KAN SINGH, J.—These are two writ petitions by a Sarpanch under Art. 226 of the Constitution and as they raise common questions, they were heard together. They can conveniently be disposed of by one judgment. 2. On 31-8-70 two orders were passed by the Government removing Shri Rewat an, Sarpanch, from the office of the Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Mathania. In writ petition No. 2027 of 1970, the order of removal is Ex. 4 and in the other writ petition it is Ex. 8. The orders were passed in consequence of the inquiries held against the Sarpanch. I may narrate the facts of the writ petition No. 2027 of 1970 for appreciating the paints arising for consideration. 3. The petitioner was elected as Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat, in Mathania in the year 1960 for the first time. He was again elected as a Sarpanch at the next elections held in the year 1965. He states that as he belonged to Praja Socialist Party and as he had contested the Assembly elections against a Congress candidate, he incurred the displeasure of the ruling party. The Panchas of the Gram Panchayat, according to him, were persuaded to put obstructions in the smooth working of the Panchayat. An inquiry was started against him in accordance with r. 21(2) of the Rajasthan Panchayat and Nyaya Panchayat (General) Rules, 1961, hereinafter to be referred as "the Rules", by the Sub Divisional Officer, Phalodi. On 9-2 66 the petitioner had been placed under suspension. The petitioner challenged the order of his suspension in this Court by writ petition No. 160 of 1966 and that order was set aside. The inquiry commenced against him by the Sub Divisional Officer, Phalodi resulted in an order of removal, but on a review petition filed by the petitioner the Government set aside that order and the petitioner was reinstated. Thereafter in the year 1968 the petitioner was served with a fresh charge sheet and was again suspended on 7-3-68. As the inquiry was not being started while the order of suspension was being continued, the petitioner filed a writ petition in this Court which was No. 436 of 1968. This writ petition was allowed by this Court on 29-7-68 and the Government was directed to conclude the inquiry within three weeks, failing which the order of suspension would stand revoked. This writ petition was allowed by this Court on 29-7-68 and the Government was directed to conclude the inquiry within three weeks, failing which the order of suspension would stand revoked. It is not necessary to recapitulate everything that the petitioner has asserted in the writ petition suffice it to say that the impugned order were passed in pursuance of the charges served on the petitioner on 26-7-66. Ex. 1 was a notice calling upon the petitioner to file his reply to the charges by 26-5-66 and Ex. 2 were the charges. Charge No. 1 was to the effect that in the order sheet of a case for the sale of Abadi land after the order dated 27-6-65 was recorded the petitioner had made an interpolation by inserting a sentence that the land had been sold and he had thereby abused his position as a Sarpanch. 4. Charge No. 2 was that the Sarpanch had sold 108 Sq. Gaz of land only for a sum of Rs. 3/- and this was irregular, as no auction had been held by him 5. The third charge was that he had disobeyed a stay order made by the standing Committee of the Panchayat Samiti of the area. 6. An Enquiry Officer was appointed by the Government for making the inquiry and on the basis of the report of the Enquiry Officer the Government gave a notice to the Sarpanch to show cause why he be not removed from Office and thereafter the Government passed the order of removal, Ex. 4 on 31-8-70. 7. The petitioner states that this order of removal was illegal because: (1) the matter has not been examined by the Government properly on a preliminary inquiry as required by r. 21 of the Rules, (2) the petitioner was not given a reasonable hearing as envisaged by r. 22(1) of the Rules which lays down that the State Government or the authority referred to in sub-r. (3) of r. 20 shall consider the findings of the Enquiry Officer, afford reasonable hearing to the person charged and thereafter pass such order as the Government or the authority may consider proper in the circumstances of the case. The petitioner avers in this connection that on a number of occasions has was called to appear for hearing before the Deputy Minister to the Government in the Local-Self Government Department, but the case was adjourned from time to time. He was finally called upon to appear for hearing before the passing of the impugned order, but he had written a postcard to the Deputy Minister praying that the hearing be held at Jodhpur as the petitioner being a patient of Asthama was not able to undertake the journey to Jaipur at the time. He added that in the event of the case being not taken at Jodhpur he would be taking a chance to appear before the Deputy Minister at Jaipur inspite of his difficulties. The petitioner further states that he did not receive any reply to his postcard and he was eventually visited with the impugned order. The petitioner, besides challenging the order on the ground that it was passed in contravention of r. 22 of the Rules as well as in violation of the principles of natural justice, submits that the order is not sustainable as it is based on no evidence and further it is not a speaking order in the sense that no reasons are contained in the order. Further, the petitioner submits that the order was discriminatory in that he has been singled out for punishment although the other Panchas too were signatories to the order in respect of which the charge was framed against the petitioner. 8. The writ petition has been opposed by the State. It is denied that the order of petitioners removal was illegal on any of the grounds taken by the petitioner. It is denied that the Government had any animus against the petitioner. It is submitted that one Shivdan had applied for the grant of land and in that case one Jaikishan Champalal had filed an objection against the issue of Patta. Therefore, the Panchayat was not authorised to issue Patta to Shivdan without following the procedure laid down by r. 269 of the Rules. It was submitted that on a complaint being received against the petitioner a preliminary inquiry was held under orders of the Collector and a report of the preliminary inquiry was submitted to the Government and it was thereafter that the Government served the petitioner with the charges and the regular inquiry was held. It was submitted that on a complaint being received against the petitioner a preliminary inquiry was held under orders of the Collector and a report of the preliminary inquiry was submitted to the Government and it was thereafter that the Government served the petitioner with the charges and the regular inquiry was held. On the basis of the inquiry report the Government gave a show cause notice to the petitioner why he be not removed. The petitioner submitted his reply to the show cause notice regarding his removal. He was afforded a number of opportunities to attend the hearing and have his say, but the petitioner never appeared before the Deputy Minister on one pretext or the other pleading illness. He never produced any medical certificate regarding his alleged illness and after each and every hearing he was informed to appear at the next hearing. It is denied that the order of removal was not based on any evidence. As regards the plea about contravention of r. 22 of the Rules or the principles of natural justice for that matter, it is maintained that there was no violation of the relevant rules or the principles of natural justice in this behalf as, according to the State, the petitioner had been afforded ample opportunity to have his say in the matter. It was further submitted that the petitioner never asked for the inquiry report and, therefore, he cannot legitimately make any grievance of the non-supply of the copy of the inquiry report to him. According to the State, therefore, there was no prejudice caused to the petitioner and there is no case for any interference. 9. In the other case the charge that was framed against the petitioner was for non-production of certain register when required by the Deputy District Development Officer for inspection. The gist of the charges is contained in Ex. 5 in writ petition No. 2029 of 1970. The order of removal is Ex. 8 in that case, otherwise the contentions of the petitioner and the reply of the State are almost the same. However, in this case the report of the Enquiry Officer has been placed on record though no report was placed on record in the first case. 10. The order of removal is Ex. 8 in that case, otherwise the contentions of the petitioner and the reply of the State are almost the same. However, in this case the report of the Enquiry Officer has been placed on record though no report was placed on record in the first case. 10. The questions that were argued before me at considerable length were two namely, (1) whether on account of the non-supply of the inquiry report to the petitioner along with the notice to show cause why he be not be removed from Office there was any contravention of R. 22 of the Rules or the principles of natural justice for that matter, and (2) whether the orders are bad as they do not contain the reasons therein. In other words, they are not speaking orders. 11. Now sec. 17 of the Rajasthan Panchayat Act, 1953, empowers the State Government to remove a Panch, Sarpanch or Up-sarpanch. Sub-sec. (4) thereof lays down that the State Government may, by order in writing and after giving him an opportunity of being heard and making such inquiry as may be deemed necessary, remove any Panch, Sarpanch or Up sarpanch who— (a) refuses to act or becomes incapable of acting as such, or (b) in the opinion of the State Government, has been guilty of misconduct or neglect in the discharge of his duties or of any disgraceful conduct ; Provided that any scuh inquiry as is referred to in this sub-section may be initiated even after the expiry of the term of a Panchayat or if already initiated before such expiry, may be continued thereafter and in any such case, the State Government shall, by order in writing record its finding on the charges levelled against a Panch, Sarpanch or Up-sarpanch of the panchayat during its term of office. 12. R. 20 of the Rules lays down that the Collector may, on his own motion or upon the requisition of the State Government initiate a preliminary inquiry under sub-sec. (4) of sec. 17 against any Panch, Sarpanch or Up-sarpanch of a Panchayat or against any member or Chairman of a Nyaya Panchayat. 13. 12. R. 20 of the Rules lays down that the Collector may, on his own motion or upon the requisition of the State Government initiate a preliminary inquiry under sub-sec. (4) of sec. 17 against any Panch, Sarpanch or Up-sarpanch of a Panchayat or against any member or Chairman of a Nyaya Panchayat. 13. Sub-rule (4) lays down that if, as a result of such preliminary inquiry, the Collector or the Munsif or the Civil Judge or the Magistrate of the 1st class initiating the inquiry is satisfied that any charges of the nature specified in sub-sec. (4) of 17 are Prima facie made out against sucb Panch, Sarpanch or Up-sarpanch or against such Chairman or member, as the case may be, a report thereof along with the recommendations of such officer the matter shall be made accordingly to the State Government or to any officer or authority to whom the powers of the State Government under sub-sec. (4) sec. 17 may be delegated by a notification under sec. 70. 14. According to r. 21 the State Government or the officer or authority referred to in sub-r. (4) of r. 20 shall consider the report of the preliminary inquiry and may either drop the proceedings or get drawn up a statement of charge prima facie made out against the person against whom the preliminary inquiry has been made, specifying such details as may be deemed sufficient for him to understand the nature thereof. A copy of such statement shall be sent to the person charged, alongwith notice calling upon him to show cause in writing why they should not be inquired into. 15. Sub-r. (3) of r. 21 provides that upon reading the representation, if any, of the person charged in response to the notice under sub r. (2) the State Government or the Officer or authority referred to in sub-r. (4) of r. 20 may either drop the proceedings or may appoint an officer or authority to inquire into the charges, hereinafter referred as to the inquiring officer, to whom the record of the preliminary inquiry, the statement of charges, the explanation of the person charged all other relevant papers shall be forwarded. 16. 16. In accordance with sub-r. (4) of r. 21 the inquiry officer shall,— (a) issue a notice to the person charged to appear before him on a date and at the time and place specified in the notice, (b) read out the person charged, when he so appears, the charge or charges levelled against him, (c) hear the explanation, if any, (d) take and consider such evidence, oral or documentary, as may be produced in support or in rebuttal of the charge or charges, and (e) record his finding on each of them. 17. According to sub-r. (5) of r. 21 the record of the inquiry; together with his findings shall be forwarded by the inquiring officer to the State Government or the officer or authority referred to in sub-r. (4) of r. 20. 18. In this context occurs r. 22. which I may read in full— "22. Orders by State Government or officer or authority referred to in Sub-rule (4) of R. 20— The State Government or the officer or authority referred to in sub-rule (4) of R. 20 shall consider the findings of the inquiring officer, afford reasonable hearing to the person charged or thereafter pass such order as it or he may consider proper in the circumstances of the case. (2) If the State Government or such officer or authority finds upon such consideration that the charges have been established, it or he shall by order remove the Panch, Sarpanch, Up sarpanch, member or Chairman concerned from his office. (3) A copy of each of such order shall be forwarded to the Panchayat officer and to the Colector. (4) The State Government or the officer or authority referred to in sub rule (4) of R. 20 shall notify the fact of such removal in the official Gazette." Here in r. 22 the words "afford reasonable hearing to the person charged" are the crux of the matter. 19. The above procedure is more or less assimilated to that of a disciplinary proceedings against a civil servant under the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1958. Sub r. 10 of the r. 16 may be read for comparison. It runs as follows— "16(10)(i) If the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to its findings on the charges is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in cl. Sub r. 10 of the r. 16 may be read for comparison. It runs as follows— "16(10)(i) If the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to its findings on the charges is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in cl. (iv) to (vii) of R. 14 should be imposed, it shall— (a) furnish to the Government servant a copy of the Inquiring Authority and, where the Disciplinary Authority is not the Inquiring Authority a statement of its findings together with brief reasons for disagreement, if any, with the findings of the Inquiring Authority ; and (b) give him a notice stating the penalty proposed to be imposed on him and calling upon him to submit within a specified time such representation as he may wish to make on the proposed penalty, provided that such representation shall be based only on the evidence adduced during the enquiry." In the case of a civil servant the rule itself lays down that a copy of the report of the Inquiring Authority shall be furnished to the government servant and where the Inquiring Authority is other than the Disciplinary Authority a statement of its findings together with brief reasons for disagreement, if any, with the findings of the Inquiring. Authority shall also be furnished. Then the government servant is required to make a representation against the proposed penalty. 20. Here under the Rules for the removal of a Sarpanch, the phrase used being "afford reasonable hearing to the person charged", the question immediately arises whether the hearing can be said to be reasonable without the copy of the inquiry report being given to the Sarpanch. The subordinate question falling to be considered will be whether the copy is to be furnished only if demanded by the Sarpanch or Panch as the case may be or within the ambit of the expression "afford reasonable hearing to the person charged" the Government have a duty to furnish a copy of the report to the concerned Sarpanch or Panch on their own. 21. 21. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to a number of cases, Bhagat Raja vs. Union of India (1); M/s. Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar vs. State of U.P.(2); M/s. Tranvancore Rayons Ltd. vs. Union of India(3); Sahela Ram vs. State(4); Lajpat Rai Malhotra vs. Financial Advisor(5); H.K. Khanna vs. Union of India (6); Vijey Singh vs. State of Haryana(7); Govindrao vs. State of M.P. (8); Jyoti Prasad vs. Union of India(9); State of Punjab vs. Bakhtawar Singh(lO). 22. Learned Additional Government Advocate on the other hand invited my attention to Union of India vs. J. N. Sinha (11) and Shahoodul Haque vs. Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bihar (12). 23. I have considered the question. The above cases did not directly deal with the ambit of the phrase "afford reasonable hearing to the person charged", though they are very helpful so far as the principles of natural justice are concerned. There is no manner of doubt that the proceedings that result in the removal of the first elected official of the Gram Panchayat are quasi judicial in character. Therefore, principles of natural justice are required to be followed. Both secs. 17(4) of the Rajasthan Panchayat Act, 1953, and R. 22 of the Rules confirm this. Whenever there is a statutory requirement it goes without saying that the authority acting under the statute has to comply with it. The question, therefore, boils down to this whether in the absence of the report of the Inquiring Officer the hearing before the State Government can be said to be a reasonable hearing within the meaning of the Rules. On comparing this rule with the corresponding provisions of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958, the difference is found to be conspicuous that while in the case of a civil servant what is needed is the affording of an opportunity of making a representation, for a Sarpanch or Panch it has to be a reasonable hearing. The opportunity that has, therefore, to be afforded to a Panch or a Sarpanch contemplates more than the filing of a representation. He will have a right to be heard. Hearing may not in every case be by word of mouth or by the ear but it may in appropriate cases be even by filing a representation. The opportunity that has, therefore, to be afforded to a Panch or a Sarpanch contemplates more than the filing of a representation. He will have a right to be heard. Hearing may not in every case be by word of mouth or by the ear but it may in appropriate cases be even by filing a representation. But to be a reasonable hearing it is essential that the copy of the inquiry report on which the Government are to act has to be furnished to the Panch or Sarpanch, as the case may be. The duty to afford reasonable hearing is cast on the Government and, therefore, it implies that it is the Government, who have to furnish the copy of the inquiry report to the Panch or Sarpanch, as the case may be. Now in the present case the order of removal itself recites that the petitioner had addressed a post-card to the Deputy Minister requesting a hearing at Jodhpur. He added that in the event of hearing not being allowed at Jodhpur, he may be heard at Jaipur for which he would be taking a chance inspite of his illness. I express no opinion on the question whether the petitioner was ill or it was a false pretext only to gain time, but the Government should have informed him that it was not possible to take up the case at Jodhpur. However, much does not turn on this aspect of the matter, as I have reached the conclusion that when the Government was put under a duty to afford a reasonable hearing to the Panch or Sarpanch, it implied that the copy of the inquiry report was to be furnished to the Panch or Sarpanch, as the case may be, with the show cause notice for removal. The Government had to consider the findings of the inquiry officer and, therefore, in the notice they should have further indicated whether they were inclined to accept the findings of the inquiry officer on each charge or not. If they were to take a different opinion then it was necessary to indicate the reasons why they were taking an opinion different from the inquiry officer. It is only after affording reasonable hearing to the person charged that an order for removal can be passed. 24. If they were to take a different opinion then it was necessary to indicate the reasons why they were taking an opinion different from the inquiry officer. It is only after affording reasonable hearing to the person charged that an order for removal can be passed. 24. I may next turn to the question whether the order of the removal of the Sarpanch should be a speaking order in the sense that it should contain the reasons therein. 25. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to Nandram Hunat Ram, Calcutta vs. Union of India(13); State of Madras vs. A.R. Srinivasan (14) Krishna Chandra vs. Union of India (15); D. Suryanarayana Rao vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh (16) and Testeels Ltd. vs. N.M. Desai (17). 26 Gujrat case (17) was one decided by a Full Bench. In delivering the Judgement of the Court Bhagwati C. J., as he then was, observed - "Both on principle and on authority, every administrative officer exercising quasi-judicial functions is bound to give reasons in support of the order he makes. A conciliation Officer exercises quasi-judicial function while hearing and disposing of an application by the employer under the proviso to sec. 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act by which he seeks the approval of the Conciliation Officer for discharging its employee during the pendency of an Industrial Dispute before the said Authority. Hence, he is bound to make an order either giving his approval or refusing it stating reasons in support thereof. Where the order said nothing more than that the Officer did not approve of the action of the employer, held, that the order was liable to be quashed. Examining the question on principle, there are two reasons why every quasi judicial order must be a speaking order The necessity of giving reaflows as a necessary corollary from the rule of law which constitutes one of the basic principles of the Indian Constitutional set-up. The admini strative authorities having a duty to act judicially cannot therefore decide on considerations of policy or expediency. They must decide the matter solely on the facts of the particular case, solely on the material before them and apart from any extraneous considerations by applying pre-existing legal norms to factual situations. Now the necessity of giving reasons is an important safeguard to ensure observance of the duty to act judicially. They must decide the matter solely on the facts of the particular case, solely on the material before them and apart from any extraneous considerations by applying pre-existing legal norms to factual situations. Now the necessity of giving reasons is an important safeguard to ensure observance of the duty to act judicially. It introduces clarity, checks the in troduction of extraneous or irrelevant considerations and excludes or, at any rate, minimises arbitrariness in the decision-making process. Another reason which compels making of such an order is based on the power of judicial review which is possessed by the High Court under Art. 226 and the Supreme Court under Art 32 of the Constitution These Courts have the power under the said provisions to quash by certiorari a quasi judicial order made by an Administrative Officer and this power of review can be effectively exercised only if the order is a speaking order. In the absence of any reasons in support of the order, the said courts cannot examine the correctness of the order under review. The High Court and the Supreme Court sons would be powerless to interfere so as to keep the administraive officer within the limits of the law. The result would be that the power of judicial review would be stultified and no redress being available to the citizen, there would be insidious encouragement to arbitrariness and caprice. If this requirement is insisted upon, then, they will be subject to judicial scrutiny and correction." 27. In Pad-field vs. Minister of Agriculture Fisheries and Food (18) the House of Lords were dealing with the question of judicial control of execution discretion. The appellants were members of the south east regional committee of the Milk Marketing Board. They had made a complaint to the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, pursuant to secs. 19(3)(b) of the Agricultural Marketing Act, 1958, praying that the complaint be referred to the committee of investigation established under that enactment. In his letter the Minister wrote to say that he did not consider the complaint suitable for investigation, as it could be settled through arrangements available to producers and the board within the milk marketing scheme. He further said that he had unfettered discretion. In that connection their Lordships held that the Minister was bound to exercise his discretion lawfully. Although the Minister had full or unfettered discretion under sec. He further said that he had unfettered discretion. In that connection their Lordships held that the Minister was bound to exercise his discretion lawfully. Although the Minister had full or unfettered discretion under sec. 19(3) of the Agricultural Marketing Act, 1958, he was bound to exercise it lawfully, viz., not to misdirect himself in law, nor to take into account irrelevant matters, nor to omit relevant matters from consideration. 28. In the course of his speech Lord Pearce observed that if there is no reason recorded then it may well be that the executive authority had no reasons. 29. Today while I was going to dictate the judgment learned Additional Government Advocate brought to my notice a decision of Tyagi J. reported in Chena Ram vs. State of Rajasthan(19). Tyagi J. had considered a number of Supreme Court decisions cited before him and then in para-30 he observed as follows — "In view of these latest observations of the Supreme Court, I am inclined to hold that an executive or an administrative authority while discharging its quasi judicial function must turn out a speaking order." Having made these observations Tyagi J. proceeded to consider next whether the order that was impugned before him could be said to be a speaking order or not. Secretariat notes leading to the order were placed before him and taking into consideration the notes, he found that the Minister had looked into the entire record and had carefully perused the report submitted by the Collector and further the Minister agreed with the findings recorded by the Collector. Though the Minister did not record reasons for arriving at the conclusion, it was clear that he recorded his finding after hearing the petitioner and going through the record. In that case, therefore, the fate of the case turned on the consideration of the secretariat notes containing the reasons and further because the person concerned had been heard by the Minister. One cannot say the same thing in the present case. Learned Additional Government Advocate, however, offered to place the secretariat notes before me provided I adjourn the hearing, but I was not inclined to adjourn the case as arguments were concluded. However, in the writ No. 2029 of 1970 the order itself contains the reasons. In the other case, however, the order Ex. Learned Additional Government Advocate, however, offered to place the secretariat notes before me provided I adjourn the hearing, but I was not inclined to adjourn the case as arguments were concluded. However, in the writ No. 2029 of 1970 the order itself contains the reasons. In the other case, however, the order Ex. 4 is as follows— jktLFkku ljdkj iapk;r ,oa fodkl foHkkx dzekad%&,Q 3 ¼,ts½ ¼59½ tksc ¼66½ t;iqj fnukad Jh jsornku ljiap iapk;r eFkkfu;k iapk;r lfefr vkSfl;k ftyk tks/kiqj ds fo:} izkjfEHkd tkap ds QyLo:i yxk, x, vkjksiksa ij jktLFkku iapk;r vf/kfu;e lu~ 1953 /kkjk ¼17½4 ds vUrxZr fnukad 16-4-66 dks uksfVl fn;k tkdj muls mDr vkjksiksa dh lQkbZ ds fy, fnukad 26-5-66 rd mRrj ekaxk x;kA Jh jsornku ljiap iapk;r eFkkfu;k us muds fo:} yxk, x, vkjksiksa dk [k.Mu djrs gq, viuk fyf[kr mRRj fnukad 23-5-66 dks izLrqr fd;k fdUrq jkT; ljdkj dks mDr mRRj ls lUrks"k u gksus ds dkj.k mijksDr vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 17¼4½ ds v/khu cus fu;e jktLFkku iapk;r ,oa U;k; iapk;r ¼lkekU;½ fu;e lu~ 1961 ds fu;e 21¼3½ ds vUrxZr mDr ljiap dh mifLFkfr esa foLr`r tkap djus gsrq mi&ftyk fodkl vf/kdkjh tks/kiqj dks vknsk fn;k x;kA mi&ftyk fodkl vf/kdkjh us rRlEcfU/kr vfUre tkap dj fjiksVZ izLrqr dh ftlds vk/kkj ijk mDr ljiap ds fo:} fuEu vkjksi izekf.kr gq, gSA ¼1½ Jh jsornku ljiap iapk;r eFkkfu;k us fealy la[;k 23@65 esa fnukad 27-6-65 dh vkMZj khV fy[kh tkus ds ckn Hkwfe fodz; djus dh bckjr tksM+ dj vius vf/kdkjksa dk nq:i;ksx fd;k gSA ¼2½ mDr Jh jsornku us fealy la[;k 23@65 esa 100&5@8 oxZ xt Hkwfe dsoy 3@&:i;s esa gh fcuk fuyke fodz; dj voS/kkfudkrk cjrh gSA Jh jsornku ljiap iapk;r eFkkfu;k dks jktLFkku iapk;r ,oa U;k; iapk;r ¼lkekU;½ fu;e lu~ 1961 ds fu;e 22¼1½ ds vUrxZr fnukad 7-7-70 dks vafre ckj uksfVl fn;k tkdj mUgs viuk tokc isk djus dk vafre volj fnukad 30-7-70 fn;k x;kA Jh jsornku ljiap mifLFkr ugh gq, cfYd mudk ,d iksLVdkMZ izkIr gqvk fd os chekj jgrs gS blfy, iskh tks/kiqj esa j[kh tkos ijUrq mudh ;g ekax vlaxr gSA pwafd mDr Jh jsornku ljiap dks blds igys Hkh dbZ ckj mUgs mifLFkr gksus ds volj fn, tk pqds gS vr% vc vkSj ekSdk fn;k tkuk vuqfpr gh izrhr gSA pwafd tkap vf/kdkjh ds izfrosnu ls Li"V gS fd mDr ljiap us foLr`r tkap ds le; Hkh tkap vf/kdkjh ls lg;ksx ugh fd;k gS rFkk ogk ij Hkh ckj ckj viuk i{k izLrqr djus dk volj nsus ds ckn Hkh os mifLFkr ugh gq, gS vkSj jkT; ljdklj }kjk Hkh dbZ volj nsus ij Hkh mifLFkr ugh gks jgs gSA pwafd jkT; ljdkj us ljiap Jh jsornku ds fo:} yxk, x, vkjksikssa ,oa tkap fjiksVZ ijk fopkj fd;k vkSj lkjs ekeys esa iw.kZr;k fopkj djus ds ipkr~ jkT; ljdkj dh ;g ekU;rk gS fd mDr ljiap iapk;r eFkkfu;k Jh jsornku ds fo:} mDr lc gh vkjksi izekf.kr gq, gS rFkk ljiap dks Hkh vius cpko esa dksbZ rF; izLrqr ugh djus gS] pwafd jkT; ljdkj bl fu.kZ; ij igaqph gS fd Jh jsornku ljiap iapk;r eFkkfu;k us vius esa fufpr kfDr dk nq:i;ksx djrs gw, drZO;ikyu esa foQy jgs gS vkSj Hkwfe fodz; esa voS/kkfudrk cjrh gS&vr% jkT; ljdkj ,rn~}kjk Jh jsornku ljiap iapk;r eFkkfu;k dks jktLFkku iapk;r vf/kfu;e lu~ 1953 dh /kkjk 17¼4½ }kjk iznr kfDr;ksa dk iz;ksx djrs gq, ljiap in ls rqjUr izHkko ls i`Fkd djrh gSA jkT;iky dh vkKk ls] g- lgk;d lfpoA This order does not disclose the reasons in support of the findings. 30. However, as I have reached the conclusion that as part of affording reasonable hearing it was the duty of the Government to furnish the copy of the inquiry report to the petitioner, the order Ex. 4 in writ petition No. 2027/70 and Ex 8 in writ petition 2029/70 have to be quashed and the Government left free to proceed with the matter from the stage of furnishing the copies of the inquiry reports to the petitioner and then calling upon him to show cause why he be not removed from office. 31. In the result, therefore, I allow the two writ petitions and hereby quash the order Ex. 4 in writ petition 2027/70 and order Ex. 8 in writ petition No. 2029/70. The parties are left to bear their own costs.