JUDGMENT The petitioners who are judgment debtors in Ejectment Execution Case No. 333 of 1972 have obtained this Rule against an order of the learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court at Calcutta vacating an order of the learned Registrar of the said Court that the said Ejectment Execution Case be disposed of on full satisfaction. The learned Chief Judge by the same order ordered that a fresh writ of delivery of possession be issued in favour of the decree-holder (the opposite party in the Rule). 2. Netai Chand Dey, the opposite party in this Rule had instituted Ejectment Suit No. 1055 of 1967 against the present petitioners in the City Civil Court at Calcutta for eviction from premises No.3 Baitakkhana 2nd Lane. The learned Judge, 2nd Bench, City Civil Court decreed the said suit in favour of Netai Chand Dey. This Court had dismissed the Appeal from Original Decree No. 1179 of 1960 preferred by the present petitioners. 3. Thereafter the opposite party had filed Ejectment Execution Case No. 333 of 1972 for execution of the aforesaid decree for possession obtained by him against the petitioners. The learned Registrar, City Civil Court by Order No.2, dated July 19, 1972 directed issue of writ of possession under Order 21 Rule 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure fixing August 11, 1972 for return. On August 11, 1972 the learned Registrar passed the following order : "Writ of possession returned after execution as per bailiff's return dated 27.7.72. Possession delivered on 27.7.72. Ordered that the execution case be disposed of on full satisfaction" A copy of the writ together with the return of a process server of the executing Court has been made annexure 'A' to the petition. According to the said return, July 27, 1972, at about 12-30 p. m. the said process server had delivered khas, peaceful and vacant possession of the suit premises as per schedule to the decree-holder who furnished a receipt obtaining possession. 4. The petitioner No. 1 Monishi Mohan Gupta was tried in the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, upon a complaint under section 448/323/506 of the Indian Penal Code filed by the opposite party. The opposite party's case in the said criminal case was that on July 27, 1972, at about 12 noon the accused Monishi Mohan Gupta had trespassed into the above premises after driving out the complainant. The learned Magistrate acquitted him. The opposite party's case in the said criminal case was that on July 27, 1972, at about 12 noon the accused Monishi Mohan Gupta had trespassed into the above premises after driving out the complainant. The learned Magistrate acquitted him. The opposite party filed Criminal Appeal No. 322 of 1973 against the said acquittal order. A. K. De, J. by his judgment, dated June 12, 1974 dismissed the said appeal. 5. Thereafter, on August 19, 1974 the opposite party, Netai Chand Dey filed before the learned Registrar, City Civil Court, an application in Ejectment Execution Case No. 333 of 1972, inter alia, praying that his order No.3 dated July 11, 1972 be set aside and for restoring the Execution case. He also prayed that the bailiff be directed to deliver possession of the suit premises to the decree-holder. 6. On August 28, 1974, the learned Registrar passed an order stating that he was not competent to decide the said application and directed that the application as filed by the decree-holder on August 19, 1974 be returned for presentation to the proper Court. Thereafter, on September 2, 1974, the opposite party refiled before the learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court the said application, dated August 19, 1974 along with a separate petition for treating the said application as one under Rule 12 of the City Civil Court Act, 1953. The learned Chief Judge directed service of the notice upon the judgment-debtor. Thereafter, the judgment-debtors filed a written objection to the said application. 7. On December 18, 1974, the learned Chief Judge heard both parties. On December 20, 1974, the learned Chief Judge passed the aforesaid order allowing the decree-holder's application. He vacated the order of the learned Registrar, dated August 11, 1972 and directed issue of a fresh writ for delivery of possession. 8. Mr. Balai Chandra Ray, the learned Advocate for the petitioners submitted before me that Rule 12 of the Rules of the Calcutta City Civil Court, 1956 was not applicable to the present case. The learned Chief Judge accordingly was not competent to set aside the order of the learned Registrar dated August 11, 1972, after expiry of the time limit laid down in Rule 12. Secondly, Mr. The learned Chief Judge accordingly was not competent to set aside the order of the learned Registrar dated August 11, 1972, after expiry of the time limit laid down in Rule 12. Secondly, Mr. Ray submitted that the learned Chief Judge acted illegally by relying upon the finding and observations in the judgment passed in the Criminal Appeal preferred against acquittal of the petitioner no. 1. According to Mr. Ray, learned Advocate for the petitioners, observations in the Criminal Court judgment are not evidence in Civil Court regarding the factum of delivery of possession to the decree-holder opposite party on July 27, 1972. Mr. Ray further submitted that in the instant case the ejectment decree in question was passed by the learned Judge, 2nd Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta. Therefore, in any event, the learned Chief Judge could not assume the powers of the executing Court and restore the execution case already disposed of on full satisfaction. 9. The Rule 11 of Chapter III, Part II of the Rules of the Calcutta City Civil Court, 1956 enumerates the duties and powers of the Registrar in relation to suits and cases in addition to powers conferred on him by other rules and regulations. The Registrar under item No. 10 may receive applications for execution. The Registrar under Rule 11 (12) exercise : ''all the powers of an executing Court under Order 21 of the Civil Procedure Code relating to the examination and registration of applications for execution and issue of different processes in cases where there is no contest but not including powers under Rules 32, 34, 37 to 41, 50, 58, 72, 89 to 92 and 97 to 10J of the Order." The judgment-debtors contested the application of the decree-holder for restoration of the execution case and for issue of a fresh writ of delivery of possession. Accordingly, the matter was to be heard by the executing Court. In the above view, Rule 12 of Chapter III was not attracted to the fact of the present case. The executing Court alone was competent to deal with the above application filed by the decree-holder. I have indicated that one of the points in this Rule is whether the learned Chief Judge was entitled to exercise the powers of the executing Court. 10. The executing Court alone was competent to deal with the above application filed by the decree-holder. I have indicated that one of the points in this Rule is whether the learned Chief Judge was entitled to exercise the powers of the executing Court. 10. In case, on July 27, 1972 the process-server of the City Civil Court had actually delivered possession to the decree-holder by executing the writ issued in Ejectment Execution Case No. 333 of 1972 then the executing Court would have no jurisdiction to revive the execution case and to order issue of a fresh writ. If, on the other hand, in fact no delivery of possession was given to the decree-holder in execution of the writ on July 27, 1972 and the decree obtained by the opposite-party has not been satisfied then the Executing Court possesses ample power to set aside the order, dated August 11, 1972 disposing of the execution case on full satisfaction and to issue a fresh writ for delivery of possession in favour of the decree-holder. Therefore, another point in the case is whether on July 27, 1972 possession of the suit premises was actually delivered to the decree-holder. 11. The City Civil Court which is an additional Civil Court for the city of Calcutta was established by Notification No. 10585 dated 14th February, 1957 issued by the State Government under Section 3 of the City Civil Court Act, 1953 (published in the Extra Ordinary issue of the Calcutta Gazette on 20th February, 1957). Under sub-section (1) of Section 5 the local limits of the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court is the city of Calcutta. The learned Chief Judge under Section 10 (1) can make arrangements as he thinks fit for distribution of the business of the City Civil Court amongst the Judges thereof. Notwithstanding such distribution of business each of the Judges of the City Court has territorial jurisdiction over the entire city of Calcutta. But for convenience there could be allocation of suits and proceedings amongst the Judges of the said Court who exercise co-ordinate jurisdiction. The exercise of powers of distribution of business and transfer and withdrawal under Section 10 of the City Civil Court Act does not curtail or limit the extent of the territorial jurisdiction of the City Civil Court. 12. But for convenience there could be allocation of suits and proceedings amongst the Judges of the said Court who exercise co-ordinate jurisdiction. The exercise of powers of distribution of business and transfer and withdrawal under Section 10 of the City Civil Court Act does not curtail or limit the extent of the territorial jurisdiction of the City Civil Court. 12. The learned Advocate for the petitioners in support of his submissions that the learned Chief Judge can not act as the executing Court had relied upon the decision in (1) Ajit Kumar Pal v. Sadhan Chandra Pal, AIR 1956 Calcutta 654. The said case was in connection with a transfer application under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and in the said case the learned Judges had referred to sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Bengal, Agra & Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887. The said case is distinguishable. The provisions of Section 13(1) of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act are not pari materia with Section 10(1) of the Calcutta City Civil Court Act, 1953. The State Government under Section 13(1) of the former Act by a notification may alter or fix local limits of jurisdiction of any Civil Court. Section 10(1) of the City Civil Court Act has some similarities with Section 13 (2). Under section 13(2) of the Bengal, Agra, Assam Civil Courts Act, the District Judge may assign civil business to one of two or more subordinate Judges or Munsifs cognizable by them subject to any special order of the High Court. In such a case the Subordinate Judge or the Munsif, as the case might be, retains his territorial jurisdiction, but for convenience he exercises jurisdiction over the area fixed by the District Judge. 13. In such a case the Subordinate Judge or the Munsif, as the case might be, retains his territorial jurisdiction, but for convenience he exercises jurisdiction over the area fixed by the District Judge. 13. Chakravartti, J. in (2) Jagabandhu Nandi v. Sivaprosad Bhattacharyya and others, 53 CWN 629 pointed out that 'The source of the jurisdiction of a Munsif is the order made by the Local Government under section 13(1) of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, and an order made by the District Judge of the station under section 13(2) merely distributes, as a matter of convenience, and with reference to certain local areas, the civil business amongst two or more Courts each of which has jurisdiction over the whole area and neither of the Courts losses jurisdiction which it has under the Government order made under section 13(1) of the Act. Accordingly, if a suit is filed in the Court of a Munsif to whom the local area does not stand allotted, then an order passed by that Court transferring the suit to the Court to which the local area stands allotted is well within jurisdiction.' 14. Sen and N. K. Sen, JJ. in (3) Shib Nath Mukherjee v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, 65 CWN 766 quoted with approval the following observations of B. K. Mukherjea and C. C. Biswas, JJ. in (4) Masrab Khan v. Deb Nath Mali and others, 46 CWN 141–75 CLJ. 255 : "An order under Section 13(2) of the Civil Courts Act does not effect a transfer of jurisdiction. It merely distributes, as a matter of convenience and with reference to certain local areas, the civil business amongst two or more Courts, each of which has jurisdiction over the whole area. In such cases neither of the Courts would lose the jurisdiction which it acquired under Section 13(1) of the Act." The learned Judges in Masrab Khan's case (Supra.) had pointed out that under section 13(1) of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Act, it is the local Government which can fix and alter the local limits of jurisdiction of any Civil Court. The local limits thus fixed determine the jurisdiction of Courts. But under Section 3(2) the District Judge assigns civil business cognizable by them. The local limits thus fixed determine the jurisdiction of Courts. But under Section 3(2) the District Judge assigns civil business cognizable by them. The City Civil Court itself under Section 5(1) of the City Civil Court Act, 1953 read with the Schedule under Section 20 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 has acquired jurisdiction to try ejectment suits upto the value specified in the said Schedule and to execute ejectment decrees passed in such suits. Such jurisdiction is neither lost not modified by arrangements made by the Chief Judge for distribution of business amongst the Judges in terms of Section 10(1). I accordingly hold that the learned Chief Judge was competent to deal with the execution case in question. Further, the Chief Judge under Section 10(2)(b)(c) can withdraw any suit or proceeding and dispose of the same. Therefore the Chief Judge was competent to pass the order impugned in this Rule. 15. I am not inclined to interfere in revision with the order passed by the learned Chief Judge for restoration of execution case. The merits of the case are overwhelmingly against the petitioners. Therefore, this Court would be slow in interfering under Section 115 with his order under Section 151 of the Code. The opposite party had obtained an ejectment decree against them which was affirmed by this Court. The petitioners neither in the executing Court nor in this Court have asserted that they have any right in respect of the suit property. Their only case was that the execution case against them having been disposed of on full satisfaction, the opposite party cannot pray for fresh delivery of possession. But I have already observed that in case possession was not in fact delivered to the decree holder the executing Court is competent to revive the execution case and to issue fresh writ. 16. There is considerable substance in the contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioners that the judgment in the criminal case against the petitioner No. 1 would be irrelevant except when the existence of such judgment is a fact in issue or relevant under some other provisions of the Evidence Act (see Section 43). Therefore, the said judgment of the Criminal Court under sections 11 and 13 would be merely relevant evidence as a transaction. Therefore, the said judgment of the Criminal Court under sections 11 and 13 would be merely relevant evidence as a transaction. But the findings in the said Criminal Court judgment that the decree-holder did not obtain delivery of possession would not be binding upon the present parties in Civil Court. In this connection see the observations in (5) Anil Behari v. Latika Bala Dassi, AIR 1955 SC 566 at page 571 and in (6) Krishnan Asari and another v. Adaikalam and others, AIR 1966 Mad 425 etc. 17. Sarkar on Evidence (12th Edition) at pages 476-177 has discussed the said question of relevancy of Criminal Court judgments in civil cases and vis-a-vis at length. 18. In the instant case, the decree-holder in his application for setting aside the order, dated August 11, 1972 and for restoration of Ejectment Execution Case No. 333 of 1972 had no doubt stated that the bailiff had delivered possession to him and on July 27, 1972, the defendant No. 9 had forceably broken open the paddlock and had trespassed into the premises (vide paragraphs 2 to 5). These averments should be read in the context of other statements made by the decree-holder in his said application and the special facts and circumstances of the present case. Further the present petitioners in their petition of objection did not admit the said fact that delivery of possession was really given on July 27, 1972. They in paragraph 3 of their objection petition dealt with the judgment in the criminal case by tersely observing that they were matters of record. The petitioners no where in their said objection petition claimed that they had dispossessed the decree-holder after the writ had been executed and the decree-holder had obtained khas possession. The present opposite party in paragraph 8 of his application in the Court below again relied upon the judgment in the Criminal Court that the decree-holder did not obtain physical possession of the suit premises. As already observed the petitioners had contested the application for restoration of the execution case not on the ground that possession was actually delivered to the decree-holder and the decree had been already satisfied, but on the broad ground that an execution once disposed of cannot be revived. 19. In the above view, the learned Chief Judge did not commit any error of jurisdiction by directing restoration of the execution case. 19. In the above view, the learned Chief Judge did not commit any error of jurisdiction by directing restoration of the execution case. The learned Chief Judge found as a fact that the decree obtained by the opposite party had not been satisfied. Even assuming that the learned Chief Judge was not quite right regarding the evidentiary value of the judgment of the Criminal Court still the same was a mere error of law without affecting his jurisdiction. The learned Chief Judge upon consideration of all the facts and circumstances reached the conclusion that the possession of the suit property had not yet been delivered to the decree-holder. I have already observed that the merits of the case are also against the petitioners. Therefore, I do not propose to interfere in this case. 20. The decision of Sri Asutosh Mookerjee. Kt., Judge and Beachcroft, J. in (7) Munshi Kali Sankar Sahay and others v. Maharajah Protap Udai Nath Saha, XVI I.C. 708 was relied upon by the learned Chief Judge. The facts of the said case have some similarities with the present one. The learned Judges with reference to the stand taken by one of the parties in a proceeding' under Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code observed : "It appears that after delivery had been effected, disputes broke up between the parties as to the possession of crops, whereupon proceedings were taken under Section 144, Criminal Procedure Code. In these proceedings the question arose, whether the decree-holder or the judgment-debtors were in possession of the property. Question were put to the judgment-debtors as to whether they challenged the delivery of possession made on the 1st September, 1911, and whether or not, they were, notwithstanding that order, still in possession of the property. The judgment-debtors took time and subsequently answered the questions in the manner following : "We are still in possession of the villages by collecting rent and appropriating the crops grown on the khas lands ; the possession given to the decree-holder, after the issue of the rule by the High Court was not valid'. Upon this, the decree-holder withdrew the case and stated that he would apply for fresh execution of the decree. The Magistrate thereupon directed that the judgment-debtors, now appellants before us do get the crops attached. The judgment-debtors plainly cannot take inconsistent position in Court, to the detriment of the decree-holder. Upon this, the decree-holder withdrew the case and stated that he would apply for fresh execution of the decree. The Magistrate thereupon directed that the judgment-debtors, now appellants before us do get the crops attached. The judgment-debtors plainly cannot take inconsistent position in Court, to the detriment of the decree-holder. They established their possession in the Criminal Court by a two-fold assertion ; namely first that the delivery of possession on the 1st September, 1911, after the order for stay had been made by the High Court, was illegal ; and secondly, that notwithstanding that order, they had retained possession of the property. It is clear, therefore, that the decree-holder is entitled to ask for fresh delivery of possession. The first ground thus fails." 21. The petitioner have taken up a rather equivocal position. While they did not claim that actual possession was delivered on July 27, 1972 at the same time they have asserted that further execution was not legal. In this case the clear finding of fact by the Court below is that the decree-holder did not previously obtain possession. Therefore, the Court below had jurisdiction to revive and restore the execution case in question. 22. For all these reasons this Rule fails. There will be no order as to costs. Let the records be sent down.