JUDGMENT The petitioner is the defendant in an ejectment suit brought by the plaintiff opposite party. He has obtained the present Rule against the order dated 5th December, 1974 of the learned Judge, 2nd Bench, City Civil Court allowing amendment of the plaint. The plaintiff had originally instituted the said ejectment suit on the ground that the defendant was a defaulter within the meaning of clause (i) of sub-section (i) of section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The plaintiff by the aforesaid amendment is seeking to insert in the plaint the plea that the defendant is liable to be ejected also on the ground specified in the clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. 2. I am unable to hold that the learned Judge of the court below has committed any jurisdictional error by allowing the plaintiff's said prayer for amendment of his plaint in order to plead the ground specified in clause (a) of section 13(1) of the Act. The Court under Order 6, Rule 17, C.P.C. may allow either party to alter or amend his pleading at any stage of the proceeding provided such amendments are necessary in order to determine the real questions in controversy between the parries. In this case the question in controversy is whether the plaintiff opposite party is entitled to get a decree for recovery of possession of the suit premises. The plaintiff is seeking by the proposed amendment to plead an additional ground in support of his said claim. The nature of the suit has not been altered by such amendment of the plaint. It is well settled that the power to a court to allow amendment is both discretionary and wide. In the instant case, the amendment if allowed will not deprive the defendant of any of his rights which might have accrued to him by lapse of time. It is also not suggested that any question of limitation is involved in the instant case. 3. Mr. Roy Choudhury, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner in support of his submissions relied upon the decision of N. C. Mukherji, J. in (1) Arun Kumar Chatterjee v. Karuna Rakshit, 78 CWN 572 at page 576. It is also not suggested that any question of limitation is involved in the instant case. 3. Mr. Roy Choudhury, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner in support of his submissions relied upon the decision of N. C. Mukherji, J. in (1) Arun Kumar Chatterjee v. Karuna Rakshit, 78 CWN 572 at page 576. N. C. Mukherji, J. made a Rule obtained by a defendant tenant absolute against an order of the trial court allowing the plaintiff landlord's application for amendment of the plaint for the purpose of pleading an additional ground of ejectment. I am however unable to accept the contention of Mr. Roy Choudhury that the observations of the learned Judge at page 576 of the report should be considered as a statement of law relating to the power of the court to amend. In the facts of the said case the learned Judge held that the plaintiff should not be allowed to amend his plaint so as to plead that the defendant was also liable to be ejected on a ground other than default. The contents of the last sentence in the paragraph of his judgment at page 576 would indicate that the learned Judge was inclined to hold that the plaintiff had all along known the said ground and without justification did not plead the same. In other words the learned Judge found that the application for amendment was not made in good faith. 4. The trial Court has not found that the plaintiff did not act in good faith. Further when a plaintiff landlord is allowed to plead additional ground in an ejectment suit the character of the suit is not altered not any new or inconsistent relief is thereby prayed for. As already observed the plaintiff by inserting an additional ground is seeking to over that on another ground the defendant has forfeited his protection under section 13(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. When a defendant tenant deposits or pays as required by sub-sections (1)(2) or (2A) of section 17 no decree for delivery of possession on the ground of default on payment of rent can be passed except in cases covered by the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 17. But such compliance with sub-sections (1) (2) or (2A) does not give a tenant immunity against ejectment on any ground other than the ground of default. But such compliance with sub-sections (1) (2) or (2A) does not give a tenant immunity against ejectment on any ground other than the ground of default. Therefore in case an ejectment suit is brought on the ground specified in clause (1) of section 13(1) and the defendant tenant complies with sub-sections (1), (2) or (2A) of Section 17 as the case might be, and thereafter the plaintiff is allowed to amend his plaint by inserting therein any other ground of eviction the defendant tenant is not thereby deprived of his right to obtain relief under sub-section (4) of section 17. Such right, if any, to obtain relief under section 17 (4) would not be in jeopardy. 5. Mukherji, J. in the case of (1) Arun Kumar Chatterjee v. Karuna Rakshit (supra) had referred to the Division Bench decision of (2) M. B. Sarkar and Sons v. Powell and Co. (60 CWN 840) but the said decision is distinguishable. The Appeal Court had allowed the appeal of the defendant against the order of the learned Single Judge allowing amendment of the plaint, inter alia, on the view that the plaintiff in the said suit did not avail of the opportunity to amend the plaint within the period of limitation. Secondly, the amendment of the plaint was for the purpose of bringing on record a new entity and the same was not a case of mere misdescription. The observations in M. B. Sarkar and Sons v. Powell and Co. may be also read in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court in (3) P. U. & Co. v. Manilal, AIR 1961 SC 325 . 6. At this stage I need not prejudge as to the truth or otherwise of the allegations regarding the alleged subletting by the defendant tenant. Mr. Roy Choudhury drew my attention to the Division Bench decision in (4) 78 CWN page 849. The Division Bench in the said case, inter alia, observed that omission to state the ground in a notice to quit which was subsequently pleaded in the suit was a relevant consideration on the question of truth or reasonableness of the plaintiff's case. This question does not arise at this stage. Further undoubtedly it is open to the defendant tenant to file additional written statement and to take such defence as might be open to him. This question does not arise at this stage. Further undoubtedly it is open to the defendant tenant to file additional written statement and to take such defence as might be open to him. In the event the issue relating to subletting is pressed the learned Judge, City Civil Court, will determine the same in accordance with law. 7. Subject to these observations, I discharge the Rule. There will be no order as to costs. Let the records be sent down expeditiously.