act. The relevant provisions of section 11 are: "(1) Notwithstanding any law, custom or contract to the contrary a tenant other than a sub-tenant shall, on application made to the Compensation Officer at any time after the commencement of this Act, be entitled to acquire on payment of compensation, the right, title and interest of the landowner in the land of the tenancy held by him under the landowner. Provided................................. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to a landlord, if he has no other means of livelihood and is a minor, widow or a person suffering from physical or mental disability incapable of earning his livelihood. In the case of a minor, sub-section (1) shall not apply during his minority and in other cases for his life time. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to a landlord, if he has no other means of livelihood and is a minor, widow or a person suffering from physical or mental disability incapable of earning his livelihood. In the case of a minor, sub-section (1) shall not apply during his minority and in other cases for his life time. (3) The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall be made in writing to the Compensation Officer who shall thereupon determine the amount of compensation payable to the landowner in respect of the land in accordance with the provisions of sections 12 and 13. (4) ....................................... (5) The amount of compensation or any instalment thereof shall be deposited by the tenant in a Government treasury and as soon as the compensation or the first instalment thereof has been deposited in the Government treasury, the Compensation Officer shall grant a certificate in the prescribed form declaring the tenant to be the landowner in respect of the land specified in the certificate. (6) On and from the date of the grant of the certificate under subsection (5) the tenant shall become the owner of the land comprised in the tenancy and the right, title and interest of the landowner in the said land shall determine. (7) ................................. (8)................................. Section 104 of the Act is also relevant. It provides:— "104. An appeal shall lie to the District Judge from any order of the Compensation Officer and a second appeal from the decision of the District Judge shall lie to the High Court." From the provisions of section 11 it is clear that the tenant applies under subsection (I) for the acquisition of the right, title and interest of the landowner in the land of the tenancy held by him under the landowner. But he is not so entitled if within the terms of sub-section (2) the landlord has no other means of livelihood and is a minor, widow or a person suffering from physical or mental disability and incapable of earning has livelihood. The bar imposed by sub-section (2) subsists so long as in the case of a minor landlord he does not attain majority and in other cases for the life time of the landlord described therein. The bar imposed by sub-section (2) subsists so long as in the case of a minor landlord he does not attain majority and in other cases for the life time of the landlord described therein. The title of the tenant to acquire is determined by two conditions: (1) He must be a tenant of the land respecting which he seeks to acquire the right, title and interest of the landowner, and (2) The bar imposed by sub-section (2) should not exist. It is only if both the conditions co-exist that a tenant can successfully maintain an application for acquiring the right, title and interest of the landowner. The two conditions constitute the frame of reference within which alone such application is maintainable. If the tenancy ceases to subsist or if the bar imposed by sub-section (2) comes into operation a tenants application will not lie and must fail. It will be noted in this context that the tenants application under sub-section (1) is directed against the right, title and interest of a particular landowner—the existing landowner—and in the same context the circumstances of that landlord for the purposes of sub-section (2) fall to be considered. In other words, the tenants application must be tried in a particular set of conditions and circumstances defined by the subsistence of his tenancy in the land in question and the absence of the circumstances enumerated in sub-section (2) peculiar to the then landlord. 5. The question next to be examined is whether the co-existence of the two sets of conditions mentioned above must be determined with reference to the date of the tenants application or the date of its determination by the Compensation Officer or the date when the proceedings become final on the disposal of subsequent appeals, if any. The ordinary rule applicable to civil cases is that the right of the plaintiff to relief is determined by the facts constituting his cause of action on the date when the suit is filed, and the suit is maintainable on that basis; but, subsequently, when the action is finally disposed of supervening events may be taken into consideration for the purpose of moulding the relief available to the plaintiff. In my opinion, that principle cannot be applied to a tenants application under section 11. In my opinion, that principle cannot be applied to a tenants application under section 11. There is no question here of any cause of action in the sense in which that expression is used in civil proceedings. A cause of action has been defined to mean every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. An essential element of the cause of action is the infraction of the right claimed by the plaintiff or the injury or wrong complained of by him. A tenants application under section 11(1) does not arise upon the infraction of any right belonging to the tenant or any injury or wrong alleged by him. It is a right conferred on the tenant by the statute. By virtue of section 11 the tenant is entitled to acquire the right, title and interest of the landowner in the tenancy land. It is significant that unlike the case of civil proceedings no period of limitation has been prescribed for an application by the tenant under section 11 (1). A tenant may apply at any time for the acquisition of the right, title and interest of the existing landowner and in case his application is defeated by virtue of the bar imposed by section 11 (2) there is no reason why he cannot apply again under section 11 (1) when the bar imposed by section 11(2) ceases to operate on the death of the existing landowner, in which event the tenants application will be directed against the right, title and interst of the successor landowner. I am of opinion that the question whether a tenant is entitled to acquire the right, title and interest of the landowner falls to be determined not not with reference to the date of his application but with reference to the date on which the proceedings are finally disposed of, whether that be the date of the Compensation Officers order where no appeal is preferred against it, or on the date when the ultimate appellate order is passed and the application can be said to have been finally disposed of. If during the pendency of the application, whether before the Compensation Officer or in subsequent appeal, the bar imposed by sub-section (2) drops into position and becomes operative by reason of the landlord becoming a widow or a person suffering from physical or mental disability incapable of earning his livelihood or if the landlord ceases to have other means of livelihood, the tenants application must falt. Likewise, if after the tenant has made his application the existing minor landlord attains majority and has ether means of livelihood, there is no reason why the tenant should not be held entitled to acquire the right, title and interest of the landowner the tenancy land. In all cases it is the situation obtaining on the date of the order disposing of the proceeding finally which determines the question whether the tenant can succeed. It will be noticed from Section 11 (5) that on a favourable order on his application under Section 11 (1) the tenant becomes entitled, on depositing the compensation or the first instalment thereof, to a certificate from the Compensation Officer declaring him to be the landowner in respect of the land specified in the certificate. Section 11 (6) declares that on and from the date of the grant of the certificate the tenant becomes the owner of the land comprised in the tenancy and the right, title and interest of the landowner in that land determines, f he grant or the certificate is subject to the ultimate appellate order finally disposing of the proceeding. 6. It has been mentioned before that a tenants application under section 11 (1) may be defeated by the subsequent imposition of the bar contemplated by section 11(2). Another event which can defeat a tenants application is the death of the existing landowner. The tenants application having been directed against the right, title and interest of that landowner and inasmuch as it depends for its success on the co-existence of the two conditions already mentioned, the application becomes infructuous if the landlord dies. The frame of reference in which the application was valid stands dissolved and exists no longer. That is the position in law no matter what the stage at which the application is pending, whether it be the original or the appellate stage. The frame of reference in which the application was valid stands dissolved and exists no longer. That is the position in law no matter what the stage at which the application is pending, whether it be the original or the appellate stage. It has been observed that in proceedings under section 11 it is not possible to suppose the existence of any underlying cause of action in the sense of the general law. No question then arises on the death of the existing landowner during the pendency of the proceeding of any liability devolving on his legal representative. On the view that the tenants application under section 11 (1) becomes infructuous in such circumstances, the entire proceeding must fail. Even if the tenant had succeeded in obtaining an order in his favour from the Compensation Officer, if subsequently during the pendency of an appeal by the landowner the latter dies the order of the Compensation Officer can be of no avail to the tenant. He must apply afresh under section 11(1) against the successor landowner. 7. Upon the aforesaid considerations, and having regard to the facts of the present case, the appeal is allowed, the order of the Compensation Officer dated November 30, 19/0, and of the learnei District Judge dated June 21, 1971, are set aside, and the application of the respondent under Section 11 (1) of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953, is dismissed as infru;tuou3. In the circumstances there is no order as to costs. Appeal allowed. -