JUDGMENT - G.N. VAIDYA, J.:---The only question which arises in the above Special Civil Application, filed by defendant-tenant, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is as to whether the application under section 15(3)(a)(i) of the Hyderabad Rent Act, filed by the present landlord who purchased the suit property from the old landlord on June 1 5, 1972, was liable to be summarily rejected in view of the judgment dated November 30, 1964, in Rent Appeal No. 30 of 1963, between the tenant and his previous landlord under section 18, of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954, which runs as follows : "The Controller shall summarily reject any application under sub-section (2) or under sub-section (3) of section 15 which raises between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim substantially the same issue as have been finally decided or as purport to have been finally decided in a former proceeding, under the Hyderabad House Rent Control Order of 1953 Fasli or under this Act." The learned District Judge, Aurangabad, before whom the certified copy of the judgment in Rent Appeal No. 30 of 1963 was produced for the first time, held that it was not barred firstly because the tenant had not produced the certified copy before the Rent Controller who decided the matter originally and the learned District Judge, did not find it necessary for a proper decision of the appeal and secondly because the "material" issue to be considered in the two applications were different. The decision of the learned District Judge, is patently illegal inasmuch as the learned District Judge, has read into section 18 a word which is not there in that section namely, material. That section lays down they Controller shall summarily reject any application (1) under sub-section (2) or under sub-section (3) of section 15, (2) if that application arises between the same parties, (3) if "Substantially" the same issues as have been finally decided in the former proceeding are raised in the application. The word substantially cannot be substituted by the word, material as has been done by the learned District Judge. The material issue in the previous landlords suit may be different from the issue in the present landlords suit. But substantially they may be the same. Materially the issues may be the same but substantially they may be different. The word substantially cannot be substituted by the word, material as has been done by the learned District Judge. The material issue in the previous landlords suit may be different from the issue in the present landlords suit. But substantially they may be the same. Materially the issues may be the same but substantially they may be different. The learned District Judge, could not usurf jurisdiction to improve upon the language used by the legislature by using the word material. Mr. Kanade, the learned Counsel for the present landlord, submitted that what was considered in the earlier application cannot even be said to be materially or substantially the same as the issue which arose in the present application because the requirements and needs of the former landlords and his family members were totally different from the requirements and needs of the present landlord. I believe that the Legislature which enacted section 18, must have known that such requirements are personal and are bound to be different. One landlords requirement is bound to be different from another landlords requirement. Section 15(3)(a)(i) is as follows : "A landlord may subject to the provisions of Clause (d) apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house--- (i) in case it is a residential house, if the landlord requires it for his own occupation and if he is not occupying a residential house of his own in the city, town or village concerned; " The Legislature surely knew that the residential house and other requirements which are referred to in this sub-section must be personal to the landlord concerned. In spite of this, the Legislature has enacted in section 18 that the Controller shall summarily reject any application under sub-section (3) of section 15, which raises substantially the same issues between the same parties of parties under whom they or any of them claim. If what is being contended by Mr. Kanade, is correct the Legislature would have found the simple device of excluding the purchasers from the ambit of section 18. The Legislature has, however, enacted in section 18 that any application under section 15(2) or (3) raising substantially the same issues between parties under whom they or any of them claim shall be rejected. Kanade, is correct the Legislature would have found the simple device of excluding the purchasers from the ambit of section 18. The Legislature has, however, enacted in section 18 that any application under section 15(2) or (3) raising substantially the same issues between parties under whom they or any of them claim shall be rejected. The word substantial means that which arises as a result of looking at the substance and not merely at the form. The Concise Oxford Dictionary had given its meanings, "Having substance actually existing, nor illusory, of real importance or value, of considerable amount". The Legislature knowing very well that the requirements of the old landlords and the new landlords are bound to be different has adopted the phraseology so that the courts must look at the substance of the matter and not merely at the formal or material contents of the matter, as has been done by the learned District Judge, in this case. Mr. Agrawal, the learned Counsel for the tenant, has drawn my attention to the certified copy of the sale-deed, which is on the record of the Rent Controller. It is dated June 15, 1972. The judgment in Rent Appeal No. 30 of 1963, is dated November 30, 1964. The sale-deed recites : ^^l/;kpk djkar vkiys rQsZ Jh egen firk eqlkns HkkM;kus jkgrkr R;kauk vkEgh lnjhy ;k iq<s gh oghokVhpk izR;{k rkck feGkyk vlY;kph rkdhn nhyh vkgs- ekxhy tquh HkkMs fpfë gh vkEgh rqeps Lok/khu dsys vkgs-** There is no doubt that in these circumstances the requirements of the old landlords and the new landlords are bound to be materially different, both in terms of needs and in terms of time. But the Legislature knowing very well these differences has extended its protection to tenant is against whom the previous landlord took proceedings on substantially similar grounds as the new landlord in the various Rents the legislations which have been enacted in the country for the protection of tenants in crowded cities and towns. We find even clear provisions prohibiting the purchases of the properties in some cases of Rent Legislature from claiming possession on the ground of personal requirement. Section 18, has given protection wherever there are substantially similar issues between the old landlord and the tenant on the one hand and the new landlord and the old tenant on the other hand. We find even clear provisions prohibiting the purchases of the properties in some cases of Rent Legislature from claiming possession on the ground of personal requirement. Section 18, has given protection wherever there are substantially similar issues between the old landlord and the tenant on the one hand and the new landlord and the old tenant on the other hand. Where the issues are substantially similar, the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to enquire into the matter further than to find out whether none issues are substantially similar. His duty is to reject the application summarily under section 18. Even in English Law, a landlord who has become a landlord after a particular date, is not entitled to apply for premises for personal occupation. (See Megarrys Rent Acts, 10th Edition, 1967 Vol. 1, page 289). It is, therefore, clear that when the Legislature has used the words, "substantially the same issues," as have been finally decided or purported to have been finally decided in a former proceeding, what must be considered is the substance of the nature of the issues in the earlier proceedings and not the material of the issues or the subject matter of the issues which may be different or the same. In the present case, the issues which were considered in Rent Appeal No. 30 of 1963 were : (1) Whether the landlord requires the house for his own occupation bona fide; (2) Whether he does not occupy a residential house of his own in the city;" In the present case, the issue were substantially the same as can be seen from the judgment of the Rent Controller, where the issues are : "Whether the plaintiff proves that he requires the suit premises bona fide"........ and from the issues in the appeal Court, namely, "Is the suit barred under section 18 of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954; whether the plaintiff-respondent proves that he bona fide requires the suit house." It must, therefore, follow that the present application by the new landlord was liable to be summarily rejected under section 18. Mr. Mr. Kanade, the learned Counsel for the landlord, however, submitted that section 18 cannot apply to the present case because the claim of the landlord for personal occupation cannot be said to be a claim under the previous landlord but the relevant words of the section are : "between the same parties or between the parties under whom they or any one of them claim." The claim is not expected to be under the original claim. It is the title which is claimed under the old landlord which determines the application as of section 18. It must be, therefore, held that the present application by the new landlord is an application under sub-clause (3) of section 15 which raises between the tenant and the landlord who claims under the old landlord the title to the premises and which raises substantially the same issues as have been finally decided in the former proceedings between the tenant and the old landlord. The contention of Mr. Kanade, that section 18, is not attracted is, therefore, rejected. It was next urged by Mr. Kanade, that the learned District Judge, rightly rejected the application Ex. 18 made to him for production of the certified copy of the judgment, in Rent Appeal No. 30 of 1963. Mr. Kanade, submitted that the power conferred on an Appellate Court to admit additional evidence under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code is a discretionary power and as the learned District Judge has given good reasons for rejecting the application Ex. 18, and for holding that it was not necessary to decide the matter to have the certified copy of the judgment in the previous proceeding, this Court should not interfere with the exercise of the direction by the earned District Judge, in this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is true that the power under Article 227 is an extraordinary power conferred on this Court, and it must be exercised with great caution as laid down in (Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarte and another)1, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1297. In the present case, the plea of the bar under section 18 was not made in the written-statement filed by the tenant, but a ground was urged in the appeal and an issue was also framed by the Appellate Court with regard to that bar. In the present case, the plea of the bar under section 18 was not made in the written-statement filed by the tenant, but a ground was urged in the appeal and an issue was also framed by the Appellate Court with regard to that bar. In the petition under Article 227 filed in this Court it is pointed out that although the point was not specifically stated in the written statement, the tenant has deposed on oath about the previous proceedings and his testimony was not challenged on behalf of the new landlord. It Exhibit 18, filed before the learned District Judge, it was pointed out that the previous judgment was operative, as res judicata under section 18, and it was final and conclusive and binding on the new landlord also. Although the certified copy was not produced in the trial Court due to inadvertence it was, therefore submitted that it was necessary to admit in the same evidence in the interest of justice. The learned District Judge, did not reject the application merely on the ground that it was in his discretion, He did not think it necessary to admit it on the ground that section 18, was not attracted in this case inasmuch as the personal requirement of the old landlord was not identical or materially the same as the personal requirement of the new landlord. However the judgement in the previous appeal, is relevant and admissible under section 40 of the Evidence Act, which lays down. "The existence of any judgment, order or decree which by law prevents any Court from taking cognizance of a suit or holding a trial, is a relevant fact when the question is whether such Court ought to take cognizance of such suit, or to hold such trial." There can be no doubt in view of what is stated above, that in view of the said judgment, the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to consider the personal requirement of the new landlord. His duty was to reject the application summarily under section 18. When a Tribunal has failed to do such a duty, and has exercised the jurisdiction contrary to section 18, I think this Court must interfere under Article 227 to enforce the rule of law. Law cannot be defeated or evaded or violated by courts and Tribunals on account of inadvertence of the parties or defaults of their lawyers. When a Tribunal has failed to do such a duty, and has exercised the jurisdiction contrary to section 18, I think this Court must interfere under Article 227 to enforce the rule of law. Law cannot be defeated or evaded or violated by courts and Tribunals on account of inadvertence of the parties or defaults of their lawyers. Justice must be done in accordance with law. The learned District Judge, failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him under Order 41, Rule 27, as it is the duty of the, appeal Court to admit the evidence which operates as a bar under section 18, so that the decision will be in accordance with law and not in contravention of law. In the result, the judgment and orders, for restoration of possession of the property in dispute passed by the Additional Rent Controller, Aurangabad on June 5, 1974, and the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, Aurangabad, on April 9, 1975, are quashed and set-aside, and the application made by the new landlord on Nov. 10, 1972, under section 15(3)(a)(i) shall be rejected. In the circumstances of this case, however, the parties to bear their own costs. Rule is made absolute. -----